Antitrust Law

O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar, com base em uma pesquisa de história legislativa e história do pensamento econômico, se houve uma “revolução do antitruste” no Brasil. A tese da “revolução do antitruste” parte do pressuposto de que, antes da década de 1990, quando teria ocorrido no Brasil a “revolução”, o antitruste brasileiro não utilizava “elementos de análise da teoria econômica”. Esta tese procura demonstrar não somente que, desde seus primeiros anos, o antitruste nacional se utiliza de elementos de teorias econômicas, mas também que há uma convergência entre antitruste e as correntes de pensamento econômico dominantes no período em estudo. O corte cronológico do trabalho vai de 1930 a 1964, por duas razões: primeiro, por falta de literatura significativa especificamente a respeito do antitruste brasileiro do período e, segundo, para demonstrar que, desde o primeiro período de existência da legislação concorrencial brasileira, antitruste e pensamento econômico estão próximos um do outro. A pesquisa se divide em quatro capítulos: no primeiro, situa-se o problema estudado, fixando-se o conceito de “revolução do antitruste”, a origem do debate nos Estados Unidos e como essa perspectiva foi importada para o Brasil; no segundo, faz-se uma análise do antitruste brasileiro no período estudado, buscando elementos não só jurídicos, mas também políticos e econômicos acerca dos tópicos propostos; no terceiro, traça-se um panorama das correntes de pensamento econômico dominantes no período, de modo a ter um quadro teórico e ideológico das ideias econômicas mais influentes à época; no quarto e último capítulo, cotejam-se os dois quadros traçados – ou seja, o antitruste nacional, de um lado, e as correntes de pensamento econômico, de outro – com o intuito de verificar a convergência entre eles, examinando o acerto da pressuposição histórica concernente à “revolução do antitruste”, a saber, que, antes da “revolução”, o antitruste não se utilizara de elementos de teoria econômica ou, em outras palavras, que antitruste e produção intelectual de natureza econômica não estavam relacionados um ao outro.
Palavras-chave: antitruste; história do direito econômico; Estado; pensamento econômico; Brasil.

The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country. | Samà, Danilo (2013), The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-50.

Im April 2019 ist das Gesetz zum Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen („GeschGehG“) in Deutschland in Kraft getreten und hat die bisherigen Regelungen hierzu im Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb („UWG“) abgelöst. Was Geschäftsgeheimnisse eigentlich sind und warum man sie besonders schützen muss, soll hier kurz zusammengefasst werden. Dieser Beitrag ist am 31.8.2019 in Fuldaer Zeitung (Hessen, Deutschland) erschienen.

Nei sei anni di operatività dello strumento di cui all’art.21bis, L. n.287del 1990, la giurisprudenza ha avuto modo di confrontarsi con diversi problemi applicativi emersi. Come identificare questa nuova forma di legittimazione? Quali sono le implicazioni al livello costituzionale? Che funzione ha il parere dell’Autorità? È possibile proporre direttamente ricorso senza previo espletamento del parere? Qual è la natura dei termini indicati dalla legge? Il presente scritto si propone di ricostruire il percorso seguito dalla giurisprudenza nel dare una risposta a questi e altri complessi interrogativi.

SOMMARIO: 1. Il problema della natura della legittimazione ad agire dell'AGCM. - 2. Le principali incertezze interpretative e applicative nella fase pre-contenziosa. - 2.1. L'emanazione del parere. - 2.2. La fase successiva all'emanazione del parere. - 3. L'attivazione del ricorso giurisdizionale e la struttura del processo. - 4. Le principali tendenze nella prassi applicativa dell'istituto. - 5. Primazia della concorrenza, ruolo dell'AGCM e funzione giurisdizionale.

