Indoctrination and Doctrines

zyxwvuts zyxwvu zyxwv Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 16,No. I , I982 3 Elmer J. Thiessen Indoctrination and Doctrines Although there is still disagreement among philosophers as to what indoctrination means, there is widespread agreement that indoctrination is in some way related to doctrines. This relation between indoctrination and doctrines is primarily understood in two different ways, which are not always clearly distinguished. Many assume an etymological connection between indoctrination and doctrines. R. S . Peters, for example, argues that “whatever else indoctrination may mean it obviously has something to do with doctrines” [l]. Antony Flew bluntly states, “No doctrines, no indoctrination” [2]. This is the way in which the content criterion of indoctrination is generally described. Doctrines are a logically necessary condition of indoctrination. It is secondly widely maintained that when one is teaching doctrines, there is a high probability that one is indoctrinating. Antony Flew, for example, argues, not only that indoctrination is limited to doctrines, but also that the teaching of doctrines very probably involves indoctrination (CI, pp. 75ff., 113f.). Even the philosophers who reject the first relation suggesting that doctrinal content is a logically necessary condition of indoctrination, nevertheless still want to maintain that there is a strong contingent connection between indoctrination and doctrines. White and Snook, for example, reject the content criterion of indoctrination, but still argue that the teaching of religious doctrine most often involves indoctrination (CI, p. 219) [3]. In this paper I wish to focus primarily on the first claim which suggests that indoctrination is conceptually related to doctrinal content. Despite the widespread acceptance of the content criterion, I want to argue that it is not a necessary condition of indoctrination. Much of the argument used to undermine the first claim will also serve to weaken the second claim. Thus, it will also be suggested that the frequently made assumption concerning the high probability of indoctrination when teaching doctrine is not as strong as is generally maintained. I will further limit my considerations largely to the area of religious beliefs and religious instruction since these are frequently taken as the paradigms of doctrines and indoctrination. zyxwvutsr zyx ‘Doctrines’ It should be obvious that before it is possible to evaluate whether or not indoctrination is limited to the doctrinal sphere it is essential to become clear as to the meaning of the notion ‘doctrine’, sometimes also identified with or seen as related to ‘ideology’ [4]. 4 zyxwvutsrq zyxwvuts zyxwvuts zyxw zyxw E. J. Thiessen What is surprising is that despite the widespread acceptance of the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’ which limits indoctrination to doctrines, very little attention has been focused specifically on the concept ‘doctrine’ which is presupposed by this criterion. Snook, among others, points to this neglect and then goes on to give, as his ‘principal argument’ against the content criterion, that the concept ‘doctrine’ is itself extremely vague (IE, p. 32). But surely this in itself cannot be used as an argument against the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’. If a concept is vague, then for the philosopher, this is merely a call for further analysis. I therefore propose to examine some of the vague descriptions of doctrines as found in the literature on indoctrination. I will limit myself to three authors, Wilson, Flew and Gregory/ Woods who make the content criterion primary in their analysis of ‘indoctrination’, and who therefore have more to say about doctrines than most other writers [5]. (1) Logical Status of Doctrinal Beliefs Frequent reference is made, in describing the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’, to the ‘logical status’ of those beliefs which are subject to indoctrination (AE, p. 28; CI, pp. 107, 172). This phrase is useful in grouping one set of characteristics thought to be essential to ‘doctrines’. For Wilson, the essential aspect of the logical status of doctrinal beliefs is that they are uncertain (AE, pp. 27ff.). For Flew, the essential characteristic of a doctrine is that it involves beliefs which are “either false or not known to be true” (CI, pp. 70f., 112f.). Gregory/Woods agree with Flew, except that they do not wish to include false beliefs or ‘manifest untruths’ as doctrine (CI, p. 171). The above summary characterisations of doctrines are, however, highly ambiguous, and thus we need to unpack the various meanings implicit in these descriptions of the logical status of doctrines. (a) False beliefs: Flew suggests, first of all, that doctrines may involve false beliefs. He interprets Wilson as also defining doctrines in terms of ‘the actual falsehood’ of beliefs involved (CI, pp. 68f.). Wilson, in places, describes beliefs subject to indoctrination as ‘irrational’ and at times seems to equate these with false beliefs (AE, pp. 35f., 38; CI, p. 103). Gregory/Woods, however, explicitly reject this characterisation of doctrines, although one example used at the end of their essay would suggest that doctrines do include false beliefs (CI, pp. 171, 187). (b) Beliefs with insufficient or no evidence: we must next consider the frequently recurring phrase ‘not known to be true’, which, unfortunately, is again highly ambiguous. To say that a doctrine involves a belief not known to be true may mean that there is no evidence for the belief or at least not sufficient evidence. Although these two notions are different, I believe they can be conveniently grouped together. Wilson describes these beliefs as uncertain in the sense “that we have no logical right to be sure” of them (AE, p. 27). There is “no publicly accepted evidence for them” (AE, p. 28). Flew contrasts beliefs which can “on the best possible evidence, reasonably be said to be known; and those at the opposite extreme for which, whether or not they happen to be true, there is no evidence at all” (CI, p. 107). It is the latter which are subject to indoctrination for Flew. Flew approves of Wilson’s “strong emphasis on sufficient and publicly admissible evidence” as a way of avoiding indoctrination (CI, p. 82). Gregory/Woods do not explicitly define doctrines in terms of beliefs for which there is no evidence, although they do seem to hint at a lack of scientific evidence for doctrinal beliefs (CI, p. 173). (c) Beliefs with ambiguous evidence: another interpretation of the phrase ‘not known to be true or false’ is alluded to most clearly by Gregory/Woods. Doctrines on this interpretation include beliefs for which the evidence is ambiguous. “Doctrines provide, as it were, room for manoeuvre in debate. There is something to be said in support, and something to be said against” (CI, p. 172). The ‘uncertainty’ that Wilson and Flew talk about could be attributed to Indoctrination and Doctrines zyx zy zy 5 the ambiguity of evidence. Thus, Flew also describes doctrines as involving ‘debatable issues’ (CI, p. 108). (d) Unfalsifiable beliefs: another important characteristic frequently associated with doctrines is that they cannot be verified or falsified. When Wilson is talking about a deeper level of uncertainty that characterises doctrines such as religious, political and moral beliefs, in contrast to scientific beliefs, he is suggesting that the former