Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and s... more Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships.
In this chapter I discuss whether it is helpful for those interested in the real-world ethics of ... more In this chapter I discuss whether it is helpful for those interested in the real-world ethics of crashes involving self-driving cars to compare that set of ethical issues with the trolley problem. What the phrase "the trolley problem" refers to should be clear to readers of this book, but it is something we will have occasion to return to below. 1 The usefulness of comparing real-world ethical issues concerning selfdriving cars to the standard cases and philosophical issues associated with the trolley problem is controversial among philosophers who have written on this
Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) i... more Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Human Brain Project, a large EU-funded research project that brings together neuroscience, computing, social sciences, and the humanities, and one of the largest investments in RRI in one project, this article offers insights on RRI and explores its possible future. We focus on the question of how RRI can have long-lasting impact and persist beyond the time horizon of funded projects. For this purpose, we suggest the concept of 'responsibility by design' which is intended to encapsulate the idea of embedding RRI in research and innovation in a way that makes it part of the fabric of the resulting outcomes, in our case, a distributed European Research Infrastructure.
In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual clim... more In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual climate ethics and suggest that most of our greenhouse gas emitting actions, behaviours, and lives are the opposite of meaningful: anti-meaningful. We explain why such actions etc. score negatively on three important dimensions of the meaningfulness scale, which we call the agential, narrative, and generative dimensions. We suggest that thinking about individual climate ethics also in terms of (anti-) meaningfulness illuminates important aspects of our troubled ethical involvement with CC and can make a fresh and fruitful contribution to existing discussions, which tend to focus on moral responsibility and obligations.
In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual clim... more In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual climate ethics and suggest that most of our greenhouse gas emitting actions, behaviours, and lives are the opposite of meaningful: anti-meaningful. We explain why such actions etc. score negatively on three important dimensions of the meaningfulness scale, which we call the agential, narrative, and generative dimensions. We suggest that thinking about individual climate ethics also in terms of (anti-) meaningfulness illuminates important aspects of our troubled ethical involvement with CC and can make a fresh and fruitful contribution to existing discussions, which tend to focus on moral responsibility and obligations.
Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) i... more Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Human Brain Project, a large EU-funded research project that brings together neuroscience, computing, social sciences, and the humanities, and one of the largest investments in RRI in one project, this article offers insights on RRI and explores its possible future. We focus on the question of how RRI can have long-lasting impact and persist beyond the time horizon of funded projects. For this purpose, we suggest the concept of 'responsibility by design' which is intended to encapsulate the idea of embedding RRI in research and innovation in a way that makes it part of the fabric of the resulting outcomes, in our case, a distributed European Research Infrastructure.
The control problem related to robots and AI usually discussed is that we might lose control over... more The control problem related to robots and AI usually discussed is that we might lose control over advanced technologies. When authors like Nick Bostrom and Stuart Russell discuss this control problem, they write in a way that suggests that having as much control as possible is good while losing control is bad. In life in general, however, not all forms of control are unambiguously positive and unproblematic. Some forms-e.g. control over other personsare ethically problematic. Other forms of control are positive, and perhaps even intrinsically
The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily... more The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily had to radically change how we live our lives to protect ourselves and others from the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. That expression – ‘a new normal’ – has been also be used in other contexts, such as in relation to societal disruptions brought about by things like new technologies or climate change. What this general idea of a ‘new normal’ means is unclear and hard to characterise, and there are diverging views about how to respond to a new normal, but one feature of a desirable new normal that most people would agree on is that it should be ‘safer’: safer technologies, safer institutions, and so on. But it is also important to consider what other ethical considerations and principles should be part of an ethics of a new normal. And it is also interesting to explore similarities and differences among different types of cases that can be classified as situations where we face a new normal. In this chapter, we will discuss the general idea of an ethics of a new normal, and consider what ethical distinctions, values, and principles are likely to be relevant in most instances where we face a new normal, including ethical considerations related to risk mitigation and ways of offsetting potential harms.
