History of Xinjiang

Округ Алтай находится в северной части Синьцзян-Уйгурского
автономного района Китайской Народной Республики. Рус-
ские старообрядцы из Российской империи и Советского Союза
жили в этом округе в деревнях вокруг озера Канас с середины
XIX в. до 1960-х гг. Большинство из них являлись старообрядца-
ми часовенного и спасовского согласий1.
Богатый природными ресурсами, округ Алтай привлекал
внимание Советского Союза, США, Англии, Японии и ряда дру-
гих стран. Вместе с тем округ был постоянным полем сражения
коренных этносов за национальную независимость.
Русские казаки-белоэмигранты играли важную роль в воен-
ном противостоянии в Синьцзяне в первой половине ХХ в. Об их
мобилизации опубликовано много исследований. История же во-
енной мобилизации русских старообрядцев в Синьцзяне изучена
крайне мало, несмотря на то что старообрядцы этого округа тоже
принимали участие в военных действиях в 1933 и 1940-х гг.
Цель статьи – опираясь на изученную литературу и новые
интервью со старообрядцами, показать, как Китайская Республика
(правительство Гоминьдана), Восточно-Туркестанская Республика,
Советский Союз, Соединенные Штаты Америки и
Китайская Народная Республика мобилизовали русских старо-
обрядцев и как они участвовали в войнах в округе Алтай в 1933
и 1940-х гг.

Книга представляет собой первую в постсоветской историографии попытку изучения истории среднеазиатской эмиграции советского и пост-советского периодов. Основное внимание уделено почти миллионной массе таджиков, узбеков, туркменов, киргизов, казахов, а также русских, вытесненных революцией за рубежи своей родины – в Афганистан, Западный Китай, Иран, Британскую Индию и Турцию в 1917-1934 гг. Заключительная глава затрагивает также основные моменты военной эмиграции 1941-1945 гг., период «холодной войны», войны в Афганистане 1980-х гг., и доводит исследование до начала 2000-х гг.  В исследовании  делается попытка вскрыть причины, вызвавшие исход; даны основные этапы эмиграции; показано расселение эмигрантов за рубежом; представлен их количественный и национальный состав; изучена история эмиграции в  стране пребывания; политические течения, а также; попытки возвращения на родину. Книга предназначена для всех, интересующихся историей Центральной Азии.

In the past, reincarnated lamas, or sprul sku, were at the top of the social hierarchy in Tibet. This is demonstrated by the succession of Dalai Lamas who were the head of the Tibetan government. Moreover, sprul sku played important roles in every aspect of Tibetan life, as almost all villages and monasteries had their own reincarnated lamas. Thus, for a long time it was assumed that the social status of sprul sku emerged only through monastic training, religious practice, and various reincarnation systems. While it is true that most sprul sku lineages developed from this standard tradition, there are many exceptions, as the establishment of incarnation lines may also have resulted from attributions to prominent actors in the political or social sphere including figures of war. In using the Tibetan biographical account of Bla ma dkar po,2 known as Rje btsun byams pa mthu stobs kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar (“The biography of the venerable and almighty Byams pa mthu stobs Bla ma dkar po”), I will show how an ordinary young monk became one of the most important ho thog thu in the Qing empire. By historical coincidence, he found himself in the midst of Islamic rebellions in Xinjiang and turning his military skills into an advantage, he soon rose to the rank of local general, a status reinforced by his recognition as ho thog thu by the Qing imperial court. In discussing how he maneuvered politics at the Qing court and settled disputes in Lhasa, I will argue that the social status of a sprul sku was not determined by past religious achievements and cultural norms. Rather, it could be invented through war, violence, and destruction.

