Books by Mark E. Jonas
Routledge, 2018
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical legacy for education is a source of enduring conflict among s... more Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical legacy for education is a source of enduring conflict among scholars. For some, Nietzsche’s seemingly radical ideas about perspectival knowledge and authentic self-creation appear to encourage the individual to cast aside all social, moral and epistemic constraints. Nietzsche seems to offer an educational vision that is inimical to organized education. Others maintain that Nietzsche endorses an elitist political order which openly militates against democratic values. Nietzsche must therefore be an enemy of democratic education, it seems. In this book, we argue that both of these interpretations of Nietzsche’s educational legacy are seriously mistaken. Nietzsche advocates neither licentious individualism nor radical elitism, but rather advocates a compelling and coherent vision of human flourishing which aims to promote the excellence of all individuals. Not only can Nietzsche serve as a crucial source of educational inspiration for modern democratic societies, but his educational philosophy offers four powerful educational ideas—perspectivism, self-overcoming, ressentiment and noble culture—which yield four compelling educational aims for the modern democratic school: empathizing with the perspectives of others, learning to think controversially, cultivating a disposition of gratitude, and creating a culture of emulation. Hence, this book is a committed effort to determine Nietzsche’s true legacy for democratic education.
Peer-Reviewed Articles by Mark E. Jonas
Philosophical Inquiry in Education, 2019
The thesis of this paper is that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtue in his i... more The thesis of this paper is that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtue in his interlocutors is not to lead them to the knowledge of virtue through dialogue, but to encourage them to participate in the practice of virtue, which will conform their souls to it. Put succinctly, the thesis of this paper is that the standard interpretation of Socrates as an intellectualist who believes that people develop a knowledge of virtue by way of dialogue and argument alone is incorrect, and that like Plato and Aristotle, Socrates affirms a habituation principle that is necessary for the cultivation of virtue.
Educational Theory, 2017
From the late eighteenth through the end of the nineteenth century, educational philosophers and ... more From the late eighteenth through the end of the nineteenth century, educational philosophers and practitioners debated the benefits and shortcomings of the use of emulation in schools. During this period, “emulation” referred to a pedagogy that leveraged comparisons between students as a tool to motivate them to higher achievement. Many educationists praised emulation as a necessary and effective motivator. Other educationists condemned it for its tendency to foster invidious competition between students and to devalue learning. Ultimately, by the late nineteenth century emulation as a specific pedagogical practice had disappeared in American educational culture. In this article, Mark Jonas and Drew Chambers ask whether the disappearance of emulation is something to be celebrated or lamented. To answer this question they examine the historical concept of educational emulation and analyze the bases on which proponents and opponents argued. Parties on both sides of the debate framed their arguments in close relation to the way emulation was being used at that time, which prioritized actual competitions and prizes. In that context, the opponents made a better case, which presumably contributed to emulation's disappearance in schools afterwards. However, as earlier proponents of emulation argued, emulation need not be restricted to competitions and prizes. Instead, these proponents offered a philosophically and psychologically rich defense of emulation, but these were not carried through to an appropriate degree. The authors conclude that, construed appropriately, emulation not only had tremendous educational potential then, but still does today. With intentional effort on the part of teachers, emulation can greatly enrich students' lives and act as a powerful learning motivator.
Western democracies have long been concerned with social equality and individual liberties—especi... more Western democracies have long been concerned with social equality and individual liberties—especially the liberty of each individual to maximize their talents and abilities. These values often come into conflict however, especially in the face of vastly unequal distributions of talent, ability, and upbringing among citizens. The question is, how can democracies maximize equality while simultaneously maximizing individual liberties? While this paper does not offer an answer to this question, it offers a framework for how to think about the question. The framework comes from an unlikely source: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as Educator. Schopenhauer as Educator has long been considered an anti-democratic text par excellence. In spite of its reputation, it offers insights into how democracies might think about balancing the impulse towards equality and liberty. Specifically, it affords an image of a cultural flourishing in which individuals genuinely achieve (partial) equality while simultaneously genuinely achieving individual flourishing—all within a context of significant inequality of talent and achievement.
In this paper, I argue that there are three broadly held misconceptions of Plato’s philosophy tha... more In this paper, I argue that there are three broadly held misconceptions of Plato’s philosophy that work against his relevance for contemporary moral education. The first is that he is an intellectualist who is concerned only with the cognitive aspect of moral development and does not sufficiently emphasize the affective and conative aspects; the second is that he is an elitist who believes that only philosopher-kings can attain true knowledge of virtue and it is they who should govern society; the third is that he affirms the Realm of the Forms as a literal metaphysical reality and believes that for individuals to attain virtue they must access this Realm through contemplation. The goal of this paper is to correct these misconceptions. By rehabilitating Plato’s reputation, future researchers in moral education may discover his philosophy new avenues for exploration in how best to cultivate virtues in students.
