Bertrand Russell

[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of ‘physical’ closely to physics? To do so (in a non-circular way) is to run the risk of ruling out the possibility that there might be two different universes that were ‘formally’ or structurally identical or homomorphic although substantially different—made of different stuff. [3] Perhaps that is not in the end a real possibility. Even so, it seems that we shouldn’t define ‘physical’ in a way that rules it out a priori. [4] If so, it may be that the word ‘physical’ is best used to denote a certain fundamental structure-transcendent stuff-nature—call it P—that allows the possibility that a universe with stuff nature Q structurally identical to a physical universe isn’t physical. [5] Can we suppose ourselves to know something about the ultimate intrinsic nature of P, if physicalism is true? I argue that we can. [6] Can we draw any further metaphysical conclusions from this knowledge? I argue that we can. We can show that panpsychism in some form constitutes the most plausible theory of the ultimate nature of P.

El siglo XX será recordado por los grandes avances científicos y tecnológicos, la conquista del espacio, el uso masivo de las computadoras y las telecomunicaciones, el desarrollo de economías a escala mundial y por una notable expansión de la cultura y del mundo universitario; pero también, por las guerras mundiales, la amenaza de una aniquilación nuclear, los genocidios, la enorme desigualdad social, la crisis ecológica; los interrogantes y debates en torno a la genética y el futuro biológico de la humanidad y del planeta mismo. Todas estas realidades se reflejaron en la filosofía de ese siglo. Este libro hace un recorrido por las principales obras y autores que han marcado el pasado inmediato de la filosofía. Con un lenguaje accesible, se muestran las propuestas fundamentales que dieron pie al prestigio académico y social de estos pensadores, y se expone un modelo hermenéutico para enfrentarse a los textos clásicos.

"Michel Weber and Will Desmond, (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought, Frankfurt / Lancaster, ontos verlag, Process Thought X1 & X2, 2008. (695 p. + 726 p. ; ISBN 978-3-938793-92-3 ; 398 €)
Gathering 115 entries written by 101 internationally renowned experts in their fields, the Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought aims at interpreting Whitehead secundum Whitehead, at canvassing the current state of knowledge in Whiteheadian scholarship and at identifying promising directions for future investigations through (internal) cross-elucidation and (external) interdisciplinary and crossdisciplinary development.
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. Aesthetics
II. Anthropology
III. Ecology
IV. Economy
V. Education
VI. Ethics
VII. Gender Studies
VIII. History
IX. Language
X. Mathematics and Logic
XI. Metaphysics
XII. Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind
XIII. Public Policy
XIV. Science
XV. Sociology of Science
XVI. Theology and Religion
XVII. Theory of Knowledge
XVIII. Urbanism & Architecture
XIX. Biographical entries
XX. Critical Apparatus

Authors : A Sister of St-John, Adam Scarfe , Albert C. Lewis, Alessandro Sardi, Alix Parmentier, Andrew Dawson, Annamaria Miranda, Arran Gare, Barbara Muraca, Berit Brogaard, Beth Lord, Brian G. Henning, Bruce Duncan MacQueen, Bruce G. Epperly, Carol F. Johnston, Carol P. Christ, Claude de Jonckheere, Claus Michael Ringel, Clifford Cobb, Craig Eisendrath, Daniel A. Dombrowski, David G. Butt, David Ray Griffin, Dominic J. Balestra, Donald Wayne Viney, Donna Bowman, Douglas R. Anderson, Elias L. Khalil, Elie During, Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, Franck Robert, Gao Shan, Gary A. Cook, George Allan, Giangiacomo Gerla , Gottfried Heinemann, Graham Bird, Granville C. Henry, jr., Gudmund Smith, Guillaume Durand, Howard Woodhouse, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Jaime Nubiola, James Connelly, James Williams, Jean-Pascal Alcantara, Johanna Seibt, John B. Cobb, Jr., John H. Buchanan, John Quiring , John W. Lango, Jonathan Delafield-Butt, Jorge Luis Nobo, Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., Joseph E. Earley, Sr., Joseph Grange, Juan Vicente Mayoral de Lucas, Judith Jones, Julie A. Nelson, Kipton Jensen, Leemon McHenry, Les Muray, Lieven Decock, Liliana Albertazzi, Luca Gaeta, Luca Vanzago, Manuel Bächtold, Marc Maesschalck, Maria Pachalska , Mark Modak-Truran, Mark R. Dibben, Mary Elizabeth Moore, Max Velmans, Michael Epperson, Michael Fortescue, Michel Weber, Murray Code, Mustafa Ruezgar, Norman Sieroka, Patrick J. Coppock, Paul Custodio Bube, Peter Hare, Peter Simons, Pierfrancesco Basile, Les Muray, Randall E. Auxier, Richard Feist, Robert Castiglione, Robert J.Valenza, Ronny Desmet , Ross L. Stein, Rudolf Windeln, Stephen T. Franklin, Sylviane R. Schwer, T. L. S. Sprigge, Thomas A. F. Kelly, Thomas E. Hosinski, C.S.C., Timothy E. Eastman, Vincent Shen, Volker Peckhaus, William Jay Garland, William T. Myers"