are uncertain in the sense that they cannot be verified or falsified. “We do not know what sort of evidence to look for.. . .We cannot even be sure that any question of truth, falsehood, or evidence arises at all” with doctrinal beliefs (AE, pp. 29f.). Wilson seems to be alluding to the positivist principle of verification or falsification by which metaphysical, moral, and religious beliefs are classified as factually meaningless because there are no criteria by which to settle questions of truth or falsehood. Flew might be interpreted as alluding to this when he describes indoctrination as “teaching as known the sort of thing which really is not or cannot be known” (CI, p. 78-my emphasis). This would certainly be in line with other essays Flew has written on religion, where he uses the positivist principle of falsification to show that religious language is factually meaningless (cf. CI, p. 116). Snook and White both interpret Gregory/Woods as also defining doctrines as unverifiable (IE, p. 33; CI, pp. 192f.). It would appear that Gregory/Woods do have this interpretation in mind when they characterise an example of a ‘pure doctrine’ such as religion, in the following way: “It is logical nonsense to talk, in the sphere of religion of the setting up of hypotheses and of the subsequent attempt to confirm or disconfirm them experimentally” (CI, p. 173, cf. p. 168). (e) Beliefs held incorrigibly: the question of verification or falsification is often confused with what I want to argue is a quite different notion of ‘incorrigibility’. Verification or falsification has to do with the logical status of the beliefs involved. But, sometimes it is not the beliefs themselves but a certain psychological fact about persons holding these beliefs that makes it impossible to prove these beliefs false to the believer. Thus, doctrines are sometimes described as beliefs which cannot be proved false because believers in these doctrines view them as incorrigible. I believe both Gregory/Woods and Flew have confused the two different notions of incorrigibility and verification/falsification. Gregory/Woods, for example, describe doctrines thus: “From the standpoint of the believer they have the status of universal, unfalsifiable truths” (CI, p. 168). Here we have both a reference to the status of the beliefs themselves, and a reference to the believer. Gregory/Woods clearly move to the notion of incorrigibility when they stress that it is people “who elevate these doctrines to the status of incorrigible truths, who passionately believe in their essential truth”, or who hold them as “absolutely and incorrigibly true” (CI, pp. 177, 167f.). I believe Flew is at times also referring to this psychological characteristic of the way in which people hold on to doctrinal beliefs regardless of the counter evidence. He criticises the traditional Christian Church “which seeks to fix in the minds of children an unshakeable conviction of the truth of its specific doctrines” (CI, pp. 114, 76). Thus, associated with doctrines is this fact about how they are held with unshakeable conviction. Strictly speaking, this feature of incorrigibility should not be considered under the heading ‘logical status of beliefs’ at all as it involves a psychological description of the believer. I am treating it here because it is so often associated with the issue of falsification which does involve the question of the logical status of religious beliefs. ( f ) Beliefs lacking public agreement: the final interpretation of doctrines as beliefs ‘not known to be true or false’ involves the lack of public agreement concerning these beliefs. Wilson’s description of religious, political and moral beliefs as ‘uncertain’ clearly turns also on the fact that there is no “publicly-accepted evidence” for them (AE, p. 28). Even the zyxwv 6 zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvut E. J. Thiessen characterisation of these beliefs as involving a deeper level of uncertainty having to do with the question of whether or not there are any truth criteria involves the problem of lack of agreement. We are agreed, Wilson states, on how to answer scientific questions, but we are not agreed on how to answer metaphysical and moral questions (AE, p. 29). “These are complex matters, about which philosophers are still not in agreement” (AE, p. 30). Flew’s description of doctrines as ‘debatable issues’ includes the connotation that these are issues over which there is public disagreement (CI, p. 108). Flew chides Wilson for not sufficiently taking into account the fact of “disagreements about what, or what sort of (thing) is or is not known” (CI, p. 78). There is also an implicit reference to public disagreement in Gregory/Woods’ statement, “Doctrines provide, as it were, room for manoeuvre in debate” (CI, p. 172). (2) Scope of Doctrinal Beliefs Another important set of characteristics frequently associated with doctrines has to do with their scope. There are two aspects of the scope of doctrinal beliefs that need to be dealt with. (a) Systems of beliefs: Gregory/Woods make some passing references to ‘systems of belief’ as another sense of ‘doctrine’ (CI, pp. 182, 175f.). This would concur with one meaning assigned to ‘doctrine’ in the Oxford English Dictionary: “A body or system of principles or tenets; a doctrinal or theoretical system”. We have already seen how Flew holds that, as a necessary condition, a doctrine is a belief which is either false or at least not known to be true. But this is not sufficient, because as he himself admits, there are many such beliefs which are not classified as doctrines. In order to be classified thus, they must satisfy another condition. They must be “somehow tied up with something wider and more ideological” (CI, p. 71). What Flew means by this is not entirely clear. Part of the meaning seems to be that doctrines involve a wider system of beliefs. This is how White interprets Flew’s statement but I believe there is more to it than this (CI, pp. 190f., cf. pp. 122f.). (b) Wide scope and generality: I believe the real focus of Flew’s description of doctrines as “somehow tied up with something wider and more ideological”, has to do with the wide ranging implications of a doctrinal belief. This is the point stressed by Gregory/Woods. In contrast to other beliefs, doctrines “have a scope and generality that others do not” (CI, p. 168, cf. pp. 174, 185). Often they entail a complete world-view or a comprehensive philosophy of life. This broad scope of doctrine may be due to the fact that they involve a complete system of beliefs. But, a single statement, involving a fundamental presupposition of a system of beliefs, can itself have a broad scope. Thus I believe Flew does allow for doctrines which are individual statements (e.g. CI, p. 144). ( 3 ) The Momentous Character of Doctrinal Beliefs There is a final set of characteristics of doctrines, stressed by Gregory/Woods, which are conveniently grouped as involving various aspects of the momentousness of these beliefs. (a) Importance of beliefs: doctrines, such as we find in religion and politics, involve beliefs that are “of great moment to mankind involving as they do considerations relating to man’s place in the universe and the ways in which societies may best be organized” (CI, p. 166, cf. p. 168). The importance of these beliefs derives in part from their scope which we have considered in the previous section. This description is no doubt somewhat vague. But, Gregory/Woods are trying