Following Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) it has been commonplace to regard Plato’s moral theory as “int... more Following Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) it has been commonplace to regard Plato’s moral theory as “intellectualist,” where Plato supposedly believes that becoming virtuous requires nothing other than “philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good” (30). This is a radical misunderstanding of Plato’s educational program, however. While Plato claims that knowledge is extremely important in the initial stages of the moral development of young adults, he also claims that knowledge must be followed by a rigorous process of imitation and habituation. Like Aristotle, Plato believes that it is not possible to become virtuous if one does not practice the virtues under the guidance of virtuous role models. This paper seeks to illuminate this little recognized aspect of Plato’s educational program. When properly understood, Plato’s theory offers educators important insights into how best to encourage the moral development of young adults.
Over the last decade, philosophers of education have begun taking a renewed interest in Rousseau’... more Over the last decade, philosophers of education have begun taking a renewed interest in Rousseau’s educational thought. This is a welcome development as his ideas are rich with educational insights. His philosophy is not without its flaws, however. One significant flaw is his educational project for females, which is sexist in the highest degree. Rousseau argues that females should be taught to “please men…and make [men’s] lives agreeable and sweet.” The question becomes how could Rousseau make such strident claims, especially in light of his far more insightful ideas concerning the education of males. This paper attempts to make sense of Rousseau’s ideas on the education of females. While I maintain that Rousseau’s project for Sophie ought to be rejected, I argue that we should try to understand how this otherwise insightful thinker could make such surprising claims. Is it a bizarre inconsistency in his philosophical reasoning or an expression of his unabashed misogyny, as so many have claimed? I argue that it is neither. Rather, it is a product of his conception of human happiness and his belief in the irreducible role human sexual relations has in achieving and prolonging that happiness. For Rousseau, sex, love and happiness are inextricably connected, and he believes that men and women will be happiest when they inhabit certain sex roles—not because sex roles are valuable in themselves, but because only through them can either men or women hope to be happy.
While a great deal has been written on Plato's Lysis in philosophy and philology journals over th... more While a great deal has been written on Plato's Lysis in philosophy and philology journals over the last thirty years, nothing has been published on Lysis in the major Anglo-American philosophy of education journals during that time. Nevertheless, this dialogue deserves attention from educators. In this essay, Mark Jonas argues that Lysis can serve as a model for educators who want to move their students beyond mere aporia, but also do not want to dictate answers to students. Although the dialogue ends in Socrates's affirmation of aporia, his affirmation is actually meant to persuade his interlocutors to reflect on an epiphany they had previously experienced. In what follows, Jonas offers a close reading of relevant passages of Lysis, demonstrating the way that Socrates leads his interlocutors to an epiphany without forcing his answers upon them.
In the first introduction of The Science of Knowledge, Fichte claims that there are two legitimat... more In the first introduction of The Science of Knowledge, Fichte claims that there are two legitimate philosophical systems: dogmatism and idealism. He then asserts that only idealism allows individuals to retain their concept of personal freedom, whereas dogmatism requires that individuals give up that concept. I argue that on his own grounds Fichte is incorrect on this point. After a close examination of his theory, I attempt to demonstrate the possibility of a non-idealistic libertarian using Fichte’s explanation of self-positing as the foundation for her libertarianism. I hope to show that Fichte’s defense for the necessarily free act of self-positing is legitimate not only for his idealist system, but also for at least one non-idealistic system as well. The act of self-positing is indeed the only legitimate foundation for freedom, but that does not entail that freedom can only found in idealism.
I argue that recent interpretations of Nietzsche's political theory that make him out to be a Mac... more I argue that recent interpretations of Nietzsche's political theory that make him out to be a Machiavellian elitist are misguided. While Nietzsche's philosophy advocates a return to an order of rank among individuals, it does not entail the domination of the few over the many. Rather, it is meant to benefit all individuals, whatever their rank. To this end, I examine several Machiavellian interpretations and demonstrate the inadequacy of their exegetical evidence. I then turn to Nietzsche's educational theory and show the ways it supports and expands his political vision for the flourishing of the few and the many.
Abstract In Book II of the Republic (370c-372d), Socrates briefly depicts a city where each inhab... more Abstract In Book II of the Republic (370c-372d), Socrates briefly depicts a city where each inhabitant contributes to the welfare of all by performing the role for which he or she is naturally suited. Socrates calls this city the ‘true city’ and the ‘healthy one’. Nearly all commentators have argued that Socrates’ praise of the city cannot be taken at face value, claiming that it does not represent Socrates’ preferred community. The point of this paper is to argue otherwise. The claim is that Socrates genuinely believes the city is a healthy and desirable city, and that he believes that the First City (the so-called ‘city of pigs’) is in fact superior to the Kallipolis.
Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to... more Patricia White (Stud Philos Educ 18:43–52, 1999) argues that the virtue gratitude is essential to a flourishing democracy because it helps foster universal and reciprocal amity between citizens. Citizens who participate in this reciprocal relationship ought to be encouraged to recognize that “much that people do does in fact help to make communal civic life less brutish, pleasanter and more flourishing.” This is the case even when the majority of citizens do not intentionally seek to make civic life better for others. Were citizens to recognize the appropriateness of gratitude in these situations, the bonds of our democratic communities would be strengthened. In this paper, I examine White’s argument more carefully, arguing that it fails to address adequately the difficulties that arise when we attempt to encourage the virtue of gratitude in our students. To address these difficulties, I turn to an unlikely source for democratic inspiration: Friedrich Nietzsche. In spite of his well-known anti-democratic sentiments, Nietzsche offers democratic citizens insights into the social value of gratitude. I argue that Nietzsche’s ideas resolve the educational difficulties in White’s argument and viably establish gratitude as an important democratic virtue that ought to be cultivated.
Many teachers in teacher education programs are cursorily introduced to Dewey’s ‘epochmaking’ ide... more Many teachers in teacher education programs are cursorily introduced to Dewey’s ‘epochmaking’ ideas on interest and effort through discussions based on the need for child-centered pedagogies that utilize students’ interests. Unfortunately, this strategy often tacitly encourages teachers to over-rely on students’ interests. In this paper, I recommend a way of introducing Dewey’s conception of interest that avoids the common pitfall of over-reliance on students’ interests. I argue that if we focus on the changes Dewey made to the expression of his philosophy during a seventeen-year period, we can help illuminate the force of his theory while protecting against unfortunate misinterpretations.
Avi Mintz (2008) has recently argued that Anglo-American educators have a tendency to alleviate s... more Avi Mintz (2008) has recently argued that Anglo-American educators have a tendency to alleviate student suffering in the classroom. According to Mintz, this tendency can be detrimental because certain kinds of suffering actually enhance student learning. While Mintz compellingly describes the effects of educator’s desires to alleviate suffering in students, he does not examine one of the roots of the desire: the feeling of compassion or pity (used as synonyms here). Compassion leads many teachers to unreflectively alleviate student struggles. While there are certainly times when compassion is necessary to help students learn, there are other times when it must be overcome. Compassion in the classroom is a two-edged sword that must be carefully employed; and yet it is often assumed that it is an unequivocal good that ought to trump all other impulses. In this article I hope to raise awareness concerning the promises and pitfalls of compassion in education by examining the theories of two historical figures who famously emphasised compassion in their philosophical writings: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche. Rousseau and Nietzsche argue that compassion is a powerful educational force but that it must be properly employed. For Rousseau and Nietzsche, compassion is necessary to develop self-mastery in human beings—the ultimate goal of education—but it is a compassion that must hurt in order to help. My hope is that Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s ideas on compassion will encourage thoughtful reflection on the uses and abuses of compassion in education.
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely mis... more In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads to a con- ception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some of the prominent features of the so-called ‘‘debate’’ of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I then offer an alternative con- ception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding of Nietzsche’s ‘‘anti-democratic’’ pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian, it can be effectively utilized in ‘‘democratic’’ classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
Journal of Philosophy of …, Jan 1, 2008
In his 2001 article ‘Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education’, Stefan Ramaekers defends ... more In his 2001 article ‘Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education’, Stefan Ramaekers defends Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism against the charge that it is relativistic. He argues that perspectivism is not relativistic because it denies the dichotomy between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world, a dichotomy central to claims to relativism. While Ramaekers' article is correct in denying relativistic interpretations of perspectivism it does not go far enough in this direction. In fact, the way Ramaekers makes his case may actually encourage the charge of relativism, especially when it comes to his appropriation of perspectivism for education. This article proposes to pick up where Ramaekers left off. It will argue that Nietzsche's denial of the opposition between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world opens up the possibility for the reestablishment of truth, albeit in a modified form. After examining Nietzsche's modified ‘realist’ epistemology, the paper will explore the implications of it for his philosophy of education. It will be argued that Nietzsche's educational philosophy is founded on his concept of perspectivism in so far as he demands that students be rigorously inculcated into a pedagogical framework that teaches students to discriminate between ‘true’ and ‘false’ perspectives. This framework is essential for the development of an intellectually robust and life-affirming culture.
ojs.ed.uiuc.edu
Ashley Taylor's goal in "Can You Hear Me: Questioning Dialogue Across Differences of Ability" is ... more Ashley Taylor's goal in "Can You Hear Me: Questioning Dialogue Across Differences of Ability" is to demonstrate the ways power structures inherent to dialogue across differences of ability serve to "challenge the goals of dialogue and the possibilities for mutual understanding that are central to the project." Arguably, she has unquestionably met her goal -and with clarity and elegance. Upon finishing her essay, a very clear sense of the problems that attend dialogue across differences of abilities is evident. Indeed, her is essay so convincing that while she refuses to consider the difficulties insurmountable, I am ready to do so -that is, at least under the terms Taylor describes.
