Philosophy Education

Philosophical arguments regarding academic freedom can sometimes appear removed from the real conflicts playing out in contemporary universities. This paper focusses on a set of issues at the front line of these conflicts, namely, questions regarding sex, gender and gender identity. We document the ways in which the work of academics has been affected by political activism around these questions and, drawing on our respective disciplinary expertise as a sociologist and a philosopher, elucidate the costs of curtailing discussion on fundamental demographic and conceptual categories. We discuss some philosophical work that addresses the conceptual distinction between academic freedom and free speech and explore how these notions are intertwined in significant ways in universities. Our discussion elucidates and emphasises the educational costs of curtailing academic freedom. The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce 'a love of virtue', practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the 'Aristotelian' and the 'Humean'. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement-or phronesis. Moreover, 'the good life' is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.

The promises and pitfalls of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) are tied to two quintessential motifs of our times: globalisation and the learning society. Both ideas have a rather different purchase in Africa than they do in Europe, North America and Australasia. So, too, do the promises of information technology.

Analysing the triad 'understanding-personal identityeducation' in three different contexts (scientism, historicism, hermeneutics) make it possible to investigate the kind of thinking that is emphasised most in each context. The implications of thinking to educational practice are stressed at each level of interpretation. The chief shortfalls in the first two contexts are reviewed, together with their restrictive consequences for how education comes to be understood and practiced. The hermeneutic context recognises the primacy of interpretation and 'pre-understanding' in all human understanding. Because of this it acknowledges the interplay that is invariably active between understanding and personal identity, and between both of these and what it means to educate. This third-hermeneutical-context is therefore offered not as any kind of final word on educational matters, but as a more appropriate and inclusive context in which education as a practice might be thought about and bettered. I UNDERSTANDING, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND EDUCATION The main issue considered in this paper is the interrelationship between 'understanding', 'personal identity' and 'education'. The character of this interrelationship is such that the three elements-understanding, personal identity, education-can properly be considered as a triad: each plays a part in defining what the other means. Isolating any of the three elements from the triad makes it impossible to catch the sense of the whole triad, and leads to a distortion in the interpretation of the other two elements. When adequately conceived and appreciated, this triad has important implications for the upbringing of children, and for all teaching and learning. The arguments I will put forward in exploring this triad will draw mainly on my readings of works by Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. Seeing differences and common points in their hermeneutics helps to sharpen one's understanding of how understanding itself takes place in humankind's being-in-the-world. Specifically, these works illuminate many frequently overlooked factors in the way that a

Some philosophers claim that young children cannot do philosophy. This paper examines some of those claims, and puts forward arguments against them. Our beliefs that children cannot do philosophy are based on philosophical assumptions about children, their thinking and about philosophy. Many of those assumptions remain unquestioned by critics of Philosophy with Children. My conclusion is that the idea that very young children can do philosophy has not only significant consequences for how we should educate young children, but also for how adults should do philosophy; and that further research is urgently needed.

In this paper I argue that reflection on competence and enfranchisement in relation to profound disability forces re-examination of the grounds of citizenship, with implications for theories of distributive justice in education. The primary purpose is less to point up that some people are disenfranchised without injustice; it is more to advance the view that, since enfranchisement is not an option for some profoundly disabled people, we require a conception of citizenship that is more sensitive to their distinctive needs and interests.

The claim that to 'learn how to learn' is the central ability required for young people to be effective 'lifelong learners' is examined for various plausible interpretations. It is vacuous if taken to mean that we need to acquire a capacity to learn, since we necessarily have this if we are to learn anything. The claim that it is a specific ability is then looked at. Once again, if we acquire an ability to learn we do not need the ability to learn how to learn. After noting the implausibility of any such general ability, the paper goes on to examine the claim that certain specific but transferable abilities might satisfy the description 'to learn how to learn'. Various candidates are considered: forming and testing hypotheses and abduction are two promising ones, but each has decisive objections to it. Numeracy and Literacy are thought to be more promising but achievements at the national level leave a lot to be desired, despite the clear advantages for learning of being able to read, write and count. If we needed to learn how to learn before we learned how to read, write and count, it is unlikely that we would get anywhere. Finally, dispositions and character rather than cognitive attributes are considered and, drawing on the work of Dearden and others, it is suggested that the development of these aretetic and personal qualities rather than cognitive ones may be most decisive for developing independent learning in a range of subject matters.

This paper presents a discussion of some central ideas in anarchist thought, alongside an account of experiments in anarchist education. In the course of the discussion, I try to challenge certain preconceptions about anarchism, especially concerning the anarchist view of human nature. I address the questions of whether or not anarchism is utopian, what this means, and what implications these ideas may have for dominant paradigms in philosophy of education.

The article argues that it is important to offer children ideals. Ideals are defined as imagined excellences, which are so desirable that people will try to actualise them. These characteristics show the importance of ideals for people: ideals give direction and meaning to their lives. The motivating power of ideals can, however, also lead to fanaticism. Education should therefore involve several worthy ideals that children can commit themselves to as well as critical reflection on the ways in which people are committed to and try to actualise them.

