Chinese Nationalism

The idea of the nation has been considered to have delivered political modernity from its native Europe to the rest of the world. The same applies, though more implicitly, to those paradoxes inherent to the nationalist ideology – that between universalism and national particularity and that between liberal nationalism and imperialism. This article seeks to complicate these theses by looking at the interpretations of nationalism, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism provided by Liang Qichao, one of the most influential Chinese intellectuals in early twentieth century, during his exile in Japan when increasingly exposed to the encounter between worlds. This reading also engages with the wider debates on modernity/modernities in non-Western societies through showing that neither the " consumers of modernity " approach nor the " creative adaptations " approach can be easily applied here. I argue that the various tensions, contingencies and historical situatedness in Liang's accounts of the nation-state structure represent and constitute the paradox of the structure itself. They also shed light on contemporary debates about the limits of our political imagination in the misnamed " global politics " beyond the false opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

本文將討論在戰後台灣文學裡，三種重要的小說文類如何再現中國民族主義這一主題，以及其敘事形式背後所採取的文化政治。（1）在反共文學中，馬克思主義被視為是中國傳統的他者，從而確立了民族身分的認同位置；（2）而在台灣現代主義小說，語言的實驗同時也蘊含了中國性的更新與再生；另外，（3）儘管後現代主義帶來了「解構」的敘事技巧，但是在特定案例中，「解構」的並非國族敘事，而是「解構」現代性的制度層面。這種「解構」的效應是，「中國民族」將被看作是傳統文化的自然產出，而不是現代性的後果。如果將台灣文學中的皇民文學與中國民族主義主題互相比較，我們更能注意到，皇民文學強調的是現代化的、與本土社會斷裂的新生民族，而不是如中國民族主義所試圖建立的，整體、連續、歷史悠久的民族圖像。這兩種民族主義想像，一個是針對少數都市菁英，一個是針對「普遍的」民族成員。綜上所述，台灣文學中的中國民族主義敘事一方面統合了「中國」的地方性與異質性，另一方面，從葛蘭西的意義上說，在中國民族主義背後的其實是某種「人民-民族」的概念，這能夠創造出某種意識形態上的接著劑，將統治政權的利益，重新表述為「中國全體」（台灣社會）的民族利益。

Le récit des crimes du 7 janvier 2015 comme leur motif le plus évident - les caricatures du prophète Mahomet - ont fait le tour du monde, nourrissant des réactions et des interprétations multiples et divergentes malgré l’unanimisme des condamnations. Les lignes qui suivent se penchent sur la réception de cette tragédie en Chine. Ce texte ne s’aventure pas sur les causes multiples et complexes qui ont rendu possible ces drames sauf à préciser qu’une idéologie mortifère et totalitaire s’est épanouie sur une pluralité de facteurs et de temporalités indémêlables. Parmi les enjeux de dimension globale soulevés par ces évènements, il est possible d’identifier pêle-mêle les pratiques terroristes de l’islamisme radical, la place des minorités dans les états-nations contemporains, la question du blasphème visant des figures politiques ou religieuses, la liberté d’expression et ses limites. Dans la longue durée, ces évènements percutent aussi la condition postcoloniale du monde, et le legs d’une hégémonie non seulement géopolitique et économique mais aussi culturelle et épistémologique des sociétés occidentales. Si les sujets évoqués dans les lignes précédentes ont bien été mobilisés parmi les interprétations « chinoises » de ces attentats, la distance culturelle, politique et affective avec les évènements a parfois empêché les commentateurs chinois de saisir certains aspects du drame propres à un imaginaire national, un contexte idéologique et un langage politique spécifiquement français. La résonance globale de ces évènements ne saurait ainsi occulter que leur interprétation se déploya au sein d’un imaginaire institué déterminé par des enjeux politiques, idéologiques et linguistiques propres à la société chinoise. Parler d’une réception « chinoise » comporte le risque d’une simplification abusive et d’une essentialisation discutable d’un espace social, politique et culturel hétérogène. Un imaginaire dominant quelque peu paresseux qui réduit la « Chine » à son régime politique autoritaire empêche trop souvent de saisir les nuances, les variations et les dynamiques internes à la société chinoise. Des points de vue parfois divergents ont pu apparaitre dans les commentaires et les interprétations des évènements de janvier 2015, en fonction du statut des auteurs, des rubriques ou des titres de presse. Cette absence d’opinion unanime fut encore plus flagrante sur les réseaux sociaux pendant les quelques jours qui ont suivi les évènements. Plus tardivement, des articles de facture plus théoriques se sont confrontés au sujet dans des revues académiques et à partir de perspectives disciplinaires variées telles que la sociologie des media, les sciences de la communication, la philosophie, les études françaises. Des publications de think tanks rattachés au Parti ont aussi proposés des analyses visant à rappeler la doxa marxiste-léniniste sur la nature et le rôle de la presse dans les sociétés occidentales. Qu’il s’agisse de la presse, des textes académiques ou des interventions d’acteurs étatiques, la position dominante peut se synthétiser à grand traits de la façon suivante : une condamnation unanime et ferme du terrorisme associée à des marques appuyées de solidarité avec les victimes et, quasi-simultanément, l’apparition de critiques à l’endroit des journalistes de Charlie Hebdo en tant qu’ils incarnaient une position, un discours et des valeurs « occidentales » antagonistes avec le modèle défendu par l’Etat-Parti.
Ce sont les fondements idéologiques et politiques, mais aussi parfois épistémologiques et historiographiques, de cette critique, que cet essai se propose d’interroger, sachant que la fonction métonymique de « Charlie » en tant que symbole global de « valeurs occidentales » putatives ne s’est évidemment pas limitée pas au contexte chinois. Dans quelle mesure, et comment, ces évènements ont-ils trouvé une résonance discursive et des correspondances idéologiques dans l’espace politico-médiatique chinois ? Quelle fut la fonction de cette critique du journal satirique dans le contexte idéologique et politique chinois ? Bref, de quoi les caricatures de Charlie Hebdo ont-elles été le nom en Chine continentale ?