Publicada en 1931, La perspectiva científica pertenece al grupo de obras de divulgación que Bertrand Russell escribió en el período de entreguerras. Su objeto fue el de «considerar la influencia de la ciencia sobre la vida humana», y a tal fin dispuso una serie de reflexiones -de extraordinaria actualidad después de décadas de su publicación-, escritas con un lenguaje asequible para todo el mundo donde trata de imaginar la futura sociedad científica a la que inevitablemente estamos abocados.

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

"Ronny Desmet & Michel Weber (edited by), Whitehead. The Algebra of Metaphysics. Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute Memorandum, Louvain-la-Neuve, Les Éditions Chromatika, 2010. (978-2-930517-08-7 ; 220 p. ; 40 €)

Drawing upon the major Harvard works —Science and the Modern World (1925), Process and Reality (1929) and Adventures of Ideas (1933)—, the essays gathered here on the occasion of the creation of the Applied Process Metaphysics Summer Institute, seek, first, to introduce into Whitehead’s thought by clarifying what is at stake in his philosophy and by providing a synoptic vision of his key categories in light of their historical development and, second, to foster a creative dialogue among all participants. These essays give the opportunity to travel through most aspects of Whitehead’s legacy: anthropology, ecology, education, epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, political theory and relativity physics. "
[Introduction to Whitehead ; Introduction to Process and Reality]

AUZEF-Felsefe "20. YY Felsefesi" ders özeti (1-14. Ünite).

Russel, Mantıksal Felsefe, Witgenstein, Analitik Felsefe, Moore, Eleştirel Dil Felsefesi, Husserl, Fenomenoloji, Heideger, Fundemental Ontoloji, Tractacus, Frankfurt Okulu, Varoluşçuluk, Viyana Çevresi, Postmodernizm,

A mildly chronological overview of the philosophers who may have been inspired by the use of psychoactive chemicals, inc. Plato, de Quincey, Davy, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Bergson, Benjamin, Jünger, Paz, Marcuse, Sartre, Foucault; and a mention of the Outsight project.

This article was based on a talk given for the University of Exeter Philosophy Society (video: https://youtu.be/X2eY4n37FC0) and at the ICPR2016 conference. It was published in the popular HighExistence magazine on August 2nd 2016, and has received over 90 000 social media shares (http://highexistence.com/hidden-psychedelic-influence-philosophy-plato-nietzsche-psychonauts-thoughts).