to do justice to the fact that generally we would not call unimportant details ‘doctrines’. (b) Self-involving beliefs: Gregory/Woods argue that because doctrines are matters of great moment to mankind, “acceptance of the doctrinal system of ideology is no mere academic Indoctrination and Doctrines zyx 7 matter-there is commitment to act in particular ways, to profess and act out a particular value and way of life” (CI, p. 166, cf. pp. 177f.). Doctrinal beliefs are “intimately related to action and purposive activity in a way in which many other beliefs are not” (CI, p. 168). Wilson also alludes to this feature of doctrines. He suggests that political and moral beliefs are “closer to the heart of the individual than other beliefs and skills” (AE, p. 27). Commenting on the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’, he argues that “it is not merely contingent that those areas which involve free commitment-preeminently morality, politics, and religion-ffer model cases for indoctrination” (CI, p. 103). (c) Beliefs promoted with evangelistic zeal there is also a certain evangelistic zeal which seems to characterise those holding doctrinal beliefs. Gregory/Woods trace this zeal to the fact that such beliefs are considered to be of momentous concern to mankind. The importance of doctrinal beliefs “leads to a strong urge to convince others, the waverers, the unbelievers, of their essential truth” (CI, p. 168, cf. pp. 177f.). This feature is also related to a previous point concerning the actions and attitudes implied by a doctrinal belief (see 3b). It would seem that doctrines necessarily entail commitment to evangelism or the persuasion of others to accept these beliefs. (d) Beliefs backed by a group or an institution: a final aspect of doctrinal beliefs involves their social or institutional character. This feature is again related to the previous points. It is because of the importance of these beliefs, and the need to engage in evangelism that we find them promoted by a group or an institution. Thus Gregory/Woods and Flew make frequent reference to the Roman Church or the Communist Party as providing the context out of which doctrines arise (CI, pp. 166, 187f., 75f., 106, 109). Religion and Science zyxwv We are now in a position to evaluate the above characterisations of doctrines as found in the literature on the concept of indoctrination. Before dealing with the major criticism to be made, I wish to make a few preliminary comments about past descriptions of doctrines. It should first of all be noted that there is a criticism implied by the very fact that such a detailed analysis of the past descriptions of doctrines has been required. Given the longstanding and general acceptance of the content criterion, and given the fact that there exists a considerable body of literature dealing with the concept of indoctrination, one would expect that the concept ‘doctrine’ would already have been clarified. One would further not expect philosophers steeped in the analytic tradition to describe doctrines in vague and ambiguous terms such as the phrase ‘not known to be true’. Snook is therefore justified in objecting to the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’ because of the extreme vagueness of the concept of doctrines (IE, p. 32). Secondly, I would like to point out that some of the characteristics identified above contradict each other. For example, if it is maintained that doctrines cannot be verified or falsified (see Id), then it cannot also be maintained that doctrines involve those beliefs that are false (see la). To identify a doctrine as false is to admit the possibility of evidence or counterevidence. But this is precisely what is denied when it is claimed that doctrines cannot be verified or falsified. Further, to talk of ‘no evidence’ or ‘lack of sufficient evidence’ (see lb), presupposes that it does make sense to talk of evidence or the lack of it. But to affirm, at the same time, that doctrines cannot be verified or falsified is to reject the very possibility of talk of evidence, and is therefore again to contradict oneself. There is a third problem involving the ‘logical status’ of doctrinal beliefs. If doctrines are defined as false beliefs, or as beliefs with no evidence, insufficient evidence, or even ambiguous evidence a fundamental question arises as to who it is who judges the beliefs to have this status. There are obviously differences of opinion as to whether a belief is false or lacks evidence, and this is problematic for those wishing to define ‘doctrines’ in terms of these 8 zyxwvutsrqpo zyxwvuts E. J. Thiessen criteria. Although this problem is touched on by some of the writers, I do not think it is adequately dealt with or resolved. The major criticism I wish to make concerning past descriptions of doctrines is that the characteristics assigned to doctrines do not clearly and unproblematically distinguish paradigm cases of doctrine from paradigm cases of non-doctrine. There is general agreement among those defending the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’that religious beliefs are a paradigm of doctrines, and scientific beliefs are a paradigm of non-doctrine. If, therefore, it can be established with some degree of plausibility that the characteristics dealt with in the previous section are present in scientific beliefs, or absent in religious beliefs, then I will have undermined the basic thrust of the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’, since the whole point of this criterion is to distinguish doctrinal from non-doctrinal beliefs and to limit indoctrination to the former. I first of all wish to make some general comments about the relation of science and religion which will help to put my specific arguments into context. It must be admitted at the outset that, as Ian Barbour has noted, “most writers today see science and religion as strongly contrasting enterprises which have essentially nothing to do with each other” [6]. However, there are an impressive number of writers, including anthropologists, philosophers, and scientists, who argue that religion and science are similar in aims, methods, and criteria by which to evaluate the fulfillment of these aims. Stewart Guthrie in a recent and important article on this topic argues this position and reviews the writers who also argue for a similarity between science and religion [7]. The issue is by no means settled, but this fact in itself already suggests that the distinction between paradigm cases of doctrine and non-doctrine is at least problematical. In what follows, I will be providing some specific argumentation for the similarity between science and religion. It will be argued that the criteria commonly used to differentiate religion, the paradigm of doctrines, from science, the paradigm of non-doctrine, do not clearly and unproblematically make the distinction they are trying to make. zyxwvu (1) Logical Status of Doctrinal Beliefs The first three descriptions of doctrines falling under the logical status of beliefs can be conveniently dealt with as a group. If doctrines are defined in terms of any or all of these criteria, then it should be rather obvious that science too contains doctrines. A review of the history of science would reveal many cases in which false beliefs were adhered to and promulgated. Similar considerations would also suggest that sometimes beliefs are accepted in science which are based on insufficient evidence and even on no evidence