In this first critical study of Zheng Guanying's career, cultural milieu, political and economic thoughts, as well as his spirituality, Guo Wu steers us into examining Zheng Guanying as a hybrid product of the late Qing treaty port culture, professionalism, and tradition, and he illuminates the contribution that this Chinese merchant made in the social and political transformation of China into an urban, commercial environment. This book is also valuable because there is an even greater dearth of research on the cultural environment of Zheng and his spirituality. First, he was a comprador merchant by profession and not a leader of political and intellectual movement, although it was the latter position that drew attention to him in past decades. Second, he was a committed modernizer but also avid practitioner of Daoism, which was then dismissed by researchers as conservative and superstitious. Third, he was more a moderate reformist than a political radical. In addition, the book covers the urbanization of China and the urban cultural space. It also reveals how Zheng's migration and sojourning between Guangdong and Shanghai shaped the formation of his reformist ideas in response to China's late-nineteenthcentury national crisis as well as how he upheld Daoism as his fundamental ideology to maintain national identity and pursue self-salvation. This comprehensive study of such a critical figure in China's political and social history is an important book for all collections in Chinese studies.

Everybody is talking about China now. The competition between China and the Western world is not only about economic growth, technological advancement, and military strength. What is ultimately at stake is a key theoretical question: Can China's political traditions and current practices (such as one-party meritocracy) offer a legitimate and desirable alternative to the ideal of liberal democracy? This course aims to approach this question through the lens of intellectual history and political theory. Attention is given to how Chinese thinkers since 1895 have conceived of China's place in the world, how they have used Western political ideas to transform China, how they have creatively transformed Chinese traditions to meet the challenge of modernity, and, most importantly, how they have advanced political ideals that claim to be able fix the problems in the West (such as imperialism and capitalism). We will also learn how Western thinkers are responding to the challenge from China. The first half of the course covers foundational texts in Chinese intellectual history from 1895 to the Maoist Era. The second half is about political thinking in contemporary China. No prior knowledge about China, Chinese, or political theory/philosophy is required.

The University of Shanghai (滬江大學) was founded in 1906 as a co-operative effort between the Southern Baptist Convention [SBC] and the American Baptist Missionary Union [ABMU]. Herman C. E. Liu (劉湛恩) was appointed its first Chinese president in 1928 and had been highly esteemed in both Christian and Chinese educational circles. Although this article focuses on the history of the University of Shanghai during the period of 1928-1938, it firstly gives a brief account of the early history of the university, as well as the nationwide Anti-Christian Movement (1922-27), which resulted in the transition of the university leadership from foreign to Chinese. This article then examines how the university, under Liu’s leadership from 1928 to 1938, attempted to achieve the goal of ‘more Christian, more Chinese, and more efficient.’ It aims to explore the complexity of the interaction between a Christian institute and Chinese society, particularly in the face of fierce nationalist tensions. The history of the University of Shanghai reflects the trend of the evolution of a Christian establishment from its denominational (Baptist) background to a more general and diverse character, and from western to Chinese. This article argues that it was a natural step during the course of the growth of the ‘selfhood’ of Christianity in early twentieth-century China; meanwhile, however, it reveals an obliged response to a politically hostile environment. In addition, this paper argues that, while making itself more indigenous and relevant to Chinese society, the university was quite exceptional by keeping and emphasising its Christian essence. This owed much to Herman Liu’s own vision and practice in Christian education in China, which reflects a contextual understanding of the Christian message and its social application.