Competition law is generally focused on competition in a market. Yet, as recent economic studies have clearly indicated, one of the main sources of competition concerns of jurisdictions around the world is the impact of high levels of aggregate concentration in their markets, when a small group of economic entities controls a large part of the economic activity through holdings in many markets. High levels of aggregate concentration can significantly impact competition and welfare. On the one hand, conglomerates' substantial resources and varied experiences, as well as their economies of scale and scope, often enable them to enter markets more readily than other firms, especially when entry barriers are high. On the other hand, high levels of aggregate concentration raise significant competitive concerns. Most importantly, oligopolistic coordination in and across markets as well as entry barriers into markets might be increased. These effects, in turn, might lead to stagnation and poor utilization of resources, which adversely affect growth and welfare. Another major concern is a political economy one: given their size and economic heft, large conglomerates may attempt to translate their economic power into political power in order to create, protect and entrench their privileged positions. Given these effects, the paper attempts to explore the weight given-if at all-to aggregate concentration in the application of competition laws around the world. The analysis is based, inter alia, on the experiences of 35 different jurisdictions in dealing with aggregate concentration through competition law, based on a survey performed with the assistance of the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

Every day, digital platforms generate, gather, store and analyze a huge amount of data, personal data included: these data can be elaborated to cluster individuals and offer personalized prices and services. Progressively individuals are losing control over their personal data and digital identities and, accordingly, data protection authorities look at the operations of these digital platforms carefully. The paper addresses the issue of a possible commingling between data protection rules and antitrust provisions and the lively global debate between those who call for a strong antitrust intervention to buffer privacy risks and those who would keep antitrust law at bay.

Leegin decision of the Supreme Court in 2007 affirmed that minimum RPM was to be evaluated under the rule of reason henceforth. Conversely, minimum RPM retains its position as a hard-core restraint in EU's BER 2010 and the De Minimis Notice. The limited amount of case law reveal that in the absence of certain factors, such as significant market power of the parties, minimum RPM is unlikely to result in the detriment of consumers. Consequently, despite the retention of the maintenance of the single market as a significant aim in EU competition policy, minimum RPM practices are entitled to a more lenient approach, if the ultimate aim is to attain consumer welfare as stated by the Commission and through most judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

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The following aspects are anylised in the paper:
- Russian courts' practice in connection with shareholders' agreements governed by foreign law before the legislative developments of 2009;
- novelties in the regulation of corporate agreements which became effective on 1 September 2014 and 1 June 2015;
- arbitrability of disputes arising from shareholders' agreements;
- recent courts' practice in connection with particular provisions of shareholders' agreements governed by Russian law.

The facilitators or informers have become important subjects in the field of Competition Law. However, just as they have served to fight against the cartels, they have also been used by the latter to facilitate and cover up their organization and activities.
In the present article, the author seeks to explain and analyze the first cases resolved by the national competition authority in which said facilitators have been immersed. Likewise, an analysis of the jurisprudence on the subject is made in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Finally, the national legislation and jurisprudence on the subject is analyzed in the light of comparative law.

Los facilitadores o delatores se han convertido en importantes sujetos en el campo del Derecho de la Competencia. Sin embargo, así como han servido para la lucha en contra de los cárteles también se han usado por parte de estos para facilitar y encubrir su organización y actividades.
En el presente artículo, el autor busca explicar y analizar los primeros casos resueltos por la autoridad de competencia nacional en los cuales dichos facilitadores se han visto inmersos. De igual manera, se realiza un análisis de la jurisprudencia sobre el tema en Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y la Unión Europea. Finalmente, se analiza la legislación y jurisprudencia nacional acerca del tema a la luz del derecho comparado.

The work, starting from a recent judgement of the Administrative Regional Court of Lazio, focuses on several topics related to the legitimate right of organizing the regularity rallies, with particular attention on the topics of insurance and competition law.

The topic of this dissertation is the analysis of buyer power and its treatment in EU competition law. The aim of the study and its main research question are connected to identifying, synthesizing, discussing, and evaluating the buyer power regulation in EU competition law. To do so, my research seeks to clarify what buyer power is, how it is legally treated, and whether there is a consistent and coherent buyer power competition policy and legal regulation in EU competition law.

Buyer power represents the other side of competition law, focusing on buying conducts and how a buyer can exert its market power to the detriment of competition. Buyer power is an umbrella concept that groups different forms of buying and bargaining over purchasing prices: monopsony and bargaining power (sensu stricto). I define buyer power as the market power possessed by a buyer (or a coordinated group of buyers) that allows said undertaking to reduce the purchasing prices it pays for an input in a profitable manner below the supplier’s standard selling price. This price reduction can be obtained by either withholding purchases – monopsony – or through bilateral negotiations and pure competitive bargaining to reduce the supplier’s prices and obtain better contractual conditions. In both cases, the buyer captures a higher share of surplus when negotiating with the supplier that would have been retained by this, absent buyer power. These better terms and conditions can be the result of efficient outcomes, as occurs with bargaining power.

