Bertrand Russell

Ich übergebe euch dieses Büchelchen als einen Spiegel um hinein nach euch und nicht als eine Lorgnette um dadurch und nach andern zu sehen. » Lichtenberg, D 617 « Ich soll nur der Spiegel sein, in welchem mein Leser sein eigenes Denken mit allen seinen Unförmigkeiten sieht und mit dieser Hilfe zurechtrichten kann » Wittgenstein

Quentin Skinner is the Barber Beaumont Professor of the Humanities at Queen Mary, University College London. He is the author of numerous books and articles on early modern political thought and is a founder of the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ of the history of political thought.

This interview, conducted by Teresa Bejan with Professor Skinner at his home in London in March 2011, is our longest yet. We’ll be publishing it in two parts: the first on Prof. Skinner’s research and method is below, and the second, on his own intellectual context, will follow in December.

Este texto é a tradução da introdução do livro Logical Forms feita por Guido Imaguire e revisada pelo próprio autor (que também fez algumas pequenas alterações no texto e é responsável por sua forma final). Muitas citações de textos originais nas notas de rodapé foram suprimidas na tradução.

A mildly chronological overview of the philosophers who may have been inspired by the use of psychoactive chemicals, inc. Plato, de Quincey, Davy, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Bergson, Benjamin, Jünger, Paz, Marcuse, Sartre, Foucault; and a mention of the Outsight project.

This article was based on a talk given for the University of Exeter Philosophy Society (video: https://youtu.be/X2eY4n37FC0) and at the ICPR2016 conference. It was published in the popular HighExistence magazine on August 2nd 2016, and has received over 90 000 social media shares (http://highexistence.com/hidden-psychedelic-influence-philosophy-plato-nietzsche-psychonauts-thoughts).

Reference:
Sjöstedt-H, P. 'The Psychedelic Influence on Philosophy', HighExistence.com (2nd-08-2016)

[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of ‘physical’ closely to physics? To do so (in a non-circular way) is to run the risk of ruling out the possibility that there might be two different universes that were ‘formally’ or structurally identical or homomorphic although substantially different—made of different stuff. [3] Perhaps that is not in the end a real possibility. Even so, it seems that we shouldn’t define ‘physical’ in a way that rules it out a priori. [4] If so, it may be that the word ‘physical’ is best used to denote a certain fundamental structure-transcendent stuff-nature—call it P—that allows the possibility that a universe with stuff nature Q structurally identical to a physical universe isn’t physical. [5] Can we suppose ourselves to know something about the ultimate intrinsic nature of P, if physicalism is true? I argue that we can. [6] Can we draw any further metaphysical conclusions from this knowledge? I argue that we can. We can show that panpsychism in some form constitutes the most plausible theory of the ultimate nature of P.

We investigate the treatment of fractions in Russell’s 1919 classic Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. In contrast to rational numbers, every fraction has an integral numerator and a non-zero integral denominator, but usage varies on exactly which integers are involved (. Our interest was first drawn to the topic by the following surprising result—paraphrasing Russell’s page 66].

Russell 1919’s Fraction-Separator Theorem: the fraction whose numerator is the sum of the numerators of two unequal given fractions and whose denominator is the sum of the denominators is between the two given fractions—excluding cases when the sum of the denominators equals zero.

Although Russell gives none, proof is obtainable from page 270 of De Morgan 1831.
REFERENCE LINKS

Russell 1919’s fraction-separator theorem. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 24 (2018) 381.
https://www.academia.edu/s/4f60c070ca/russell-1919s-fraction-separator-theorem?source=link
https://www.academia.edu/34438558/2_Russell_1919_s_fraction-separator_theorem_090117.pdf
Semiotic confusions in Russell 1919. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 24 (2018) 382–3.
(Co-author: Kevin Tracy) https://www.academia.edu/34195085/Semiotic_confusions_in_Russell_1919.AC
https://www.academia.edu/34195085/Semiotic_confusions_in_Russell_1919.AC
HOW CAN THIS BE IMPROVED?

The aim of this paper, written in Finnish, is to provide a critical evaluation of Jean van Heijenoort's distinction between "logic as language" and "logic as calculus". The focus is on the interpretative claim, advanced by advocates of this distinction, that proponents of the conception of logic as language, such as Frege and Russell, subscribed a very distinctive set of theses regarding the nature of logic and deriving rationale. I reconstruct a number of interpretative arguments that are found in the secondary literature but which are hardly ever formulated as explicit arguments. I argue that the attribution of these arguments to Frege and Russell is not well supported. The principal critical tool that is used here is the distinction between logic as (universal) science and logic as calculus.