Images act as the animator to an object into culture: The modern Han dress or Hanfu Movement promulgated primarily through images and multimedia on the internet in its first decade (2003-2013). Images served both for and against the movement through its interpretation, whereas Han proponents appealed to the pathos for redrawing the definitions and boundaries of the Han and Chinese nation, while detractors captured the bathos of the ethnic as the exotic and anachronistic. Through the crystal-clear focus of high-definition studio portraits on intricately embroidered, well-tailored specimens, however, introduced capitalistic desire into the gaze and broke past the nationalist  quagmire and digressed the topic into the realm of commodification, thereby somewhat intentionally establishing the once historical clothing firmly into the realm of modernity.

MA Thesis submitted to University of Toronto Department of History, 2018.

This essay is originally part of a bigger research project, covering the Han Dress or Hanfu Movement outside of the People's Republic of China, and its impact on ethnic and national identity politics in Malaysia and Hong Kong.

This article examines the emergence of an increasingly vociferous public debate in China over the true contribution made by the KMT in the war against Japan. Following years of rigid adherence to the traditional Maoist line that the CCP won the war almost single-handedly, the party has finally moved towards a more realistic and honest assessment that recognises the pivotal role played by the KMT in defeating the Japanese. The rationale for conceding this point is ultimately linked to the question of nationalist legitimacy. At a time of increasing socio-economic uncertainty and in an effort to fill the ideological void left by the demise of Chinese Marxism, the party is trying hard to bolster its nationalist credentials. One way that it is doing this is by presenting a united patriotic front on the war against Japan, with itself at the helm. However, things have not materialised in the way the party had anticipated. Along with strong expressions of national pride in China's war effort, some members of the public have responded with sympathy towards the KMT veterans who fought the Japanese. With this sympathy has come antipathy towards the CCP who are accused of persecuting KMT soldiers after 1949, of re-writing the history of the war for its own propaganda purposes and of betraying the nation by, amongst other things, avoiding armed conflict with Japan and leaving the KMT to fight the war on its own. In light of this growing (although not necessarily majority) public reaction, we argue that instead of fortifying the party's nationalist legitimacy, the official reappraisal of the KMT's role in the war runs the risk of eroding that legitimacy.

S.V. Dmitriev and S.L. Kuzmin. 2014. The Qing Empire as China: an Anatomy of Historical Myth. – Oriens (Moscow) (1): 5-17.
It is often considered that China is a unique state in the world which has been several times won by foreigners, but never became a part of any other state, thus retaining continuity of its history and statehood based on consecutive row of ruling dynasties. This view is based on ancient sinocentric model which does not satisfy testing by comparative historical approach. Our analysis revealed that the Qing Empire cannot be equaled to China. Although the latter term has been broadly used, it had different meaning at different times. Actually, China was only a part of the Qing Empire. Manchu declarations that their state is China (i.e. Middle State, most important in the world), are similar to those by German, Ottoman, Russian and other monarchs on their states' continuity from the Roman Empire. These declarations have only historical value and cannot be used for modern international law. The Qing and other "conquest dynasties of China" were actually different empires created by non-Chinese peoples. The Han nation-state: Republic of China and People's Republic of China (PRC) had acquired almost whole territory of the Qing Empire as a result of occupation of weaker neighbors, instead of continuity of one state. Modern concept of PRC as a multinational state of "one Chinese nation", that included "minority nationalities" at least from the Middle Ages, is a historical myth.

This is the general introduction to my forthcoming Princeton book, Plato Goes to China:  The Canon in the Middle Kingdom. I post it with permission from PUP in the hope that it will demonstrate how valuable it is for us to understand the reception of the western classics in contemporary China.

Cet ouvrage propose de se confronter à des enjeux culturels, politiques et sociaux de la Chine contemporaine à travers l’étude de mots-clés. Certains sont des concepts familiers aux praticiens des sciences sociales occidentales (moderne, nation, nature, civilisation), d’autres appartiennent à la catégorie des « mots courants », mais témoignent d’usages particuliers où se donnent à voir les bouleversements subis au cours de cette période cruciale (voyage, héros, performance). Résultant d’une pratique de la traduction et des échanges culturels, ou d’une relecture d’un passé à la fois aimé et haï, ces mots structurent le paysage idéologique des élites intellectuelles et politiques chinoises, imprègnent les imaginaires populaires et orientent les pratiques du quotidien.
Les auteurs rassemblés dans ce volume s’inscrivent dans différents champs disciplinaires allant de l’anthropologie à la science politique, en passant par les études littéraires et cinématographiques, la sociologie et l’histoire. Ils se sont demandé quels étaient pour eux, à partir de leur domaine de recherche,  les mots qui donnaient le mieux à penser les ruptures, les persistances et les émergences propres à l’histoire de la Chine moderne et contemporaine.

