Natural Law Theory

Автор статьи анализирует научное наследие выдающегося историка и философа Евгения Спекторского. В статье рассматриваются некоторые детали его биографии, так как история жизни Е. Спекторского в эмиграции еще недостаточно исследована современным научным сообществом. В центре статьи-проблема социальной физики, разрабатывавшаяся Спекторским в фокусе историко-философского анализа. Автор исследует вопрос о том, каким образом Спекторский описывает происхождение социальной физики через изучения диалога между идеями естественного и социального. В статье доказывается, что Спекторский считал социальную жизнь древнего общества главным идейным фундаментом физического миросозерцания Нового времени, которое породило феномен социальной физики. Ключевые слова: Е.В. Спекторский, социальная физика, русская философия, философия русского зарубежья, история русской эмиграции

Are you like the man in Kafka's Parable of the Law, waiting outside a forbidding castle for the law?  Or are you just waiting outside a legislature or for the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court to know what the law is?  Are you waiting in the wrong place?  This paper looks at Natural Law theory as developed by Thomas Aquinas, with its theory of value, theory or right action and virtue by which every rational being with free will through reflective reasoning can access the law, without waiting for the guards to let you in.  We also look at this history of natural law through the Enlightenment and the Age of Science, the rise of Legal Positivism, the natural law revival after WWII, the substrata of "un-natural" law that uses the veneer of natural law to advance its agenda, and the "new" natural law and contemporary natural lawyers and their approach to the theory that just won't go away.

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The origins of Natural Law are obscure.  The earliest societies had no conception of a Divine Rule Maker.  The Gods and Spirits were capricious; omit your rituals or fail to supply the Gods with their quota of still beating hearts, and the sun may not rise in the morning.  From the pre-Socratics, to Plato and Aristotle to the Stoics, Natural law takes on the features that still influence legal philosophy and politics to this day: rationalism, universalism, the ethical and moral necessity of law and the ability for all to access the logos of the universe through observation, experience, contemplation and God given reason.  In this first introductory look at Natural law, we cover the period up to the Stoics, and their most notable practitioner, Marcus Aurelius, and consider what their ancient wisdom might tell us about our modern world.

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The paper considers different ways of referring to Vico in the context of the so-called "cultural turn" and its predecessors. It is shown that the most important aim of the "cultural turn"-to make explicit forms of thought that have already formed us-has its beginnings in Vico's works and has profoundly influenced the contemporary development of humanities.

Истраживања и човекова непресушна радозналост, философи и научници свих
наука припадали су разним мишљењима и школама кроз векове. Доколицом, чуђењем,
постављањем питања, истраживањем, сазнавањем и схватањем све науке, тако и право,
су се развиле и разгранале у различитим правцима. Овај рад се, конкретно, бави
природном и позитивном школом права и разноликошћу те две школе. Да ли је
метафизика и у коликој мери, присутна у нашим животима, или је то пак, пуко
претпостављање које нам не може помоћи у нашем овоземаљском животу где свако
стреми доказима. Историја нам је врло битан фактор јер је знање развоја ових школа у
прошлости кључ за разумевање истих у садашњости. Ослањајући се на рад великих
правника и (правних) философа попут Ханса Келсена, Гвида Фасоа, Радомира Лукића,
Густава Радбруха и др.  циљ рада јесте да приредим упоредни преглед кроз призму
историје и историје философије. Приређујем упоредне аспекте природно правних
теорија од антике (Софиста, Платона и Аристотела) преко средњег века (Светог Августина
Ипонског и Томе Аквинског) до новог века (Томаса Хобса, Џона Лока, Емануела Канта) са
философима правницима позитивноправне школе (Конт, Остин, Келзен). Природном
праву сам посветио мало више пажње зато што је то једна од ретких идеја која се
одржала преко два миленијума и била заступљена од највећих философа свих врмена.