Bertrand Russell was one of the great public intellectuals of the 20th century.  During WWI he turned from logic and analysis to working for peace and a better future for all humanity.  His humanism and public writings deserve serious study.  (The peace symbol comes from the anti-nuclear-war group he led later.)  Here I contrast him with other intellectuals of the period such as Dewey and Santayana, and relate him to Julien Benda and Romain Rolland.

Se si parla delle analisi condotte da Bertrand Russell sulle descrizioni definite, è inevitabile tenere conto di un elemento: le sue tesi linguistiche sono intrecciate con altre posizioni che sconfinano dall'ambito prettamente semantico. In "Vagueness" (1923), Russell affronta la questione della vaghezza, realizzando delle riflessioni destinate a durare nel tempo. Egli ritiene che l'influenza del simbolismo porti inevitabilmente a nozioni erronee. L'intento è quello di dimostrare, attraverso il fenomeno della vaghezza, che «tutto il linguaggio è vago». 1 La vaghezza è caratteristica che può appartenere solo ad una rappresentazione, e ha a che fare con il rapporto tra la rappresentazione e ciò che essa rappresenta. Le cose, quindi, sono ciò che sono. Per Russell il conoscere è accadimento che ha relazione con altri accadimenti, gruppi di accadimenti, o caratteristiche di tali gruppi. Quando la conoscenza è vaga, ci si riferisce esclusivamente alla conoscenza per descrizione : la vaghezza è una caratteristica della relazione tra l'atto del conoscere e il conosciuto. Attraverso una serie di esempi Russell cerca di convincere il lettore che tutte le parole che esprimono qualità sensibili hanno un certo grado di vaghezza. 2 In merito ai nomi propri, Russell si pone la domanda circa l'associabilità del nome ad un individuo e il momento in cui ciò avviene. In maniera più chiara: è il nome attribuibile prima della nascita? No, in tal caso l'ambiguità sarebbe più ovvia, «poiché nessuno può decidere a partire da quale intervallo di tempo prima della nascita il nome diviene attribuibile» 3. A questo punto, Russell, risponde a ciò ponendo il riferimento alla morte. La morte, come la nascita, è un processo e anche in questo caso si pone la stessa problematica: nel processo di decomposizione deve accadere un momento a partire dal quale il nome non è più attribuibile. Chiaro è che questo momento nessuno può determinarlo. Viene fatto riferimento a una cosiddetta «zona di penombra», i cui contorni non sono definibili. È l'intera vaghezza che viene applicata anche al tentativo di fissare un limite alla applicabilità delle parole. La vaghezza, anche se applicabile in primo luogo a ciò che è cognitivo, è applicabile ad ogni tipo di rappresentazione. Come viene espresso da Russell: «una rappresentazione è vaga quando la relazione del sistema rappresentativo col sistema rappresentato non è uno a uno, ma uno a molti». Esplicativo è l'esempio della fotografia che se macchiata può portare a raffigurare tre individui differenti. Questo perché meno accurata. La vaghezza dunque risulta connessa al concetto di accuratezza, il quale rappresenta

The article proposes a diachronic reconstruction and philological analysis of Gramsci’s reflections on logic and methodology, with particular attention to section IV of Notebook 11. The Author maintains that the same answer found by Gramsci to the question of the logical instruments of thought – a solution based on the idea of “instrumental value” – enables him to “translate” in historicist terms the features of individual philosophy (systematicity, continuity of development, universality) and to clarify the tasks of the individual philosopher considered as a “specialized intellectual”. It is also argued that this historicist “translation” of individual philosophy (or “philosophers’ philosophy”) does not entail its simple and direct reduction to politics but, rather, the explanation of its peculiar “politicalness” and the redefinition of its “relative autonomy”. The Author concludes with some comments on the theoretical and material links between Notebooks 10 and 11.

Dios y su extraña forma de hablar ¿Qué es el lenguaje en el génesis? La apuesta del siguiente texto es realizar un análisis semántico de los capítulos 1 y 2 del libro del Génesis. El análisis se realizará desde dos teorías: la teoría de la referencia mediada y la teoría de la referencia directa. La lectura fregiana y la russelliana se hará sobre dos fenómenos que considero centrales dentro del pasaje: lo que Dios enuncia antes de crear y la manera en que Adán nombra a los animales. -

This book bridges a gap between discussions about truth, human understanding, and epistemology in philosophical circles, and debates about objectivity, bias, and truth in journalism. It examines four major philosophical theories in easy to understand terms while maintaining a critical insight which is fundamental to the contemporary study of journalism. The book aims to move forward the discussion of truth in the news media by dissecting commonly used concepts such as bias, objectivity, balance, fairness, in a philosophically-grounded way, drawing on in depth interviews with journalists to explore how journalists talk about truth.