In 1942 the Republic of China established a legation in Tehran. Neither during the last years of the Qājār dynasty nor during the subsequent reign of Reẕā Pahlavī did the Chinese manage to send a diplomatic mission to the capital of the Empire. The change in attitude by the Persian government must therefore obviously be attributed to the new international role of Iran after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941, the abdication of Reẕā Pahlavī, and the accession to the throne of his son Moḩammad Reẕā Pahlavī. Furthermore, the Republic of China, engaged in the hard and long conflict with Japan, was trying to build a diplomatic network in the Near and Middle East that would also support the international re-legitimation after the humiliations suffered since the First Opium War. In particular, the opening of the legation meant the full implementation of the Sino-Persian treaty of 1920. After more than twenty years, the political meaning of that document was probably reconsidered in light of the negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom regarding extraterritorial rights. The paper, therefore, outlines the political issues and objectives around the opening of the Chinese legation, trying to analyze the role played by the Foreign Office and the British legation in Tehran.

AUTHORS/EDITORS: Yang Chia-ling and Roderick Whitfield. Other contributors: Shana J Brown, Robert Culp, Shao Dan, Hong Zaixin, Tamaki Maeda, Pai Shih-ming and Wang Cheng-hua. Commissioning editor, general editor and Saffron Asian Art & Society Series Editor: Sajid Rizvi. This volume investigates the roles as politician, antiquarian, art dealer, and publisher, of Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 (1866~1940) who, together with his circle of Qing loyalists (yilao), established modern historical and intellectual practices in late dynastic and early Republican China. For additional info visit www.saffronbooksandart.net and www.saffronbooks.com. For permissions contact: [email protected]. Additional materials may be uploaded here, please revisit or Follow.

This article discusses Xiao Tianshi 蕭天石 (1909-1986), well known for his publishing efforts in Taiwan after 1949, but less known as an officer in the Nationalist government in mainland China prior to 1949. The article delves into Xiao’s intellectual, political and religious coming of age in Nationalist China, and how his background influenced his life as a publisher in Taiwan after 1949 . The complex processes of transmission of Daoist scriptures and practices from China to Taiwan that Xiao participated in has to be understood in the wider historical context of war, displacement, Nationalist discourse, anti-superstition campaigns, and the call for national renewal in Republican China.

Taiwan as a country rich in colonial history, had been under the control of Japan from 1895 to 1945. These fifty years of colonization influenced Taiwan’s cultural and political phenomenon both in a visible and imperceptible fashion. The most persuasive colonial evidence is
undoubtedly the architectural works, and Japan did not fall behind of leaving these traces in Taiwan as well. Until now, it is still easy to see the colonial architecture everywhere in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the most intriguing is that in fact, these buildings had gone through great
difficulties of being preserved or not by the later coming Chinese government. Thanks to the complexity of cultural demand and historical context of Taiwan, these colonial architecture could eventually be preserved. Therefore, in this paper, I would like to analyze the motives and the meanings behind the preservation act. Furthermore, I would also like to look into a deeper aspect of how governmental strategies and local efforts interweaved into the consensus of forming the national identity through the preservation of the historical architecture in Taiwan.

Closely associated with China’s growing prominence in international politics are discussions about how to understand Chinese history, and how such perspectives inform the way a stronger China may relate to the rest of the world. This article examines two narratives as cases, and considers how they fit against more careful historical scholarship. The first is the nationalist narrative dealing with Qing and Republican history, and the second is the narrative on the Chinese world order. Analyses of Chinese nationalism tend to see a more powerful China as being more assertive internationally, based in part on a belief in the need to address and overcome past wrongs. Studies of historical regional systems in Asia point to the role that a peaceful ‘Confucian’ ethos played in sustaining a stable Chinese-led order, and highlight the promise it holds for checking regional and international tensions. The two perspectives create an obvious tension when trying to understand China’s rise, which can suggest that using historical viewpoints to understand contemporary developments may be doomed to incoherence. This article argues that difficulties in applying knowledge of the past to analyses of China’s role in contemporary world politics indicate a relative inattentiveness to Chinese and Asian history. It illustrates how the nature of China’s rise may be more contingent on the external environment that it faces than popular received wisdom may indicate. The article suggests that a more extensive engagement with historical research and historiography can augment and enrich attempts to appreciate the context surrounding China’s rise.