The title 翕侯 or 翖侯 xihou applied to Kujula Kadphises, in Chinese textual sources, and, on the coins of Kujula Kadphises in the forms yavuga, yaüa or yaü in Gandhari Prakrit and εἰα[ι]οϛ (ēia[i]os) or ζαοοϛ (zaoos) in Greek, is normally rendered in modern scholarship as “yabgu,” from the later Turkish version of the title. This link with the later Turkish term has led some to understand the Kushan title from its Turkish usage as “tribal chief” (e.g. Cribb 1985, p. 146; Salomon 1996, pp. 440–441; Srinavasan 2007, p. 6; Liu 2001, p. 267). In the Turkish context it is used both for the level of authority immediately below the royal title qagan and as a title for the chief of a tribal group. In the Chinese texts relating to the Kushan xihou Kujula Kadphises and other individuals among Inner Asian peoples, it appears to have the former meaning. And it appears to have the same meaning in Kujula Kadphises coin inscriptions.
There has been frequent debate in academic research about the origins of the title, with two widely held positions predominating, one identifying it as a Chinese title, the other as a Central Asian title transcribed into Chinese. Recent publications have outlined the debate, especially the entry for the term jabguya in Encyclopedia Iranica (Sims-Williams and de la Vaissière 2012), which presents the main arguments on both sides and concludes that the term is a Chinese transcription of a title used by the Wusun and Yuezhi peoples of Inner Asia. One of the authors of this note had previously proposed that the term was a Chinese title meaning “allied prince” (Sims-Williams 2002, pp. 229–230). The same position is proposed in his commentary on the Western Regions section of the Hou Han Shu by John Hill (Hill 2009, p. 588).
This paper sets out to examine the use of the term in the Chinese chronicles of the period of the Kushan xihou and in coin and stone inscriptions of Kujula Kadphises to illustrate the function of this title for him (Hou Han Shu 118, 13; Hill 2009, pp. 28–29) and interrogate the contextual evidence from these sources for the meaning of this title and its likely origins.

The Chinese Communist Party has often used history as a tool to serve its political pur- poses. This article analyzes the ways in which mythological accounts have been manipulated in order to strengthen Beijing’s control over the restive northwestern province of Xinjiang. Relying on an analysis of various materials (including museum exhibitions, textbooks and travel guides), I explore how the figures of the Queen Mother of the West and King Mu of the Zhou have been used to assert that Xinjiang has been an inalienable part of China since prehistoric times. The materials analyzed treat mythological texts as valid sources of geographical and historical data, whereas Western scholars largely agree that these cannot provide any reliable information of this kind. In accordance with the tradition of early com- mentators, I define this approach as euhemeristic, in that it treats mythological accounts as a reflection of historical events.

In the past decades migration has been the dominant explanation employed by scholars to explain how the Kharosthi script and other innovations from North-West India spread to the Tarim Basin region during the first centuries CE. This article is a case study which seeks to challenge this migration scenario, based on a close study of the textual and material evidence available from the Krorainian Kingdom which occupied parts of the Southern Tarim Basin in antiquity. First evidence
which challenges the migration scenario is presented, looking both at linguistic and literary evidence, as well as evidence for continuity in local practice and belief. An alternative scenario based on exchange and interaction is proposed towards the end of the article, arguing that to suppose large scale migration is unnecessary to explain the phenomenon at hand. For this alternative the article draw upon
ideas from recent archaeological studies on the pre-historic Central Eurasia.

In 1757, the Qing Dynasty dispatched the Nusan mission to negotiate directly with Ablay Sultan, a leader of the Kazakh Middle Juz. The first stage of the negotiations with Ablay was spent on the problem to capture Amursana, an Oyirad leader, who rebelled against the Qing and hid in the Kazakh steppe. Then, in the latter half of the negotiations, they discussed problems related to development of the Qing-Kazakh relationship. Ablay, who recognized that the relationship with the Qing Dynasty did not involve any effective control and reorganization of Kazakh society, was very active in negotiations on the submission of a list of Kazakh leaders and groups, the bestowal of titles, and so on, through which he tried to derive a lot of profit from the Qing. The basic framework of the Qing-Kazakh relationship was established through the dispatch of the Nusan Mission. In addition, the two reports drafted by the Nusan mission are valuable contemporary sources that include interesting information about Ablay, his followers, and Kazakh society.

