Contracting Out Government Services

This paper analyzes recent developments in the outsourcing of prison contracts to highlight the relationship between oversight and legitimacy.  When the government outsources an inherently governmental function (IGF) or a function closely associated with an IGF, oversight and monitoring of the contractor becomes central to maintaining the direction of the contractor and control over government policy.  Developing greater methods of oversight and monitoring of government contractors will help overcome the informational asymmetries that arise between contractors performing such functions and the government.  Private prisons are but one example of how weak oversight can undermine the legitimacy of the government's decision to outsource a closely-associated function.

Final report of  Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Created in Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, this eight-member Commission is mandated by Congress to study federal agency contracting for the reconstruction, logistical support of coalition forces, and the performance of security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan submitted "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan" to Congress on June 10, 2009, describing its operations to that date, identifying areas for research, and flagging eight "issues of immediate concern" for lawmakers to consider.

The extensive use of contractor personnel to augment military intelligence operations is now an established fact of life and, occasional contracting “scandals” notwithstanding, any effective and efficient design for intelligence support to operating forces must provide for their use. The civilian sector can respond to rapidly changing requirements of the Global War on Terror with flexibility and speed that the government sector does not possess. And, in a number of cases, the civilian sector possesses technology, equipment, and technological know-how that the government sector could not acquire in any reasonable amount of time. Add to this the problem of end-strength limitations and recruiting and retention problems, and it is apparent that contractors are a permanent part of the intelligence landscape.
But this dependence on contractors comes with its own set of problems, most of which stem from inadequate planning and from lack of training of deployed uniformed personnel in the intricacies of contracting for and administering contractor personnel. The author points out certain steps that must be taken to provide for effective management of contractor personnel in the field, and, indeed, the Army even has a Field Manual devoted to contractor administration which brings out many of the same points. Yet uniformed intelligence personnel continue to be deployed without adequate training and preparation to handle contractors who will be supporting them.

Purpose: This study is an evaluation of specific ethical dilemmas which can occur during various steps of the contracting out process. The literature shows that the issue of contracting out is one that has steadily proved to be an attractive form of alternative service delivery for local, state, and federal government. Yet, despite the widespread use of contracting out and the identification of important ethical dilemmas that can occur there exists a dearth in research examining how these two components interact. Thus, this research has a fourfold purpose: describe the steps in the contracting out process; identify key ethical concerns that arise from contracting out process; consider the connection between the contracting out process and ethical concerns; and explore the interplay of ethics and the contracting process from the point of view of practitioners

Method: Through the use of a conceptual framework descriptive categories where identified and supported. These categories where then used to develop a survey instrument. This survey was distributed to members of the Texas State University Graduate Masters of Public Administration listserv. The results were analyzed through the use of descriptive statistics.

Findings: The data indicates that the ethical dilemmas identified in the literature are considered to be important concerns at most of the contracting out process steps. Overwhelmingly, however, the ethical dilemmas of Integrity and Accountability were found to be of most importance during the seven different steps of contracting out.

The power to surreptitiously gather and control information is arguably among the most consequential authorities granted to the government of a free society.  In exchange for this power the intelligence community assumes an imperative obligation to ensure good governance and ethical management of its institutions and processes, particularly as the very nature of the profession imposes inherent limitations on transparency and public scrutiny over its operations.  Maintenance of this unique social contract requires that community leaders provide wise stewardship of taxpayer resources, strict accountability over processes and effective safeguards to protect sensitive information.  Yet as corporate interests assume a larger and larger role supporting the nation’s critical intelligence functions it is necessary to question if these new actors have interfered with the government’s basic responsibility to provide oversight and sound management of its operations.  Given the rapid expansion of commercial interests now operating inside the intelligence community the time is overdue for a thoughtful debate concerning potential ethical and legal dilemmas posed by this transformation.

Private contractors provide a wide variety of services, supporting international contingency operations that range from disaster relief to peacekeeping missions, and frequently occur in conflict and post-conflict areas. The size of the contingency contractor industry fluctuates significantly over time and is highly reflective of geopolitical events.  In fact, the industry’s size is directly based on the demands of clients, primarily national governments, but also nongovernmental organizations, relief organizations, international organizations and other private companies.  Industry ethics also largely stem from client requirements, and the drive by some clients to save costs can undermine international efforts to improve ethics and professionalism.  The character of the industry is influenced by several factors including market demand, contractual terms for the companies and the laws and regulations – created by relevant state bodies – that govern the type and manner of work private contractors may perform.  Ultimately the industry is a direct reflection of the urgent needs of the international community for specialized services in risky and difficult locations.