Book Chapters by Mark E. Jonas
Virtues in the Public Sphere, 2019
In this chapter, I examine Plato’s ideas on the necessity of political leaders to be virtuous in ... more In this chapter, I examine Plato’s ideas on the necessity of political leaders to be virtuous in the highest degree. In the contemporary Western world, we want our political officials to be honest and intelligent, but we are less concerned with the whole range of virtues like generosity, gratitude, temperance. So long as our leaders are modestly civil, and as long as they are not corrupt, and as long as they can manage the business of running the state, we are content to ignore most of their
vices. Explicitly or implicitly, we assume that their most important qualities are intellectual or managerial, but not moral. Plato assumes otherwise. While he does believe political leaders must have outstanding intellectual qualities if a society is to flourish, he equally believes that they must also have outstanding moral qualities. Plato claims that a city’s happiness is ultimately dependent on the moral quality of
its leaders and the leaders’ ability to foster virtue in their citizens. Social well-being is not determined by economic wealth, political power, or military might, but by the extent to which leaders and citizens embody justice, temperance, wisdom and courage. The question I seek to answer in this chapter is: why does Plato think virtues are necessary for good leadership, and how those virtues can be cultivated in future leaders. To answer these questions, I will examine Plato’s longest and most detailed expression of his political philosophy: the Laws. As I have argued elsewhere (Jonas and Nakazawa, 2012), it is misguided to interpret the Republic as Plato’s ultimate expression of his political philosophy. The Republic is primarily a pedagogical text aimed at the transformation of Glaucon’s soul, and not a treatise that aims to lay out a preferred political order. The Laws, by contrast, is a better representation of Plato’s political philosophy, although even here the Laws cannot be said to be the exact constitution that Plato would want to see enacted.
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Books by Mark E. Jonas
Peer-Reviewed Articles by Mark E. Jonas
Book Chapters by Mark E. Jonas
vices. Explicitly or implicitly, we assume that their most important qualities are intellectual or managerial, but not moral. Plato assumes otherwise. While he does believe political leaders must have outstanding intellectual qualities if a society is to flourish, he equally believes that they must also have outstanding moral qualities. Plato claims that a city’s happiness is ultimately dependent on the moral quality of
its leaders and the leaders’ ability to foster virtue in their citizens. Social well-being is not determined by economic wealth, political power, or military might, but by the extent to which leaders and citizens embody justice, temperance, wisdom and courage. The question I seek to answer in this chapter is: why does Plato think virtues are necessary for good leadership, and how those virtues can be cultivated in future leaders. To answer these questions, I will examine Plato’s longest and most detailed expression of his political philosophy: the Laws. As I have argued elsewhere (Jonas and Nakazawa, 2012), it is misguided to interpret the Republic as Plato’s ultimate expression of his political philosophy. The Republic is primarily a pedagogical text aimed at the transformation of Glaucon’s soul, and not a treatise that aims to lay out a preferred political order. The Laws, by contrast, is a better representation of Plato’s political philosophy, although even here the Laws cannot be said to be the exact constitution that Plato would want to see enacted.
vices. Explicitly or implicitly, we assume that their most important qualities are intellectual or managerial, but not moral. Plato assumes otherwise. While he does believe political leaders must have outstanding intellectual qualities if a society is to flourish, he equally believes that they must also have outstanding moral qualities. Plato claims that a city’s happiness is ultimately dependent on the moral quality of
its leaders and the leaders’ ability to foster virtue in their citizens. Social well-being is not determined by economic wealth, political power, or military might, but by the extent to which leaders and citizens embody justice, temperance, wisdom and courage. The question I seek to answer in this chapter is: why does Plato think virtues are necessary for good leadership, and how those virtues can be cultivated in future leaders. To answer these questions, I will examine Plato’s longest and most detailed expression of his political philosophy: the Laws. As I have argued elsewhere (Jonas and Nakazawa, 2012), it is misguided to interpret the Republic as Plato’s ultimate expression of his political philosophy. The Republic is primarily a pedagogical text aimed at the transformation of Glaucon’s soul, and not a treatise that aims to lay out a preferred political order. The Laws, by contrast, is a better representation of Plato’s political philosophy, although even here the Laws cannot be said to be the exact constitution that Plato would want to see enacted.