松井太「大英圖書館所藏對譯語彙斷片 Or. 12380/3948 再考」東方學132, 東方學會，2016.7, 87–74.
The Chinese manuscript fragment of a bilingual vocabulary referred to in the title (Or. 12380/3948) is one of the Central Asian manuscripts collected by Sir Aurel Stein and now preserved in the British Library. It was published in a facsimile volume of written materials from the ruins of Qara-Qota (Inner Mongolia), and thus far it has been considered to be a New Persian-Chinese vocabulary dating from the Mongol period in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This article revisits and refutes this identification.
First, the fragment was unearthed not at Qara-Qota but at Mazar Tagh, a ruined fort located in the Tarim Basin (Xinjiang), a fact that is clearly shown by its site number “Mr.Tagh 0393.” Mazar Tagh fort was operating only from the early eighth century to the mid-ninth century, and the more probable date of the fragment lies in the eighth century.
Second, a careful reexamination of the Chinese transcriptions and translations of the non-Chinese vocabulary suggests that it is not New Persian but can be better reconstructed as Old Turkic. Consequently, the Turkic vocabulary retrieved from this text may be regarded as some of the oldest Turkic material, being contemporaneous with the Orkhon Turkic inscriptions.
The Turkic vocabulary lists several commercial terms, and consequently it would have been produced by Chinese merchants in charge of supplies to Mazar Tagh fort under T‘ang dominion. Moreover, the Turkic vocabulary may indicate that the trade network of such Chinese merchants in the Tarim Basin extended as far as and was closely related to the Turkic nomads in the steppe zone beyond the T‘ien-shan 天山 Mountains.

In this paper I focus on the historical and contemporary context and conception of Uyghur names and places in translation under the Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese Nationalists and Chinese communist rulers of the region in the last two centuries. More recently this has combined with the current so called ''Bilingual education'' policies that have unofficially abandonned Uyghur language instruction in Uyghur education to produce a real threat to Uyghur identity and sense of ownership over this territory.

It is useful to remind ourselves that similar procedures and methods were applied by the British and Russian empires during their vast colonial exapnsion over the last three centuries, and it is now aggressively copied and implemented by China in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

I ask whether the Chinese state can ultimately achieve its Sinification of Uyghur geographical place names, or whether Uyghurs will be able to preserve the Uyghur language names that currently co-exist with the Chinese names in the Uyghur region.

Article link: https://www.azizisa.org/en/chinese-colonialism-in-translation

The rise of Khwāja Ish .ā q, one of the most influential figures in the history of Central Asian Sufism, has often been explained by the patronage of particular royals. This "royal patron" model has, however, been based on a flawed reading of hagiographical sources by which crucial questions of genre are overlooked in the effort of mining these complex narratives for apparent historical facts. New evidence, presented here, allows us to question the "royal patron" model, along with the commonly-accepted chronology of Khwāja Ish .ā q's life, and calls for a different approach to Sufi hagiography as a historical source.

Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение науки Институт востоковедения Российской академии наук УЧЁНЫЕ ЗАПИСКИ ОТДЕЛА КИТАЯ Выпуск 22 47-я научная конференция ОБЩЕСТВО И ГОСУДАРСТВО В КИТАЕ Том XLVII Часть 1 МОСКВА ИНСТИТУТ ВОСТОКОВЕДЕНИЯ РАН 2017 УДК 94 (510) ББК 63.3 (Кит) О-28 УЧЁНЫЕ ЗАПИСКИ ОТДЕЛА КИТАЯ Выпуск 22 Издание осуществлено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ

This paper focuses on the genesis and the development of "Abdurrahman Khan", a heroic legend which is currently recognized as one of the masterpieces of Uyghur national oral literature (Uyghur Xelq Khälq EÄghiz ÄEdibiyati). This heroic story is based on a real historical event that occurred in the 1860s. Abdurrahman was a one of the leaders of the Khotan rebellion against the Qing empire in 1864 and was “martyred” in the battle against other Muslim forces that invaded from Yarkand in 1865. The memory of his “martyrdom” was maintained in song by the people of Khotan and documented in the style of manuscripts ordered by foreigners as part of their collection of linguistic materials from the region. Later on, the song was labeled as an important work of “national oral literature” and made a jump from being a short and simple ballad (qoshaq) to a fixed long and well-polished form of epic poetry (dastan). We can grasp the process of this story’s development clearly by comparing several texts collected by Grenard (1898), Hartmann (1901), Rakhman (1980s), and Sayit (1990s). Through comparison of the contents of eight different versions of this oral literature and the descriptions of other historical sources, we can observe several prominent themes emphasized by singers and audiences alike, such as making the hero encounter misfortune, praise for notions of brotherhood, and anger due to oppression or betrayal. At the same time, we can also see that some historical facts, such as inter-oases conflicts and the role of the Tungan in the initial stages of the rebellion, have been neglected in this oral tradition, omissions that likely reflect the historical mentality of the people of Khotan.

This article argues that the conclusions in the prevailing modern literature on the formation The Silk Road from China through Xinjiang to the west by direct involvement of the Chinese only begins to function in the 1 st c. BC, and then only when the Han Empire at great cost finally succeeded in pushing the Hunnu out of Xinjiang and established control over this territory. This event was preceded by active trade relations between the northern kingdoms of China and the nomads of southern Siberia in the 4 th and 3 rd c. BC and the delivery of the gifts to the Huns (Xiongnu) from the Han Dynasty in the 2 nd c. BC. This enabled silk and varnish products to penetrate Southern Siberia, Central Asia, and then back into Xinjiang. Kivonat Ez a tanulmány a Selyemút kialakulásának kérdéseivel foglalkozik. Véleményünk szerint a modern irodalomban felmerülő korai datálási kísérletek (Kr. e. III-II., sőt VI-III. évezred) nem fogadhatók el a rendelkezésre álló bizonyítékok (írásos és tárgyi források) tükrében. Egészen a Kr. e. 3-2. sz.-ig a Xinjiang tartomány északi és nyugati határai mentén alapvetően kaukázusi jellegű nagyrasszba tartozó népesség ugyan kapcsolatban állt Kazahsztán és a Szaján-Altáj hegységek népességével, de nincs bizonyítékunk kereskedelmi kapcsolatokról a Gansu keleti mongol lakosságával vagy a régi kínai birodalom földművelőivel vagy az észak-kínai nomádokkal. Az ismert régészeti bizonyítékok alapján, a népesség jelentős vándorlása Xinjiang-ból Kínába és az ellenkező irányba nem volt megfigyelhető a Kr. e. I. évezred közepe és a Kr.e. 3. század között. A kínaiak tényleges közreműködésével létrejött Selyemút nyugat felé, a Xinjiang területén keresztül csak a Kr.e. 1 évszázadtól működik, csak akkor, amikor a Han birodalom jelentős erőfeszítései nyomán kiszorítja a hunokat a Xinjiang tartományból és megszilárdítja az ellenőrzést a terület felett. Ezt az eseményt megelőzték az aktív kereskedelmi kapcsolatok Kína északi királyságai és Dél-Szibéria nomádjai között a Kr.e. 4. és 2. században és a Han Dinasztia részéről a hunoknak (Xiongnu) szállított ajándékok a Kr. e. 2. század folyamán. Ennek során a selyem és lakk termékek eljutottak Dél-Szibériába, Közép-Ázsiába majd vissza Xinjiang területére

Approximate areas governed by the Ming dynasty and by various Muslim administrations in the 14th century and areas in Asia with historically significant Muslim populations (ranging from Muslim majority to estimated 1/400) ©  2018 Brendan Newlon.