For the Routledge Research in Journalism Series.

Da Pirrone a Rorty, passando per Socrate, Carneade, Cicerone, Giovanni di Salisbury, Guicciardini, Montaigne, Sorbière, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, Nietzsche, Russell, Rensi, Oakeshott e Popper: il volume offre per la prima volta un quadro completo della storia dello scetticismo politico, rappresentato da alcune delle figure intellettuali più influenti del pensiero occidentale ma ritenute politicamente “scomode” per la loro incessante critica alle ideologie, ai dogmatismi dei partiti, ai paradigmi normativi e ai mezzi di persuasione diversi da quelli improntati al buon senso, alla prudenza e alla moderazione. L’autore dimostra che a unire tutti gli scettici politici è uno “stile” che privilegia il saggio al trattato, l’ipotesi alla certezza infallibile, il pluralismo al monismo, la verità conversazionale alla soluzione finale. Benché quasi tutti siano stati additati dai loro contemporanei come infedeli, reprobi, esiliati e gretti, le loro posizioni si sono rivelate essenziali non solo per la teoria politica in senso proprio, ma anche per l’affermazione di idee “altre” di libertà, tolleranza e convivenza civile.

The human resource (HR) domain contains various types of privacy-sensitive textual data, such as e-mail correspondence and performance appraisal. Doing research on these documents brings several challenges, one of them anonymisation. In this paper, we evaluate the current Dutch text de-identification methods for the HR domain in four steps. First, by updating one of these methods with the latest named entity recognition (NER) models. The result is that the NER model based on the CoNLL 2002 corpus in combination with the BERTje transformer give the best combination for suppressing persons (recall 0.94) and locations (recall 0.82). For suppressing gender, DEDUCE is performing best (recall 0.53). Second NER evaluation is based on both strict de-identification of entities (a person must be suppressed as a person) and third evaluation on a loose sense of de-identification (no matter what how a person is suppressed, as long it is suppressed). In the fourth and last step a new kind of NER dataset is tested for
recognising job titles in tezts.

In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects of Russell’s overall theory of knowledge and acquaintance. Finally, I consider the radical impact that Russell’s actual views on acquaintance have for our understanding of his well-known George IV case in ‘On Denoting’. In particular, I argue that Russell’s treatment of the George IV case is not a one-size-fits-all solution to Frege’s Puzzle and provides no support for the received view of acquaintance.

AbstrAct A russellian notion of what it is for a proposition to be " directly about " something in particular is defined. Various strong and weak, and mediate and immediate, russellian notions of general (direct or indirect) aboutness are then defined in terms of russellian direct aboutness. In particular , a proposition is about something iff the proposition is either directly, or strongly indirectly , about that thing. A competing russellian account, due to Kaplan, is criticized through a distinction between knowledge by description and denoting by description. The epistemologi-cal significance of russellian aboutness is assessed. A russellian substitute for de re propo-sitional attitude is considered.

This short essay analyses the discussion over the topic to decide the nature of Mathematics as an art or a science. Unlike as it is perceived today as “Mother of Sciences”, Mathematics historically had not always been look upon as one. Eminent mathematicians like Bertrand Russel and Hagel contested the portrayal of Math as a pure science.

How exactly did the British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, influence Bhimrao Ambedkar? This study examines possible interpersonal connections that they may have shared, as well as lines of textual influence from Russell to Ambedkar. While we find it doubtful that Russell and Ambedkar ever met or corresponded, we do find evidence of Ambedkar's pragmatism being shaped by Russell's writings.

The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting” (the so-called "George IV puzzle"). This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that Russell must abandon his commitment to propositions.

Cet article porte sur la notion de vérité chez Kazimierz Twardowski. Celui-ci fut un disciple de Brentano, dont il a diffusé la méthode et les idées en Pologne. Mais Twardowski ne fut pas que le propagateur des idées de son maître. Comme l’exposent les deux premières parties de cet article, il s’est notamment opposé à Brentano en défendant une conception absolutiste de la vérité. Pour ce faire, il a d’abord montré que tous les soi-disant exemples de vérités relatives étaient ambigus et pouvaient être complétés de manière à exposer les jugements absolus dont ils dérivent. Il a ensuite mis en évidence le fait que la forme de relativisme qui consiste à affirmer que tout jugement est vrai pour nous est incompatible avec certains principes logiques fondamentaux, et ne peut pour cette raison être dérivée d’une thèse plus générale. La dernière partie de cet article est consacrée à la critique twardowskienne de la version forte de la vérité-correspondance développée par Russell. Après avoir montré les défauts de cette théorie en dénonçant la conception du jugement sur laquelle elle reposait, il en a proposé une version affaiblie reposant sur une conception du jugement comme acte sui generis.

