Global Project Management

This paper describes the methodology and results obtained after productivity improvement work conducted on two consecutive building construction jobs.  The first one was used to evaluate production rates and productivity, current construction methods, potentials and lacks of construction equipment, current construction planning methodology, and existing tools to asses productivity.  These are briefly discussed in this paper. The second job was preplanned based on the experience and detailed documentation obtained in the first one. Work was conducted in order to “design” construction methods in detail, develop a detailed production planning based on the construction methods developed, select crew components and select their specific tasks, and design communication and control tools. Although the second job’s schedule and budget were originally calculated using standard methods (i.e. historical production rates), new schedule and budget were calculated based on the preplanning effort. Construction performance was measured against these values.

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner was an exciting project and an important step for the entire industry. By outsourcing most of it's development Boeing sought to “reduce the 787′s development time from six to four years and development cost from $10 to $6 billion.”. If successful, this would bring a new supply chain approach to airplane-manufacturing and lower the costs across the industry.
Research question: "What improvements can Boeing make to successfully implement a new manufacturing model for its Dreamliner 787 model?"

Global Project Management is a unit taught at the undergraduate and masters degree levels in project management. This presentation helps non-project professional in project management to deliver the Global Project Management unit to their classes without a feel of the technicality and deficiency in content. The presentation therefore intends to ensure that global project management delivery, especially to the undergraduate students, follow an aspect that is unequivocal on the intent and objective to be achieved at the end of the lectures.

Nepal has a population of 27 million with a third of it is under poverty line. It is the world's youngest republic. It is steadily recovering from an 11-year civil war, with the conflicting parties entering into a Comprehensive Peace Agreement monitored by United Nations Mission in Nepal.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

There has been much talk in the development sphere from donors of recent times, lamenting the difficulties in attaining project sustainability, long after donors and funding structures are withdrawn from communities.  There are a plethora of factors which may affect development projects sustainability, though of recent years, there has been much more emphasis placed on post project evaluations and post project impact assessment, all of which have paved the way to mitigating the obstacles and challenges which threaten project sustainability.

In the following paper I will seek to explore the core contributing factors which negatively impact project sustainability with a focus on the core areas of donor funding, values based project development, stakeholder engagement, capacity building, external factors affecting sustainability. Considering the core areas explored, I will also seek to reflect on if projects can truly be sustainable in practice.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

The objective of this research paper is to provide
information regarding structural implementation of a Project
management office. This Paper discusses PMO’s structure such
as Characteristics Features, Roles, Functions, Challenges,
Benefits, Governance Mechanism and Form Structure.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

This study aims to investigate the perceptions of software professionals in relation with impact of agile practices to accelerate the delivery of software products. Quantitative data obtained from a sample of 109 professionals were collected and analyzed by Pearson correlation and factor analysis. The results of factor analysis showed that the perception of professionals in relation to agile practices can be grouped into seven factors. From the correlation analysis, it was observed that customer satisfaction is the main variable influencing the perceptions of professionals regarding the use of agile practices to meet the deadlines on software projects.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

For many businesses, managing globally distributed IT projects effectively is key to success in today’s competitive environment. However, IT projects and their managements are notorious for failures, and managing globally distributed teams poses unique additional challenges. While the Internet, email and the Web have been major means of communication among such teams, new Web 2.0 technologies and applications which have emerged into prominence in the last few years present new opportunities for successfully managing global projects. This paper presents the authors’ findings on awareness and level of use of Web 2.0 tools for project management among global teams. It also offers recommendations on how managers of global IT projects can manage their teams more efficiently and effectively using Web 2.0 tools.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