This chapter discusses whether technological manipulation poses threats to our opportunities to l... more This chapter discusses whether technological manipulation poses threats to our opportunities to live meaningful lives, have meaningful relationships, or do meaningful work. It starts with a discussion of what we should understand by technological manipulation, which makes use of Marcia Baron's more general account of manipulation. It then discusses four different views about what technological manipulation might be taken to involve, landing on the hybrid view that technologies can relate to people in manipulation-like ways and that it is possible for humantechnology teams to manipulate people. After this, the chapter reviews a number of common ideas about what values create positive meaningfulness in life. The chapter then comes to its main argument, which is as follows: if technological manipulation threatens one or more of the values commonly associated with meaning in life considered in the chapter, then it poses a significant threat to our opportunities to live meaningful lives. Technological manipulation poses serious threats to all of these values and therefore poses significant threats to our opportunities to live meaningful lives. The chapter discusses this argument in some detail and ends with a concluding discussion that, among other things, answers some potential objections to its main line of argument.
While it is widely thought that activities and lives can be meaningful or meaningless, this chapt... more While it is widely thought that activities and lives can be meaningful or meaningless, this chapter explores the possibility that they could also be ‘anti-meaningful’. Anti-meaning is the opposite of meaning. This chapter has two main objectives: first, it discusses what anti-meaning is (or could be taken to be); second, it discusses whether there are good reasons to add this unfamiliar notion to our set of concepts for thinking about meaning in life. The authors review the limited literature on this topic, distinguish two formal interpretations of the idea of anti-meaning, and propose different substantive theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. They then defend the notion of anti-meaning against scepticism about the usefulness of this concept.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality, 2022
This chapter starts with a discussion of what sex robots are and could be, distinguishing between... more This chapter starts with a discussion of what sex robots are and could be, distinguishing between humanoid sex robots (designed to look and act like human beings) and non-humanoid sex robots. The chapter then critically discusses two moral objections to humanoid sex robots: first, that they might reinforce negative stereotypes about-and lead to objectifying attitudes towards-human sex partners, particularly women; and, second, that sex with humanoid robots can only represent something morally bad, such as rape or ideas associated with rape culture. The chapter ends with a discussion of whether it is possible to exhibit any sexual virtues, such as temperance or tenderness, in sex that is had not with other human beings, but with humanoid sex robots.
The absence of meaningfulness in life is meaninglessness. But what is the polar opposite of meani... more The absence of meaningfulness in life is meaninglessness. But what is the polar opposite of meaningfulness? In recent and ongoing work together with Stephen Campbell and Marcello di Paola respectively, I have explored what we dub 'anti-meaning': the negative counterpart of positive meaning in life. Here, I relate this idea of 'anti-meaningful' actions, activities, and projects to the topic of death, and in particular the deaths or suffering of those who will live after our own deaths. Connecting this idea of anti
Deliberatio - Studies in Contemporary Philosophical Challenges, 2021
In his book On Transhumanism, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner defends a particular version of transhumanism... more In his book On Transhumanism, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner defends a particular version of transhumanism, which is inspired both by the English tradition of philosophy, including Mill's utilitarianism, and Nietzsche's philosophy. Sorgner rejects the idea of universally valid moral principles, and argues that we should be pluralists about what it might mean to live a good human life. Everyone ought to enjoy negative freedom of a form whereby they are not being hindered from using science and developments in modern technology in their quest to live a good life according to their own conceptions of the good. Nobody, however, ought to be forced to undergo a program of moral enhancement of the sort that Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that we need in order to help us deal with the existential risks we are facing, which our evolved human psychology has not prepared us to deal with. In this commentary, I argue that while Sorgner's techno-optimistic outlook is inspiring, we should not ignore issues related to existential risks created by modern technologies of the sorts that Persson and Savulescu discuss. Artificial intelligence and other developing technologies pose great risks, including that of contributing to climate change, and so transhumanists should concern themselves with the existential risks related to modern technology, and not only the potential benefits of these technologies. In addition to articulating that point, I also discuss Sorgner's metaethical assumptions, his claims about value, and the comparison between Nietzsche and Nick Bostrom that Sorgner makes in the book.
Rapid developments in evolutionary computation, robotics, 3D-printing, and material science are e... more Rapid developments in evolutionary computation, robotics, 3D-printing, and material science are enabling advanced systems of robots that can autonomously reproduce and evolve. The emerging technology of robot evolution challenges existing AI ethics because the inherent adaptivity, stochasticity, and complexity of evolutionary systems severely weaken human control and induce new types of hazards. In this paper we address the question how robot evolution can be responsibly controlled to avoid safety risks. We discuss risks related to robot multiplication, maladaptation, and domination and suggest solutions for meaningful human control. Such concerns may seem far-fetched now, however, we posit that awareness must be created before the technology becomes mature.