Reference:
Sjöstedt-H, P. 'The Psychedelic Influence on Philosophy', HighExistence.com (2nd-08-2016)

"Este trabajo se ocupa del desarrollo histórico-filosófico de las posiciones subjetivistas sobre los valores surgidas a partir del siglo XVIII con David Hume, en el seno de la tradición del empirismo analítico. Partiendo de esta posición, se centra en la transformación del subjetivismo axiológico de raigambre analítica en el siglo XX hacia el emotivismo, en el marco del giro lingüístico de la filosofía contemporánea. Los filósofos cuyas posiciones se examinan son David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Ayer, Bertrand Russell y John Leslie Mackie.
A partir de la dicha indagación, se examinan las posibilidades actuales del emotivismo como propuesta de análisis del lenguaje moral. En las Conclusiones se toma posición frente a dos importantes objeciones que surgieron contra el emotivismo: su incapacidad para dar cuenta de las pretensiones de verdad o de validez que estarían presentes en todo juicio de valor, y su imposibilidad de ofrecer una explicación suficiente del sentido de la discusión moral, al restringir la misma a mera retórica y negar que existan razones para apoyar un juicio de valor.
Mediante un examen crítico de esas dificultades, se vislumbra en qué medida el emotivismo (y más en general el no-cognitivismo) puede aún hoy ser reivindicado como una posición metaética posible, o bien si debe considerarse definitivamente superado. En ese sentido, se analiza también qué aspectos del emotivismo pueden reformularse de modo de mantener alguna vigencia, incorporando elementos del estudio de los juicios de valor provenientes de otras tradiciones metaéticas.
El capítulo I contextualiza la corriente del ‘empirismo analítico’, a la vez que se ocupa del tipo de tratamiento con que esta tradición filosófica abordó la problemática de la ética en general y del estatus de los valores en particular. Desde el capítulo II al VI, se presentan las posiciones de Hume, el 1º Wittgenstein, Ayer, Russell y Mackie. El capítulo VII ofrece un intento de clasificación de las distintas posturas que reciben el nombre genérico de ‘subjetivismo axiológico’. El capítulo VIII versa acerca de las relaciones del empirismo analítico con diversos temas relevantes para la ética (argumentos contra el objetivismo axiológico, posibilidad de fundamentar la ética, papel de la razón en la práctica moral, emotivismo y empirismo, etc.). Finalmente las Conclusiones recapitulan las diferentes posiciones metaéticas y de la argumentación moral expuestas, a los fines de reexaminarlas a la luz de algunas de las críticas que pretendieron impugnar el emotivismo. Se intenta así demarcar el papel que juegan las pretensiones de verdad o de validez en los juicios de valor, no tenidas en cuenta por dicha doctrina. También se examina y se defiende la posibilidad de dar cuenta de un genuino razonamiento moral en el marco de una posición emotivista."

C.K. Ogden (1889–1957) and I.A. Richards’ (1893–1979) The Meaning of Meaning is widely recognised as a classic text of early twentieth-century linguistic semantics and semiotics, but less well known are its links to the ‘logical atomism’ of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), one of the foundational doctrines of analytic philosophy. In this paper a detailed comparison of The Meaning of Meaning and logical atomism is made, in which several key similarities between the two theories in subject matter and approach are identified: both attempt to describe meaning in terms of the latest psychological doctrines and both pursue a normative program aimed at rectifying the perceived deficiencies of language. But there are also a number of differences between the theories. Ogden and Richards – most probably inspired by Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912) – offered a pragmatically oriented account of ordinary language, while Russell sought a ‘logically perfect language’ beyond interpretation, and rejected the work of Welby and her allies. These differences contributed significantly to Russell’s largely negative opinion of The Meaning of Meaning. Despite this, several ideas pioneered in The Meaning of Meaning re-appear in Russell’s later writings. The Meaning of Meaning, it would seem, not only drew inspiration from Russell’s philosophy but may have also contributed to its further development.

An overview of the origins and development of analytic metaphysics. The first part is strictly historical, focusing mainly on Russell and Moore, and then on Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Stebbing, but also on other authors whose work has been more or less directly influential, from Husserl to Twardowski, Kotarbiński, and Leśniewski. The second part deals with later developments, including recent work in ontology and meta-ontology, identity, persistence through time, and the metaphysics of modality.

The main question treated in this book is the relation between statements (sentences, propositions) and reality. The book is the first volume of a larger work about the fundamental (ontological, epistemological, linguistic) character of logic. My viewpoint is a realistic and metaphysical view of logic and truth influenced to a very large extent by works of Plato, Aristotle, Frege, Russell, Gödel, and Hardy, among others. Hence the title "Logical Forms", inspired by Plato. I list below the titles of the chapters in lieu of an abstract.