Saying that human dignity constitutes a problem may require explanation. It is in fact one of those things that we like to take for granted, and thus not to consider a problem. At the same time, paradoxically, we may be so sceptical about the possibility of bringing it into focus that we aren’t willing even to consider as amounting to a problem. Between these two extreme, but common, attitudes this article addresses the problem of identifying what human dignity is, what we mean by the expression and what we refer to when we intend what is meant by the expression. Discussions about this have often turned into a competition between different traditions and worldviews that provide incompatible ‘foundations’ for human dignity, a competition that seems to have to be ‘won’ before a discussion of the nature of human dignity can begin. Such competition misses the point that we must mean something by the word for us to find it meaningful in order to fight about it. The ‘problem’ of human dig...

Introduction
I recently read Howard Kislowicz’s review of Benjamin L. Berger’s Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism. This thought-provoking analysis explores how law engages with religion, often imposing its own cultural commitments on diverse faith practices. The review was particularly relevant to my ongoing reflections on a critical question: when, if ever, do Christians owe duties to God that compel us to defy governmental authority?
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                     
Kislowicz and Berger do not fully address this question, as their analysis assumes that governments inherently possess the authority to adjudicate the legality of religious beliefs and conduct. Nevertheless, Kislowicz makes an intriguing observation: if governments are to regulate religious practices, they should do so with an understanding rooted in the lived experiences of believers rather than abstract legal theory.
                                                                                                                                                 


I agree that lived experience must inform any consideration of religious rights. This approach aligns with Christ’s teachings, particularly his two great commandments, which emphasize the primacy of each individual’s personal relationship with God in discerning our duties to Him and to earthly authorities. Christ’s message is clear: when our duty to God conflicts with our duty to government, obedience to God must prevail.
                                                                                                                                         
These reflections are not merely theoretical for me. As I work on my response to the Washington State Bar Association’s challenge to my assertion that Senior Judge Robart is not a constitutionally competent judge, I find these questions at the heart of my advocacy. In a system where judicial officers fail to embody impartiality and neutrality, how can we reconcile our duties as citizens with our higher obligations to divine justice?

Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law–such as the provisions of pt IV div 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)–tries to tackle this negative impact through civil and criminal remedies. The prohibition of cartels is most commonly justified on economic grounds. However, reference is also often made to broader moral grounds for proscribing cartels–for example, it is commonly stated that cartels are deceptive, unfair or engaged in a form of cheating. This article advances a unified account of the moral status of cartels that integrates both economic and moral factors. It does so by emphasising the relationship of cartel behaviour to the moral duty to promote the common good. Cartels are wrong because they undermine the role of open and competitive markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that leads to seriously harmful economic outcomes. This combination of factors supplies a ro...

This contribution to a symposium on Samantha Frost's Lessons from a Materialist Thinker considers her innovative reinterpretation of Thomas Hobbes's philosophy, situating him as a precursor of New Materialism. Frost's reading emphasizes Hobbes's conception of human beings as 'thinking bodies' inextricably intertwined with their environment. This materialist conception leads to a relational, peace-oriented ethic rooted in our interdependence. Frost's interpretation is contrasted with those of Arash Abizadeh and Stephen Darwall. Abizadeh identifies two normative dimensions in Hobbes's ethics: the prudential and the juridical. This perspective highlights the role of contractual obligations, which is less prominent in Frost's interpretation. Darwall's projectivist interpretation suggests that Hobbes saw ethical judgments as projections of our desires onto the world, which potentially challenges Frost's materialist reading. While acknowledging the tensions between these interpretations, it is argued that Frost's reinterpretation offers valuable insights for addressing contemporary ethical and political challenges.

Once upon a time, there was sex – an obvious characteristic that branched off into female and male ways of being in the world. But anatomy does not explain everything. Today we have a term to describe how, in any society, human beings experience their sexed bodies. How do we learn to become womanly or manly? How do we accept or reject the sex we are assigned at birth? To answer these questions, gender comes into play. Indeed, that’s when genders come into play. This word helps us express attitudes, roles, and identities but also reveals disparities in morals and social representations. This book reconstructs a long journey from the recognition of universal rights to the appreciation of gender as a lived, transformable and transferable difference.  Erudite and normative, it envisions a neomodern future: neither a utopia nor a dystopia, but the unfinished project of gender eudemonism.