Closely associated with China's growing prominence in international politics are discussions about how to understand Chinese history, and how such perspectives inform the way a stronger China may relate to the rest of the world. This article examines two narratives as cases, and considers how they fit against more careful historical scholarship. The first is the nationalist narrative dealing with Qing and Republican history, and the second is the narrative on the Chinese world order. Analyses of Chinese nationalism tend to see a more powerful China as being more assertive internationally, based in part on a belief in the need to address and overcome past wrongs. Studies of historical regional systems in Asia point to the role that a peaceful 'Confucian' ethos played in sustaining a stable Chinese-led order, and highlight the promise it holds for checking regional and international tensions. The two perspectives create an obvious tension when trying to understand China's rise, which can suggest that using historical viewpoints to understand contemporary developments may be doomed to incoherence. This article argues that difficulties in applying knowledge of the past to analyses of China's role in contemporary world politics indicate a relative inattentiveness to Chinese and Asian history. It illustrates how the nature of China's rise may be more contingent on the external environment that it faces than popular received wisdom may indicate. The article suggests that a more extensive engagement with historical research and historiography can augment and enrich attempts to appreciate the context surrounding China's rise.

This article explores why the term “public intellectual” has turned into a disgraceful label in Chinese cyberspace. Through examining how netizens have constructed the negative perception of “public intellectuals,” it shows that the Internet has not only empowered regime critics, but also promoted pluralization of expression by bringing different values, beliefs and identities into contact with an unprecedented frequency and intensity. The denigration of public intellectuals illustrates the contestation between digitally expressed civility and incivility, which has yet to be sufficiently discussed. Findings in this study also suggest that “authoritarian resilience” depends on the regime’s adaptability as well as the dynamics between its supporters and challengers.

This article examines how affective narratives of the COVID-19 pandemic on Chinese social media reinforce and challenge established scripts of national identity, political legitimacy, and international geopolitical imaginary. Taking theoretical insights from the scholarship on trauma, disaster nationalism, and politics of emotions, I structure the analysis of social media posts from state media and private accounts around three emotional registers: grief as a crucial site of control and contestation during the initial stage of the outbreak; gandong (being moved in a positive way) associated with stories of heroic sacrifices, national unity, and mundane 'heart-warming' moments; and enmity in narratives of power struggles and ideological competition between China and 'the West', especially the United States. While state media has sought to transform the crisis into resources for strengthening national belonging and regime legitimacy through a digital reworking of the long-standing repertoire of disaster nationalism, alternative articulations of grief, rage, and vernacular memory that refuse to be incorporated into the 'correct collective memory' of a nationalized tragedy have persisted in digital space. Furthermore, the article explicates the ways in which popular narratives affectively reinscribe dominant ideas about the (inter)national community: such as the historical imagination of a continuous nationhood rising from disasters and humiliation, positive energy, and a dichotomous view of the international order characterized by Western hegemony and Chinese victimhood. The geopolitical narratives of the pandemic build on and exacerbate binary oppositions between China and 'the West', which are co-constructed through discursive practices on both sides in mutually reinforcing ways. The lens of emotion allows us to attend to the resonances and dissonances between official and popular narrativizations of the disaster without assuming a one-way determinate relationship between the two.

The Han Dress Revival Movement, or Hanfu Movement for short, strives for restoring widespread acceptance and practice of wearing traditional Han Chinese dress that was banned prior to the Manchu Qing dynasty in 1644 and later averted due to Westernization in the 20th Century. With Chinese understanding of the clothing at a blank slate after three and a half centuries of disuse, adapting the dress into modernity and daily life sparked heated controversy. Parties defending designs from certain periods ("dynasties") clashed with each other as well as the moderates who suggested magnanimous acceptance of all period designs. More influential than verbal (or textual) debate was demonstration: Each faction rallied support through presenting modern replicas of such period designs, made publicly accessible as commercially available products for purchase. The earliest group to capitalize on this advantage was the Ming subgroup, who marketed replica Ming-era (1368-1644) garb as high-end products, and soon gained popularity and acclaim as the "most historically informed" design. With synthetic materials and mechanized weaving and sewing, what material and design contexts are different with modern "Ming-style" clothing with actual specimens from the historical era? What elements or sum of contexts constitute a qualifying "Ming" piece and how much personal liberty can be taken? What can the evolution from early 21st Century hanfu, extrapolated from Chinese opera costume and paintings, to the Ming-style prevalent present say for fashion development of traditional dress? How has the rediscovery of Ming fashion aesthetics contributed to the understanding of Han clothing itself? This paper attempts to draw together contemporary theories of fashion, social media usage and business to witness an internal evolution of the hanfu subculture, in turn speculate on Chinese perspectives towards dress, selectiveness on the perception of history and heritage, and defining boundaries on innovation within its tradition.

Why do ethnic minority groups play or not play football? The answers might be different depending on specific socio-cultural contexts. This thesis concentrates on the Uyghurs and the Kazakhs from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. By situating the diverse participants (young footballers, coaches, parents, government cadres in charge of sports, and fans, etc.) in the late-socialist China where marketization led by state domination and appeal to nationalism, this thesis seeks to answer the major research question: How do ethnic relation, state governance, and social mobility shape the discourse or phenomenon, which I call, the “rise of Xinjiang youth football”?

