Appointment of Judges

Abstract (D): Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Richteramts steht in der Schweiz in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur richterlichen Unabhängigkeit. Dies trifft auch auf das Bundesrichteramt zu: Bundesrichterinnen und Bundesrichter werden vom Schweizer Parlament nach Massgabe des Parteiproporzes gewählt und müssen sich nach Ablauf ihrer 6-jährigen Amtszeit zur Wiederwahl stellen. Aufgrund dieser Besonderheit sind Kandidierende für das Bundesrichteramt faktisch gezwungen, einer Partei anzugehören, um für die Wahl überhaupt in Frage zu kommen. Die 2019 eingereichte Justiz-Initiative möchte eine Abkehr von diesem System erwirken, indem sie vorschlägt, dass die Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts nach einer ersten, durch eine unabhängige Fachkommission vorgenommenen Vorauswahl per Losverfahren bestimmt werden; ausserdem soll deren Amtszeit erst fünf Jahre nach Erreichen des ordentlichen Rentenalters enden. Eine Abwahl durch das Parlament ist nur in schwerwiegenden Fällen vorgesehen. Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt diese Initiative zum Anlass, um das schweizerische Wahlsystem der Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts kritisch zu beleuchten. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt in diesem Zusammenhang der von Dennis Thompson und Lawrence Lessig entwickelte Begriff der institutionellen Korruption. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass die Justiz-Initiative dazu beitragen kann, diese institutionelle Korruption zu verhindern und die Unabhängigkeit der Bundesrichter(innen) wesentlich zu stärken.

Abstract (E): In Switzerland, the institutional design of the judiciary conflicts with judicial independence. This also applies to the Swiss Federal Tribunal: its judges are elected by the Federal Parliament based on the proportional strength of its political parties, and they must be re-elected after 6 years. Because of this peculiarity, candidates for the federal judicial office are de facto forced to join a political party in order to be elected. The "Justice Initiative", submitted in 2019, seeks to move away from this system by proposing that the members of the Swiss Federal Tribunal be chosen by lot after a pre-screening by an independent commission. Moreover, the initiative proposes that they remain in office until five years after they reach the ordinary retirement age. Recall by the Federal Parliament is only possible in particularly serious cases. The present contribution takes this initiative as an opportunity to critically evaluate the Swiss system of parliamentary elections that applies to Federal Supreme Court judges. In this context, the concept of institutional corruption developed by Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig plays an important role. The article shows that the Justice Initiative can contribute to preventing institutional corruption in the Swiss federal judiciary, and that it can significantly strengthen the independence of Swiss federal judges.

Español:
En Argentina existe un mecanismo tradicional para el nombramiento de jueces de la Corte Suprema, basado en un acuerdo entre el presidente y el Senado. Cuando discurren situaciones urgentes y excepcionales, el presidente está facultado para nombrar en comisión a estos magistrados. En una de sus primeras decisiones, el presidente Mauricio Macri decidió designar ministros de la Corte Suprema de esta manera, lo que valió aceptaciones y rechazos en la doctrina más especializada en el tema. Este trabajo analiza los distintos medios de nombramiento de ministros del alto cuerpo desde la óptica constitucional, y examina si la decisión adoptada se amolda a cánones normativos y políticos.

English:
The traditional mechanism for the appointment of Supreme Court judges in Argentina is based on an agreement between the president and the Senate. In urgent and exceptional situations, the president is authorized to make recess appointments of these magistrates. In one of his first decisions, President Mauricio Macri appointed ministers of the Supreme Court in this manner, which was met by both acceptance and rejection in the most specialized doctrine on the subject. This work analyzes the
different means of appointing high court ministers from a constitutional perspective, and examines whether the decision adopted conforms to normative and political canons.

Deutsch:
Das traditionelle Verfahren zur Ernennung der Richter am Obersten  Gerichtshof Argentiniens beruht auf einer Vereinbarung zwischen Staatspräsident und Senat. In dringenden Fällen oder in Ausnahmzuständen ist der Staatspräsident befugt, die Richter zeitlich befristet zu ernennen. In einer seiner ersten Amtshandlungen stützte sich Präsident Mauricio Macri bei der Ernennung von Richtern am Obersten Gerichtshof auf dieses Ausnahmeverfahren. Dies rief sowohl zustimmende als auch ablehnende Reaktionen bei den Vertretern der herrschenden Lehrmeinungen hervor. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die unterschiedlichen Mechanismen zur Ernennung der Mitglieder des Obersten Gerichtshofs aus verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive und geht der Frage nach, ob die Ernennung der Richter mit den gesetzlichen Vorschriften und den maßgeblichen politischen Bestimmungen vereinbar ist.