Together, the essays in this book present a historical and political theology of Christianity, arranged along a shared narrative arc covering the origins of the Hebrew Bible, the Jesus movement, and the early Christian church in Greco-Roman antiquity. 
The next part considers the extent to which the rise and fall of early medieval Anglo-Saxon Christendom was influenced by the “project of peoplehood” represented by the Hebrew Bible.  Moving into modern history, several essays illustrate the contemporary crisis of Anglo-Protestant theology first discussed in the Introduction and Chapter One. 
The book culminates in a (clearly counter-intuitive) call for cooperation between throne and altar in the ethno-(re)genesis of all British-descended peoples.  Any such process will require a classically republican reformation of religious and civil institutions now overseeing the deliberate degeneration of historic Anglo cultures into mere economic zones populated by rootless, shifting masses of morally debased monads.

It is a common mistake of contemporary natural law scholarship to overestimate the ancient Greeks' contribution to a meaningful theory of natural law and to mistake an appeal to unwritten law with natural law's criteria for normative validity. This paper was designed to elaborate on two interrelated queries. On the one hand, it labours to reconstruct the ancient Greeks' understanding of a hierarchy of law, which is answered in the affirmative. On the other hand, the paper inquires whether there existed any meaningful sense of natural law in the Classical period, to which question the Archytean nexus of law and natural justice is offered as a palpable compromise.

Lell, H. M., Escudero Giménez, R. ., Lafferriere, N., Ratti Mendaña, F., & Macbeth, G. (2024). Dignidad y autonomía en el discurso de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Experiencia de trabajo con un diccionario de términos. Revista de Humanidades Digitales, 9, 95–113. https://doi.org/10.5944/rhd.vol.9.2024.40224

Breve análisis del artículo: "De la tesis de la doble naturaleza de Alexy a un "iusnaturalismo moderado": una propuesta de comprensión de los derechos fundamentales implícitos a partir de la jurisprudencia constitucional de Perú y chile" de José Chávez Fernández Postigo & Piero Rios Carrillo.

In this paper, I seek to introduce, define, and ultimately defend the concept of 'evil law', which is needed to make sense of what Green calls the 'immorality that law makes possible', i.e., the recognition that law has the capacity not only to deter, but also to produce moral iniquity. Firstly, I argue that evil law is distinct from merely bad or unjust law in that it does not create even pro tanto moral duties and can be defined as law, which, if interpreted in its best light, will inflict or enable intolerable harm (including atrocities) to victims themselves. Secondly, I claim that evil law is indeed law despite objections from both its external and internal immorality. Instead of eschewing legality, evil regimes benefit from it in a number of ways. Thirdly, I answer the challenge that using the vocabulary of 'evil' law is at best reductive and at worst dangerous. Correctly defined, the concept of evil law does not hinder but instead aids us in asking further questions about this phenomenon's nature. Even more so, proper use of the concept helps to articulate the horror evil law inflicts on those marginalised and corrupted by it. Fourthly and finally, I look at the reasonsboth theoretical and moralwhy using the concept of evil law is valuable. Theoretically, employing the concept introduced in the paper helps to understand evil law as a phenomenon with a familiar legal nature and, at the same time, a distinct normative payoff. Morally, it aids us in searching for the best ways of responding to it, both contemporaneously and in its aftermath.

The New Digest is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Last year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) celebrated its 75th anniversary. Notwithstanding the usefulness it has so o en proved to have, as a MANAGING EDITORS-NEW DIGEST 25

This Book of Abstracts collects the Abstracts of the 24th Conference of the European Society for Philosophy of Religion: Human Nature and Religion.