Introduction. Logic, ontology, and epistemology.
1. Truth, description, and identification.
2. The True and the False.
3. Use, mention, and Russell's theory of descriptions.
4. Arguments for Frege's thesis.
5. Objections to facts.
6. Truth, denotation, and interpretations.
7. Tarski's semantic conception of truth.
8. The True and the False revisited: Frege's logic.
9.Structuring reality: properties, sets, and states of affairs.
10. Identity and extensionality.
11. Senses.
12. Truth and correspondence.

A translation to Spanish--Formas Lógicas I--was published by Eudeba in 2015 and I added some information and a link to Eudeba in TRANSLATIONS.

A translation to Portuguese--Lógica, ontologia e epistemologia --of the Introduction was published in 2006 and I added the pdf in TRANSLATIONS.

In this article, I want to explore the possibility of seeing private phenomenal experiences along the line with Russell’s thought: as having objectivity, which would allow seeing them as objects of scientific research. Or, in other words, to ask if it would be possible to speak scientifically about mental events usually called impressions. Although some philosophers still consider this problem to be inscrutable —the so-called explanatory gap that leads to all the complex and extense debate about qualia, my hypothesis is, as Sellars indicated, that it is highly probable that only errors or limitations in our use of vocabulary impede us in finding a solution according to Russell’s intention.

In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela discusses Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies of logic, situating them in the context of early and middle analytic philosophy, with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap and Strawson. He argues that throughout his career Wittgenstein sought to solve problems with Frege’s and Russell’s philosophies of logic, address the limitations thereof, and to further develop a broadly Fregean–Russellian logical-philosophical methodology, aiming to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated this approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered-up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a new interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methods beyond calculus-based methods, and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the richness and complexity of thought and language use while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein’s later work, and explains how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is aimed at philosophers and students of philosophy interested in the philosophy of logic and language, philosophical methodology, and the history of analytic philosophy, and anyone interested in logical methods or the question of how to manage complexity through simplification and idealization without falsification.

This public article presents three arguments for the plausibility of panpsychism: the view that sentience is a fundamental and ubiquitous element of actuality. Thereafter is presented a brief exploration of why panpsychism has been spurned.
The article was commissioned by High Existence.

– Introduction
– 1. The Genetic Argument
– 2. The Abstraction Argument
– 3. The Inferential Argument
– Why Panpsychism is Spurned
– End Remarks

Originally published 15 January 2018: http://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/ [note different subtitle]

Accompanying audio version: https://youtu.be/B7B_RmZQp5Q

©Peter Sjöstedt-H 2018

We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objections to the positions due to Howell and Kind. We suggest possible avenues of response open to the Russellian monist, and develop the ideas of 'compatibilist' and 'necessitarian' Russellian monism.

The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Western Philosophy, Philosophy, The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century, Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, Bolzano, Husserl, The Varieties of Analysis, Semantic, Conceptual and Phenomenological Analysism, Connective and Explicatory Analysis, Decompositional and Transformative Analysis, Michael Beaney, Beaney Michael,
http://alhassanain.org/english/?com=book&id=833

"Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, Frankfurt / Lancaster, ontos verlag, Process Thought I, 2004. (339 p. ; ISBN 3-937202-49-8 ; 89 €)
When Rescher’s Process Metaphysics (1996) was published, it was widely acclaimed as a major step towards the academic recognition of a “mode of thought” that has otherwise been confined within sharp scholarly boundaries. Of course it is not an easy book: despite its stylistic clarity, it remains the complex outcome of a life’s work in most areas of philosophy. The goal of the present volume is to systematically unfold the vices and virtues of Process Metaphysics, and thereby to specify the contemporary state of affairs in process thought. To do so, the editor has gathered one focused contribution per chapter, each paper addressing specifically and explicitly its assigned chapter and seeking to promote a dialogue with Rescher. In addition, the volume features Rescher’s replies to the papers.
« Whenever Nicholas Rescher writes, wise philosophers take note. This volume bears witness to that fact. Its essays not only engage Rescher's wrestling with Alfred North Whitehead and process metaphysics in helpful ways but also make distinctive and instructive contributions of their own. This book advances the development of an important and lively philosophical tradition. » John K. Roth, Edward J. Sexton Professor of Philosophy and Director of The Center for the Study of the Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights, Claremont McKenna College, USA.
"