7 Regolamento (CE) n. 773/2004 della Commissione, del 7 aprile 2004, relativo ai procedimenti svolti dalla Commissione a norma degli articoli 81 e 82 del trattato CE, GUUE L 123, 27 aprile 2004, p. 18 ss. 8 Per un esame generale dei poteri di indagine preliminare previsti negli articoli da 17 a 22 del regolamento n.1/03, nonché sulle sanzioni e le penalità di mora, si rinvia al nostro Indagini preliminari e diritti della difesa nella procedura antitrust comunitaria, in questa In giurisprudenza vedi le sentenze della Corte di giustizia del 21 settembre 1989, cause riunite 46/87 e 227/88, Hoechst AG c. Commissione (Hoechst), Raccolta, p. 2859, punti 33-35, e del 22 ottobre 2002, causa C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA c. Directeur Général de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (Roquette Frères), Raccolta, p. I-9011 ss. 12

Los autores realizan un análisis crítico del nuevo delito de abuso de poder económico a la luz de la dogmática del Derecho Penal económico y el Derecho de la Libre competencia. En ese sentido, formulan críticas que tienen como finalidad evidenciar la tensión que propicia este nuevo tipo penal entre las dos materias, para que se pueda plantear su reforma o su derogatoria en atención a los perjuicios que se generan a los destinatarios de la norma y a la coherencia del ordenamiento jurídico.

I diritti di traduzione, di memorizzazione elettronica, di riproduzione e di adattamento totale o parziale, con qualsiasi mezzo (compresi i micro lm e le copie fotostatiche), sono riservati per tutti i Paesi. Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo di periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall'art. 68, commi 4 e 5 della legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633. Le riproduzioni diverse da quelle sopra indicate (per uso non personale -cioè, a titolo esempli cativo, commerciale, economico o professionale -e/o oltre il limite del 15%) potranno avvenire solo a seguito di speci ca autorizzazione rilasciata da EDISER Srl, società di servizi dell'Associazione Italiana Editori, attraverso il marchio CLEARedi Centro Licenze e Autorizzazioni Riproduzioni Editoriali. Informazioni: www.clearedi.org. L'elaborazione dei testi, anche se curata con scrupolosa attenzione, non può comportare speci che responsabilità per eventuali involontari errori o inesattezze.

Minority share acquisitions between competitors have been mistakenly considered of concern only in case they result in a change of control. First the economic theory, closely followed by courts and doctrine, explained and demonstrated that even the acquisition of non-controlling shareholdings may distort competition and requires a close scrutiny by competition authorities. This article analyzes the impact of minority shareholdings on the incentives of rival firms and ascertains whether the authorities are provided with adequate tools to investigate and address the potential anti-competitive effects. The results of the economic theory are the starting point to assess whether the legal treatment of minority shareholdings under the EU and US antitrust systems is appropriate and adequate.

ABSTRACT

This is a very brief textbook that introduces a basic explanation about the relationship between Law and Economics. In Chile, the study of Economics for Law Schools began in the middle of 20th century using the denomination “ Economic Law”. The text assumes that the expression “ Economic Law” is not updated  and is not related to the current state of the art on law and Economics, Regulation and Antitrust law. The text, primarily oriented to students of Law Schools,  analyzes several areas of intersection between Law and Microeconomics, focused on the foundations, the main topics and the outcomes of the regulatory process.


Este es un muy breve libro de texto que introduce una explicación básica sobre la relación entre derecho y economía. En Chile, el estudio de la economía de las facultades de derecho se inició a mediados del siglo 20 utilizando la denominación "Derecho Económico". El texto supone que la expresión "Derecho Económico" no se actualiza y no está relacionado con el estado actual de la técnica en el Derecho y Economía, Regulación y Derecho de la competencia. El texto, orientado principalmente a los estudiantes de las facultades de Derecho, analiza varias zonas de intersección entre la Ley y Microeconomía, se centró en las bases, los temas principales y los resultados del proceso regulatorio.