at all. Of course the latter phrase raises some additional problems, but these cannot be pursued here. It can further be argued that there are certain presuppositions or first principles underlying science which various authors have recognised as not being susceptible to proof or evidence. The problem of presuppositions and their status is also related to the problem of verification/ falsification, and thus I will postpone consideration of this topic until later. Finally, it can also be shown that science contains beliefs for which the evidence is ambiguous. Progress in science rests in part on noting anomalies, a process which really involves a recognition of ambiguity in evidence. Various authors have pointed out that no theory ever fits all the relevant observations [8]. If so, it follows that there always remain some observations that seem to mitigate against any particular scientific theory. Thus, the acceptance of a scientific theory always takes place in the context of some ambiguity of evidence. We have seen that another feature often attributed to doctrines involves their having the status of not being falsifiable or verifiable. It is quite understandable why Wilson, Flew, Gregory/Woods and others would choose the verification/falsification principle as a means of distinguishing doctrine from non-doctrine. One of the main objectives of positivism, which Indoctrination and Doctrines zy 9 introduced this principle, was to distinguish science from metaphysics and theology, and to rule out the latter as factually meaningless. It would seem however, that the choice of this principle to distinguish doctrine from nondoctrine is an unhappy one because it was precisely in its attempts to distinguish science from non-science (or nonsense) that positivism encountered most of its difficulties. The verification/falsification principle was revised again and again largely due to the fact that each version was found, on closer examination, to be inadequate in distinguishing science from metaphysics and theology. Malcolm Diamond, in a recent review of the developments of the positivist movement, comments on the tenacity and even the partisanship that became more and more evident as the positivists pursued their objective. zyxw There was, after all, something prejudicial and dogmatic about the tortuous efforts of the positivists to achieve a version of the verifiability principle with the right combination of permissiveness (“science-in”) and restrictiveness (“metaphysics-out”). [91 It would appear that there is general consensus that the positivists have failed to distinguish science from non-science on the basis of the principle of verification/falsification. Patricia Smart, for example, points to the ‘notorious’ difficulties of the criterion of verifiability or falsifiability, because a “criterion which is stringent enough to exclude metaphysics also excludes propositions of science and a criterion which includes scientific statements also includes metaphysics”. Smart concludes that any attempt to define ‘doctrines’ on the basis of the positivist principle of verification or falsification will only serve to establish that science too contains doctrines [lo]. Various writers such as Ronald S. Laura and John F. Miller have examined the logical status of presuppositions, first-order principles, or epistemic primitives in science and have argued that they are not verifiable or falsifiable [I I]. Thus again it would seem that doctrines cannot be distinguished from non-doctrines on the basis of the verification/falsification principle. We must next consider incorrigibility as a defining feature of ‘doctrines’. It must be admitted that religious doctrines are often held in an unshakeable manner. But religious believers do sometimes become agnostics and atheists. There is evolution and change within religious thought. Thus this feature does not invariably accompany so-called doctrines. It can further be shown that the holding of beliefs in an incorrigible manner is also frequently present in paradigm cases of non-doctrine. A survey of the history of science and other recognised disciplines would reveal many examples of theories stubbornly held on to despite evidence against them. In fact, Flew himself, in another context, gives one such example [ 121. Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions provides additional support for the claim that the holding of beliefs in an incorrigible manner might also characterise scientists [ 131. Incorrigibility occurs both in ‘normal science’, where the majority of scientists do research under the guidance of a paradigm with its set of presuppositions and techniques which are seldom, if ever, critically examined, as well as in ‘extraordinary science’ where there is debate among proponents of competing paradigms, but where there are no trans-paradigmatic grounds for evaluating these paradigms. This leads one writer, interestingly, to express concern about the implication that this would make paradigm adoption “closer to a religious than an intellectual endeavour” [ 141. There is finally some research, referred to by T. F. Green, which suggests that incorrigibility applies to the holding of beliefs in any areas of thought (CI, pp. 29ff.). Thus, it would seem that incorrigibility also cannot be used uniquely to describe religious doctrines. The final aspect of the logical status of doctrinal beliefs concerns the question as to whether doctrines can be defined in terms of beliefs about which there is public disagreement? This is a very common description and there does seem to be an initial plausibility about it. There does zyxwvuts 10 zyxwvu zyxwvut zyx zyxwvuts E. J. Thiessen seem to be a tendency to label as doctrinal those areas where debate and disagreement abound. But this description of doctrines is also not without its problems. There is first of all a problem as to how ‘public’ is to be defined in the expression ‘public agreement’. Is a belief identified as a doctrine so long as less than 100%of the public agrees on it? Or is it only the experts that are consulted? But what if several of the experts disagree with ‘established opinion’? Does this make it a doctrine? If public agreement is strictly defined as unanimous agreement by all of the public, then all beliefs are doctrines as it is surely evident that there is no belief that is not disputed by someone. It should also be evident that on this interpretation of ‘public agreement’, science also contains doctrines as the history of science reveals countless examples of disagreement, not only by the public at large, but also within the scientific community [ 151. If on the other hand, ‘public agreement’ is defined more loosely so as not to require 100% agreement by all of the public, or even by all the ‘experts’, then it turns out that religion is no longer doctrinal in nature. Religious beliefs are most often held by a community of people, often by a large community, which even includes many who would otherwise be considered quite rational. I therefore conclude that the notion of public agreement also will not distinguish the paradigm cases of doctrine from those that are non-doctrinal. (2) Scope of Doctrinal Beliefs It has been suggested that doctrines are broad in scope, first of all in the sense that they are tied to a wider system of beliefs. It should be obvious that this feature will not serve to distinguish paradigm cases of doctrine from those that are non-doctrinal, because the sciences surely also