As empirical data in this thesis illustrate, the “field of play” is not just the pitch where the youth play football; rather, it might be seen as the field where grassroots of ethnic minority groups and the state compete, compromise or cooperate for defining identities and values; furthermore, it might be the Bourdieusian social field, in which ethnic minority youths, as agents, involve in football and aim of converting their capitals for achieving upwards social mobility.

By jointly analysing discourses and practice related to ethnic relation, nationalism and marketizing in Xinjiang youth football, this thesis argues that while China’s authoritarian sport officials selectively embrace logics of marketization and competition to ease ethnic tensions and to seek regional stability in Xinjiang, the popularization of football reflects and contributes to public debates on inequalities existing betwixt classes and ethnic groups.

Huang Guliu’s The Story of Shrimp-ball has long been read as a local Cantonese story about 1940s Hong Kong. This essay offers an alternative reading by placing it within the context of “threshold nationhood.” This historical period straddles the time when the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-45) was drawing to a close and civil war was imminent, and when the disintegrating Nationalist Party was yielding to the would-be government of the Chinese Communist Party. In order to clarify the unsettled linguistic and historical context of this “threshold nationhood,” this essay explores two language movements that were contemporaneous with Shrimp-ball: the Chinese Latinization Movement and the Topolect Literature Movement.

As this essay will show, the Latinization Movement—which sought to Latinize Cantonese along with other non-Mandarin topolects—would potentially contribute to the Topolect Literature Movement in Hong Kong. Central to the practice of Latinization is the creation of alphabetized words. On one hand, topolect literature writers would have contributed to exploring the grammatical standing of these newly created alphabetized words if they had tried to use Cantonese Latinization in literary production. On the other hand, Cantonese Latinization would have contributed to codifying the ways of writing Cantonese so that topolect literature writers would not have to use different Chinese characters to write the same Cantonese expressions. The Latinization of Cantonese and the development of a Cantonese literary language had the potential to be mutually beneficial.

Even though both the Chinese Latinization Movement and the Topolect Literature Movement supported the communist causes of mass literacy, mass enlightenment, and mass literature, these two movements remained unaligned. This essay argues that this misalignment articulates the fundamental challenge that China faced in its transformation into a modern nation. How can mass literacy, mass enlightenment, and mass literature be organized around the language of a nation divided by class, geography, and language? After examining the Latinization Movement and the Topolect Literature Movement, this essay will analyze how Shrimp-ball offers a contingent and provisory solution to the fundamental challenge that China faced.

In 1988, Caucasian Canadian Da Shan (aka Mark Rowswell) performed a comedic skit on China Central Television’s New Year’s gala, China’s highest rating television show, watched by an estimated 550 million viewers. Recognized for his fluent Mandarin skills and expert delivery, Da Shan (lit. Big Mountain) quickly become China’s biggest foreign celebrity, frequently appearing on national television and performing the highly skilled comic art of crosstalk (xiangsheng). Since Da Shan’s trailblazing appearance, foreign performances of Chinese language and cultural art forms have become common on China’s small screen. Using a combination of content analysis, informal interviews with producers and directors, as well as our own reflections on our experiences as participants on two televised Chinese language and culture competitions, this chapter investigates the political and discursive patterns underlying these spectacles of foreigners performing Chineseness and reflects on how these shows position China, its culture, and its place in the world.

We begin by introducing the two programs – the 2010 and 2011 Chinese Bridge Mandarin Proficiency Competitions shown on the nationally popular Hunan Satellite Television (HSTV) and the 2009 Global Chinese Storytelling Competition, broadcast on China Central Television’s Mandarin-language international channel CCTV-4 – and discuss their institutional and political contexts. We examine the organizational roles of Radio Beijing Corporation (RBC) and Hanban, the State Council-affiliated education body behind the world’s Confucius Institutes, and situate the programs in the context of China’s “soft power” push and its often-overlooked domestic nation-building dimensions. We then analyze the shows' key themes, drawing on insights from a broader literature on the role of foreigners in the production of Chinese national identity, in particular the intertwined concepts of self-Orientalism, Occidentalism, and ‘Middle Kingdom mentalities.’ We argue that the two programs deploy foreign performances of Chineseness to present to domestic audiences the image of a powerful, modern and unified Chinese nation, firmly at centre of world civilization. In the process, these shows proclaim the success of China's "soft power" initiatives in attracting global validation of this vision of a revitalized Middle Kingdom.

The Importance of the Song clan's eldest sibling, Song Ailing, for the modern history of China lies with her crucial role as confidential secretary for the Tong Meng Hui and Sun Yat-sen between 1909-1914, a critical period in Sun's revolutionary career.