About ESPR
The European Society for Philosophy of Religion provides a forum for researchers employing different approaches to the philosophy of religion. For further info, please visit the website:
http://www.philosophy-of-religion.org

The intellectual legacy of Isidore of Seville is impressive. The Sevillian left behind hundreds of pages of texts that are a subject of reflection of theologians, historians, philosophers and literary scholars. The author of Etymologiae, as a talented compiler, created a cohesive vision of law, that resonates indirectly in contemporary philosophy of law. The aim of this paper is to show one possible path of implementation of a fragment of the intellectual legacy of the bishop of Seville to explore and expand readers' horizons in legal philosophy. Isidore of Seville did not create his own school of natural law, but his works affected Thomas Aquinas, to name one. The bishop of Seville can hardly be called solely a thoughtless copyist, because the model of law that he proposed is largely a universal and timeless canon explored by today's outstanding philosophers and theoreticians of law, such as L.L. Fuller or R. Dworkin. Despite the passage of fifteen centuries since the birth of the bishop of Seville, it turns out that the answer to the question of what should a good law be like is still a subject of discourse among lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, sociologists or anthropologists of culture. In order to present the intellectual legacy of the Sevillian, this article uses the method of historical investigation, comparison and linguistic analysis.

The aim of this study is to discuss information on the origins of natural law (ius naturale) in Etymologiae (Etymologiarum sive Originarum libri XX) written by St. Isidore of Seville (d. 636). Such a choice of the subject matter seems reasonable mainly because research on Christian concepts of natural law as a rule places the study of St. Thomas Aquinas's natural law theory as its focal point. Previous Christian concepts are only briefly touched upon. Meanwhile, they have immense historical significance that have determined the entire Christian reflection on the idea of natural law since as early as the 13th century. The research allows a conclusion that the definition of natural law constructed by St. Isidore of Seville, along with the examples presented in his Etymologiae, is an exceptional creation that has no clear archetype in juridical and non-juridical sources. It quite clearly presents elements taken from Ulpian. However, the very essence of natural law as a normative system, that connects all people (not people and animals) due to their "natural instinct" (instinctus naturae) and that is independent of the will of the positive legislator, remains under a marked influence of the Christian thought.

As formulated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila
represents the core values agreed upon during the meetings of the Body of
Investigators for Preparatory Efforts for Indonesian Independence and the
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence. These values were
subsequently adopted as the Foundation of the Indonesian State. However,
the question persist regarding whether Pancasila can be considered as the
grundnorm within Hans Kelsen’s framework in his pure theory of law. This
study finds that the grundnorm, as the highest source of legal obligation, is
accepted as a necessity by individuals as a necessity through their free will
and is inherently perceived as true. It exists in the practical reason of each
individual, is a priori, and is never formalized through state processes.
Pancasila, although fundamental, cannot be equated with the grundnorm as
its authority as the source of all state laws derives not from its content but
from its formal declaration by legislative and executive bodies. Despite
this, Pancasila serves as a unifying foundation that reconciles differences
in ethnicity, race, and religion, ensuring Indonesia’s sustainable existence,
transcending merely being a source of legal obligation

In "Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths," John Gardner argued that legal positivism should be understood only as a thesis about the validity of individual norms. This influential view has had the effect of discounting and marginalizing two other important questions about the separation or non-separation of law and morality: regarding the legal status of significantly immoral legal systems, and regarding the role of moral evaluation in the construction of theories about the nature of law. More importantly, there is far less attention now paid than there should be to the interesting theoretical question of the extent to which a position in favor of separation (or non-separation) on one topic entails, or at least strongly supports, a similar view on the other topics.