When an international cartel member considers self-reporting a global collusion in various jurisdictions, it is confronted with more than 60 different leniency programs applicable to a single infringement. The diversity of rules affects strategies of poten- tial leniency applicants as transaction costs and uncertainties may deter them from blowing the whistle.Competition authorities promote soft-conver- gence of leniency programs and cooperation among agencies but a unified policy is unavoidable in the long term to secure effective enforcement.

Much evidence from recent antitrust cases casts doubt on the ability of conventional remedies to restore competition in digital markets. This paper considers three untested remedies for antitrust enforcement in digital markets: mandatory sharing of algorithmic learning (rather than the data itself); subsidization of competitors; and temporary shutdowns. All three remedies are radical from several perspectives. First, they go beyond halting specific anticompetitive conduct by actively seeking to restore structural conditions favoring competition. Second, they entail government interference with freedom of enterprise and property rights to a substantially higher degree than the market-driven process which normally governs antitrust remedy design. However, the remedies fall short of outright economic regulation in that they aim to restore the competitive process, not to impose a competitive outcome. Third, all three remedies create complex tradeoffs, in that they could lead either to competitive benefits (e.g., the entry of new firms) or to harms (e.g., consumer losses in cases of platform shutdowns, or anticompetitive coordination in cases of algorithmic sharing). All three thus require careful balancing before implementation.

1. Introduction
In what is undoubtedly the most high-profile antitrust case of this moment, tech giant Google has been hit with a string of allegations with regard to its business practices. These allegations led Europe’s highest competition authority, the European Commission (hereafter: Commission), towards initiating formal proceedings against Google. The Google saga has been keeping legal practitioners, academia, competition authorities and courts busy since 2010. In November of that year, the first allegations were made with regard to Google’s online search services. The allegations accused Google of systematically favouring its own online search services (including its comparison shopping service ‘Google Shopping’) to the detriment of that of its rival providers by treating its competitors’ services unfavourably in Google’s search results. In April 2015, a second investigation was launched into Google with regard to its mobile operating system, Android, and its applications suite, Google Apps. While these cases are still pending, it seems that Google’s legal woes are far from over. The latest news suggests that the Commission is taking steps towards a third investigation against Google, this time over its ‘AdWords’ advertising service. What all three investigations have in common is that the submitted allegations revolve around Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter: TFEU), which prohibits undertakings from abusing their dominant market position. The focus of this bachelor thesis shall be Google Android case, as this is not only the most recent still pending case, it also raises several thought-provoking and far-reaching questions that lie at the core of EU competition law. These legal questions shall therefore be carefully assessed from an EU competition law perspective. While doing so, the particular challenges of the application of Article 102 TFEU by the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter: CJEU) shall be highlighted. Special attention shall be given to the wider (EU) digital sector and its significance in the field of EU competition law. The thesis shall be concluded by evaluating whether the Google Android case is a wake-up call for a different approach by the Commission and the CJEU.

Non-compete clauses in patent license agreements can result in both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. In the EU and the U.S., these competitive effects of non-compete clauses are taken into account under the rules of competition. The dividing line between the two legal systems is that in the EU a more rigid and general approach has been taken, whereas in the U.S. individual assessment is always required under the rule of reason.

In a tort law regime established on the basis of corrective justice considerations, causation requirements will tend to play a predominant role in regulating the damages claims brought forward. The requirement of the causal link between the harm suffered and the anticompetitive conduct in damages claims for the infringement of EU competition law has nevertheless received remarkably little attention in the recently adopted EU Damages Directive and in academic literature. The Damages Directive and some recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU proceed to some limited harmonization of evidential presumptions and procedural requirements, as well as the exclusion of national rules that may deny the right of the parties harmed by the competition law infringement to receive compensation. Yet, the contours of the requirement of causal link are left to the interpretative work of national courts, in view of their respective tort law doctrines on causation and the lack of a proper EU tort law. The study first explores the role of the concept of causation in claims for damages for infringement of EU competition law and the different approaches taken by the legal systems of EU Member States in conceptualizing the inquiry of a causal link. It then focuses on the methods used by the tort law systems of the EU Member States, the recent Damages Directive and the case law of the EU Court to engage with situations of causal uncertainty, which may frequently arise in the context of competition law actions for damages, in view of the complexity of the commercial environment and the multiple factors influencing markets.