A través de tres paradigmas (parabellum, pacífico y defensivo) orientados hacia el mantenimiento de su seguridad nacional, se analiza la cultura estratégica china. Invita a la reflexión de cómo elementos subjetivos pueden determinar el comportamiento de China en el escenario internacional, así como los factores que influyen en que los Estados tomen decisiones distintas aún en igualdad de circunstancias. Al mismo tiempo se aproxima a la noción de nacionalismo chino como producto de su memoria histórica y cultural, resaltando el impacto que éste tiene en la definición de sus intereses y política exterior. Como columna vertebral de este texto, se abordan conceptos confucianos como el de virtud (德 dé), benevolencia (仁 rén) y justicia (义 yì), los cuales aún tienen peso en el imaginario político chino. Finalmente se reflexiona sobre si la cultura estratégica china descrita desde occidente se acerca a cómo China se percibe y quiere ser distinguida.

This chapter examines how local history, and by extension civic identity, has been represented in Shanghai’s museums since the 1990s. Museums across China nowadays are designated ‘bases for patriotic education’ (aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi), implying conformity to centrally determined ideological messages. Meanwhile, intense inter-city competition, allied to an upsurge in domestic tourism, has fuelled a boom in museum construction nationwide. The effects of this are perhaps most marked in the rampant museumification of urban landscapes, as areas spared the wrecking ball are smartened up to attract tourists and local yuppies. In Shanghai, the Bund, Nanjing Road, Xintiandi, Darroch Road, and the relics of the Kuomintang’s ‘Great Shanghai Plan’ to the northeast of the city have in recent years all received this treatment. But while we comment in passing on this remodeling and sanitizing of Shanghai’s urban heritage, we focus primarily on how museums explicitly narrate the past with which it is associated.

Kína a világ egyik legősibb civilizációja, s egyben a leghosszabb ideje folyamatosan fennálló állam. Milyen identitásuk volt a kínaiaknak, akiknek még állandó elnevezésük sem volt se saját magukra, se országukra, s saját területüket az egész világgal azonosították? Hogyan jött létre a kínai nemzet, létrejött-e egyáltalán? Milyen hatással volt a nemzetállamok kialakulása a kínaiak gondolkodására és azonosságtudatára? Mit jelent ma a kínai nemzettudat, s hogyan viszonyul ehhez a külvilág? Mik ma a kínai identitás fő összetevői? Megmarad-e a "kínaiság" a globalizáció korában? Kína olvasztja be és alakítja saját képére a külső hatásokat, vagy maga olvad be a globális kultúrába? Az előadásban ezekre a kérdésekre keressük a választ.

Frustrated with the " white imperialism " of the League of Nations and the " red imperialism " of the Third Communist International, a number of Chinese intellectuals began discussing possibilities for a third option during the interwar years. Turning away from liberalism and Marxism, they examined Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and began working to promote his Principle of Nationalism as a concept that focused on the ruoxiao (weak and small nations) and could liberate people around the world that were suffering under imperialism. This discourse often centered on the possibility of creating a new form of " International, " the International of Nations, which would unite the oppressed nations of the world in opposition to the imperialist nations, rather than divide nations along class lines, as Chinese critics perceived the Comintern to do. This article examines Chinese intellectual discussions of a China-centered " International " by a variety of writers, including Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin, from 1925 to 1937. The author shows that, although this discourse on a China-centered " International of Nations " influenced intellectuals' perceptions of China's position and responsibility in the world, it was consumed and invalidated by Japanese imperialism, as the Japanese Empire employed a similar discourse of pan-Asianism to justify militarism in the 1930s and 1940s.

This article examines the upsurge in Chinese public support for the legacy of the Republican era, a phenomenon known as ‘Republican fever’. The fever has arisen following the formal relaxation of restrictions on discussing the Republican period. The rationale for doing so is linked to political expediency and in particular to the CCP’s quest for nationalist legitimacy. By acknowledging the positive aspects of the Republican era as part of a placatory policy on reunification with Taiwan, the CCP is trying to present itself as a key partner in a united patriotic front with the Kuomintang. But things have not turned out as planned. As Republican fever has spread across a diverse section of Chinese society, so too has criticism of the CCP’s record in power. In light of this, we argue that instead of fortifying the Party’s nationalist legitimacy, the CCP has unwittingly started a process which appears to be eroding that legitimacy.

As early as the 1980s, Chinese leaders were proclaiming the need to strengthen what they termed “maritime consciousness” (海洋意识) among the country’s traditionally land-oriented population. Since then, the task of elevating public attention on the maritime domain has been personally mandated by top leaders and written into state development plans.