This work intends to face the question if it is possible to reconcile John Finnis' Neoclassical Theory of Natural Law, Economic Analysis of Law and the Tax Incidence Matrix Rule and how this illuminates the relationship between taxation and the common good. Therefore, it aims to demonstrate that the Economic Analysis of Law and the Incidence Matrix Rule are not only compatible with the Neoclassical Theory of Natural Law by John Finnis, but also as precious instruments for the authority to make the search for the common good effective. Having the realist tradition as an epistemic foundation, and using the dialectical method, and the hypothetical-deductive method, with the bibliographic review tool. The work is divided into 4 chapters: Natural Rights, Economic Analysis of Law and Incidence Matrix Rule. In the first 3 chapters a new layer will be inserted so that in the fourth chapter, the answer about the possibility of conciliation is the conclusion. Starting from the very first architectural principle of Practical Reason, good must be sought and evil must be avoided and the first substantial principles (life, knowledge, game, friendship, marriage, religion and practical reasonableness), going to the supreme principle of morality (love your neighbor as yourself) and the golden rule (do to others what you want them to do to you) where the requirements of practical reasonableness result in the morality of human action, reaching human flourishing, where each person must seek the goods human beings in a reasonable manner and the pursuit of each human person within the requirements of practical reasonableness. Common Good, such is the flowering of each person in the political community, being the substantive purpose of authority. The Economic Analysis of Law complements the criteria of justice as requirements of the common good, allowing the authority in the legislative or hermeneutical task to have before it the design of the structure of incentives that gives greater effectiveness to that intended objective, under the requirements of practical reasonableness, that is, a taxation that not only generates resources for the authority to pay for those goods that can only be achieved in a community way or even encourage/induce behaviors. The Incidence Matrix Rule, as a logical-semantic structure, gives the authority a greater degree of security and reduces the discretion of the judge. Thus, it is clear that a reconciliation between the Neoclassical Theory of Natural Law, the Economic Analysis of Law and the Incidence Matrix Rule is not only possible, but also desirable.

In this paper, I argue that a theory of natural law should admit that practical thought is distinct from and not derivative from speculative thought. While both practical and speculative thought have, in Aquinas’s words, “the aspect of truth,” this does not make practical thought derivative from speculative thought, unless one identifies truth with speculative thought. Rather, we should understand both practical and speculative thought to be distinct manifestations of intellect (or thought), as such ordered to the true, but the former ordered to action or operation and the latter to being or truth simply. This position places me somewhere between the ONL and NNL formulations of the issue, even though in the main, I am arguing for a distinction that NNL also argues for. Still, this paper does not provide or endorse a natural law theory (NNL, that is) but rather establishes contours within which one should exist. Thinkers that recognize the natural law and find a basis for ethics in truth about nature should recognize that practical and speculative reason are two distinct employments of the intellect, neither simply derivative from the other.

Moreso se ha referido a «los intocables del derecho» para aludir-desde su original imagen del derechoa cierto aspecto de la dimensión institucional de los sistemas jurídicos, por la que, precisamente debido a razones morales, algunas de sus decisiones institucionales no estarían sujetas a una lectura moral, ni ser directamente derrotadas por razones de carácter moral. El objetivo de este trabajo es esbozar la tesis de que Moreso acierta en plantear esta suerte de inmunidad institucional que clausura los sistemas a su permanente lectura moral, pero que ésta podría hallar no solo una mejor justificación sino ciertos matices, si estos «intocables institucionales» se complementasen con algunos «intocables morales» para el derecho-por así decirlo-, justificados en última instancia en una antropología algo más robusta pero no por ello incompatible con nuestros Estados Constitucionales de Derecho, y en una teoría de la acción moral humana que justifique la equidad no solo como un mecanismo o técnica, sino sobre todo como una virtud, tesis propias de la tradición aristotélica.

The common good is one of the central elements in the debate on contemporary natural law, as defined by Thomas Aquinas in his Treatise on Law, where it is presented as the end for which law is created. However, there are different interpretations of the meaning of the common good in law. Among these, the instrumental and transcendental approaches stand out in the Anglo-Saxon legal world, currently represented by John Finnis and Adrian Vermeule, respectively. This article aims to present both perspectives, comparing them and highlighting their similarities and divergences through a dialectical analysis of the main writings of these authors. It concludes that, despite theoretical differences, the doctrines exhibit practical agreements, allowing for greater dialogue and the establishment of bridges between supporters of each approach.

Bulletin d’histoire du traditionalisme, t. 4, 2024, p. 3-12 (« Michel Villey, filósofo del derecho natural », M. Ayuso (dir.), ¿ El derecho natural contra el derecho natural ? Historia y balance de un problema. Actas de las VIII Jornadas Hispanicas de Derecho Natural, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2024, p. 243-253).

Negative rights signal the core of natural law in the American tradition, also known as our Bill of Rights. Without them the Constitution might never have been ratified, or we might be a very different country today. This is one of those concepts that gets tossed around but is never fully explained.