In a recent "Eco-Preacher" blog post, "Religion and Science Can be Besties," (http://www.patheos.com/blogs/ecopreacher/2017/04/religion-science-besties/), pastor, professor, and activist Dr. Leah Schade claims that "the narrative of Christianity opposing science is neither helpful nor true." She argues that "[i]nsights from science inform Christian ethics, and Christian ethics can help us understand the implications of science." She then proposes to utilize Dynamic Systems or "Chaos" Theory as a lens through which to examine and thereby support these claims--leading the reader to believe she understands both the science of dynamic systems and the moral substance and motives of Christianity. 

Unfortunately, however, Rev. Schade makes it clear she understands neither science nor ethics. If she did, she'd see that science no more needs Christian ethics to show us the mechanics of physics, chemistry, or biology than being a moral person requires having faith, as Bertrand Russell put it, in an "ally in the sky." Indeed, if we're going to mount a successful campaign against the "starvation" budgets proposed by the Trump regime for the National Institute of Health (cuts of 20%), the Department of Energy's Office of Science (20%), the Environmental Protection Agency (50%), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ($250 million dollar budget cut), and the $100 million from NASA, there could be no better time to make an uncompromising defense of reason unmuddied by the efforts of religion to imprison us in the very fear and uncertainly autocratic charlatans like Trump and his mercenary cronies are all too eager to exploit.

It's time, in other words, to not be suckers.

"Michel Weber, Whitehead's Pancreativism. The Basics, Foreword by Nicholas Rescher, Frankfurt / Paris / Lancaster, ontos verlag, Process Thought VII, 2006. (278 p. ; ISBN 3-938793-15-5 ; 84 €)
There is one question that any potential reader who suspects that Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) might be important for past, contemporary, and future philosophy inevitably raises: how should I read Whitehead? How can I make sense of this incredibly dense tissue of imaginative systematizing, spread over decades of work in disciplines so different and specialized as algebra, geometry, logic, relativistic physics and philosophy of science? Accordingly, this monograph has two main objectives. The first one is to propose a set of efficient hermeneutical tools to get the reader started. These straightforward tools provide answers that are highly coherent and probably the most applicable to Whitehead’s entire corpus. The second objective is to illustrate how the several parts of Process and Reality are connected, something that all commentators have either failed to recognise or only incompletely acknowledged.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Foreword—Nicholas Rescher
Introduction
I. Historico-Conceptual Context
II. The Intertwining of Science, Philosophy and Religion
III. Process and Reality’s Goal and Method
IV. Creative Advance and Categoreal Scheme
V. Pancreativism
VI. Epochal Actuality and Types of Potentiality
VII. Conclusion
Bibliography
Analytic Table of Contents
"

This study explores the religious advocacy of the " untouchable " reformer, Bhimrao Ambedkar, during the 1950s to expand what we know about the nexus between religion, force, and the quest for social justice. Unearthing the sources of Ambedkar's early references to John Dewey and pragmatism, this study argues that Ambedkar evinced an abiding concern over the role of force and violence in reform efforts. In his final years, Ambedkar addressed international audiences reconstructing Buddhism as an alternative to communism, a move that posited compassionate persuasion as the pragmatist answer to his early concerns over using force in pursuing social justice. [forthcoming in Journal of Religion 97 (2)]

Shakespeare never met Wittgenstein, Russell, or Ryle, and one wonders what a conversation between them would have been like. “What’s in a name, you ask?” Wittgenstein might answer “A riddle of symbols.” Russell might respond “An explanation of concepts,” and Ryle might retort “Many unneeded problems.” What might Hegel, Husserl, or Nietzsche reply? It seems odd to even ask such a question, but why? To answer that, we need to look at the philosophical traditions which these thinkers inhabit. This will reveal the differences at the heart of the divi- sion between what have become known as ‘analytic’ and ‘conti- nental’ philosophy. I hope that by understanding these two philosophical camps we may better understand their differ- ences and similarities, as well as how they might compliment each other.