È opinione comune, presso gli studiosi moderni, che i giudici privati del processo civile romano (giudici monocratici o recuperatores) appartenessero alle classi sociali più elevate e più colte e che mantenessero, nel ricoprire il loro incarico, un atteggiamento di grande dignità. Questo dato appare in effetti confermato se si considerano tutti i giudici privati, dei quali le testimonianze antiche hanno tramandato l’identità. Ci sono tuttavia significative fonti letterarie, che presentano indizi dai quali è lecito sospettare, di fatto, l’esistenza di una seconda ‘categoria’ di giudici privati, costituita da persone di bassa estrazione sociale, che mantenevano spesso, nell'esercizio della funzione, comportamenti tutt’altro che incensurabili. I giudici di questo secondo gruppo erano, nella maggior parte dei casi, probabilmente quelli scelti al di fuori dell’album iudicum. Dall’indagine è risultato anche che, sebbene le due categorie di giudici fossero per molti aspetti differenziate tra loro, esse erano tuttavia assimilate per un importante carattere comune: l’imperitia iuris dei giudicanti, che si trova a più riprese lamentata dalle fonti antiche.

The article is organised in three parts. The first one illustrates the historical features and the institutional and political background that have to be taken into account in order to understand how initial teacher education and training has developed in Italy. Presently, all teacher education is managed by Universities, but a considerable difference still remains between the organisation of courses for primary and pre-primary teachers, on one hand, and secondary teachers, on the other. The second part analyses the transition, between the end of the 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 st , from an education for primary teachers that took place at high school level (Istituto Magistrale) to a fully University one (Corso di laurea in Scienze della formazione primaria); and it also examines the crucial issue of the creation, in the same period, of the PostGraduate Schools for Secondary Teachers (Scuole di Specializzazione per l'Insegnamento Secondario-SSIS), until they were abolished in 2009. The third part shows the present framework of initial teacher training in Italy, mainly related to teaching in lower and upper secondary schools. At this level of schooling the legislation was recently changed; the Scuole di Specializzazione per l'Insegnamento Secondario (SSIS) have been replaced with the Tirocinio Formativo Attivo (TFA), which at present is being implemented for the first time by the universities. In the final section of this part a provisional balance of the innovation is outlined and some critical issues are pointed out. The essay is essentially focused on initial teacher training, as in Italy in-service training, while not completely absent, has never been the object of specific regulation nor of systematic actions, but it existswhen it existson the basis of the initiative of individual groups or associations.

In the interests of maintaining the independence of the English judiciary, it is prudent to consider whether the system of judicial recruitment is safeguarded now, when it has previously been so heavily influenced and reliant upon members of the executive. 

The CRA 2005 transformed distortions in the system to better control the authorities dealing with judicial appointments, realigning inequalities to better represent the diversity of the British populace. Recently however, the Act has come under fire for employing obstructive and unnecessary provisions which hinder it from meeting its goals of increased inclusion and fair, transparent assessment.