involve broad systems of belief (IE, p. 33). Gregory/Woods themselves admit that theories in science function as part of “a very complex theoretical system” (CI, p. 172). Various philosophers have come to see that it is precisely because science too is characterised by “elaborate systematic conceptual structures” that difficulties arise concerning verification [la It is also evident, as has been argued at length by J. P. White that doctrines cannot only refer to “systems of belief’ (CI, pp. 122f., 191ff.). We do talk of individual statements as doctrines. We not only speak of ‘Catholic doctrine’ but also of individual doctrines within Catholicism such as the doctrine of the future life, the doctrine of the infallibility of the pope. Gregory/Woods themselves, give some examples of single propositions which are called doctrines (CI, pp. 172, 178, cf. p. 191). If it is argued that an individual statement is a doctrine only if it is tied to a wider doctrinal system of beliefs, as Flew intimates (CI, p. 71), then all statements qualify, since all statements evolve in some way from a wider system of beliefs. If we instead interpret the wide scope of doctrines in terms of the wide-ranging implications of these beliefs, then science again contains doctrines. Surely the principle of causality and determinism is just as broad in scope and generality as many religious claims. In fact many extend this scientific principle to all domains including that of religion. The same could be said for other first-order principles, theories, and laws of science. All of them have wideranging implications. Broadness of scope, however interpreted, will not therefore distinguish science from the paradigm cases of doctrine. ( 3 ) The Momentous Character of Doctrinal Beliefs This brings us to the final group of criteria, where doctrines are described in various ways as momentous beliefs. We examined (a) the characterisation of doctrines ‘as of great moment to mankind’, or ‘of momentous concern to mankind’. But according to this, there are many doctrines in science as well. Surely the discovery of nuclear fission is of great moment or of momentous concern to mankind. Surely Darwin’s evolutionary theory has been and still is of zyx zyx Indoctrination and Doctrines 11 momentous concern to mankind, inspiring ethical theories, political theories, and perhaps even the horrible atrocities of the Hitler regime, as has been argued by some [ 171. (b) Gregory/Woods also suggest that doctrinal beliefs are “intimately related to action and purposive activity”. They entail commitment to act in accordance with the values inherent in them. There is an initial plausibility to this since the paradigm cases of doctrines, religion, politics and morality are all intimately related to actions and commitment. On the other hand, when one asserts or accepts a scientific theory or observation report, it seems that one can do so without committing oneself to future conduct or without expressing any personal attitude for or against what is asserted. Before we can critically evaluate this feature of doctrines, we must take note of an ambiguity in the expression, “an intimate tie-up of doctrine and action” (CI, p. 167). (i) This expression can first of all be taken to mean that belief in a doctrine necessarily entails a “commitment to act in particular ways”. Doctrines simply cannot be accepted as “a mere academic matter” (CI, p. 166). To believe is to be committed to certain actions or attitudes. Thus some have suggested that it is impossible to acknowledge the doctrine of God‘s existence and then not respond to him in worship or obedience. (ii) But this phrase can also be interpreted to mean that doctrines are unique in that they entail certain ‘action-beliefs’. Here we are not asking, as in the first interpretation, whether doctrines necessarily entail actual commitment. Rather, we are asking whether certain beliefs have as their entailments other beliefs as to what the believer ought to do, and this quite apart from the question as to whether the believer will actually do what he ought to do or as dictated by his beliefs. Gregory/Woods argue, for example, that Catholic doctrine entails that the believer “is expected to live his life in the sight of God and to strive at all times to see that the quality of that life measures up to the Divine law” (CI, p. 167). There are problems, however, with both interpretations. Surely it is possible for someone to believe that God exists and yet fail to respond in worship or obedience. This may be due to hypocrisy, irrationality, or the wilful refusal to respond as might normally be deemed appropriate. Roger Trigg states, “It does not seem self-contradictory to imagine someone accepting fully that there is a God and repudiating Him completely. This is presumably the position the Devil holds in Christian theology” [ 181. This first interpretation of a connection between doctrine and commitment or action is therefore itself an implausible one. We need not therefore ask whether science can be characterised thus, since there are difficulties characterising any beliefs, including religious and political beliefs, as entailing commitment and personal response to action. Is it secondly the case that all doctrines entail ‘action-beliefs’? Gregory/Woods seem to be unaware of the force of a counter-example they themselves raise. They admit that it is “difficult to see what differences to one’s daily life, acceptance or rejection of (Berkeley’s metaphysical doctrine) would make” (CI, p. 167). Even in the paradigm cases of doctrinal domains, I believe it is possible to identify some beliefs that do not entail action-beliefs. For example, what implications follow from the claim that “God is eternal spirit”, or, “Jesus was crucified”? A further difficult question can be raised as to whether ‘entailment’ should be interpreted in a logical sense in the above relation. Surely religious doctrines about what is the case do in some sense have implications for what ought to be done by the believer who accepts these doctrines. But if ‘entailment’ is interpreted loosely, then science too contains doctrines because many, if not most, scientific statements do ‘entail’ some action-beliefs. For example, an understanding of the law of gravity ‘implies’ that one should not jump off a high bridge. The claim, ‘H,SO, is an acid’, makes chemistry instructors warn students to be careful not to spill any on their hands or clothes. Our ‘technological society’ and its way of approaching life is surely an ‘implication’ of the acceptance of the scientific method and the beliefs associated with it. Thus some express concern about science being ‘ideological’. zyxwvutsr 12 zyxwvuts E. J. Thiessen (c) Another identifying characteristic of doctrines suggested by Gregory/Woods concerns the evangelistic zeal with which they are promoted. It must be admitted that the holding of religious and political doctrines is often associated with a ‘strong urge to convince others’. But is this necessarily the case, as it must be, if this feature is part of the analysis of the concept ‘doctrine’? We must not let the zeal of a few radicals blind us to the fact that many believers in religious or political doctrines hold their beliefs very dispassionately with little or no attempt to persuade others of what they believe. It is a contingent matter whether doctrines are kept to oneself, shared with others on certain occasions or whether the convincing of others becomes an