In a fascinating recent paper, Matthias Braun considers how digital twins might represent a patie... more In a fascinating recent paper, Matthias Braun considers how digital twins might represent a patient. He claims, among other things, that we can view a digital twin as an extension of a patient's body. I discuss this idea, and suggest that it should be compared with Clark and Chalmers' well-known extended mind thesis.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ethics of sex robots, fuelled by the technology ... more Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ethics of sex robots, fuelled by the technology industry's ability to build better and better robots that can be used as sex toys (such as realdoll.com). Although the pros and cons of sex robots have been discussed for several years in the philosophy of technology, only a few contributions have focussed on child sex robots. None of these prior essays have examined a Kantian approach to the question of whether one should allow people to use child robots as sex toys. Accordingly, this article considers the possibility of using Kant either in support of or in opposition to child sex robots. The conclusion is that a Kantian approach yields inconclusive results and is therefore ill-equipped to solve this particular moral problem.
Philosophy of Love in the Past, Present, and Future, 2022
How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms... more How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms to track, quantify, and ‘gamify’ romantic relationships—change how we understand and value love? We canvass some of the main ethical worries posed by such technologies, while also considering whether there are reasons for “cautious optimism” about their implications for our lives. Along the way, we touch on some key ideas from the philosophies of love and technology.
Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. ... more Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency, they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people's ability to participate in meaningful forms of work. Achievement gaps are interesting, in part, because they are the inverse of the (negative) responsibility gaps already widely discussed in the literature on AI ethics. Having described and explained the problem of achievement gaps, the article concludes by identifying four possible policy responses to the problem.
Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. ... more Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people's ability to participate in meaningful forms of work. Achievement gaps are interesting, in part, because they are the inverse of the (negative) responsibility gaps already widely discussed in the literature on AI ethics. Having described and explained the problem of achievement gaps, the article concludes by identifying four possible policy responses to the problem.
Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and s... more Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships.
In this chapter I discuss whether it is helpful for those interested in the real-world ethics of ... more In this chapter I discuss whether it is helpful for those interested in the real-world ethics of crashes involving self-driving cars to compare that set of ethical issues with the trolley problem. What the phrase "the trolley problem" refers to should be clear to readers of this book, but it is something we will have occasion to return to below. 1 The usefulness of comparing real-world ethical issues concerning selfdriving cars to the standard cases and philosophical issues associated with the trolley problem is controversial among philosophers who have written on this
Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) i... more Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Human Brain Project, a large EU-funded research project that brings together neuroscience, computing, social sciences, and the humanities, and one of the largest investments in RRI in one project, this article offers insights on RRI and explores its possible future. We focus on the question of how RRI can have long-lasting impact and persist beyond the time horizon of funded projects. For this purpose, we suggest the concept of 'responsibility by design' which is intended to encapsulate the idea of embedding RRI in research and innovation in a way that makes it part of the fabric of the resulting outcomes, in our case, a distributed European Research Infrastructure.
In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual clim... more In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual climate ethics and suggest that most of our greenhouse gas emitting actions, behaviours, and lives are the opposite of meaningful: anti-meaningful. We explain why such actions etc. score negatively on three important dimensions of the meaningfulness scale, which we call the agential, narrative, and generative dimensions. We suggest that thinking about individual climate ethics also in terms of (anti-) meaningfulness illuminates important aspects of our troubled ethical involvement with CC and can make a fresh and fruitful contribution to existing discussions, which tend to focus on moral responsibility and obligations.
In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual clim... more In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual climate ethics and suggest that most of our greenhouse gas emitting actions, behaviours, and lives are the opposite of meaningful: anti-meaningful. We explain why such actions etc. score negatively on three important dimensions of the meaningfulness scale, which we call the agential, narrative, and generative dimensions. We suggest that thinking about individual climate ethics also in terms of (anti-) meaningfulness illuminates important aspects of our troubled ethical involvement with CC and can make a fresh and fruitful contribution to existing discussions, which tend to focus on moral responsibility and obligations.
Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) i... more Drawing on more than eight years working to implement Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Human Brain Project, a large EU-funded research project that brings together neuroscience, computing, social sciences, and the humanities, and one of the largest investments in RRI in one project, this article offers insights on RRI and explores its possible future. We focus on the question of how RRI can have long-lasting impact and persist beyond the time horizon of funded projects. For this purpose, we suggest the concept of 'responsibility by design' which is intended to encapsulate the idea of embedding RRI in research and innovation in a way that makes it part of the fabric of the resulting outcomes, in our case, a distributed European Research Infrastructure.
The control problem related to robots and AI usually discussed is that we might lose control over... more The control problem related to robots and AI usually discussed is that we might lose control over advanced technologies. When authors like Nick Bostrom and Stuart Russell discuss this control problem, they write in a way that suggests that having as much control as possible is good while losing control is bad. In life in general, however, not all forms of control are unambiguously positive and unproblematic. Some forms-e.g. control over other personsare ethically problematic. Other forms of control are positive, and perhaps even intrinsically
The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily... more The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily had to radically change how we live our lives to protect ourselves and others from the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. That expression – ‘a new normal’ – has been also be used in other contexts, such as in relation to societal disruptions brought about by things like new technologies or climate change. What this general idea of a ‘new normal’ means is unclear and hard to characterise, and there are diverging views about how to respond to a new normal, but one feature of a desirable new normal that most people would agree on is that it should be ‘safer’: safer technologies, safer institutions, and so on. But it is also important to consider what other ethical considerations and principles should be part of an ethics of a new normal. And it is also interesting to explore similarities and differences among different types of cases that can be classified as situations where we face a new normal. In this chapter, we will discuss the general idea of an ethics of a new normal, and consider what ethical distinctions, values, and principles are likely to be relevant in most instances where we face a new normal, including ethical considerations related to risk mitigation and ways of offsetting potential harms.
This chapter discusses whether technological manipulation poses threats to our opportunities to l... more This chapter discusses whether technological manipulation poses threats to our opportunities to live meaningful lives, have meaningful relationships, or do meaningful work. It starts with a discussion of what we should understand by technological manipulation, which makes use of Marcia Baron's more general account of manipulation. It then discusses four different views about what technological manipulation might be taken to involve, landing on the hybrid view that technologies can relate to people in manipulation-like ways and that it is possible for humantechnology teams to manipulate people. After this, the chapter reviews a number of common ideas about what values create positive meaningfulness in life. The chapter then comes to its main argument, which is as follows: if technological manipulation threatens one or more of the values commonly associated with meaning in life considered in the chapter, then it poses a significant threat to our opportunities to live meaningful lives. Technological manipulation poses serious threats to all of these values and therefore poses significant threats to our opportunities to live meaningful lives. The chapter discusses this argument in some detail and ends with a concluding discussion that, among other things, answers some potential objections to its main line of argument.
While it is widely thought that activities and lives can be meaningful or meaningless, this chapt... more While it is widely thought that activities and lives can be meaningful or meaningless, this chapter explores the possibility that they could also be ‘anti-meaningful’. Anti-meaning is the opposite of meaning. This chapter has two main objectives: first, it discusses what anti-meaning is (or could be taken to be); second, it discusses whether there are good reasons to add this unfamiliar notion to our set of concepts for thinking about meaning in life. The authors review the limited literature on this topic, distinguish two formal interpretations of the idea of anti-meaning, and propose different substantive theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. They then defend the notion of anti-meaning against scepticism about the usefulness of this concept.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality, 2022
This chapter starts with a discussion of what sex robots are and could be, distinguishing between... more This chapter starts with a discussion of what sex robots are and could be, distinguishing between humanoid sex robots (designed to look and act like human beings) and non-humanoid sex robots. The chapter then critically discusses two moral objections to humanoid sex robots: first, that they might reinforce negative stereotypes about-and lead to objectifying attitudes towards-human sex partners, particularly women; and, second, that sex with humanoid robots can only represent something morally bad, such as rape or ideas associated with rape culture. The chapter ends with a discussion of whether it is possible to exhibit any sexual virtues, such as temperance or tenderness, in sex that is had not with other human beings, but with humanoid sex robots.