2008. 352 pp. r150.00 (hardcover). This volume is intended to explain why major investment projects (the so-called mega-projects) often are not completed on time and cost more than originally budgeted. Drawing from experiences of European and North American countries, the book also suggests ways to avoid such failures. Although the topic is rather specific, the book is worth reading for both experts and nonexperts as infrastructure development continues to be a major key to economic expansion across the globe.g row_486 380.. 408 For those who only have a vague idea of what a mega-project is, the book begins by introducing the topic and reviewing the most important recent literature. The first part of the volume, then, provides numerous insights on the complexity of mega-projects, starting from the large number of reasons why mega-projects might fail. For example, the project might be "underdesigned," thus less costly but less robust to unforeseen developments, or it might be "overdesigned," when a large number of weaknesses and possible problems are considered in advance, and solutions are evaluated before the problem actually occurs. Overdesigned projects are more robust, less likely to fail, but are much more costly. The project might involve the use of innovative technologies that have never been applied to a similar context, and that involve more uncertain implementation costs and results. Most projects have an impact on the environment and might face opposition for example from environmentalist groups. If representative of these groups have not been directly involved in the design of the project, they might try to stop it, thus causing delays and increasing costs. Finally, because of incorrect predictions of 380 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2009

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

Globally competing companies must see the project management as a sustainable
competitive advantage and a tool for strategic competence in order to be successful, and
all aspects of the project management must be designed accordingly. While carrying
main characteristics of the local projects, unlike the classic project management, project
managers that work with global teams are faced with more diverse and complex
challenges: The cultural diversity of the project team, project stakeholders who live in
different time zones, unclear requirements caused by different native languages, and
host country-specific political, economic and legal environment, etc. In this study, by
conducting an extensive literature review, the environmental factors in the global
projects and the impact of organizational structure on the success of the project is
synthesized, the controversial and lacking parts in the literature are indicated. On this
basis, the global project management methodologies in academic literature that are
developed to be compatible with the dynamics of the global projects are examined; the
weak and strong aspects are emphasized and based on this a model is developed. With
this study it is aimed to introduce a broad theoretical framework for the new academic
researches and applications in the field of global project management.

Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can theoretically be supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This paper gives a formal account of this relation by a signalling game. This is a game with incomplete information which considers the way in which parties anticipate upon other parties’ behaviour in choosing a course of action. The game shows how cost overruns are the result of an inappropriate signal. This makes it impossible for the principal to distinguish between the types of agents, and hence, allows for strategic behaviour. It is illustrated how cost overruns can be avoided by means of two policy measures, e.g. an accountability structure and benchmarking.

Cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects know no geographical limits; overruns are a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the size of cost overruns varies with location. In the Netherlands, cost overruns appear to be smaller compared to the rest of the world. This paper tests whether Dutch projects perform significantly better in terms of cost overruns than other geographical areas. It is concluded that for road and tunnel projects, the Netherlands performs similarly to the rest of the world. For rail projects, Dutch projects perform considerably better, with projects having significantly lower percentage cost overruns in real terms (11%) compared to projects in other North West European countries (27%) and in other geographical areas (44%). Bridge projects also have considerably smaller cost overruns-7% in the Netherlands compared with 45% in other NW European countries and 27% in other geographical areas. In explaining cost overruns, geography should therefore clearly be taken into consideration.

For many businesses, managing globally distributed IT projects effectively is key to success in today’s competitive environment. However, IT projects and their managements are notorious for failures, and managing globally distributed teams poses unique additional challenges. While the Internet, email and the Web have been major means of communication among such teams, new Web 2.0 technologies and applications which have emerged into prominence in the last few years present new opportunities for successfully managing global projects. This paper presents the authors’ findings on awareness and level of use of Web 2.0 tools for project management among global teams. It also offers recommendations on how managers of global IT projects can manage their teams more efficiently and effectively using Web 2.0 tools.

Humanitarian aid, development, assistance and government, budget allocations to education continues to dwindle, resulting in an increase of the number of children out of school, especially for sourceless countries. GMR, 2021. Due to this, Zimbabwean education has become expensive and thus inaccessible to children in low income communities and rural areas. Hereto models of funding are deployed to effectively confront the challenges in the current education system. An ideal financing framework composed with lessons and literary studies has been drawn up to meet this purpose taking in consideration the costs of sustainability measures with regard to the financial balance of the project.

This paper presents some results of the application of research thinking within
an industrial project environment. During the last five years the impact of Computer
Advanced Visualization Tools (CAVT) in the design and construction process of industrial
projects was studied as part of a research carried out by the Universidad Católica de Chile and
Bechtel Chile Ltda. A Ph.D. researcher working within Bechtel developed methods and
procedures to conduct 4D Planning and Scheduling (4D-PS). His work included pioneering
the first 4D application on a large project that rendered significant and demonstrable savings
in man-hours and materials, showing that 4D technology is viable and cost-effective. Benefits
of applying CAVT to the design process, new conceptualization of the design process, review
of the constructability concept and guidelines to manage organizational change due to IT
impact are examples of the research results that will be presented and discussed in this paper.