Tackling internal insecurity and preventing crime through increased cooperation within society is considered as the paramount solution to rising security concerns. This can only be achieved through establishing mutual trust through continuous efforts by promoting a culture of dialogue. However this dialogue must start at the community level with community policing initiatives that are mapped and executed with a conscientious and concentrated approach. The present study analyzes and evaluates the strategy and initiatives of the public and community relation practices being carried out by the Chandigarh police. The study finds that these practices have shown remarkable benefits through winning trust and plugging the gaps that exist between the public and the police. However to strengthen the spirit of effective public/police interface issues of corruption, lack of professionalism, low morale and conflict among different strata's of Chandigarh police need to be dealt on an immediate basis.

Pre-publication version; [2021] Public Law (forthcoming) For most of the twentieth century, administrative decisions were taken and public services were delivered by public servants. Over the last forty years, government has increasingly contracted out such tasks to private contractors in order to secure efficiency and to reduce costs. Outsourcing has led to important changes in the structure of public administration. Private contractors are now governing institutions. They perform some core governmental functions. One issue raised by this development is whether the provision of public services by private contractors rather than government bodies has affected the quality of administrative justice and, if so, how. At a general level, administrative justice comprises both the justice inherent in administrative decision-making and internal and external redress mechanisms. 1 The idea of administrative justice has developed on the basis that policy is made and then implemented by government bodies which are then scrutinised through public accountability mechanisms. Outsourcing proceeds on a different set of assumptions. Government is no longer a monopoly provider, but instead goes to the market to select which private contractors can best deliver public services. Such contractors are not motivated by the public interest, but by the search for profit. Outsourcing also introduces new forms of accountability, such as the monitoring by government of the performance of contractors. This article investigates how outsourcing and the use of private contractors affects the operation of administrative justice in practice. It does so by examining a number of case-studies from both local and central government concerning the performance of private contractors in the delivery of public services and the degree to which they have been able to ensure administrative justice. It is argued that it is not possible to provide a single, overall answer as to whether outsourcing improves or weakens administrative justice. In some * Thanks to Michael Adler, Rick Rawlings, and the reviewer for comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

This policy paper discusses issues related to information, contract management, transparency and ethical standards to improve local units of government contracting out for case management in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Existing research points to contracting out taking place in a weak macroeconomics context (Petersen et al., 2018; Domberger and Jensen 1997) with budgetary constraints that impact a government’s provision of public assistance schemes (Neil, 2004) to review and change service delivery mechanisms. These changes contribute to a more decentralised administration and also reduce the overall quality and performance of the government. Moreover, the administration of governance faces reduced access to information, increased accountability/transparency problems to administer public business, and presents major challenges to institutional compliance and performance management (Berle and Means, 1932). Although the agency relation shows certain local units of government in transitional economies have failed or are inappropriate to administer huge sum of taxpayers’ money in contracting out for welfare governance, there is still little policy study research in CEE countries analysing the improvement of local units of government overall contracting out for welfare governance. This also impacts third country nationals and disadvantaged ethnic-minorities employment-related transition in the selected entities. Based on a qualitative cross-country oriented research approach with fewer country comparisons, this policy paper analyses and assesses both centrally directed and locally initiated contracting out governance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The findings show certain service provision is negotiated and exempt from open access to information; contracts are often treated as secret, and the existence of unethical behaviour, which distorts the core value of trust in corporate governance and impacts third country nationals and (ethnic) minority citizens’ transition to work in the selected entities. As a matter of fact, the research recommends open access to (relevant) information, up-skilling and increased public service staff, and open book accounting to combine accountability, integrity, and ethical standards in the formation, delivery and implementation of public service. Not meeting these recommendations may reinforce fraud, penalise vulnerability and belongings, as well as weaken the economy in a global competitive market spectrum

Purpose. Procurement is an integral part of any organization, including public agencies. Government procurement is a highly complex and highly political issue nationwide. While contracting occurs at every level of government, municipalities appear to be in the forefront of the “contracting-out” movement. Contracting-out has both positive and negative consequences; however, there are certain characteristics required in order to administer an efficient, productive, and responsive governmental procurement program. This applied research project assesses the City of Austin’s procurement process and programs based on a practical ideal type framework developed through a literature review. A review of literature pertaining to government procurement and contracting programs reveals eight necessary elements of quality and successful programs: ethics, accountability, transparency, competitiveness; complexity, equity, quality, and monitoring and oversight. Method. Using the City as a case study, the eight categories are used to evaluate the City of Austin procurement program. The data collection methodology for this study includes document analysis and structured interviews. Results. The results of the case study reveal that quality measurement and the monitoring and oversight functions do not meet the established criteria of the practical ideal type model. The City exceeds in areas of having established written processes and procedures that address the majority of the practical ideal type categories. Conclusion. Recommendations for improving the City of Austin’s current procurement program are also identified in the areas of quality and monitoring and oversight.