The absence of meaningfulness in life is meaninglessness. But what is the polar opposite of meani... more The absence of meaningfulness in life is meaninglessness. But what is the polar opposite of meaningfulness? In recent and ongoing work together with Stephen Campbell and Marcello di Paola respectively, I have explored what we dub 'anti-meaning': the negative counterpart of positive meaning in life. Here, I relate this idea of 'anti-meaningful' actions, activities, and projects to the topic of death, and in particular the deaths or suffering of those who will live after our own deaths. Connecting this idea of anti
Deliberatio - Studies in Contemporary Philosophical Challenges, 2021
In his book On Transhumanism, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner defends a particular version of transhumanism... more In his book On Transhumanism, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner defends a particular version of transhumanism, which is inspired both by the English tradition of philosophy, including Mill's utilitarianism, and Nietzsche's philosophy. Sorgner rejects the idea of universally valid moral principles, and argues that we should be pluralists about what it might mean to live a good human life. Everyone ought to enjoy negative freedom of a form whereby they are not being hindered from using science and developments in modern technology in their quest to live a good life according to their own conceptions of the good. Nobody, however, ought to be forced to undergo a program of moral enhancement of the sort that Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that we need in order to help us deal with the existential risks we are facing, which our evolved human psychology has not prepared us to deal with. In this commentary, I argue that while Sorgner's techno-optimistic outlook is inspiring, we should not ignore issues related to existential risks created by modern technologies of the sorts that Persson and Savulescu discuss. Artificial intelligence and other developing technologies pose great risks, including that of contributing to climate change, and so transhumanists should concern themselves with the existential risks related to modern technology, and not only the potential benefits of these technologies. In addition to articulating that point, I also discuss Sorgner's metaethical assumptions, his claims about value, and the comparison between Nietzsche and Nick Bostrom that Sorgner makes in the book.
Rapid developments in evolutionary computation, robotics, 3D-printing, and material science are e... more Rapid developments in evolutionary computation, robotics, 3D-printing, and material science are enabling advanced systems of robots that can autonomously reproduce and evolve. The emerging technology of robot evolution challenges existing AI ethics because the inherent adaptivity, stochasticity, and complexity of evolutionary systems severely weaken human control and induce new types of hazards. In this paper we address the question how robot evolution can be responsibly controlled to avoid safety risks. We discuss risks related to robot multiplication, maladaptation, and domination and suggest solutions for meaningful human control. Such concerns may seem far-fetched now, however, we posit that awareness must be created before the technology becomes mature.
In a fascinating recent paper, Matthias Braun considers how digital twins might represent a patie... more In a fascinating recent paper, Matthias Braun considers how digital twins might represent a patient. He claims, among other things, that we can view a digital twin as an extension of a patient's body. I discuss this idea, and suggest that it should be compared with Clark and Chalmers' well-known extended mind thesis.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ethics of sex robots, fuelled by the technology ... more Recent years have seen a growing interest in the ethics of sex robots, fuelled by the technology industry's ability to build better and better robots that can be used as sex toys (such as realdoll.com). Although the pros and cons of sex robots have been discussed for several years in the philosophy of technology, only a few contributions have focussed on child sex robots. None of these prior essays have examined a Kantian approach to the question of whether one should allow people to use child robots as sex toys. Accordingly, this article considers the possibility of using Kant either in support of or in opposition to child sex robots. The conclusion is that a Kantian approach yields inconclusive results and is therefore ill-equipped to solve this particular moral problem.
Philosophy of Love in the Past, Present, and Future, 2022
How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms... more How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms to track, quantify, and ‘gamify’ romantic relationships—change how we understand and value love? We canvass some of the main ethical worries posed by such technologies, while also considering whether there are reasons for “cautious optimism” about their implications for our lives. Along the way, we touch on some key ideas from the philosophies of love and technology.
Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. ... more Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency, they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people's ability to participate in meaningful forms of work. Achievement gaps are interesting, in part, because they are the inverse of the (negative) responsibility gaps already widely discussed in the literature on AI ethics. Having described and explained the problem of achievement gaps, the article concludes by identifying four possible policy responses to the problem.
Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. ... more Rapid advances in AI-based automation have led to a number of existential and economic concerns. In particular, as automating technologies develop enhanced competency they seem to threaten the values associated with meaningful work. In this article, we focus on one such value: the value of achievement. We argue that achievement is a key part of what makes work meaningful and that advances in AI and automation give rise to a number achievement gaps in the workplace. This could limit people's ability to participate in meaningful forms of work. Achievement gaps are interesting, in part, because they are the inverse of the (negative) responsibility gaps already widely discussed in the literature on AI ethics. Having described and explained the problem of achievement gaps, the article concludes by identifying four possible policy responses to the problem.