Dalam kehidupan manusia semenjak diturunkan Nabi Adam A.S. ke dunia ini, perbezaan fikiran dan pendapat merupakan perkara yang dapat dikatakan akan wujud apabila ada interaksi antara dua individu manusia atau lebih. Perbezaan pendapat ini kadang-kadang membawa perbalahan dan pergaduhan antara kedua-dua individu berkenaan. Jika hal ini berlaku, maka siapakah yang akan menyelesaikan atau mendamaikan kedua-dua individu ini? Interaksi antara dua individu manusia sering kali juga menyebabkan termeterainya perjanjian antara mereka tentang berbagai-bagai perkara. Misalnya, jual beli barangan, sewa-menyewa premis atau tanah, pelantikan sebagai ejen atau prinsipal, pajakan dan sebagainya. Pada masa kini, perjanjian itu dikenal sebagai perjanjian komersial. Jika timbul perbalahan tentang perjanjian ini, maka siapakah yang akan membuat penyelesaian tentang perbalahan ini? Contohnya, perbalahan tentang tafsiran perkara tertentu dalam perjanjian. Dalam konteks negara pula, berbagai-bagai undang-undang yang bertujuan untuk mengawal dan mewujudkan keamanan dan ketenteraman dalam negara berkenaan telah diwujudkan. Contohnya, undang-undang jenayah dan undang-undang perlembagaan merupakan dua cabang undang-undang awam yang begitu sinonim dengan sesebuah negara demokrasi. Sekiranya seseorang rakyat ditangkap oleh pihak berkuasa yang memerintah atau lebih mudah difahami sebagai kerajaan, siapakah yang patut menentukan sama ada yang ditangkap itu bersalah ataupun tidak? Demikian juga sekiranya timbul perbalahan tentang tafsiran mana-mana artikel atau perkara dalam perlembagaan. Maka, siapakah yang sepatutnya memberikan tafsiran tentang perkara perlembagaan berkenaan? Sebagai jawapan kepada semua persoalan itu, tentulah orang yang waras dan berilmu akan mengatakan bahawa perlulah dipilih atau dilantik seseorang yang tidak mempunyai kepentingan atau kaitan dengan perbalahan, perkara, atau pertikaian yang menjadi persoalan. Orang yang waras dan berilmu akan mengatakan bahawa hendaklah dipilih seorang orang tengah yang tidak akan berat sebelah terhadap mana-mana pihak yang bersengketa atau berbalah. Orang tengah ini mestilah orang yang dalarn persoalan pertama bukannya orang yang mempunyai pertalian darah atau persaudaraan atau sahabat handai yang akrab dengan pihak yang berbalah. Manakala dalam persoalan yang kedua, orang tengah itu mestilah orang yang tiada pertalian dengan pihak yang terlibat atau tiada kepentingan…

[PL] Sejm VIII kadencji ustanowił niespotykane wcześniej w polskim systemie prawnym procedury dla wyłonienia organów państwowych. W szczególności — jako analizy przypadków — zostaną przedstawione postępowania i faktyczne czynności wyborcze dla Rady Mediów Narodowych, Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa oraz Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej. Służyć będą nadrzędnemu zadaniu referatu — próbie ukazania, że w przyszłości omawiane organy zagrożone są przez krótkowzroczność ustawodawcy oceniającego funkcjonalność założeń w ramach ówczesnej sytuacji politycznej.

Kiedy spojrzy się ponad obecną arytmetykę sejmową, odpowiedź na tytułowe pytania wskaże nie tylko postulaty de lege ferenda, ale również — co prawdopodobnie najciekawsze — stałą zależność, tendencję projektodawców. Dla doktryny zaś — przestrogę na przyszłość, jak nie tworzyć procedur wyboru dla poszczególnych organów oraz jak walczyć z podobnymi pomysłami w perspektywie następnych kadencji parlamentu.

———————————— Challenges for judicial independence and impartiality in the member states of the Council of Europe Report prepared jointly by the Bureau of the CCJE and the Bureau of the CCPE for the attention of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe as a follow-up to his 2015 report entitled " State of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Europe – a shared responsibility for democratic security in Europe ". The report addresses challenges to judicial independence and impartiality, especially political influence on the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors, but also the financial situation of the judiciary and corruption

President Barack Obama’s nomination and the United States Senate’s confirmation of Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court in the summer of 2009 had important implications for Latina and Latino identity and the meaning of “law” in the United States.  Objectively one of the most highly qualified individuals ever nominated to the high bench,  Judge Sotomayor’s nomination exploded into a national discussion of her remarks to the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law in 2002.
Subjected to a slew of characterizations, ranging from “racist” to “intellectual lightweight,” her nomination seized the attention and imagination of Latina@s and non-Latin@s. She portends new directions in American law.
This paper: (1) reviews the nomination/confirmation process and the public debate that surrounded it; (2) discusses the Berkeley speech in the context of  Judge Sotomayor’s  “Latinidad” and the legal perspective it articulates; (3) considers the idea of “subjectivity” in the development of American law and her proposed interjection of life experience into what is popularly perceived to be “objective” application of legal rules, which is deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal tradition; (4) explores the implications of culture and language in the construction of social reality and the law; and (5) suggests that her nomination, beyond its likely effects on the development of the law, has a profound effect on the development of Latina and Latino identity.

The judicialization of politics has been described as one of the most significant phenomena of late twentieth and early twenty-first century government. While the courts have more judicial muscle than they did centuries ago, it would be a mistake to assume that with more power, has come more protection. This paper discusses judicial independence by highlighting some concerning instances of judicial interference which have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2010 to date. In my discussion of these threats, I highlight that the executive is not the only avenue by which interference in the judiciary occurs. I conclude with suggestions of ways in which judges as social actors can mitigate undue influence and present a stronger judiciary.