all-consuming passion. Evangelistic zeal is also at times present in those holding scientific beliefs. Many would want to give as an example the way in which evolutionary theory is perpetuated in our schools, in print and via the media. They might admit that this does not look exactly like religious evangelism, but this is only due to the fact that evolutionary theory is part of established opinion. If it were a minority view, recourse would have to be taken to special attempts at convincing others, special rallies, paid broadcasts, etc. As it is, these special efforts are unnecessary, since those who accept the evolutionary theory have at their disposal the entire educational system with textbooks and all devoted to their cause. Malcolm Muggeridge speaks to this issue in a more general sense. The dogmatism of science has become a new orthodoxy, disseminated by the Media and a State educational system with a thoroughness and subtlety far exceeding anything of the kind achieved by the Inquisition. [19] (d) The above argument is also related to the final characteristic attributed to doctrines, namely their being supported by a group of people or an institution. It should be obvious that this feature also will not distinguish paradigm cases of doctrine and non-doctrine. Lest the above quote from Muggeridge be dismissed as obscurantist, let me refer to John Dewey, whose writings have perhaps done more to shape North American education than any other writer. Dewey is very clear in advocating that schools promote science and the use of the scientific method [20]. Thus we have the institution of public education or schools backing and promoting not only science generally, but also specific scientific beliefs. It is simply naive to assume that only religious or political beliefs are backed by an institution. This concludes a rather detailed evaluation of various features that have been attributed to doctrines in past analyses of ‘indoctrination’. I have attempted to show that some of the proposed criteria need not apply to the paradigm cases of doctrine such as religious or political beliefs. However, I was primarily concerned to show that all of the proposed criteria are present, to some degree at least, in the paradigm example of non-doctrine, science. The common assumption that religion and science can be distinguished in terms of possessing or not possessing doctrines is therefore problematic. It might be objected that there are other criteria which past descriptions of doctrines have somehow overlooked. For example, is not an obvious difference between scientific and religious beliefs that the one refers to the supernatural while the other does not? I would suggest, however, that there are good reasons why this has not been proposed as a distinguishing feature of doctrines. First of all, there is some question as to whether all religions do make reference to the supernatural. Guthrie warns against applying this ‘Western folk category’ cross-culturally, since some cultures simply do not think in terms of a ‘natural-supernatura1’ distinction. Guthrie further suggests that there may even be some supernatural elements within science! [211. Perhaps scientists are merely suppressing the metaphysical assumptions underlying the scientific enterprise. Finally, it would be inadvisable to define ‘doctrine’ in terms of the supernatural because it is generally believed that indoctrination is not only limited to religious beliefs. Political beliefs are also susceptible to indoctrination and these obviously do not make reference to the supernatural. zyxwvutsr zy zyxwvu Indoctrination and Doctrines 13 There may be other possible criteria of ‘doctrines’, but until such time as they are proposed, I believe we must conclude that there are problems defining doctrines in such a way as to make religion doctrinal and science non-doctrinal. The conclusion we have arrived at by way of a detailed critique of various proposed descriptions of doctrines can be further substantiated by an appeal to ordinary usage. We do talk about doctrines in areas other than religion or politics. The Oxford English Dictionary assigns three meanings to ‘doctrine’: 1. The action of teaching or instructing; instruction; a piece of instruction, a lesson, precept. 2. That which is taught. a. In the most general sense: Instruction, teaching; a body of instruction or teaching. ... b. esp. That which is taught or laid down as true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge, as religion, politics, science, etc.; a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, tenet. 3. A body or system of principles or tenets; a doctrinal or theoretical system; a theory; a science, or department of knowledge. We see here that with all three meanings, there is no restriction of doctrine to the areas of religion or politics. In fact, the last two meanings specifically refer to science as an example of a doctrine. This is further substantiated by an examination of actual usage of the term ‘doctrine’. J. S. Mill, for example, writes about “the detailed doctrines of science” [22]. White refers to a recent paper by C. P. Ormell in which he talks of doctrines in mathematics such as “the doctrine of Logical Sequence” (CI, p. 190). Gregory/Woods themselves give some examples of talk about doctrines in the sciences, but these are dismissed as unusual usages (CI, pp. 172ff.). The fact remains that these are examples of the term ‘doctrine’ being used in the sciences, and many more such examples could be provided. Thus, an examination of current actual usage further substantiates the conclusion that any attempt to limit doctrines to areas such as religion or politics is simply due to arbitrary decision. zyxwv zyxwvu A Proposed Analysis of ‘Doctrine’ Before proceeding to draw some conclusions as to the relation between ‘indoctrination’ and ‘doctrine’ it might be well to ask ourselves what can be learned from past descriptions of the term ‘doctrine’ by way of providing a more adequate analysis of this concept. It might appear that the conclusion that follows from the arguments of the previous section is that the concept ‘doctrine’ is simply meaningless. But despite the contradictions, confusions, and fundamental problems concerning the denotation of the concept, which have been found in past descriptions of doctrines, I do not believe the concept is meaningless. Nor should ‘doctrine’ be equated simply with ‘belief, as is suggested by some dictionary definitions. We do not, as Gregory/Woods have argued, “go around talking about the doctrine that eight pints equal one gallon, or the doctrine that two twos are four” (CI, p. 181). I further agree with Patricia Smart that we do not generally speak of observational statements as doctrines (231. I suggest the following as a correct analysis of the concept ‘doctrine’, based in part on past descriptions of this notion, but hopefully avoiding the problems that have been identified in the previous section: (i) ‘Doctrines’ refer to the central beliefs of any belief system, variously identified as ‘firstorder principles’, ‘primary beliefs’, or ’presuppositions’ [24]. Following a model close to that of W. V. Quine and T. F. Green, let me propose as a picture of a belief system, a series of concentric circles [25]. At the outer circumference of the belief system are observational statements. The next level involves generalised statements. Further in the interior of the belief system are broader statements still, which may function as