Can robots perform actions, make decisions, collaborate with humans, be our friends, perhaps fall... more Can robots perform actions, make decisions, collaborate with humans, be our friends, perhaps fall in love, or potentially harm us? Even before these things truly happen, ethical and philosophical questions already arise. The reason is that we humans have a tendency to spontaneously attribute minds and “agency” to anything even remotely humanlike. Moreover, some people already say that robots should be our companions and have rights. Others say that robots should be slaves. This book tackles emerging ethical issues about human beings, robots, and agency head on. It explores the ethics of creating robots that are, or appear to be, decision-making agents. From military robots to self-driving cars to care robots or even sex robots equipped with artificial intelligence: how should we interpret the apparent agency of such robots? This book argues that we need to explore how human beings can best coordinate and collaborate with robots in responsible ways. It investigates ethically important differences between human agency and robot agency to work towards an ethics of responsible human-robot interaction.
Some critics of sex-robots worry that their use might spread objectifying attitudes about sex, an... more Some critics of sex-robots worry that their use might spread objectifying attitudes about sex, and common sense places a higher value on sex within love-relationships than on casual sex. If there could be mutual love between humans and sex-robots, this could help to ease the worries about objectifying attitudes. And mutual love between humans and sex-robots, if possible, could also help to make this sex more valuable. But is mutual love between humans and robots possible, or even conceivable? We discuss three clusters of ideas and associations commonly discussed within the philosophy of love, and relate these to the topic of whether mutual love could be achieved between humans and sex-robots: (i) the idea of love as a “good match”; (ii) the idea of valuing each other in our distinctive particularity; and (iii) the idea of a steadfast commitment. We consider relations among these ideas and the sort of agency and free will that we attribute to human romantic partners. Our conclusion is that mutual love between humans and advanced sex-robots is not an altogether impossible proposition. However, it is unlikely that we will be able to create robots sophisticated enough to be able to participate in love-relationships anytime soon.
This book offers new readings of Kant’s “universal law” and “humanity” formulations of the catego... more This book offers new readings of Kant’s “universal law” and “humanity” formulations of the categorical imperative. It shows how, on these readings, the formulas do indeed turn out to be alternative statements of the same basic moral law, and in the process responds to many of the standard objections raised against Kant’s theory. Its first chapter briefly explores the ways in which Kant draws on his philosophical predecessors such as Plato (and especially Plato’s Republic) and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. The second chapter offers a new reading of the relation between the universal law and humanity formulas by relating both of these to a third formula of Kant’s, viz. the “law of nature” formula, and also to Kant’s ideas about laws in general and human nature in particular. The third chapter considers and rejects some influential recent attempts to understand Kant’s argument for the humanity formula, and offers an alternative reconstruction instead. Chapter four considers what it is to flourish as a human being in line with Kant’s basic formulas of morality, and argues that the standard readings of the humanity formula cannot properly account for its relation to Kant’s views about the highest human good.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 2022
This is a short encyclopedia entry on the ethics of artificial intelligence, written for the Ency... more This is a short encyclopedia entry on the ethics of artificial intelligence, written for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, and published here: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1093-1
This article provides a comprehensive overview of the main ethical issues related to the impact o... more This article provides a comprehensive overview of the main ethical issues related to the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on human society. AI is the use of machines to do things that would normally require human intelligence. In many areas of human life, AI has rapidly and significantly affected human society and the ways we interact with each other. It will continue to do so. Along the way, AI has presented substantial ethical and socio-political challenges that call for a thorough philosophical and ethical analysis. Its social impact should be studied so as to avoid any negative repercussions. AI systems are becoming more and more autonomous, apparently rational, and intelligent. This comprehensive development gives rise to numerous issues. In addition to the potential harm and impact of AI technologies on our privacy, other concerns include their moral and legal status (including moral and legal rights), their possible moral agency and patienthood, and issues related to their possible personhood and even dignity. It is common , however, to distinguish the following issues as of utmost significance with respect to AI and its relation to human society, according to three different time periods: (1) short-term (early 21 century): autonomous systems (transportation, weapons), machine bias in law, privacy and surveillance, the black box problem and AI decision-making; (2) mid-term (from the 2040s to the end of the century): AI governance, confirming the moral and legal status of intelligent machines (artificial moral agents), human-machine interaction, mass automation; (3) long-term (starting with the 2100s): technological singularity, mass unemployment, space colonisation.