The National Judicial Appointments Commission system for appointing judges is unconstitutional for four reasons.  There is potential for its misuse as appointments to the higher judiciary will be controlled by the executive branch of the government. It suffers from the vice of arbitrariness as there is no way to determine who an “eminent person” is.  The veto powers given to any two members also make it susceptible to misuse.  Finally, there are concerns about maintaining the independence of the judiciary because the high courts and the Supreme Court examine the validity of actions taken by the executive branch as well as the legislature.

È opinione comune, presso gli studiosi moderni, che i giudici privati del processo civile romano (giudici monocratici o recuperatores) appartenessero alle classi sociali più elevate e più colte e che mantenessero, nel ricoprire il loro incarico, un atteggiamento di grande dignità. Questo dato appare in effetti confermato se si considerano tutti i giudici privati, dei quali le testimonianze antiche hanno tramandato l’identità. Ci sono tuttavia significative fonti letterarie, che presentano indizi dai quali è lecito sospettare, di fatto, l’esistenza di una seconda ‘categoria’ di giudici privati, costituita da persone di bassa estrazione sociale, che mantenevano spesso, nell'esercizio della funzione, comportamenti tutt’altro che incensurabili. I giudici di questo secondo gruppo erano, nella maggior parte dei casi, probabilmente quelli scelti al di fuori dell’album iudicum. Dall’indagine è risultato anche che, sebbene le due categorie di giudici fossero per molti aspetti differenziate tra loro, esse erano tuttavia assimilate per un importante carattere comune: l’imperitia iuris dei giudicanti, che si trova a più riprese lamentata dalle fonti antiche.

Although having a diverse bench is instrumental to a fair judicial
system, the first Mexican American was not appointed to the federal
bench until 1961. In that year, President John F. Kennedy appointed
Reynaldo G. Garza, to the U.S. federal bench as a district
court judge. Judge Garza hoped that by becoming an “effective jurist”
he would quell any scrutiny over his appointment and,
moreover, “encourage [the] appointment of other qualified Mexican
Americans to the federal bench.” Judge Garza was the only Latino
appointed to the federal bench until 1979 when President Jimmy
Carter appointed several Latinos to the bench, as well as, appointing
Judge Garza to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Latino community lobbied for and persistently requested that a Latino Supreme Court Justice be appointed for many years. When President Bill Clinton was elected they believed he would appoint a Latino to the
highest court. They were, however, sorely disappointed. In 2009, President Barack Obama historically appointed the first Latina to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor. A lack of Latina and Latino judges exists at all levels of the judiciary.

This article introduces the reader to Latina and Latino judges, serving
at the city, state and federal level. The author had the honor of interviewing eighteen judges, including Hon. Sonia Sotomayor (she was a Second Circuit Court of Appeals judge at the time) and presents the interviews in the first part of the article. In this section, the judges detail their journeys to the bench. The article next details the history of Latina and Latino judges in the U.S. The article also discusses the appointment process to the federal bench and details the importance of having and keeping the “merit system” also known as the “Missouri Plan” to select judges to state court appointments. Ultimately, sharing their stories, the judges demonstrate the importance of having a diverse bench and discuss the necessary steps to increase the presence of Latinas and Latinos on the bench.

I.- Introducción.
1.- El nuevo Tribunal Constitucional en la República Dominicana.
  1.1.- Composición.
  1.2.- Designación.
    1.2.1.- La participación del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura.
    1.2.2. - El procedimiento selectivo de jueces constitucionales.
1.3. - La designación de los primeros jueces.
1.4.- Algunas observaciones al procedimiento selectivo.

2.- El Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de Bolivia.
2.1.- Integración.
2.2.- Designación.
  2.2.1.- Primera etapa: convocatoria, postulación y preselección a cargo de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional.
2.2.2.- Segunda etapa: campaña y votación popular organizada por el Tribunal Supremo Electoral.
2.3.- La reciente experiencia selectiva de magistrados.
2.4.- Apuntes sobre el proceso selectivo.