In this article I report some of the findings of my research into the impact on church-related agencies of contracting. I set the scene with accounts of the policy shift to contracting, developments in the power and reach of the state more generally, and the implications of these developments for the contracting relationship with church-related agencies. The narratives on the impact of contracting that I present in this article come from interviews with senior agency management in a wide range of church-related agencies, supplemented by information from annual reports and agency websites. The theoretical basis for the analysis draws on both organisational sociology and the sociology of religion.

With emerging interest in contracting for outcomes, this study re viewed the lessons to be learned from a number of sectors where some form of payment-by-outcome had been employed in the past - welfare-to-work, offender management, the management of long-term health conditions, pharmaceutical pricing and foster care.

Witnesses:

William Solis, Director Of Defense Capabilities And Management, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State James Kundar, Assistant Administrator For The Near East And Africa, U.S. Agency For International Development (USAID)
Chris Taylor, Vice President, Blackwater USA
Major General Robert Rosenkranz (Ret.), President Of International Technical Service, Dyncorp International
Ignacio Balderas, Former CEO And Current Board Of Directors Member, Triple Canopy
Doug Brooks, President, International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)
Alan Chvotkin, Senior Vice President And Counsel, Professional Services Council (PSC)

Purpose-To look at contracting-out for case management (job search assistance, counselling) service implementation through public and private employment service agencies in Czech Republic enabling young third country immigrant employment-related transition from unemployment to all types of employment Design/Methodology/approach-The qualitative case study was to understand the role of Local Public Employment Service (PES) and Private Employment Service agencies in contracting-out for case management service delivery to enable young third country immigrant employment-related transition from welfare to work. Drawing on official employment-related legislative documents and scholastic text, data were collected. Data were analyse using document and thematic qualitative content analysis techniques. Finding-Research has shown that contracting for welfare service delivery is a major trend of Public Employment Service privatisation reforms, given the enthusiasm to outsourcing (in general) with competitive multiple independent non-state service providers, assuming that private agencies are better off to meet consumers need and less bureaucratic in the implementation process. Yet, private enterprise may have too strong incentives to cut costs, which can impair their quality on services provision to hard-core unemployed (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993) people. Similarly, local government units faced challenges with costly administrative ways to negotiate and manage private contracts for taxpayer`s money due to the lack of information (Gesine 2016; Gilbert 2004: 120) and conflicting strategies to fulfil their tasks. The findings show the role of open information, delegation of authority as cooperate governance, and monitoring to guide ethical value and accountability. This is crucial to manage taxpayer`s money in time where countries are still facing financial crisis with gross domestic product deficit. Research limitations/implications-The findings of this investigation have shown that managing of taxpayer`s money through contracting-out for welfare implementation is a complex policy measure. Since the study is exclusively from a single case-oriented approach, the investigation focused only to the socio-political phenomenon in Czech Republic that is insufficiently generalized to explain the phenomenon in countries not included in the study leading to low external validity. Moreover, this study focuses mainly on young third country immigrant employment-related transition from welfare to work in Czech Republic. Thus, irregular and undocumented third country immigrants are not part of this study. Analysing research findings with the lens of contracting-out model, assumes that human beings actions are rational bounded with self-interest and opportunism. Using principal-agent theory in contracting-out case management study allows the investigation to specify tasks as well as how controlling and monitoring over private agencies and bonding mechanism serve as

How can a transport authority organise efficient and affordable public transport? Presentation on public transport regulation and contracting, including institutional framework, financial arrangements and different types of contracts. Presented as part of a UITP training programme for public transport experts, Johannesburg, October 2014.

The use of contractors to support international policies overseas is not a recent phenomenon. However, increased reliance on the private sector to operate in roles traditionally carried out by government and the military in Afghanistan and Iraq has created apprehension in some academic and policy circles. This essay provides an overview of the modern use of contractors by looking at the different roles that contractors play in support of U.S. foreign policy—from the contentious use of private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, to security sector reform in post-conflict nations, to logistics and camp servicing for the all-voluntary U.S. military, to rule of law consulting and development aid delivery. It will then move to address a number of concerns that have been raised in the academic and policy communities. Much of the existing literature demonstrates a failed understanding or ideologically driven interpretation of the role and incentives of the private sector, contributing to a flawed analysis from critics. Contractors do not lead; they follow. They do not create policy, but they are critical to implementing important aspects of it, as outlined in comprehensive contracts, designed and guided by governments or international organizations.  Finally, this article will address the issue of extraterritorial accountability, discussing domestic and international legal frameworks and arguing that the stability operations industry benefits from effective legal frameworks. The industry is essential to international policies, and an honest understanding of its role and limitations is crucial to any accurate analysis.