Este artigo procurou identificar as questões estratégicas que estiveram presentes nos projetos globais conduzidos por empresas multinacionais brasileiras e quais critérios de desempenho esses projetos atenderam. Nós investigamos 36 projetos globais de inovação tecnológica de empresas multinacionais brasileiras por meio de uma web-survey. Os resultados mostram que essas empresas foram além do tradicional triângulo de ferro para avaliar seus esforços tecnológicos e consideraram dimensões adicionais de desempenho como a satisfação do cliente, os resultados do negócio e a preparação para o futuro. Os resultados também demonstram elevado grau de presença para questões que emergiram da indústria, moderado grau de presença para questões que emergiram do projeto e das atividades de P&D e baixo grau de presença para questões que emergiram da matriz, das subsidiárias e do ambiente externo. Pesquisa adicional é necessária para se identificar se e como essas questões influenciaram o desempenho dos projetos globais de inovação tecnológica estudados.

Using a methodology similar to that used the in the worldwide research, the cost performance of Dutch large-scale transport infrastructure projects is determined. In the Netherlands, cost overruns are as common as cost underruns but because cost overruns are larger than cost underruns projects on average have a cost overrun of 16.5%. The focus on one country further enabled to consider cost overruns during different project development phases. It turned out that in the Netherlands the majority of the cost overrun occurs in the pre-construction phase (the period between the formal decision to build and the start of construction). The frequency as well as the magnitude of pre-construction cost overrun is significantly higher than in the construction phase. The used methodology of calculating cost overruns does however not take lock-in into account. This phenomenon shows that the real decision to build was taken much earlier in the decision-making process. Since estimated costs are usually lower during these earlier stages, the cost overruns based on this real decision to build are likely to be much higher. Cost overruns presented in studies are therefore often underestimated and the problem of cost overruns is much larger than we think.

Full reference: Cantarelli, C. C., Molin, E. J. E., van Wee, B., and Flyvbjerg, B. 2012. Characteristics of cost overruns for Dutch transport infrastructure projects and the importance of the decision to build and project phases. Transport Policy, 22: 49-56.

Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often threaten the overall project viability. This paper investigates the explanations for cost overruns that are given in the literature. Overall, four categories of explanations can be distinguished: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Political explanations have been seen to be the most dominant explanations for cost overruns. Agency theory is considered the most interesting for political explanations and an eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-political explanations are diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and prospect theory), depending on the kind of explanation is considered more appropriate than one all-embracing theory.

Communication in global project teams is emerging research topic as more and more work is done in form of global project, with geographically dispersed teams communicating using different communication channels. There are several unique dimensions to consider in comparison to communication in traditional project teams, including some unique risks and success factors. This article provides a systematic literature review on internal communication in global project teams. Cultural aspects of global project team collaboration were also investigated. A bibliometric analysis was performed through methodological approach applied in previous studies. Traditional project management and communication methods are not the best option for global projects as they can't answer the additional challenges that global projects provide in comparison to traditional projects. Key risks and success factors on global projects were identified and proposals extracted on how to run the internal communication on global projects. Requirements for successful global project manager were described. Our research revealed a gap in available literature, encouraging further exploration and serving as a basis for further research.

Communication in global project teams is emerging research topic as more and more work is done in form of global project, with geographically dispersed teams communicating using different communication channels. There are several unique dimensions to consider in comparison to communication in traditional project teams, including some unique risks and success factors. This article provides a systematic literature review on internal communication in global project teams. Cultural aspects of global project team collaboration were also investigated. A bibliometric analysis was performed through methodological approach applied in previous studies. Traditional project management and communication methods are not the best option for global projects as they can't answer the additional challenges that global projects provide in comparison to traditional projects. Key risks and success factors on global projects were identified and proposals extracted on how to run the internal communication on global projects. Requirements for successful global project manager were described. Our research revealed a gap in available literature, encouraging further exploration and serving as a basis for further research.