first-order 14 zyxwvutsrq zyxwvut E, J. Thiessen principles. I would suggest that these, and the presuppositions at the core of the belief system, are called ‘doctrines’. A larger belief system may consist of several smaller belief systems, each of which also has first-order principles, which may also then be identified as ‘doctrines’. (ii) Doctrines are broad in scope or have wide-ranging implications and this is due to their being central in a belief system. It would seem that the term ‘ideology’ is at times used to connote this specific sense of ‘doctrine’. (iii) Doctrines are not verifiable or falsifiable, though this should perhaps be qualified, as there is a sense in which an entire belief system together with its first-order principles can be verified/falsified. T. Kuhn, for example, speaks of ‘scientific revolutions’, such as the ‘Copernican Revolution’, which involved a complete shift in conceptual frameworks. Such a shift is partly a response to problems at the outer periphery of the former belief system, involving observational statements. But various other non-observational criteria are at work in causing major conceptual upheavals, such as internal consistency, simplicity, aesthetic elegance, explanatory power, etc. [26].Thus, there is a sense in which conceptual frameworks and their first-order principles are subject to testing but this is a complex affair. However, if one is speaking of the logical status of statements within a conceptual framework, then first-order principles are unfalsifiable because they “are used logically as principles in accordance with which evidence is interpreted, and as such logically could not ever befulsijied if they continued to be used in this manner” [27]. Thus, I am defining doctrines as unfalsifiable in this special sense involving their logical status within a belief system. (iv) A final characteristic of doctrines involves their importance. This feature is necessarily somewhat vague. It might also seem that the rating of the importance of doctrinal beliefs will be relative to individuals or groups of individuals but I do not believe this involves a serious qualification. Whether individuals agree or disagree with a certain doctrine, both sides would agree that it is an important truth or falsity. This importance of doctrines derives from the fact that they are central and primary beliefs of a belief system and also from their broad scope. Thus I believe Gregory/Woods are correct in suggesting that generally we would not call unimportant details ‘doctrines’. I would tentatively suggest that these four criteria serve to define what is generally understood as a ‘doctrine’. Much more could be done by way of expanding and defending the above analysis but this is beyond the scope of this paper. It needs to be stressed, however, that this proposed analysis is still in line with the major argument of the previous section where it was concluded that doctrines are found in science as well as religion. Non-falsifiable first-order principles or presuppositions of broad scope and importance are found in all belief systems or forms of knowledge. Indoctrination and Doctrines We return now to the questions that prompted our inquiry into past descriptions of doctrines. Is indoctrination limited to doctrines? Are doctrines more susceptible to indoctrination than other areas of knowledge and belief? It is generally assumed that doctrines are only to be found in religion, politics, and morality, and that the danger of indoctrination only exists in these areas. I have argued, however, that ‘doctrines’ as described by Wilson, Flew, and Gregory/Woods are also found in what is usually taken to be a paradigm of non-doctrine, science. It therefore follows that even if ‘indoctrination’ is seen as limited to ‘doctrines’, and if the latter term is understood as it has been in the past, this still does not entail that indoctrination is restricted to the areas of religious, political, and moral beliefs. Indoctrination and Doctrines zy zy 15 This conclusion is further supported by my proposal for a more adequate analysis of the concept ‘doctrine’. I have argued that ‘doctrines’ should be defined in terms of non-falsifiable first-order principles and presuppositions of broad scope and importance. But doctrines in this sense are found in science, and indeed in all areas of knowledge. Thus, if the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’ is accepted, i.e. if indoctrination is seen as limited to doctrines, then indoctrination must again be seen as possible in all areas of knowledge and belief. Thus far we have been assuming that there is a conceptual link between ‘indoctrination’ and ‘doctrines’. I have shown that even if this is assumed, it does not have the usually intended effect of limiting indoctrination to religious, political, and moral beliefs. Another way in which to undermine this limitation of indoctrination to certain areas of belief which are considered suspect is to show that the assumption of a conceptual link between ‘indoctrination’ and ‘doctrines’ is itself problematical. This is the strategy of J. P. White who argues both for a weaker claim, that ‘indoctrination’ should not be understood as being limited to doctrines at all, and for a stronger claim, about which he is a little less confident, that indoctrinated beliefs could be of any kind whatever (CI, pp. 117ff., 190ff.). Although I am sympathetic with White’s arguments, it is not possible to deal with them here. It should be noted, however, that White and I both object to arbitrarily limiting ‘indoctrination’ to certain spheres or areas of knowledge and belief. Both of us reject the usually accepted denotative definition of ‘indoctrination’. Thus our arguments should be seen as complementing each other. Although the question of a conceptual link between ‘indoctrination’ and ‘doctrines’ is significant in itself, I would suggest that it is the second question concerning the probability of indoctrinating doctrines that is of greater significance for education. As has already been pointed out, the claim that there is a strong contingent connection between indoctrination and doctrines is made both by those who accept the content criterion of ‘indoctrination’, and by those who reject it. Thus, it is unfortunate that in the literature on indoctrination, this second question has been treated with even less rigour than the first. It is only possible, here, to make a few comments on this second question based on my critique of past descriptions of doctrines and my own proposal for a correct analysis of this concept. It should be noted that in dealing with this second question we are assuming that it is possible to define ‘indoctrination’ in some other way, perhaps the methods criterion [28]. I want to suggest that indoctrination is indeed more likely to occur with regard to doctrines, understood in terms of non-falsifiable, first-order principles and presuppositions of broad scope and importance. The reason for this is that it is simply easier to indoctrinate doctrines. It is very difficult to indoctrinate observational statements, or beliefs that are obviously true or false. It is for this reason that we generally use the word ‘indoctrination’ in connection with the teaching of doctrines (CI, pp. 123, 181). But this is a contingent, not a conceptual matter. The reason why we seldom talk of indoctrinating a ‘scientific fact’ is that it would be most difficult to obtain. But, it is conceivable, and even