Today, in academic and media circles outside China, speculation persists regarding the relationship between Chinese public opinion and the PRC’s actions in the disputed areas in recent years. Are assertive policies driven by hardline policy preferences among the public? Are the country’s leaders constrained from necessary compromises by nationalistic sentiment? How will public opinion shape China’s future relations with its neighbours and the world? Although online surveys are common, and state-owned media occasionally organize telephone polls on current events, there is a pressing need for more reliable indications of the evolving nature of Chinese public opinion on these maritime
territorial issues, in order to help move this vital discussion beyond the realm of speculation.

This chapter tries to clarify two sets of conceptual connections. On the one hand, Chinese discourses of compelled change, i.e. civilizing, and practices of conquest and colonialism are compared to the European discourses on missionizing, and their conceptual similarities are demonstrated. On the other hand, connections between Chinese ideas of a ‘Confucian civilizing mission’ as change of moral, cultural, and ethnic identity from the Ming and Qing dynasties are linked to later Chinese ideas of ‘nationizing’, i.e. integration of non-Chinese people into the Chinese nation by assimilation of language, script, way of living, and other cultural and ethnic markers.

As the Manchu desperately struggled to retain their claim on political legitimacy in the early 20th century reform period, a revolutionary movement was emerging at the center of Chinese political thought. Nationalism was fast establishing itself as the primary tool of opposition to decades of imperialist domination, ultimately serving as the rationale for dismantling the foreign dynasty itself. But while Sun Yat-sen was still formulating his nationalist agenda abroad, other intellectual ex-patriots sought to seize the political instability to open a discourse that transcended Han unification, extending anti-Manchuism to a critique of despotism in general. Despite advocating an anti-political, utopian universalism that would preclude the need for a Chinese nation, this group of revolutionaries collaborated with Sun, lending money, theory and membership to his Revolutionary Alliance from the moment of its formation. By 1907, independent Tokyo and Paris groups were moving away from the moralistic terrorism they gleaned from Russian nihilism and towards a more distinctively social conception, charting a transformation evident in their short-lived journals of translated western theory and their application of it to the context of Chinese turmoil.  Credited as the first radical current to impact China, the movement took its theory to practice after the revolution, returning home heralding a radical education platform and organizing China’s first modern labor unions. Adherents laid the conceptual framework for the New Culture movement with their incisive critique of traditional social hierarchies, and contended with the nationalists for predominance on the left at the height of the May 4th Incident. Though by the early 1920’s their concept of social revolution had infused mainstream political thought - with Mao candidly admitting its strong influence on him and Sun calling it the end point of his 3 principles - their contributions have gone largely unacknowledged until recent scholarship has sought to redeem their role in China’s revolutionary history. These were the Chinese Anarchists.

"After the worst anti-China violence for 15 years took place in Vietnam this month, it took China’s propaganda authorities nearly two days to work out how the story should be handled publicly. However, this was not a simple information blackout. The 48-hour gap between the start of the riots and their eventual presentation to the country’s mass audiences exemplified some of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) sophisticated techniques for managing information during fast-breaking foreign affairs incidents in the Internet era. Far from seizing on incidents at sea to demonstrate China’s strength to a domestic audience, the official line played down China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and emphasized Vietnamese efforts to stop the riots, effectively de-coupling the violence from the issue that sparked them. This indicated that, rather than trying to appease popular nationalism, China’s leaders were in fact reluctant to appear aggressive in front of their own people. [1]

By framing the issue in this way, China’s media authorities cultivated a measured “rational patriotism” in support of the country’s territorial claims. In contrast to the 2012 Sino-Japanese confrontation over the Diaoyu Islands, when Beijing appears to have encouraged nationalist outrage to increase its leverage in the dispute, [2] during the recent incident the Party-state was determined to limit popular participation in the issue, thus maximizing its ability to control the escalation of the situation, a cornerstone of the high-level policy of “unifying” the defense of its maritime claims with the maintenance of regional stability (Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], 2011). "

Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities has long been established as one of the major contributions to theories of nations and nationalism. Anderson located the rise of national identities within a long-evolving crisis of dynastic conceptions of identity, time, and space, and argued print-capitalism was the key cultural and economic force in the genesis of nations. This article offers a critical appropriation and application of Anderson's theory through two steps. Firstly, it evaluates the conceptual underpinning of his approach through an engagement with recent scholarship on the ‘theory of uneven and combined development’. The fruits of this interchange provide a deeper analytical framework to account for what Anderson calls the ‘modularity’ of national identity, that is, its universal spread across the globe. Modularity is now reconceptualised as a product of combined development with its causal efficacy derived from the latent dynamics of a geopolitically fragmented world. The latter gave shape and form to the new national communities. Secondly, this revised framework is applied to the emergence of Chinese national identity in the late nineteenth century. This allows Chinese nationalism to be recast as an ideological amalgam of indigenous and imported elements that emerged out of the crisis-ridden encounter between Imperial China and Western imperialism in the nineteenth century.