Antitrust policy nominally plays an instrumental public interest role. The generally accepted notion is that it is a government instrument designed to intervene in relatively unregulated markets in order to preserve rivalry among independent buyers and sellers. Competition authorities are supposed to restrain business conduct that exercises monopoly power aimed at excluding competitors or exploiting consumers and clients. Thus it can be said – although few pro-market theorists make the insight explicit – that antitrust provisions reveal mistrust of the capacity of markets to promote social welfare. The inner logic, enforcement mechanisms, and practical outcomes of antitrust provisions are all intrinsically contradictory to the natural dynamic course of market functioning.

In Dr. De Leon’s challenging thesis, this mistrust of the market lies at the root of antitrust policy, giving rise always to a preference towards ‘predicting’ the result of impersonal market forces rather than interpreting the entrepreneurial behaviour which creates those forces. And it is in Latin America that he finds the powerful evidence he needs to support his case. From the formative years of Latin American economic institutions, during the Spanish Empire, economic regulations – far from being driven by the pursuit of promoting free trade and economic freedom – have been conceived, enacted and implemented in the context of deeply anti-market public policies, trade mercantilism and government dirigisme. The so-called “neoliberal” revolution of the 1990s triggered by the Washington Consensus did not really change the interventionist innuendo of these policies, but merely restated the social welfare goal to be achieved: the pursuit of economic efficiency. Dr. De Leon presents his case against the assumption that consumer welfare orientated policies such as antitrust do really promote entrepreneurship and market goals. Paradoxically, antitrust enforcement has undermined the transparency of market institutions, in the name of promoting market competition.

El derecho de la competencia, al que los norteamericanos llaman derecho antimonopolístico (en inglés Antitrust Law), puede describirse como el conjunto de normas jurídicas que pretenden regular el poder actual o potencial de las empresas sobre un determinado mercado, en aras del interés público. En la práctica el derecho de la competencia prohíbe la realización de prácticas restrictivas de la competencia, la adquisición de una posición de dominio en el mercado a través de la realización de dichas prácticas y el abuso de la posición dominante.

El presente documento contiene una aproximación al análisis de una de las premisas fundamentales de esta disciplina, según la cual, los mercados en competencia producen mayores beneficios a la sociedad que los mercados con estructuras monopólicas. Para el efecto, analizaremos los orígenes, evolución y finalidad del derecho de la competencia, las dificultades prácticas que deben enfrentar las autoridades de la competencia específicamente las latinoamericanas y también las críticas que se han formulado en contra de las normas que desarrollan el derecho de la competencia. Para tal efecto se exponen los siguientes temas: 1) Orígenes y evolución del derecho de la competencia en Estados Unidos de América, la Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe. 2) Aspectos económicos del derecho de la competencia. 3) Los mercados competitivos y los mercados monopólicos. 4) Críticas al derecho de la competencia. 5) Los retos para las autoridades de la competencia latinoamericanas.

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Antitrust law can be described as the set of legal rules that regulate the current or potential power of the companies on a certain market, on behalf of public interest. In practice, antitrust law prohibits the execution of restrictive competition practices, the acquisition of a dominant position in the market through the accomplishment of these practices and the abuse of the dominant position.

This document is an approach to the analysis of one of the fundamental premises of this discipline, which states that the markets in competition produce greater benefits to society than the markets with monopolistic structures. In this order, we will analyze the origins, evolution and purpose of the Antitrust Law, the practical difficulties that the competition authorities must face particularly the Latin American authorities, and also the criticisms that have been formulated against the laws that develop Antitrust. For this is purpose the following subjects are exposed: 1) Origins and evolution of the Antitrust Law in the United States of America, the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean. 2) Economic Aspects of the Antitrust Law. 3) Competitive markets and monopolistic markets. 4) Criticisms to the Antitrust Law. 5) The challenges for the Latin American competition authorities.