possible, as White demonstrates (CI, pp. 200f.). Here it is important, however, not to misunderstand what is being said when it is claimed that indoctrination is more likely to occur with regard to doctrines. I have argued that however doctrines are defined, they are to be found in science as well as religion. Thus the suggestion that doctrines are more susceptible to indoctrination does not mean that indoctrination is more probable in the areas of religion, politics, and morality, as is generally assumed. Indoctrination may be just as common in the area of science as in the area of religion because there are doctrines in both areas. Much more would need to be done to establish that indoctrination is indeed just as probable in science as in religion. For example, it would have to be shown that there are just as many doctrines, i.e. non-falsifiable, first-order principles of broad scope and importance, in the area of science as in the area of religion. To show this might be difficult, if not impossible. zyxw 16 zyxwvu E. J. Thiessen Thus, we cannot come to any final conclusions concerning the comparative probability of indoctrination in science as against religion. However, I believe it can be safely maintained that there are doctrines in science, as indeed in all areas of knowledge. I therefore suggest, that the difference in the probability of indoctrination between science and religion is not as great as is generally assumed. I would finally suggest that some of the arguments against religious education, or even against the very possibility of religious education are not as strong as is sometimes assumed. Correspondence: Elmer J. Thiessen, Medicine Hat College, Medicine Hat, Alberta T 1A 3Y6, Canada. zyxwv zyxwvut zyxwvutsrq zyxwvuts NOTES AND REFERENCES [I] PETERS,R.S. (1966) Ethics and Education, p. 41 (London, Allen & Unwin). (21 FLEW,ANTONY(1972) Indoctrination and religion, in: SNOOK,LA. (Ed.) Concepts of Indoctrination, p. 114 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). Hereinafter, cited in the text as CI. (31 SNOOK,LA. (1972) Zndoctrination and Education, pp. 56f.. 68, 74f. (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). Hereinafter, cited in the text as IE. [4] For example, Snook, Flew and Green all tend to use ‘doctrine’ and ‘ideology’ interchangeably (IE, p. 37; CI, pp. 152, 70f., 8lf., 85f., 37f.). Since it is generally assumed that there is an etymological connection between ‘indoctrination’ and ‘doctrines’, 1 will interpret the content criterion in terms of a limitation to doctrinal beliefs, rather than to ideologies. This restriction should not affect the soundness of my critical evaluation of the content criterion. Further, my arguments can easily be extended to include the notion of ideology but such extrapolation will not be undertaken in this paper. [S] John Wilson’s essays are contained in HOLLINS, T.H.B. (Ed.) (1964) Aims in Education, pp. 24-46 (Manchester University Press). Hereinafter, cited in the text as AE. See also Wilson’s essays in Snook’s anthology (C1, pp, 17-24, 101-105). The essays by Antony Flew and I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods are also found in Snook’s anthology (CI, pp. 67-92, 106-1 16, 162-189). [6] BARBOUR, IAN(1971) Issues in Science and Religion. p. 1 (New York, Harper & Row). [7] GUTHRIE, STEWART (1980) A cognitive theory of religion. Current Anthropology, pp. 181-203, Hereinafter, Guthrie. (81 See, for example, FEYERABEND, PAUL(1975) Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, chapter 5 (London, New Left Books). [9] DIAMOND, M.L. & LITZENBURG, T.V. (Eds) (1975) The Logic of God: Theology and VeriJication,p. 38 (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merill Co. Inc.). Hereinafter, Diamond & Litzenburg. [lo] SMART,PATRICIA (1973) The concept of indoctrination, in: LANGFORD, GLENN(Ed.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education, pp. 41f. (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). Hereinafter, Smart. [ I I ] LAURA, R.S. (1978) Philosophical foundations of religious education, Educational Theory, pp. 310-3 17. Hereinafter, Laura. MILLER, JOHNF. Science and religion: their logical similarity, in: DIAMOND & LITZENBURG, op. cit., pp. 351-380. Hereinafter, Miller. See. also T. F. Green and J. P. White in C1, pp. 29ff., 193. 1121 Flew, in an essay, The Jensen uproar (1973). describes the reaction of the scientific community to Arthur Jensen’s studies on IQ, and his suggestion “that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average NegroWhite intelligence difference. . . . The original publication occasioned an enormous coast to coast brouhaha of protest and denunciation; including tyre-slashing, slogan-painting, telephone abuse and threats, and strident demands to ‘Fire’ or even to ‘Kill Jensen’” (Philosophy, 48, p. 63). Smart informs us that the history of nonEuclidean geometry during the early nineteenth century provides us with further examples of incorrigibly held beliefs in science. Smart, p. 37. RUDY(1979) Kuhn, education and the grounds of rationality, 29, pp. 117-127. [I31 See FENNELL, JON& LIVERETTE, & LIVERETTE, p. 118. [I41 Quoted by FENNELL (151 J. S. Mill, in commenting on the disagreement that exists over first principles in morality, points out that “similar discordance exist(s) respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed most certain of them-mathematics” (Utilitarianism, chapter I). [ 161 Miller, p. 380; QUINE,W.V. & ULLIAN, J.S. (1978) Web of BelieJ chapter 2 (New York, Random House). [ 171 For example, ROUBICZEK, PAUL(1966) traces Nazi values to Nietsche, who in turn was influenced by Darwin (Existentialism: For and Against, chapters I, 2 especially, pp. 20, 34 (Cambridge University Press). [IS] TRIGG, ROGER(1973) Reason and Committment, p. 41 (Cambridge University Press). It should also be. noted that this description of doctrines might be suggested by a certain view of religious language arising out of the positivist challenge. Instead of focusing on the cognitive aspect of religious belief, meaning is here located in the Indoctrination and Doctrines zy zy 17 zyxwvu zyxwvu zyxwvuts believer’s response. However, this view of religious language is by no means accepted by all philosophers and theologians, and it would surely be inadvisable to define ‘doctrines’ in such a way that it is based on a certain view of religious language which is itself a point of debate. MUGGERIDGE, MALCOLM (1975) Jesus: the Man Who Lives, p. 25 (London, Fontana/Collins). DEWEY, JOHN (1916/1966) Democracy and Education, chapter 17 (New York, The Free Press). Guthrie, pp. 184f. MILL,J.S. Ufititarianism, chapter 1. Smart, p. 40. Websfer’s Third New International Dictionary (1976) hints at this limitation of ‘doctrine’ when it defines ‘indoctrinate’ as “to give instruction esp, in fundamentals or rudiments”. Snook also argues that “the basic assumptions and postulates of an empirical science qualify as doctrines” (IE, p. 35). QUINE.W.V. (1953) Two dogmas of empiricism, in From a Logical Poinf of View, section 6 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press). Green, CI, p. 31. See Miller, p. 360; Guthrie, pp. 192, 196. Miller, p. 360 Laura, pp. 312ff. Elsewhere, 1 have argued that past attempts to define ‘indoctrination’ in terms of one or more other criteria, including the methods criterion have failed. See THIESSEN, E.J. (1980) Indoctrination, education and religion: a philosophical analysis, PhD dissertation, University of Waterloo.