"Abbreviations—Whitehead v
Abbreviations—James vi
0. Preface vii
1. Introduction—Whitehead’s Reading of James and Its Context 1
2. The Creative Advance of Nature 27
3. Panpsychism in Action 65
4. The Polysemiality of the Concept of “Pure Experience” 91
5. Religiousness and Religion 115
6. James’s Mystical Body in the Light of the Transmarginal Field 147
7. The Art of Epochal Change 175
8. On Pragmatic Anarchy 205
9. The Assassination of the Diadoches 243
10. Conclusion—The Gnostic James 277
Bibliography 279
Table of Contents 281
"

Quentin Skinner is the Barber Beaumont Professor of the Humanities at Queen Mary, University College London. He is the author of numerous books and articles on early modern political thought and is a founder of the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ of the history of political thought.

This interview, conducted by Teresa Bejan with Professor Skinner at his home in London in March 2011, is our longest yet. We’ll be publishing it in two parts: the first on Prof. Skinner’s research and method is below, and the second, on his own intellectual context, will follow in December.

The aim of this paper is to show that " traditional " and " resolute " interpretations have not freed the Tractatus from the apparent paradoxical self-defeat. I argue that these readings only give it new clothing. Hacker's " traditional " reading ends up ascribing a metaphysical conspiracy to the “Tractatus”, which is incompatible with the aims of the book. The “resolute” reading of Diamond and Conant ascribes an authorial conspiracy to Wittgenstein, which contradicts his views on authorship and method. Grounded in the difficulties found in both sides of the current debate, I conclude this paper by proposing several requirements that the correct interpretation of the Tractatus should fulfill.

Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal perception is a fundamental property of the universe, is one of the oldest theories in philosophy of mind. While it may seem counter-intuitive at first glance, panpsychism deftly avoids many of the glaring problems in the various forms of dualism and materialism. The central challenge to panpsychism is the combination problem: How to integrate fundamental units of conscious experience, which is usually considered an indivisible property, into one larger individual subject; in other words, how to form a macro-subject from micro-subjects. Several authors consider the combination problem to be insurmountable, and to require a retreat from a strong panphsychist view to a neutral monism. I argue that a reappraisal of the work of Leibniz in this area gives an informative perspective on this problem, and moves us further toward its dissolution.

In: GRAMSCI E LA SCIENZA
Storicità e attualità delle note gramsciane sulla scienza
a cura di
Marina Paladini Musitelli
Atti del Convegno
organizzato dall’Istituto Gramsci del Friuli Venezia Giulia
in collaborazione con
S.I.S.S.A. (Scuola Intenazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati)
Centro Interuniversitario di Ricerca per gli Studi Gramsciani
Trieste, 1 dicembre 2007
Trieste 2008

Plato’s contest for the early Academy was to answer Parmenides’ criticisms of the Theory of the Universal Forms through an interpretation of the dialectical exercises presented in the Parmenides (§I).  Plato’s Theory of the Universal Forms and the objections of the Parmenides may now be more precisely formulated in predicate logic using the notational convention developed by Edward Zalta (§II).  The two principal objections to Plato’s Theory of the Universal Forms are the Third Man Argument and the Greatest Difficulty Argument: the Third Man Argument can be answered by Constance Meinwald’s distinction of Self-Predication and Gail Fine’s distinction of Non-Identity (§III); and the Greatest Difficulty Argument implies the inconsistent set of Russell's Paradox, yet may be answered through the construction of a hierarchical set theoretical model that subsumes and restricts the semantic scope of each subordinate hypothesis (§IV).  The rejection of the external predication of the Third Man Argument and the two-world ontology of the Greatest Difficulty Argument suggests a monistic ontology of internal relations in the Concrete Universal form of all forms (§V).