Il testo rappresenta un’introduzione alla storia del Xinjiang, dalla preistoria fino al 1949, anno dell’istituzione della Repubblica Popolare Cinese. Il principale proposito del volume è quello di sottolineare il ruolo strategico della regione, oggi estremo confine occidentale della Cina e tradizionalmente uno dei principali snodi lungo la via della seta. Attraverso un’analisi storica ma anche geografica e letteraria, il testo mostra come la posizione “centrale” del Xinjiang abbia favorito l’approdo in regione di influenze, popolazioni e culture variegate, contribuendo alla formazione di civiltà ricche e straordinariamente complesse. L’opera si rivolge ad un pubblico non necessariamente accademico, ed è basata su anni di ricerca in Xinjiang e sull’analisi di fonti primarie e secondarie di diverso genere. Si tratta della prima storia del Xinjiang pubblicata in lingua italiana, e colma così un vuoto importante nella letteratura sulla Cina nel nostro paese.

Doğu Türkistan'da yaşayan Uygurlardan bazıları Çin'in baskısı nedeni ile 1961 yılında vatanlarını terk etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Bu kafile önce Afganistan'a gelmiştir. Burada Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından korumaya alınmışlardır. Çin tarafından Afganistan'a yapılan baskılar sonucunda ise Türkiye'ye göç etmişlerdir. Bu makalede göçün ayrıntıları ve göçenlerin şimdiki durumu hakkında bilgi verilmeye çalışılmıştır.

China has declared a war on terrorism in Xinjiang, identifying violence in the region as a top security threat. However, what nowadays is officially constructed as ‘terrorism’ was framed as ‘counter-revolution’ in the past. Informed by the concept of macrosecuritization and the agenda of critical terrorism studies, this article examines the changing nature of Chinese state framing of violence in Xinjiang. Through a comparative analysis of the discursive construction of the Baren (1990) and Bachu (2013) violent incidents, I find that the terror lexicon has replaced old narratives of counter-revolution to legitimize a sustained crackdown under a novel geopolitical context. The construction of violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, I argue, is contingent, limited and unstable. It marginalizes factors other than an extremist or separatist agency in the incubation of the violence, in particular the frictions created by the crackdown with which the Chinese government is trying to placate the unrest.

The Turkic peoples represent a diverse collection of ethnic groups defined by the Turkic languages. These groups have dispersed across a vast area, including Siberia, Northwest China, Central Asia, East Europe, the Caucasus, Anatolia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. The origin and early dispersal history of the Turkic peoples is disputed, with candidates for their ancient homeland ranging from the Transcaspian steppe to Manchuria in Northeast Asia. Previous genetic studies have not identified a clear-cut unifying genetic signal for the Turkic peoples, which lends support for language replacement rather than demic diffusion as the model for the Turkic language's expansion. We addressed the genetic origin of 373 individuals from 22 Turkic-speaking populations, representing their current geographic range, by analyzing genome-wide high-density genotype data. Most of the Turkic peoples studied, except those in Central Asia, genetically resembled their geographic neighbors, in agree...

Este artículo analiza el período chino de reforma y apertura en la Región Autónoma Uigur de Xinjiang (RAUX) y explora las dinámicas que facilitaron la resurgencia del separatismo uigur pese a la relativa liberalización, especialmente en el ámbito religioso, con la que el gobierno chino acompañó el viraje económico. En primer lugar, se presentan las medidas ‘gradualistas’ de índole económica y social aplicadas por el Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) en Xinjiang durante la década de los años 1980. Posteriormente, se evalúan sus resultados’, identificando las limitaciones que para las minorías étnicas tuvo este enfoque ‘gradualista’, sobre todo en lo referente a la autonomía política y prosperidad económica. Finalmente, el artículo examina el desarrollo de actividades disidentes y separatistas en la región como las manifestaciones estudiantiles de Urumqi en 1985 o la ‘rebelión contrarrevolucionaria’ de Baren en 1990, evento que catalizará una campaña represiva en la región. El artículo reflexiona sobre el complejo (des)equilibrio entre moderación y asimilacionismo al que los líderes chinos se enfrentan en Xinjiang y por el que, independientemente del enfoque adoptado, las políticas del régimen chino acaban contribuyendo de uno u otro modo al separatismo uigur.