Iddo Landau understands a meaningful life as a life containing a sufficient number of sufficientl... more Iddo Landau understands a meaningful life as a life containing a sufficient number of sufficiently valuable aspects. Do the world's and the human condition's imperfections threaten meaning, thus understood? Landau argues that we can have a sufficient number of sufficiently valuable parts of our lives, even if the world is imperfect and the human condition involves various different imperfections. In this review, we offer some constructive criticisms of Landau's discussion, and we also highlight some of the virtues of his book.
In Just Freedom, Pettit presents a powerful new statement and defense of the traditional “republi... more In Just Freedom, Pettit presents a powerful new statement and defense of the traditional “republican” conception of liberty or freedom. And he claims that freedom can serve as an ecumenical value with broad appeal, which we can put at the basis of a distinctively republican theory of justice. That is, Pettit argues that this “conception of freedom as non-domination allows us to see all issues of justice as issues, ultimately, of what freedom demands.” It is not, however, clear that liberty is the only value that Pettit (a) actually appeals to and (b) should be appealing to. He seems to be as much a defender of relational equality and legal dignity as he is a defender of liberty. And he must either (it seems) make the implausible claim that the basic requirements of justice only apply to able-minded adults, or else admit that justice at bottom consists in something wider than just securing liberty as non-domination for all able-minded adults. For by his own admission, Pettit’s theory of justice as republican freedom “ignores issues of justice in relation to children and the intellectually disabled.” It would be better to say, therefore, that the promotion of freedom as non-domination constitutes one, but not the only, requirement of justice.
Besser-Jones holds that well-being consists in having the experience of satisfying three innate ... more Besser-Jones holds that well-being consists in having the experience of satisfying three innate psychological needs at the core of human nature: "relatedness," "autonomy," and "competence." Of these three, the first is the most central one, and we satisfy it by interacting with our fellows in caring and respectful ways: by "acting well." To act well, we need, Besser-Jones argues, a virtuous character: we need certain moral beliefs, and we need those to interact with our intentions in ways that reliably lead us to act in ways that satisfy our psychological needs. Besser-Jones’s theory has many virtues, but appears overly narrow. The theory ignores the importance of bodily, or physical, well-being. It is also overly restrictive to base an account of virtue wholly upon the agent’s own psychological well-being. If we possess qualities of mind or character that do or would make us into good friends or associates, this appears to be a sufficient reason for counting these qualities as virtues of ours. And giving others due care and respect is surely worthwhile in itself, not only as a means to our own psychological well-being.
Persson argues that common sense morality involves various “asymmetries” that don’t stand up to r... more Persson argues that common sense morality involves various “asymmetries” that don’t stand up to rational scrutiny. (One example is that intentionally harming others is commonly thought to be worse than merely allowing harm to happen, even if the harm involved is equal in both cases.) A wholly rational morality would, Persson argues, be wholly symmetrical. He also argues, however, that when we get down to our most basic attitudes and dispositions, we reach the “end of reason,” at which point we simply must accept our basic attitudes and dispositions as given, or as being beyond rational criticism. Since many of the “asymmetries” in our moral attitudes that Persson argues against depend on our most basic dispositions, his own overall framework implies that these asymmetries in our moral attitudes and dispositions are beyond rational criticism, and that we must simply accept them as given elements of human life. Persson therefore seemingly faces a choice: either he revises his view of the reach of reason, or else he must scale back his views about the degree to which our most basic moral attitudes are proper subjects of rational criticism.
“In this episode I talk to Sven Nyholm about self-driving cars. Sven is an Assistant Professor of... more “In this episode I talk to Sven Nyholm about self-driving cars. Sven is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy . . . with an interest in moral philosophy and the ethics of technology. Recently, Sven has been working on the ethics of self-driving cars, focusing in particular on the ethical rules such cars should follow and who should be held responsible for them if something goes wrong. We chat about these issues and more”
Description provided by the Dissenter: "In this episode, we dig into the main topics of Nyholm's ... more Description provided by the Dissenter: "In this episode, we dig into the main topics of Nyholm's book, Humans and Robots. We refer to the fact that there are different kinds of robots and how we should deal with them. We talk about anthropomorphization, and the intuitions people have about robots’ minds. We raise the question about the way we treat robots spilling into how we treat other humans. We address agency and moral responsibility in the context of self-driving cars and military robots. We ask if we can establish proper relationships with other robots. Finally, we go through what kinds of minds robots can have and what that would mean, and also if robots can also me moral agents and be “good”."