Resumen:
Wittgenstein, el filósofo más original del siglo XX, fue tomado erróneamente por un positivista. Pese a ello, la intención con la que Wittgenstein escribió el Tractatus era, en última instancia, una intención ética, que puede compendiarse bajo lo que el autor llama lo místico (das Mystische), que incluye la ética, la estética y la teoría de los valores. La preocupación por estas y otras cuestiones conexas, como la religión y el del sentido de la existencia, desempeñan un sordo papel central en el conjunto de su  pensamiento.
Y, si bien, según las propias tesis wittgensteinianas, las cuestiones éticas, no pueden ser respondidas y, en rigor, ni siquiera formuladas en el marco de la ciencia natural, esto no implica un menosprecio de “esta irrevocable tendencia del espíritu humano” a plantear tales cuestiones, sino más bien el reconocimiento de las limitaciones de nuestro lenguaje para dar cuenta de ellas. Ello se desprende de una afirmación central del Tractatus: “Nosotros sentimos que incluso si todas las posibles cuestiones científicas pudieran responderse, el problema de nuestra vida no habría sido más penetrado”.
Dr. Adolfo Vásquez Rocca
Palabras clave:
Filosofía Analítica, Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Lógica, Lenguaje, Mundo, Estética, Círculo de Viena,  Ética, Mística, Filosofía,  Religión, Psicoanálisis.
Referencia:
VÁSQUEZ ROCCA, Adolfo, “Wittgenstein; Mística, Filosofía y Silencio” – CONFERENCIA en 'SEMINARIO HUMANIDADES: ESTUDIOS ANTROPOLÓGICOS ACERCA DE LO DIVINO', Departamento de Artes y Humanidades, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Andrés Bello UNAB, Santiago, octubre, 2005. Publicada en Revista Observaciones Filosóficas – ISSN 0718-3712,  Sección Filosofía Contemporánea, Año 2006  http://www.observacionesfilosoficas.net/misticayfilosofia.html

This is the introductory essay to the collection of essays: 'Acquaintance: New Essays' (eds. Knowles & Raleigh, forthcoming, OUP). In this essay I provide some historical background to the concept of acquaintance. I examine various Russellian theses about acquaintance that contemporary acquaintance theorists may wish to reject. I consider a number of questions that acquaintance theorists face. I provide a survey of current debates in philosophy where acquaintance has recently been invoked. And I also provide brief summaries of the other essays in this volume.

In 1911, Bergson visited Britain for a number of lectures which led to his increasing popularity. Russell personally encountered Bergson during his lecture at University College London on 28 October, and on 30 October Bergson attended one of Russell’s lectures. Russell went on to write a number of critical articles on Bergson, contributing to the hundreds of publications on Bergson which ensued following these lectures.
Russell’s critical writings have been seen as part of a history of controversies between so-called ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’ philosophers in the twentieth century. Yet Russell’s engagement with Bergson’s thought comes as a response to a particular British form of Bergsonism and is involved with the wider phenomenon of the British import of Bergsonism (by figures connected in different ways to Russell, such as Hulme, Wildon Carr or Eliot). Though this may challenge the view of Russell and Bergson as enacting an early version of the ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide, there are however some particular characterisations of Bergson by Russell which contribute to the subsequent formation of the ‘rotten scene’ (Glendinning 2006: 69) of the divide in the second half of the twentieth century.

This article explores the strategies available for defending Aquinas’s view of existence in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. The rival view of existence prevalent among contemporary analytic philosophers is subject to serious objections. At the same time, the main contemporary analytic objections to Aquinas’s view can be adequately answered. The widespread use of “exist(s)” to ascribe existence to individuals and objects provides good reason to think that such use makes sense, and analogies like those of Aquinas can help to illustrate the commonsense meaning of “exist(s)” to those who doubt it. The truth of Aquinas’s view of existence as a real property of individuals or objects can be defended at least in principle by appealing to its descriptive and explanatory usefulness. In addition to Aquinas’s own uses of it, there are a number of areas in contemporary analytic metaphysics where his view of existence could likely be of use, such as contemporary essentialism, substance-attribute ontology, and the revival of ontological pluralism.