Avi Mintz (2008) has recently argued that Anglo-American educators have a tendency to alleviate student suffering in the classroom. According to Mintz, this tendency can be detrimental because certain kinds of suffering actually enhance student learning. While Mintz compellingly describes the effects of educator’s desires to alleviate suffering in students, he does not examine one of the roots of the desire: the feeling of compassion or pity (used as synonyms here). Compassion leads many teachers to unreflectively alleviate student struggles. While there are certainly times when compassion is necessary to help students learn, there are other times when it must be overcome. Compassion in the classroom is a two-edged sword that must be carefully employed; and yet it is often assumed that it is an unequivocal good that ought to trump all other impulses. In this article I hope to raise awareness concerning the promises and pitfalls of compassion in education by examining the theories of two historical figures who famously emphasised compassion in their philosophical writings: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche. Rousseau and Nietzsche argue that compassion is a powerful educational force but that it must be properly employed. For Rousseau and Nietzsche, compassion is necessary to develop self-mastery in human beings—the ultimate goal of education—but it is a compassion that must hurt in order to help. My hope is that Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s ideas on compassion will encourage thoughtful reflection on the uses and abuses of compassion in education.

This paper argues that the new science of positive psychology is founded on a whole series of fallacious arguments; these involve circular reasoning, tautology, failure to clearly define or properly apply terms, the identification of causal relations where none exist, and unjustified generalisation. Instead of demonstrating that positive attitudes explain achievement, success, well-being and happiness, positive psychology merely associates mental health with a particular personality type: a cheerful, outgoing, goal-driven, status-seeking extravert.

Professor Harry Brighouse has written extensively against 'educational choice' reforms in England and Wales and in the USA, and has challenged the status quo of private school provision in England and Wales. This paper explores the extent to which his arguments are applicable to the more radical, but prima facie linked, concept of the 'privatisation of education', that is, where funding, provision or regulation of education are progressively moved away from the state to the private sector. The arguments address in particular the issues of autonomy-facilitating education and educational equality, suggesting that Brighouse's arguments that use these concepts are not powerful objections to the case for choice or privatisation. Indeed, it is suggested that there are several arguments in Brighouse's writings, concerning the virtues of efficiency, diversity and innovation, and the power of the 'mimicking effect' of parents who are not skilled choosers, that contain the kernel for an argument advanced elsewhere that defends, rather than opposes, the privatisation of education.

Philosophy for Children arose in the 1970s in the US as an educational programme. This programme, initiated by Matthew Lipman, was devoted to exploring the relationship between the notions 'philosophy' and 'childhood', with the implicit practical goal of establishing philosophy as a fullfledged 'content area' in public schools. Over 40 years, the programme has spread worldwide, and the theory and practice of doing philosophy for or with children and young people appears to be of growing interest in the field of education and, by implication, in society as a whole. This article focuses on this growing interest by offering a survey of the main arguments and ideas that have given shape to the idea of philosophy for children in recent decades. This aim is twofold: first, to make more familiar an actual educational practice that is not at all well known in the field of academic philosophy itself; and second, to invite a rethinking of the relationship between philosophy and the child 'after Lipman'. Philosophy for Children 1 arose in the 1970s in the US as an educational programme, initiated by Matthew Lipman (1922-2010), which was devoted to exploring the relationship between the notions 'philosophy' and 'childhood', with the implicit practical goal of establishing philosophy as a full-fledged 'content area' in US public schools-a goal that has, with time, become an increasingly distant one. This is not so much the case in the UK, Europe and Latin America, however, where the theory and practice of doing philosophy for or with school age children appears to be of growing both interest and concern in the field of education and, by implication, in society as a whole. Examples of this emergent interest can be found not only in the growing number of curriculum materials published in this area, but in the many workshops and teacher training courses devoted to practical philosophy that are organised for educational practitioners, managers and teacher trainers. This special issue focuses on the emergence of this 'philosophy/child' relation, and more precisely, on the horizon against which it has been born and has taken shape. We attempt to locate the arguments that make it

As conceived by founders Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, Philosophy for Children is a humanistic practice with roots in the Hellenistic tradition of philosophy as a way of life given to the search for meaning, in American pragmatism with its emphasis on qualitative experience, collaborative inquiry and democratic society, and in American and Soviet social learning theory. The programme has attracted overlapping and conflicting criticism from religious and social conservatives who don't want children to question traditional values, from educational psychologists who believe certain kinds of thinking are beyond children of certain ages, from philosophers who define their discipline as theoretical and exegetical, from critical theorists who see the programme as politically compliant, and from postmodernists who see it as scientistic and imperialist. The paper is written as a dialogue in order to illustrate the complex interactions among these normative positions. Rather than respond to particular criticisms in depth, I indicate the general nature of my position regarding them and provide references to published material where they have been made and responded to over the past 40 years.

Educational psychology is a curricular requirement for most teacher preparation programs in the world. Knowledge of educational psychology is assessed on examinations for teacher licensure in most jurisdictions, and understanding of psychology is assumed to be indispensible for effective teaching at all levels. Traditional university-based teacher-certification pathways have recently come under attack from various socio-political sectors, and the curriculum for teacher preparation is among the most contested issues. This article examines the lure of psychology for teacher education.