It was in fact Borges who taught me that Carroll’s allegory about a king, a lion, and a unicorn concerns more than the factional (and fractional) history of the United Kingdom. It’s ultimately about the viability of individuals. In other words, Borges showed me that Carroll showed us that modern individuals are people whose existence requires something more than constitutional restraints on dueling parties. Individuals also require respect qua individuals. The preconditions for a liberal order are individuals who respect other individuals. Without us, it’s hard to envision a peaceful society growing and advancing into the future. And if we can’t imagine such a society, how on earth can we constitute one?

As with negative rights, there’s a lot of confusion regarding natural law. People use the term without much explanation of what it means, and those of us who are not trained lawyers or legal historians don’t want to reveal our ignorance by asking for clarifications. This is my attempt as a non-specialist to explain what it means.

Resumo
Objetivo: Investiga-se neste artigo a teoria da lei natural de Tomás de Aquino. Especificamente, visa-se a: (1) expor como Aquino aborda o primeiro princípio da razão prática; (2) expor a interpretação que os filósofos e jusfilósofos constitutivos da Nova Escola da Lei Natural oferecem a respeito do mencionado princípio; (3) expor as principais discordâncias quanto à interpretação da Nova Escola da Lei Natural; (4) argumentar por que a interpretação da Nova Escola da Lei Natural se adequa à abordagem de Aquino; e (5) expor as dificuldades nas interpretações alternativas.

Método: Abordagem teórica e reflexiva segundo bibliografia autorizada e atualizada. Utiliza-se das lições de Tomás de Aquino e de seus intérpretes contemporâneos, com destaque para aqueles que constituem a Nova Escola da Lei Natural.

Resultado: As posições tradicionais derivacionistas não são capazes de explicar adequadamente os atos humanos. Isso se dá porque não explicam a diretividade prática fornecida pelo primeiro princípio prático em um ato considerado imoral. Além disso, apresenta‑se um argumento hermenêutico adicional em favor da interpretação da Nova Escola da Lei Natural a respeito do primeiro princípio prático em Aquino: considerando-se a influência inegável de Aristóteles na obra do aquinate e uma continuidade relativa entre ambos, percebe‑se que há uma tese muito semelhante defendida por ambos – formulada de maneiras diferentes – e que tornam mais consistente a interpretação da teoria neoclássica da lei natural. Assim, compreende-se o papel do primeiro princípio da razão prática como um princípio estruturante e diretivo do ato humano em geral, seja para atos considerados moralmente adequados, seja para atos considerados moralmente inadequados.

Contribuições: As linhas a seguir reúnem anotações preliminares, inobstante técnicas. Sua contribuição remonta ao necessário avanço de estudos atentos à estrutura da razão humana, a qual possui um aspecto teórico, que busca conhecer a verdade das coisas e das proposições filosóficas, e um aspecto prático, que busca orientar os atos humanos para certos fins. Ademais, este artigo contribui também devido às lacunas da literatura nacional a nível filosófico-jurídico e ético, fazendo-se indispensável a uma visão holística das lições do principal expoente da tradição da lei natural – Tomás de Aquino.

Applying an experimental approach that combines Pope Francis's inductive synod theological method and sociology, this chapter analyzes the empirical foundations of homosexuality, homosexual union, and gender in the contemporary world as well as suggests a revision to the Catholic Church's traditional philosophical approach based on natural law theory to resolve moral issues. It argues that resolving the hot moral issues of homosexuality, homosexual union, and the inclusivity of the LGBTQI group in the Church in light of Pope Francis's inductive synodal theology, which requires listening to people's lived experiences and accurately learning from them through scientific sociological research before passing moral judgment and ecclesial action to resolve them. It recommends that the Catholic Church should revisit and update the conceptual ethical framework of its moral teachings on homosexuality, same-sex union, and LGBTQI inclusivity to achieve Francis's synodal church.