The logic of service delivery is changing profoundly due to technological, organisational, institutional and social innovations. This development paves the way for new forms of interaction and socio-economic composition in social and economic life. In this article we provide an overview of the on-going service transformation and apply it to public service provision and delivery. Our focus is on organisational innovation in public service delivery, which refers to innovations that aim at renewing or improving public service delivery processes and related organisational arrangements. In this context attention is paid to both competitive and collaborative solutions. In the empirical part, the transformation of Finnish public service delivery is discussed in the light of outsourcing in local government and of inter-municipal collaboration. Our conclusion is that the logic of public service delivery is increasingly based on the idea of marketisation with various manifestations. Yet, the other side of the coin is increased use of various forms of collaborative mechanisms, which tends to balance the development and show that collaborative synergy remains to be essential aspect of innovation in public service delivery.

Background: The case of contracting out government health services to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been weak for maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) services, with documented gains being mainly in curative services. We present an in-depth assessment of the comparative advantages of contracting out on MNCH access, quality, and equity, using a case study from Pakistan. Methods: An end-line, cross-sectional assessment was conducted of government facilities contracted out to a large national NGO and government-managed centres serving as controls, in two remote rural districts of Pakistan. Contracting out was specific for augmenting MNCH services but without contractual performance incentives. A household survey, a health facility survey, and focus group discussions with client and spouses were used for assessment. Results: Contracted out facilities had a significantly higher utilization as compared to control facilities for antenatal care, delivery, postnatal care, emergency obstetric care, and neonatal illness. Contracted facilities had comparatively better quality of MNCH services but not in all aspects. Better household practices were also seen in the district where contracting involved administrative control over outreach programs. Contracting was also faced with certain drawbacks. Facility utilization was inequitably higher amongst more educated and affluent clients. Contracted out catchments had higher out-of-pocket expenses on MNCH services, driven by steeper transport costs and user charges for additional diagnostics. Contracting out did not influence higher MNCH service coverage rates across the catchment. Physical distances, inadequate transport, and low demand for facility-based care in non-emergency settings were key client-reported barriers. Conclusion: Contracting out MNCH services at government health facilities can improve facility utilization and bring some improvement in quality of services. However, contracting out of health facilities is insufficient to increase service access across the catchment in remote rural contexts and requires accompanying measures for demand enhancement, transportation access, and targeting of the more disadvantaged clientele.

Analysis of the state of the UK public services market in 2017. The report argues that government is responsible for the quality of its supply chain and that poor procurement and contract management have severely undermined the political and commercial sustainability of the market.

บทความนี้นำเสนอประเด็นของการทำสัญญาว่าจ้างในรูปแบบของของการว่าจ้างภายนอก เริ่มต้นจากการทบทวนแนวทางการศึกษาของการจัดการนิยมและเสรีนิยมใหม่ จัดเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการจัดการภาครัฐใหม่ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง การแปรรูปกิจการสาธารณะเป็นสาเหตุหลักของการว่าจ้างภายนอกและจ้างงานเหมาช่วงในหน่วยงานภาครัฐต่าง ๆ ผู้เขียนจึงมีข้อโต้แย้งต่อความเป็นหุ้นส่วนระหว่างรัฐและเอกชน เนื่องจากแท้จริงแล้วไม่สนับสนุนความร่วมมือจากภาคส่วนอื่น เช่น ประชาสังคมและสหภาพแรงงาน เป็นต้น ขณะที่แนวทางปฏิบัติของการอภิบาลประสานความร่วมมือส่งเสริมการมีส่วนร่วมพลเมืองและปรึกษาหารือตามครรลองประชาธิปไตย ท้ายนี้ การอภิบาลในเศรษฐกิจแบ่งปันเน้นที่บทบาทของภาคเอกชนเพื่อจัดเตรียมบริการสาธารณะ และประโยชน์ของเศรษฐกิจแบ่งปัน ได้แก่ กระบวนการภายในขององค์กร ทั้งแบ่งปันข้อมูลและว่าจ้างภายนอก และกระบวนการภายนอกของการส่งมอบบริการสาธารณะ โดยสรุป การนำไปปฏิบัติของเศรษฐกิจแบ่งปันในภาครัฐ ต้องพิจารณาต้นทุนและประสิทธิภาพการบริหารควบคู่ไปกับความเท่าเทียมและเป็นธรรม เพื่อเสริมสร้างความเป็นหุ้นส่วนและยกระดับสู่ความเป็นหุ้นส่วนที่เท่าเทียม
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This article presents the issue of contracting-out in the form of outsourcing. First, it reviews an approach to managerialism and neoliberalism as part of the New Public Management, particularly privatization is the root cause of outsourcing and subcontracting in public sector organizations. After that, it argues to public-private partnership because it does not support cooperation from other sectors, such as civil society and trade unions. Meanwhile, the practice of collaborative governance promotes citizen engagement and deliberative democracy. Finally, the governance in the sharing economy focuses on the role of private sector in providing public services and benefits of sharing economy includes (1) the internal process of organizations both sharing data and hiring an external organization, and (2) the external process of public service delivery. To sum up, the practice of sharing economy in public sectors must consider administrative costs and efficiencies along with equity and fairness for strengthening ownership and building an equal partnership.