This article analyses China’s reform and opening up period in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and explores the dynamics that facilitated a revitalisation of Uyghur separatism in spite of the liberalization policies, particularly in the religious realm, that accompanied the economic change. To this aim, it first introduces the economic and social ‘gradualist’ policies applied by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Xinjiang during the 1980s decade, paying special attention to those that allowed a religious and cultural revival in the region. Next, it evaluates the ‘gradualist’ approach, identifying the limitations that these policies had for the ethnic minorities with respect to political autonomy and economic prosperity. Finally, the article examines the emergence of dissident and separatists activities in the region, from the student demonstrations in Urumqi (1985) to the Baren ‘counterrevolutionary rebellion’ (1990), which would eventually trigger a repressive campaign in the region. The article reflects on the conundrum faced by Chinese leaders in Xinjiang, by which moderate policies originally aimed at appeasing the ethnic minorities may well result in the emergence of separatism, thus triggering a further repressive approach also conducive to dissidence.

China has declared a war on terrorism in Xinjiang, identifying violence in the region as a top security threat. However, what nowadays is officially constructed as ‘terrorism’ was framed as ‘counter-revolution’ in the past. Informed by the concept of macrosecuritization and the agenda of critical terrorism studies, this article examines the changing nature of Chinese state framing of violence in Xinjiang. Through a comparative analysis of the discursive construction of the Baren (1990) and Bachu (2013) violent incidents, I find that the terror lexicon has replaced old narratives of counter-revolution to legitimize a sustained crackdown under a novel geopolitical context. The construction of violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, I argue, is contingent, limited and unstable. It marginalizes factors other than an extremist or separatist agency in the incubation of the violence, in particular the frictions created by the crackdown with which the Chinese government is trying to placate the unrest.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, sedentary societies in Europe and Asia made innovative and rapid breakthroughs in the field of firearm technology, logistics, and transport that changed the world.  On the steppe, the Zunghar simultaneously created a nomadic empire that exerted hegemony over a large portion of Central Eurasia.  Unlike sedentary societies, nomadic polities historically left relatively few physical reminders of their existence.  Given the constant need to migrate with the seasons, based on their primary economic pursuit of nomadic pastoralism, this is not at all surprising.  The Zunghar, however, did not fit this mould and actively constructed Buddhist monasteries, walled towns, and agricultural settlements throughout the Central Eurasia Steppe in an effort to compete with their settled neighbours.  When the Zunghar Empire finally imploded in the mid-18th century, most of their physical monuments appeared destined to disappear back into the steppe.  In present day, more than 300 years later, what is the current state of these Zunghar structures?  My recent fieldwork in Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Xinjiang has shown that many physical reminders of this nomadic empire do in fact remain in relatively remote locations.  Although rarely written about, important sites including Hoboksar (Khoboqsar), Galdan Boshogt Khan Khiit, Galdan’s fort at Khovd, Ghulja Temple (Jinding Temple), and Tamgaly Tas still exist in various states of decay, but also in great need of preservation.

The Turkic peoples represent a diverse collection of ethnic groups defined by the Turkic languages. These groups have dispersed across a vast area, including Siberia, Northwest China, Central Asia, East Europe, the Caucasus, Anatolia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. The origin and early dispersal history of the Turkic peoples is disputed, with candidates for their ancient homeland ranging from the Transcaspian steppe to Manchuria in Northeast Asia. Previous genetic studies have not identified a clear-cut unifying genetic signal for the Turkic peoples, which lends support for language replacement rather than demic diffusion as the model for the Turkic language's expansion. We addressed the genetic origin of 373 individuals from 22 Turkic-speaking populations, representing their current geographic range, by analyzing genome-wide high-density genotype data. Most of the Turkic peoples studied, except those in Central Asia, genetically resembled their geographic neighbors, in agree...