This article attempts to determine the source of moral obligation in al-Māturīdī’s thought. First of all, a classification of concepts of morality in his writings is presented. These concepts are found to be three in number: Utility, Virtue and Right. However, of these, the concept of right is found to be the ultimate representative of moral obligation, since it alone offers us the idea of a categorical imperative which is essential for morality to be objective.
Thereafter, two main sources of moral obligation are noted. One is revelation and the other is reason. Revelation presents the notions of divine lordship and sovereignty together with the divine command and prohibition. Yet, at the same time, reason determines our moral understanding with objective principles and supports revelatory teachings. This means that the findings of reason in the field of morality are usually in accord with revelation; where they differ, it is often because humanity lacks access to the necessary knowledge, which makes it impossible for them to reach the correct conclusions. Hence, al-Māturīdī also notes that revelation is especially needed in regards to areas of morality that are obscure and controversial, since it offers answers that humans would not otherwise be able to know with certainty. At the same time, it is understood that reason is a source of obligation in accordance with natural law theory, and therefore this latter theory is a basic way to categorize al-Māturīdī’s thought. The natural world offers guidance to reason and is a source of knowledge from which moral conclusions can be derived that are in line with basic human needs and desires. Al-Māturīdī, in particular, cites peace and prosperity as fundamental aims for humanity that can only be ensured by a guiding foundation. However, since God is the creator and designer of the world, the principle that ultimately determines the form of morality is divine wisdom.
In the third section of this article, the topic of moral motivation is addressed. This is the key to understand how people can behave morally, and it is concluded that al-Māturīdī shows that we can act for objective reasons and judge actions morally without only taking into consideration their consequences. This is because reason allows one to judge actions according to criteria that are not based only on contingent and subjective aspects of reality but also on categorical principles and imperatives. In the last part of this study, it is suggested that al-Māturīdī views reason as independently bringing moral obligations. This allows us to overcome the gap that David Hume presented between is- and ought- statements. Thus, it is concluded that for al-Māturīdī the source of moral obligation is not simply based on revelatory commands, but also derived from the principles of reason. These principles are to a significant degree the result of derivations made from observations on human nature and the natural world.

Сергей Иосифович Гессен на основе аксиологии Генриха Риккерта предложил трактовку нации как коллективного социального субъекта, воплощающего культурные ценности в форме определенной национальной культуры. Все национальные культуры являются уникальными, но равнозначными вариантами воплощения культурных ценностей. Человечество существует и развивается в форме плюрализма национальных культур. Ключевые слова: нация, народ, культура, неокантианство Благодарности: исследование выполнено в рамках реализации проекта РНФ № 22-28-20165 «Модели социабельности в неокантианстве русского зарубежья: синтез социологического номинализма и универсализма».

Natural Law Theory holds that Law draws its force from objective morality – that laws are good laws when they correspond to objective ought statements that are beyond the people who follow them, and not just social facts. The Classical Natural Law tradition further says that we can derive these objective moral claims by asking whether they conform to particular conceptions of “naturalness.” But David Hume, in what is now called the naturalistic fallacy, contends that the philosophers of the Classical Natural Law tradition fail to explain the leap from nature’s state of affairs – all of which are Is statements – towards the Ought statements that are required by Natural Law. In this paper, I argue that Finnis’s “New” Natural Law Theory, while far from being a perfect account of how we can derive objective moral oughts, is successful in avoiding the naturalistic fallacy. First, I sketch a general outline of how Classical Natural Law theorists tried to derive ought statements from what they saw as “natural,” and show why they fail to justify the leap from descriptive to normative statements. Then, I show how Finnis deals with the problem, and that by accepting the direct apprehension of goodness and the First Principle of Practical Reason, he manages to evade the naturalistic fallacy, shifting the question entirely towards their acceptance or non-acceptance.

Even though their views differ on what constitutes the proper relationship between morality and the law, Aquinas, J.S. Mill and Brentano all agree that the state is morally justified in inflicting punishment on those who are found guilty of infringing state law and committing crime. Punishment is necessary, they argue, for the purposes of bringing about law compliance and a better society. Punishment, however, steps in after the law has not been complied with and, even when transacted, punishment is no guarantee of any moral betterment in society. Notwithstanding the different moral theories that Aquinas, Mill and Brentano elaborate, this paper argues that each of these authors hold an a priori moral conviction in the state's justification of punishment, but this cherished conviction can be called into question on practical, moral and state grounds.