This article aims to place the selection process of judges to the Slovak Constitutional Court, which is most likely to determine its composition for more than a decade, into the context of the constitutional judges’ interaction with other political actors, including the broader public. It illustrates how selected quality Slovak newspapers have framed the role of politics in the selection process. Conceptually, the article departs from a more robust line of research undertaken in several Western democracies, particularly the United States, that has given rise to discussions about how their apex courts interact with the media and, through them, with the public at large. Building on theories of the courts as political institutions and informed by theses on the judicialization and mediatization of politics, the article presents a broader understanding of both the decisionmaking process of constitutional judges and politics emphasizing expertise in their selection. Firstly, the selection of judges and their adjudication might be seen through partisan bias, associated with the attitudinal model of judging, and secondly, it might be perceived as a neutral expertise, associated with the vision of the courts as bureaucratic non-political actors. Surveying selected, primarily opinionated newspaper outputs, the article found a peculiar interaction between the debate surrounding qualification as a necessary justification for a constitutional appointment and the three different fameworks of constitutional judges as political but non-partisan, partisan, or neutral (non-political) actors. Qualification is overwhelmingly seen as a necessary condition for appointing a constitutional judge, regardless of their views. However, disagreements persist as to whether previous political experience disqualifies a candidate. Such disagreement overlies a deeper divide over whether constitutional judges are political actors, and if so, what kind of political actors they are.

This is a review essay discussing the arguments and implications of two impressive books published in the United Kingdom in 2013 - Alan Paterson's 'Final Judgment – The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court' and Erika Rackley's 'Women, Judging and the Judiciary – From Difference to Diversity'.

""This paper discusses the different models of appointment applied for constitutional judges in Europe, taking into consideration also the appointment procedure of the two European regional courts. It offers an account and a comparative analysis of the three appointment models: the split, the collaborative and the parliamentary model, discussing their practical application and shortcomings. In particular, the paper deals with the question of
how to avoid standstills in the different appointment procedures and with the publicity of these procedures. The author concludes with a proposal for the Hungarian Constitutional Court, arguing that the split model is the one that ensures better that the composition of the Court expresses a balance between the branches of government.""

This Article presents a comparative study of the appointment process to the Supreme Court in the United States and Argentina. The study reviews the Executive Branch's role, focusing on the selection criteria of potential candidates, such as age, professional expertise, and gender. As far as institutional design is concerned, the Article compares the procedures that can guarantee external evaluation and enhance the participation of interest groups and society at large, prior to formal nominations. A particular focus is laid upon recess appointments, to evaluate the extent to which this interim procedure conforms to current demands for improving the democratic legitimacy of the Judicial Branch. Furthermore, this Article explores and discusses the Senate's role, comparing procedural rules and recent institutional practices in both countries. Finally, using insights drawn from Game Theory, this study provides a model to better understand political dynamics and recently failed nominations.

[Contd. Article Series] Article 4: This is the fourth article of the series and undertakes a conceptual analysis of the concept of judicial appointments.The author has ventured to design a series of six articles on "Higher Judicial Appointments and the Related Constitutional Virtues : A Contemporary Analysis".  This series of articles has basically been designed to concentrate on the conceptual analysis of the parameters involved in the higher judicial appointments. This issue relating to the higher judicial appointments has gained a lot of importance in India lately and it is required that the lawyers and the common citizenry stay informed with the intricacies of the issue, and the values involved at its heart, particularly in view of protection of the Constitutional virtues of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability.

Elek and Rottman argue that judicial evaluation is often biased against women and minority judges. The need to address bias is important, however often the desire for diversity seems so self-evident as to belie deeper analysis. This paper examines the two main rationales for gender equality on the bench. First, female judges are often considered necessary in order to bring a gendered perspective to judging, however it is argued that this rationale is flawed. Second, an alternative rationale based on equality and legitimacy is offered which avoids gender essentialism. While debates typically focus on these two rationales, a third rationale embraces both difference and equality/legitimacy. The presence of female judges has an important symbolic value which destabilises existing fraternal legal norms. Finally, increasing the number of female judges may not necessarily change judging, and this paper also analyses how the transformative potential offered by judicial diversity can work in practice.

Elek y Rottman defienden que la evaluación judicial suele estar sesgada en contra de las mujeres y los jueces pertenecientes a minorías. La necesidad de abordar el sesgo es importante, sin embargo a menudo el deseo de diversidad parece tan evidente como para contradecir un análisis más profundo. Este artículo examina los dos motivos principales para la igualdad de género en el banquillo. En primer lugar, las mujeres jueces a menudo se consideran necesarias para aportar una perspectiva de género al hecho de juzgar, sin embargo, se defiende que este razonamiento es erróneo. En segundo lugar, se ofrece una alternativa lógica basada en la igualdad y la legitimidad que evita el esencialismo de género. Mientras que los debates suelen centrarse en estas dos razones, una tercera justificación abarca tanto la diferencia como la igualdad/legitimidad. La presencia de mujeres en la judicatura tiene un importante valor simbólico que desestabiliza las normas legales fraternales existentes. Por último, aumentar el número de juezas no puede cambiar necesariamente el hecho juzgar en sí, y este artículo también analiza cómo el potencial transformador que ofrece la diversidad judicial puede funcionar en la práctica.