Split off from other U.S. regional commands, AFRICOM is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) new command for Africa and this new customized organization offers enormous opportunities for the continent, particularly if it is able to fully harness the capabilities of the private sector to support its goal of enhancing African stability. The private sector has long supported international policies in Africa with logistics, peacekeeping support, peacekeeper training, demining, heavy aviation, security and many other services. With AFRICOM’s greater focus on African problems, it is likely that the unique capabilities of private companies will be utilized to an ever-greater degree to improve and expand policies that have been helping to provide stability to the African continent.

This article shows that variations in how two UK governments justified contracting-out (issue
framing), combined with shifting sector-derived incentives for union activism (sector character),
can help explain the extent of contracting-out. Janitorial service, an activity of the UK government
that should have been ‘low hanging fruit’ for its prolific reformers, proved difficult to contract-out
for Thatcher’s New Right Conservatives, but easier to contract-out for Blair’s New Labour. The
New Right government framed contracting-out narrowly, as merely an improvement in operational
efficiency, and its reform faced unions that stood to lose a great deal from movement of janitorial
jobs to private firms. In contrast, the New Labour government framed contracting-out broadly, as
a means to efficient social justice, and faced unions with low stakes in government janitors. As a
consequence, UK government units could expect lower benefit and higher cost from contracting-out
janitors under Thatcher than they would under Blair.

The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential resources. Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both healthcare and economic stabilization) at an unprecedented scale, creating opportunities for rent-seeking of many kinds, including outright corruption. Third, politicians, bureaucrats and medical professionals exercise substantial discretion in the allocation of resources. A lack of transparency and weak oversight and enforcement have exacerbated the problems of corruption and fraud, and public measures against these offenses have not kept pace with the developing crisis. The paper discusses how these features interact in procurement processes, in gover...

Capacity is considered as fundamental for implementing public policies in developing and developed countries alike, and constraints are understood as the external or internal factors which control what an organisation does by keeping it within particular limits.
The aim of this paper is to analyse capacity constraints in the public sector with regard to the implementation of two reforms: contracting-out and regulation. The first case analyses the experience of contracting-out in Ghana, Africa, with especial focus on the capacity constraints which had in the past undermined this specific reform. The context is mainly from 1990 to 1998, and I focus on the introduction of contracting-out in the health sector. The second case is slightly different, but lies within the framework of the relationship between the state and the market: regulation. The examination takes into account the Peruvian experience of regulating mining companies. The timeframe is from 1990 to 2006, and there are specific references to ongoing processes since 2007.
Though both country-specific experiences are from different sectors, they have similarities which allow comparison, draw some conclusions and suggest some policy recommendations regarding capacity building.

Billions of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars will be wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan if the host nation governments cannot take over the operation, maintenance, and security of efforts undertaken to reconstruct,
stabilize, and develop those countries.
Potential waste from unsustainable projects exceeds $11 billion for just one program in Afghanistan, facilities construction for the national security forces. The total risk from all contracts in both Iraq and Afghanistan could be much higher.
In many cases, the opportunity to avoid or mitigate waste from sustainment failure has already passed. In other cases, there is
still time to act. But time is growing short.
Without prompt and decisive action, the biggest waste in Iraq and Afghanistan may be yet to come.
We recommend:
1. Officials at the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development examine both completed and current projects for risk of sustainment failure
and pursue all reasonable strategies to mitigate risks.
2. Officials ensure that any new requirements and acquisition strategies regarding contingency contracts for projects or services to be handed over to a host nation include a detailed assessment of
host nations’ ability and will to meet the out-year costs essential for long-term
success.
3. Officials take appropriate action to
cancel or redesign projects or programs
that have little or no realistic prospect for
achieving sustainability.