Depuis ses premiers pas la philosophie a eu deux objets d’étude différents qui furent considérés comme étroitement reliés. Son objectif était d’une part d’atteindre une compréhension théorique de la structure du monde ; et d’autre part, d’essayer de découvrir et d’inculquer la meilleure manière de vivre possible. D’Héraclite à Hegel, ou même chez Marx, ces deux objectifs furent constamment en ligne de mire ; ni purement théorique ni purement pratique, mais à la recherche d’une théorie de l’univers sur laquelle on puisse établir une pratique éthique.

Table of contents

1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism; 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy; 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a form of life; 4. Epicurus and ethics as care for oneself; 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions; 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism; 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism; 8. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelianism; 9. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism; 10. Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian moral doctrine and Aristotelian ethics; 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry; 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living
13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism; 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality; 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism; 16. Richard Price and intuitionism; 17. Adam Smith and sentimentalism; 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism; 19. Immanuel Kant, the practical use of reason and judgment; 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and a critique of Enlightenment universalism; 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment; 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism; 23. Edmund Husserl and the a priori of action; 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism; 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics; 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism; 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy; 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics; 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics; 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics.

Abstracts for 20 papers to be discussed at a symposium on  Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933, From the Notes of G. E Moore, edited by David Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron.  The symposium will be held at the University of Iowa, May 18-22, 2015.

Negation and Difference compares these two thinkers' competing responses to the problems of representation in philosophical systems. The argumentation is skillfully executed, and its conclusion is compelling. It is vital for those interested in a careful and balanced cross-analysis of Deleuze and Hegel, and it also serves as a remarkably useful companion to chapters one and four of Deleuze's Difference and Repetition. The text ranges across a wide scope of topics while remaining coherent throughout, covering interesting and rarely combined concepts from philosophy, mathematics, aesthetics, and science. In accordance with the demands of its task, the argumentation on a whole is somewhat complex. Yet the text is well divided and organized, and it keeps the whole picture always within view by consistently summarizing and previewing the parts of the argument. In all, the first part introduces the representational systems and their problems, the second part elaborates on the theoretical bases of Hegel's and Deleuze's solutions, and the third part cross-evaluates them. Chapter one situates Deleuze's transcendental empiricism in the post-Kantian tradition. For Kant, our judgments have a subject-predicate structure that is parallel to the subject-predicate (or subject-property) structure of concepts and of intuited objects. What unifies objects, concepts, and judgments each themselves and all to one another is the a priori unity of a transcendental self. Yet, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is based on neither the unity of the self nor of the object, for it makes use of a logic of incompossible predication. (Adam is both sinner and innocent when on the verge of deciding to eat the fruit of knowledge.) Chapter two explains how a strict adherence to the principle of identity and the law of excluded middle causes three main problems in Aristotle's and Bertrand Russell's representational systems of classification. Aristotle's highest genus, which is 'being' or 'unity', has no genus above it, so it cannot be defined; and Russell's makeshift solution to the paradox of the set of all non-self inclusive sets weakens his system (problem of the large). Unlike species, individuals in Aristotle's classification are distinguished by accidental and not by essential traits. This creates difficulties for representing individuals, which change throughout time (problem of the small). Also there are cases in the natural world, for example ring species, which cannot be classified using Aristotle's system of division (problem of division). Chapters three and four elaborate on how Deleuze's concept of non-oppositional difference is based on Bergson's continuously-integrated, heterogeneous multiplicity. Deleuze's virtual/actual relation is like topographical phase-space portraits, where we can see all possible ways a dynamic system can behave. The infinity of incompossibly actualizable developments are differentially related yet are continuously integrated. Chapter five accounts for how Hegel's internal dialectic solves problems of representational systems by making use of productive contradiction: from out of a concept arises its contrary, and from out of that opposition emerges a new concept that is not implied in the first pair. So contraries are located within one another, and there is a genetic chain of production of the categories of the understanding. Finite thought like the sort used in Kant's and Aristotle's systems would find such contradictions unthinkable, but Hegel's infinite thought can conceive them in terms of their sublation. Because Deleuze's and Hegel's theories of difference allow for more ambiguous or flexible identities, they solve the three problems of representational systems.