The Appointment clause between politics and law: the American case. In the era of modern
constitutionalism, the importance of selection and appointment of constitutional judges has
become ever more crucial for democratic societies. In our democratic systems, the nomination
procedures for constitutional tribunals must observe, within the logic of the separation of
powers, the proper balance between the judges’ independence and the political agenda that
brought to their election. The Appointment Clause of the US Constitution represents a favorable
example to appreciate this sort of constitutional balance. In the last decades, US political and
cultural divisions highly impacted the nominations of Supreme Court Justices. The increasing
partisanship and obstruction at the hands of both Democrats and Republicans, involved in the
Senate confirmation process, has been the subject of much scholarly debate and criticism. The
latest example of this is the recent replacement of Justice Scalia, who died unexpectedly during
the last year of Obama’s presidential mandate, with Neil Gorsuch, appointed by the new President
Trump. The long political fight between Democrats and Republicans for the appointment
of Justice Gorsuch explains the legal struggle between political views and constitutional rules
that informs the US Supreme Court composition.
Keywords: Appointment clause, nuclear option, advise and consent, US Supreme Court.

Judicial selection and training policies and standards must include two fundamental dimensions which reflect current realities in judicial activity:
1) Judicial ethics; which refers to (a) the good character which a judicial candidate must prove when becoming a judge, according to some ethical standards; and (b) the situations where an actual judge must avoid bias, conflicts of interests, and resolve ethical issues in court and outside court, according to some code of ethics;
2) Modern judicial skills; which encompass generic skills that are not normally associated with judicial decisionmaking but become increasingly important in nowadays’ judicial activity – starting with case and court management, public relations skills, foreign languages, continuing with handling new technologies in court and concluding with time management and personal development.

Check the pdf for State of the art, literature review, methodology and others.

Reforms to the process for electing judges to the European Court of Human Rights have generally focused on identifying the most qualified individual candidates. This Article argues for a more holistic approach, advancing a theory of why professional diversity on the European Court of Human Rights is an asset in collegial decision making. The results of original interviews with several Strasbourg judges are presented, followed by an empirical analysis of the professional backgrounds of all judges elected to the European Court of Human Rights since 1998. Although the interviews indicate that the judges themselves see the value of professional diversity, the quantitative evidence suggests a trend in the direction of a more professionally homogenous bench. The Article concludes with some suggestions for how the promotion of professional diversity might be appropriately pursued in future reforms to the process for electing Strasbourg judges.

1.- Introducción.
2.- El modelo de renovación de los magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional.
3.- El retraso en la renovación de los magistrados constitucionales.
4.- El contexto de la reforma: coincidencia entre las designaciones de magistrados del Senado y Congreso.
5.- El trámite parlamentario de la ley.
6.- El contenido de la reforma.
  a) Cobertura de vacantes producidas por causas distintas a la expiración del mandato.
  b) Legalización del retraso en la designación parcial de magistrados constitucionales.
7.- La opción tomada por el legislador.
8.- El irresuelto problema de fondo: una propuesta para evitar la excesiva dilación en la designación de magistrados.

France maintains a court system outside of the European continent in so-called overseas regions such as Martinique and New Caledonia. Held as colonies until the 1940s, these territories became part of the French state with varying degrees of autonomy. Drawing on original qualitative and archival research, this article argues that through these overseas courts, France continues to legally assume the traditional role of a colonial power despite its declared commitment to the nation-state, republican model. Subordinating discourses and elements of colonial structure have outlived the transition to nonempire, continuing to exert strong influences on the courts’ operations, especially the way in which judges and prosecutors are ap- pointed and promoted. This study should also be read as a contribution to the scholarship on how court systems around the globe grapple with the legacy of colonialism in shaping their organizational structure and practices.

The international legal system encompasses a variety of legal norms, but the perceived increase in "fragmentation" of these norms has recently been seen as a problem for the system as a whole. Consequently, many writers have suggested forms of increased comity among international tribunals in order to combat the problems associated with fragmentation; indeed, locating harmonies among international legal regimes within a coherent international legal system appears to be the dominant trend. Yet these perspectives dismiss, or at the very least, largely overlook, the benefits of competition among international tribunals.