The study first takes a normative perspective and examines the various goals that have been advanced by competition law literature on the objectives of EU competition law. A critical analysis of this literature shows the weaknesses of an economic welfare approach and the difficulties, as well as some normative objections, to incorporating non-welfare goals in the implementation of EU competition law. The normative perspective is then followed by an analysis of positive EU competition law arriving to the conclusion that the case law of the EU Courts is ambiguous as to the existence of a hierarchy of objectives in EU competition law and that the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty opens the door to a more holistic competition law, in congruent co-existence with the other Treaty provisions and policies instituted by the EU Treaties. The final part criticizes the literature on the goals of EU competition law for its monotonous emphasis on goals. I argue that the choice of a general objective as an enforcement criterion tells us little about whether any particular institution, for example the adjudicative process, should be charged with implementing that criterion. Comparative institutional analysis emphasizes the connections between issues of institutional choice and goals. The question of goals should follow and not precede that of institutional choice. Institutional choice should, however, be comparative and not proceed to choosing an institution without a proper analysis of the weaknesses of the alternative institutions on offer. The conceptualization of the role of courts, and other institutions in a holistic competition law, using comparative institutional analysis, is one of the major challenges faced by EU competition law, and new competition law regimes, in the future.

The present article aims to outline the latest developments of Competition Law and Policy in Brazil. The so-called Brazilian Competition Policy System has become increasingly more active over the past decade. Since the beginning of the 2000s, a commodities boom has fueled strong growth and lowered poverty across Latin America. Once hobbled with high inflation and highly susceptible to worldwide crises, Brazil now has wide foreign reserves and a rousing consumer market. Furthermore, Brazil achieved an investment grade status for its sovereign debt in 2008 and 2009.

The BCPS is internationally recognized for creative initiatives to further increment the effectiveness of their enforcement activities, including a strong and creative cartel enforcement program and efforts to streamline merger review procedures.

This article aims to provide a brief perspective and commentary on such developments. In order to do so, it will focus on the following topics: (a) the foundations of competition policy in Brazil; (b) an overview of the current Brazilian Competition Policy System; and (c) the enactment of the new legislation and its main changes.

Lo scritto affronta la problematica del sindacato giurisdizionale sui
provvedimenti dell’Antitrust cercando di ricavare una soluzione di sintesi
dal sistema. Inquadramento costituzionale delle Autorità indipendenti,
(limiti della) giurisdizione di legittimità e garanzia dell’equo processo
vengono letti in controluce con i chiarimenti recentemente forniti dalla
sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 13 del 2019 sulla natura e sulle
modalità di funzionamento dell’AGCM. Ricostruita l’evoluzione
registratasi sul problema del sindacato giurisdizionale sui provvedimenti
dell’Antitrust, dalla sua genesi all’entrata in vigore dell’art. 7 d. lgs. n.
3/2017, si suggerisce dunque un possibile criterio di bilanciamento tra
full jurisdiction ed effettività del diritto antitrust. In particolare, si
propone di valorizzare la presunzione di innocenza di cui all’art. 6, § 2
CEDU quale parametro di costituzionalità interposto in grado di
conformare l’interpretazione (dell’art. 7 d. lgs. n. 3/2017 e) dell’art. 15,
comma 1 legge n. 287/1990. In questa prospettiva, il Giudice
amministrativo dovrebbe dunque accogliere la censura di violazione o
falsa applicazione di legge in tutti quei i casi in cui l’Autorità, specie con
riferimento all’attività di applicazione della norma contestualizzata al
caso concreto, non abbia adeguatamente esaminato, nel provvedimento
finale, le difese “attendibili” (in difetto di prove o elementi indiziari
gravi, precisi e concordanti in grado di confortare l’esistenza
dell’illecito) o “maggiormente attendibili” (in presenza di un simile
corredo probatorio) dedotte dalla parte interessata in sede
procedimentale.

Brazil is currently discussing the introduction of a nationwide Fixed Book Price (" FBP ") policy, thus providing context for a discussion of its welfare benefits. There is a rift between the reasons for implementing FBP regimes, and those used to scru‐ tinize them. In order for the debate surrounding the pros and cons of implementing FBP regimes to become more productive, one must investigate the links between the reasons for designing and enforcing such policies, on one side, and standard antitrust analysis, on the other. There are many interesting arguments at the table that both corroborate and compromise the case for an FPB policy. However, throughout history, these policies have experimented cognizable trends. The objec‐ tive FBP regimes pursue and their design have changed subtly, yet relevantly throughout history. In our view, the current academic and public policy debate sur‐ rounding FBP regimes, in both countries considering adopting or revoking them, would benefit from an enhanced awareness of these trends and their policy implica‐ tions. Ultimately, so would the antitrust analysis of these policies. We argue that a better grasp of these trends could potentially result in a more sober examination of the welfare risks associated with FBP policies.