ABSTRACT: One of the main challenges faced by Russell’s theory of judgment was to provide a satisfactory account of judgment that was not committed to the existence of true, false or inexistent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article, I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell’s theory of judgment find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus.

In this unit, students will be introduced to the basic concepts, questions, thinkers, and history of philosophy of science. The unit begins with the historical background. In this section of the unit, students will learn about various changes that science has undergone, particularly in the shift from European medieval science to early modern science. Students will then confront a series of classic questions in philosophy of science, including: How do we go from specific observations to general scientific claims? What is reality? Does science describe reality? Is there such a thing as scientific progress (if so, how does it work)? What are the limits to science? Is science value-neutral? Does science have a male bias?
Throughout, students will learn that there are many ways of thinking about science, and that there is no consensus on the way it works, the nature of the claims it makes, or its value. They will also have opportunities to connect their understanding of science and philosophy of science to their own lives, especially in the lesson on feminist critiques of science. The other lessons have practical import as well, particularly when it comes to gaining a better understanding of common conversations around science – for example, conversations on claims about scientific discoveries; the relationship between science and other ways of knowing (such as religion); and the relationship between science, society, and their personal lives. Students will also have opportunities to develop their philosophical research skills, particularly in a research workshop and a work period.

Nietzsche “Dili ciddiye alın!” diyor. Dilin daha ziyade iknâ vasıtası olarak hizmet
verdiği zamanlardan, onun teorisi üzerine kafa yorulduğu çağa atlamak bizi
“pratik” ve “teori” çatışması ile karşı karşıya bırakmaz. Mukayeseden çıkarılacak
çok daha mühim neticelerin olması böylesine basit bir değerlendirmeyi gölgede
bırakır. Sofistlerin para kazanma aracı olarak kullandıkları “dil” aslında sadece
yüzeysel olandır. Yani her ne olursa olsun muhatabı ikna etmek için odaklanmış bir
“konuşma” ortama ve zamana göre büyük değişiklikler gösterebilir. Oysa doğrunun
bir tek olması, zamana ve mekana göre dayanıklılık göstermesi gerekir. Bu noktada
mantıksal bakımdan mükemmel, muğlak olmayan, tam/kesin bir dilin günlük
konuşma için uygun olmadığını zaten tespit etmiştir Russell. Peki bu iki
kullanımdan (ideal lisan ve hatibin dili) hangisi “ciddiye alınmalı”dır?

This article gives a short overview of the theories of Meinong, Russel and Kripke about fictious names and nonexisting entities, whilst also highlighting points of intersection and shortcomings of the three theories and, at the end, sketching an account which combines the strenghts of all three theories in order to provide a more robust account of nonexistence.

(Partially unrevised, may contain grammatical errors)

(Written for the "Mathematical Logic" class at PUC-RIO,  Master's Degree in Logic and Philosophy of Language, 2016.1)

Nuova edizione integrale di T. Moro, UTOPIA (Giunti-Demetra, Firenze 2018). Introduzione e cura di D. Breschi.
Utopia è isola non così lontana, sia pur non definita nelle sue coordinate geografiche. Non è così lontana, perché nella descrizione dell'Inghilterra del proprio tempo Moro ci mostra Utopia come il rovescio del regno dei Tudor. O meglio: come la versione corretta, riformata, di esso. L'utopia di Moro è riformare l'esistente seguendo consigli atti ad ''aiutare il progresso della comunità''. Consigli che vengono da Atene e da Gerusalemme, da Platone e da Cristo... Coltivare l'utopia significa dunque riscoprire il valore della perseveranza, la virtù di chi non cede alle difficoltà e regge nel tempo. Questione di condotta, di stile e di carattere. Tommaso Moro, Utopia, introduzione e cura di D. Breschi, Giunti-Demetra, Firenze 2018, pp. 160, € 5,90.

Source: archive.org
This approach is mathematics as language.

Bertrand Russel nesta obra examina a Matemática como linguagem. Esse enfoque inovador ao lado do desenvolvimento da Física e da Química, teve repercussões impactantes na Cibernética (Norbert Wiener foi aluno de Russel) e na Ciência da Computação.

I argue that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was NOT refuted by Wittgenstein’s famous criticisms of it. Russell's theory only came back strengthened as a higher-order theory of belief, a theory which still merits attention today. To see this we need to understand the way in which Russell’s thinking about relations developed, from the view that relations have direction, to the view that that relations are neutral, and back again.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein? What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of the article is about Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views on an ideal formal language.