Fragmenting norms could provide opportunities for better norms, particularly since differing legal traditions bring differing norms to adjudication, all of which may have their relative strengths. This continual updating of law and legal dispute resolution is healthy for the law to maintain legitimacy while keeping up with social change. How popular courts weigh the need for equality, the right to a hearing, and so on might suggest a balance among principles that is the most just approach. Other tribunals may look to the decisions of more popular fora as examples of justice, and reform themselves and their image appropriately. Thus, increased competition may increase the diversity of legal norms and the legitimacy of the norms applied.

Any objection to the beneficial role of fragmentation is based on one's conception of justice and whether justice can be a democratic and competitive preference. If international tribunals are created by States in order to do justice among them, then being recognized as the most attractive forum is evidence that a particular tribunal may have a better appreciation for justice. Fragmentation may not be a problem to be solved, but rather, a sign that the international legal system needs to consider a variety of legal norms. As society's definition of justice evolves, so do many tribunals, not necessarily towards a top-down, constitutionalized, hierarchical system overseeing a coherent, unitary international legal order, or for that matter towards a network of friendly, lending, and borrowing professionals. Instead, they may affirm a bottom-up, vigorous system where different legal actors compete for the best realization of justice.

The article is organised in three parts. The first one illustrates the historical features and the institutional and political background that have to be taken into account in order to understand how initial teacher education and training has developed in Italy. Presently, all teacher education is managed by Universities, but a considerable difference still remains between the organisation of courses for primary and pre-primary teachers, on one hand, and secondary teachers, on the other. The second part analyses the transition, between the end of the 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 st , from an education for primary teachers that took place at high school level (Istituto Magistrale) to a fully University one (Corso di laurea in Scienze della formazione primaria); and it also examines the crucial issue of the creation, in the same period, of the PostGraduate Schools for Secondary Teachers (Scuole di Specializzazione per l'Insegnamento Secondario-SSIS), until they were abolished in 2009. The third part shows the present framework of initial teacher training in Italy, mainly related to teaching in lower and upper secondary schools. At this level of schooling the legislation was recently changed; the Scuole di Specializzazione per l'Insegnamento Secondario (SSIS) have been replaced with the Tirocinio Formativo Attivo (TFA), which at present is being implemented for the first time by the universities. In the final section of this part a provisional balance of the innovation is outlined and some critical issues are pointed out. The essay is essentially focused on initial teacher training, as in Italy in-service training, while not completely absent, has never been the object of specific regulation nor of systematic actions, but it existswhen it existson the basis of the initiative of individual groups or associations.

This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process-selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates-with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-à-vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.

This paper analyzes the vicariates forane and the profile of their main official, explaining the process through which the diocesan apparatus penetrated into the territory of Central-Southern Portuguese America (i.e. Minas Gerais and São Paulo, 1745-1800). Firstly, an explanation is provided of the way in which such structures were organized in the diocesan territory, as well as of their role in episcopal government. Secondly, some light is shed on the power relations and social dynamics that controlled access to the office of vicar forane (vigário da vara).
I argue that the ecclesiastical power positions fitted a rationale similar to that which guided the occupation of offices in the town councils (câmaras) and the lay brotherhoods of mercy (misericórdias). The relationship between the latter and the formation of local elites has been exhaustively analyzed by Portuguese-speaking historians, while the diocesan power positions, on the contrary, are almost always ignored by studies on social groups and the structuring process of social hierarchies in Portugal’s Ancien Regime.

There is a furore in Queensland about the appointment of Judge Carmody to be Chief Justice of Queensland. This paper examines why processes such as confidential consultation with stakeholders is important. It also explains the importance of judicial independence.

The debate about the tenure of judges of the Supreme Court of India is fixated somewhat unnecessarily on the retirement age than the actual time spent in the Court. Examining the length of the tenure gives some hints as to the unwritten criteria of appointment and may potentially offer a deeper understanding of the systemic problems faced by the
courts.