Philosophy with children (P4C)1 presents significant positive challenges for educators. Its ‘community of enquiry’ pedagogy assumes not only an epistemological shift in the role of the educator, but also a different ontology of ‘child’ and balance of power between educator and learner. After a brief historical sketch and an outline of the diversity among P4C practitioners, epistemological uncertainty in teaching P4C is crystallised in a succinct overview of theoretical and practical tensions that are a direct result of the implementation of P4C in mainstream education. These recurring pedagogical tensions in my practice as P4C teacher, teacher educator and mentor of teacher educators cause disequilibrium that opens up rich opportunities for philosophy of education in supporting novice P4Cers. Disequilibrium is a positive force that opens up a space in which educators need to reflect upon their values, their beliefs about learning and teaching, and ultimately encourages educators to rethink their own role. Plato's metaphor of the stingray highlights the role of the P4C teacher educator as model of the P4C teacher in any setting: ‘to numb and to be numbed’. The P4C community and its institutions need to address the questions arising from these pedagogical tensions; and this needs to be done with integrity, that is, in communities of enquiry that include children. If not, in the long term, a more instrumental version of P4C may prevail.

It is commonly thought that indoctrination is limited to doctrines (i.e. religious doctrines), and that when one is teaching  doctrines, there is a high probability that one is indoctrinating.  In this paper I  focus primarily on the first claim, challenging the assumption that indoctrination is conceptually related to doctrinal content.  I also argue against the idea that doctrines are only found in religion. There are also doctrines in science.  This arguement also serves to undermine the frequently made assumption concerning the high probability of indoctrination when teaching religious doctrine.

We suggest in this paper that the practice of philosophy with children can be fruitfully understood as an example of a transindividual system. The adoption of the term 'transindividuality' serves two main purposes: it allows us to focus on individuation as a process and at the same time to problematise some of the classical antinomies of Western philosophy that continue to inform our understanding of the relation between individuality and community. We argue that the practice of philosophical inquiry with children, when interpreted in terms of Spinoza's conceptions of relational individuality and affective reason, offers a compelling example of how shared thinking operates as an individuating process in that knowledge and affect, interiority and exteriority, individuality and collectivity can be experienced in action and thought as complementary aspects of the same process. Individual and collective do not succeed one another, but are, rather,

In connecting educational theory to a neo-pragmatist social epistemology, we set out to understand education as knowledge practices that yield ‘the cultural world again’ by retelling culture or by making explicit what is implicit in culture. Recent trends in German educational studies towards holistic understanding of education demonstrate that such a holistic, non-representationalist framework is deliberately placed outside the traditional procedure of merely applying knowledge gained in the so-called foundational disciplines such as philosophy, sociology or psychology to the field of education. By constructively relating Brandom’s non-representational inferentialism to a re-reading of Mollenhauer’s distinction of the presentation and representation of culture in and through education, we try to show that Brandom’s philosophy can also be used to point out an inferentialism that is already at work in educational theory. Together, this strengthens a social theoretic account of education that explores how to conceptualise the role of knowledge in educational processes in terms of a holistic epistemology.

This paper examines the pedagogical values inherent in various traditions of philosophy education, from the ancient Greeks to current policies in Ontario high schools, and asks whether our current educational practices are imparting the philosophical values we wish to bestow upon our learners. I compare the approaches of Socrates, Descartes, and Dewey on the nature of philosophy and the pedagogical frameworks they defend for transmitting the “spirit” of philosophy, and then examine the Ontario curriculum guidelines for the teaching of philosophy. In past philosophical traditions, dynamic growth, free questioning, and social responsibility are considered essential to the practice of philosophy. Certain factors in today’s educational institutions limit students’ abilities to achieve those values, although the appeal to these values is the same. I end with recommendations for amendments to the Ontario curriculum expectations that would help put the philosophical development of the individual student more clearly at the centre of these guidelines.

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In this paper I want to analyse the meaning of education for democracy and thinking as this is generally understood by Philosophy for Children. Although we may be inclined to applaud Philosophy for Children's emphasis on children, critical thinking, autonomy and dialogue, there is reason for scepticism too. Since we are expected as a matter of course to subscribe to the basic assumptions of Philosophy for Children, we seem to become tied, as it were, to the whole package, without reservation. Following ideas of Hannah Arendt, I draw attention to the instrumentalised nature of Philosophy for Children and the loss of originality that this instrumentalisation means. This does not mean that I wish to abandon Philosophy for Children. The point is rather that I want to examine whether or not another kind of philosophy for children is possible.

The article investigates how two different conceptions of the edifying potential of education attempt to take into account the normative dimension of scientific knowledge. In the first conception it is the demand for truth that is edifying, whereas in the second concept it is a distinctively ethical demand. It is argued that the first concept in the end implies the subjection of education to the ‘brutality of facticity’, under which it risks losing its critical point. The second conception, drawing on Levinas and Arendt, tries to safeguard this critical point. It conceives education as a process through which scientific knowledge is made subject to reflection, and is thus confronted with the ethical challenges and demands of society.