Description provided by The Dissenter: "In this episode, we talk about philosophy of technology. ... more Description provided by The Dissenter: "In this episode, we talk about philosophy of technology. We go through some specific topics, like self-driving cars, love enhancement, and sex robots, and several different philosophical perspectives on them, and their ethical ramifications."
"Most of us think that loving romantic relationships are of value – they’re among the things that... more "Most of us think that loving romantic relationships are of value – they’re among the things that make life worth living. But many people don’t find a suitable partner. With advances in robotics and artificial intelligence, a new question has arisen. Could humans have loving relationships with robots? Sven Nyholm tells us what that might entail."
This text is by David Edmonds, and is from here: http://philosophy247.org/podcasts/robot-love/
I discuss the ethics of self-driving cars and accident-scenarios in "De Filosoof", a philosophy m... more I discuss the ethics of self-driving cars and accident-scenarios in "De Filosoof", a philosophy magazine published and edited by the philosophy club at the University of Utrecht. I cover three topics: (1) whether the ethics of self-driving cars is analogous to the trolley problem, (2) whether "empirical ethics" is a useful resource to draw on in the ethics of self-driving cars, and (3) what traditional moral theories like utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue-ethics can contribute to the ethics of self-driving cars. My article, on pages 24-27, is available here: http://fufxl.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/De-Filosoof-75.pdf
This is a blog post written for the Dutch "Bij Nader Inzien" philosophy blog. It summarizes the m... more This is a blog post written for the Dutch "Bij Nader Inzien" philosophy blog. It summarizes the main points in Nyholm and Smids 2016: "The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: An Applied Trolley Problem?", which appeared in the journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Available here: https://bijnaderinzien.org/2017/01/26/can-we-learn-anything-about-self-driving-cars-by-considering-the-trolley-problem/
This is an interview conducted by John Danaher. We had "a wide ranging conversation, circling aro... more This is an interview conducted by John Danaher. We had "a wide ranging conversation, circling around three main themes: (i) how technology changes what we value (using the specific example of love enhancement technologies); (ii) how technology might affect the true self (using the example of deep brain stimulation technologies) and (iii) how to design ethical decision-making algorithms (using the example of self-driving cars)." (Source: the blog post accompanying the podcast episode: https://algocracy.wordpress.com/2016/05/12/episode-3-sven-nyholm-on-love-enhancement-deep-brain-stimulation-and-ethics-of-self-driving-cars/ )
This is an article about the ethics of automated driving from a Dutch newspaper (de Volkskrant), ... more This is an article about the ethics of automated driving from a Dutch newspaper (de Volkskrant), which was partly based on an interview with me.
The carbon emissions of global healthcare activities make up 4-5% of total world emissions, plac... more The carbon emissions of global healthcare activities make up 4-5% of total world emissions, placing the healthcare industry on par with the food sector. Yet, the environmental impact of health care has been underconsidered, in part, because of the belief that all available health care technologies are medically necessary and therefore carbon emissions are morally irrelevant. As such, when the carbon impact of health care is evaluated, it is primarily at the institutional level—that is, the carbon of hospital buildings. This paradigm circumvents accountability for the environmental impact of healthcare delivery, even though hospital care and physician and clinical services are the two largest carbon contributors to health care—exceeding even healthcare structures. From an environmental perspective, it is unclear whether implementing digital twins into the healthcare system will reduce health care’s carbon emissions by promoting preventive medicine or increase carbon intensive personalised medicine. As technology becomes an integrated and essential part of health care, ethical reflection must include the potential to negatively impact the environment, evaluated the larger framework of biomedical ethics and environmental ethics.
Uploads
Papers by Sven Nyholm
A review by Jelena Govedarica (University of Belgrade), who does a great job at summarizing the book, is available here: http://147.91.230.44/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Govedarica.pdf
This text is by David Edmonds, and is from here: http://philosophy247.org/podcasts/robot-love/