The appointment of Judges and Advocates-General to the CJEU was historically within the Member States’ discretion. The candidates were selected on the national level and on the EU level were appointed by common accord of all Member States. However the procedures on the national level were very often opaque and on the EU level rather formal, since Member States limited themselves to the mere mutual confirmation of their candidates without any scrutiny. In order to fix these issues regarding appointment to the CJEU, the Lisbon Treaty introduced, among other things, a new judiciary panel under article 255 TFEU. As an advisory body, its task is to give non-binding opinions on the suitability of the candidates to perform the duties of Judge and Advocate-General. This paper concerns the role, functioning and impact of this panel. Regard is also taken to the implications of establishment of such panel and relating issues are also discussed.

Published in: Unité et diversité du droit international: Ecrits en l'honneur du professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy / Unity and Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy (edité par / edited by Denis Alland, Vincent Chetail, Olivier de Frouville & Jorge E. Vinuales). Leiden/Boston, Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 581-597.

This article presents statistical information about the High Court's decisionmaking for 2013 at both an institutional and individual level, with an emphasis on constitutional cases as a subset of the total. The results have been compiled using the same methodology 1 employed in studies of earlier years. 2 Likewise, we maintain our customary advice to readers about the inevitable limitations that must apply to the results of an empirical study of the decisions of any final court over the space of a single calendar year. In particular, the fact that constitutional

The Presidential assent to the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014 has finally set the ball rolling for advent of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). This new constitutional body seeks not only to give decent burial to the beleaguered ‘collegium’ system that was perceived to function in an opaque manner but also seeks to institutionalize the process for appointment of judges of the Supreme Court (SC) and the High Courts (HCs).

After the decision of the Supreme Court in the NJAC case, the collegium system is back in action vis-à-vis appointment and transfer of judges to the higher judiciary in India. The noteworthy aspect of the majority judgement in the case is that it acknowledges that there are flaws in the collegium system and it needs reforms. Suggestions were invited from the general public as well on four aspects. However, in addition to those four aspects, keeping in view the past experience of the working of the collegium system, reforms are needed to be brought in other respects too. More importantly to the working of the collegium system and the procedure it follows. Reforms must aim at obviating the scope for arbitrariness in the appointment process without compromising judicial independence. The five judge bench of the Supreme Court, which is currently seized of the matter, cannot bring all the reforms that are needed since it is bound by the decisions rendered in the second and third judges’ cases.

Ausgrenzen oder integrieren? Verfassungs richter wahlen mit oder gegen die AfD verfassungsblog.de/ausgrenzen-oder-integrieren-verfassungsrichterwahlen-mit-oder-gegen-die-afd/ Am 14. Juni dieses Jahres wählte der Landtag von Baden-Württemberg die Unternehmensberaterin Sabine Reger zur Richterin am Verfassungsgerichtshof des Bundeslandes. Damit wurde erstmals eine von der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) nominierte Kandidatin Mitglied eines der 17 Verfassungsgerichte in der Bundesrepublik. Die Laienrichterin Reger wurde jedoch kaum unterstützt. Während sie im ersten Wahlgang am 6. Juni mit 29 zu 36 Stimmen (bei 56 Enthaltungen) glatt durchgefallen war, erhielt sie beim zweiten Versuch nur eine knappe einfache Mehrheit von 30 zu 28 Stimmen, die erst durch die erneut hohe Zahl von 65 Enthaltungen ermöglicht wurde. Immerhin stimmten dabei aber mindestens zehn Abgeordnete anderer Fraktionen für die AfD-Kandidatin. Für die Wahl der Landesverfassungsrichter genügt in Baden-Württemberg gemäß § 2 Abs. 2 VerfGhG BW bereits eine einfache Stimmenmehrheit.

TheseguidelinesaredesignedtoexpandonandexplicatethelanguagenotedinthecurrentBy-Laws pertainingtoStandingCommittees(SCs): ByLaws4.1extract:responsibilitiesofWCCESPresidentincludingto"appointcommitteesandworkinggroupsasneeded" ByLaws7.Activities(Article5oftheStatutes) 7.1TheExecutiveCommitteeshallcreateasetofStandingCommitteesresponsibleforsuchmattersascongresses;financeandfundraising; specialprojects;admissionsandnewsocieties;research;andpublications.EachStandingCommitteeshallhaveamembership,whichreflects globaldiversity.TheChairpersonofeachStandingCommitteeshallnormallyholdofficeforthreeyears,followingtheexpiryofwhichthe ChairpersonshallnormallybecomePastChairpersoninordertoassisttheincomingChairpersonandprovidecontinuityinthebusinessof theStandingCommittee.MembersofStandingCommitteesshallalsonormallybeappointedforthreeyears.Chairpersonsshallbeeligiblefor appointmentfortwoterms.