Parity clauses, also known as most-favoured-nation clauses, are designed to address the hold-up problem in vertical relations and facilitate investment and efficiencies by the downstream platform. However, when designed too broadly, they have the potential of undermining the dynamics of competition and reducing consumer welfare. This paper explores the welfare effects of parity clauses and reflects on the level of intervention they may call for. It reviews the possible theories of harm associated with parity clauses and draws a dividing line between the effects generated by narrow and wide parity.

Full paper available to download on: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441056.2016.1148870

A oposição entre a defesa da concorrência e os direitos de propriedade intelectual, ou a abstrata complementariedade entre essas normas jurídicas, não são suficientes para resolver os desafios da interface entre esses ramos do Direito. Entende-se que esses desafios devem ser avaliados em setores específicos e em um determinado ordenamento jurídico. O objetivo deste artigo é investigar como o Direito da Concorrência da União Europeia tem sido aplicado para punir comportamentos abusivos de empresas detentoras de direitos de propriedade intelectual. A indústria farmacêutica foi selecionada para ser analisada, sobretudo, por causa da recorrente instrumentalização das patentes para excluir a entrada de genéricos no mercado. Realizouse levantamento dos principais julgados de órgãos europeus de defesa da concorrência, com intuito de avaliar as suas contribuições na proteção da inovação. Constatou-se que o modelo europeu consolidou a importância das autoridades de defesa da concorrência em casos envolvendo direitos de propriedade intelectual. Palavras-chave: Direito da Concorrência da União Europeia; direito econômico; propriedade intelectual; proteção da inovação; indústria farmacêutica.

El presente artículo tiene por objeto la revisión y descripción del panorama doctrinal, legislativo, precedentual y casuístico de una de las modalidades de prácticas anticompetitivas, cual es la colusión en compras públicas, y su más importante tendencia actual: la participación accionarial horizontal. De igual forma, se concluye el carácter atípico y casi embrionario del derecho de competencia en América Latina y como ello repercute en la represión a las prácticas anticompetitivas en la contratación pública.

Competition policies have failed to reach mainstream status among economic policies, particularly in developing countries. The policy is mistrusted, in no small scale due to the lack of competition metrics. We contend that lack of metrics follows a lack of theoretical consistency on what the policy actually seeks. In this essay, we examine how the theoretical wellsprings of antitrust theory have rendered the policy unable to build stable legal doctrines, and to be executed consistently, which is reflected in no small part, in the lack of adequate metrics with which to measure policy performance. We also propose looking into innovation metrics and government barriers as a source of assessment of competition policy in the market, in place of the current emphasis on market structure and alleged foreclosing effect of business barriers.

Building an effective private competition law enforcement system is no doubt dependent on its relationship with public competition law enforcement. The frailty of this relationship becomes particularly clear in the question of whether claimants should be granted access to self-incriminating statements provided by the members of a cartel in the leniency programme. Although recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union have favoured access to leniency statements, the Directive 2014/104/EU denies such access. This choice of denying access appears to be inconsistent with the goal pursued by the Directive that aims to provide full compensation to victims of cartels. This article discusses the problems relating to this choice and proposes a solution for improvement.

The paper explores how EU competition law has integrated so far the concept of brands in different areas of enforcement. Although EU competition law has engaged in multiple instances with branding and product differentiation, brands do not yet constitute an operational concept in EU competition law. This is due to an important uncertainty as to the normative choices that need to be made with regard to the relation between brands and the formation of consumer preferences. The concerns raised by retailer power and the development of private labels also indicate that the existing economic theory on product differentiation may not also provide a complete picture on the effects of brands on the competitive process and ultimately on consumers. Competition law will also need to tackle the issues raised by the development of ‘social branding’ and the dialogic interaction between brand owners and consumers in the constitution of their brand identity.