Cette conférence a un double but : 1) dessiner précisément la figure du « réalisme métaphysique », qu’exemplifient, de manière différente, Frege et Russell, et tenter d’en comprendre les raisons. 2) Evaluer ce « réalisme métaphysique », autrement que par la condamnation sans appel (« risible, délirant »), trop souvent en vigueur aujourd’hui chez les nombreux ennemis réalistes (ordinaire, scientifique, contextualiste, etc.) du « réalisme métaphysique » et montrer comment Frege et Russell retrouvent, en fait, toute la structure nucléaire des positions réalistes philosophiques classiques, défendues tout au long de l’histoire de la philosophie.

Being and Intelligibility is a philosophical treatise on the meaning of being in its two senses. The book explores the most originary ontological question, namely, " what do we mean when we say that something is? " , and also the most originary existential question, namely, " what is the meaning of human experience? " , in each case, by reference to a fundamental principle of being and intelligibility, which, following the pre-Socratics, is called the " Logos ". The book posits that all rational experience is of objects which are at root a unity (ground) of relations (predicates) which include sequence, magnitude, and proportionality and hence are called " logical objects ". From this simple premise, the book develops its three central theses. The first is that the beingness of beings (called " Being ") and the intelligibility of Being are strictly self-same. The second is that, because nothingness (i.e., absolute not-Being) entails the absence of the rules of its own conception, it is self-contradictory and unintelligible and, therefore, Being is logically necessary. The third is that the fullness of human rational experience cannot be explained in materially reducible terms and requires recognition of the existence of transcendent reality. The book identifies the confused state of modern mainstream metaphysics as resulting from two fundamental errors. The first, which is laid at the feet of René Descartes, is the deconstruction of the unity of the human being into mind and body, which set modern philosophy down the parallel but ill-fated paths of rationalism and empiricism. The former imploded at its Hegelian end of " thought thinking about itself " and the latter expired upon the declaration of A.J. Ayer that metaphysical statements are meaningless because they are not verifiable. The second error, which is attributed initially to Immanuel Kant and is repeated by Martin Heidegger, is the failure to recognize the essential logicality of Being. In the case of Kant, who characterizes logic as a contentless abstraction from empirical categories of understanding, the scope of logic is limited to empirical experience and metaphysics is relegated to faith. In the case of Heidegger, Being holds privileged status over logic, with the results that Heidegger grants coherency to the possibility of nothingness, determines Being to ground all beings but itself to be ungrounded, and denies the necessity of Being. Being and Intelligibility investigates the implications of the essential logicality of Being, which resound throughout the full range of human rational experience. The book shows how logically conceived Being underpins the possibility of objective knowledge of an inherently ordered universe, the homogeneity of logic and mathematics, and the necessary existence of God, as the Supreme Principle of Being and Intelligibility and the ground of all Being including God itself. The book also shows how, from this epistemological and metaphysical context, human Being shows itself to itself from within itself as a substantive, persistent, morally obligated unity among the ordered manifold of its life experiences, whose essential Being is orientation towards God. In connecting Being and logic, Being and Intelligibility restores metaphysics to its proper place at the pinnacle of human understanding, which is precisely where reason, which (as Leibniz tells us) demands that the reasons for all that there is be rendered to it, insists that it must be.

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone " finally solves " in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form.

Revista Aproximação Volume 8 – Edição 2014/02
A Revista Aproximação é uma publicação acadêmica eletrônica especializada em Filosofia. Seu objetivo principal é veicular o trabalho de pesquisa dos graduandos da UFRJ. Estamos abertos, entretanto, a qualquer proposta cujo principal interesse seja o da pesquisa filosófica.

Philippe Devaux, La Cosmologie de Whitehead. Tome I, L'Épistémologie whiteheadienne. Édité par Thibaut Donck et Michel Weber, Préface de Paul Gochet, Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Chromatika, 2007. (978-2-930517-01-8 ; 351 p. ; 35 € ; http://www.i6doc.com/fr/livre/?GCOI=28001100006190)