493029
JOS0010.1177/1440783313493029Journal of SociologyNasir: The September 11 generation
2013
Article
The September 11
generation, hip-hop
and human rights
Journal of Sociology
2015, Vol. 51(4) 1039–1051
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1440783313493029
jos.sagepub.com
Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir
Nanyang Technological University
Abstract
This article examines the global human rights activism of young Muslims through their participation
in hip-hop culture. The increased awareness of their Muslim identity in the post-September 11
era inadvertently influences and permeates the consumption of popular youth culture. The article
contends that there is an attempt by the hip-hop ummah to draw from the struggles of the African
American experience to articulate the human rights concerns facing respective communities.
The right to appropriate hip-hop as a means to express their predicaments also brings its young
practitioners into conflict with moral entrepreneurs who act as gatekeepers to the religion.
However, the human rights activism of young Muslims is bridging the seemingly irreconcilable gap
between hip-hop and piety, serving not only as an important framework of social identity but also
providing the space to forge generational and transnational solidarities.
Keywords
generation, hip-hop, human rights, Muslim youth, popular culture
In comparison to fields such as law, philosophy and theology, sociology’s contribution to
the field of human rights can be argued to be largely indirect and negative. The discipline’s attention has been focused more on ‘the study of social citizenship in specific
(capitalist) societies than with the study of human rights as a normative framework for
international political action’, and this is peculiar given much sociological interest in the
study of globalization (Turner, 2002: 602). After all, human rights can be aptly scrutinized through the lens of globalization to delineate the category of ‘humanity’ (Robertson,
1992). In this article, I propose that examining the sphere of popular culture enables
sociologists to observe the vibrant human rights activism in both a transnational and
generational framework.
Corresponding author:
Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive HSS-05-25, Singapore,
639798, Singapore.
Email:
[email protected]
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Two prevailing trends within the scholarly community make the exploration of the
relationship between human rights and hip-hop a timely one. First, there has been much
debate on whether Islam is capable of accommodating and advancing human rights
(Mayer, 1995; Sachedina, 2009). In this discussion, scholars have turned to the writings
of both classical Islamic thinkers and contemporary reformers, noting the role of Islam
throughout history in human rights advocacy. Second, there has been burgeoning work
of late on the relationship between popular music and human rights (Fischlin and Heble,
2003; Peddie, 2011). Studies have accentuated the social movements and protest traditions within popular music. These works demonstrate popular music’s response to matters of human rights. Hence it is not far-fetched to examine the hip-hop activism of
young Muslims in urban settings and how the latter are operationalizing these ideals in
the realms of everyday life.
Youth participation in the hip-hop genre calls for particular attention as hip-hop culture among youth has often been utilized as a sphere of contestation for government
institutions, political parties, media and religious groups to claim moral guardianship
over their societies against the corrupting influences of the youth. This is understandable,
given that hip-hop was born in the age of post-industrial malaise. Hip-hop originally
refers to an African American urban youth culture with its origins in the South Bronx of
New York and manifests itself in the form of rapping, graffiti, a particular way of dress
and so forth. The hip-hop generation has been defined as ‘those young African Americans
born between 1965 and 1984 who came of age in the eighties and nineties and … share
a specific set of values and attitudes’ (Kitwana, 2002: 4). Kitwana delineated six major
driving forces behind the hip-hop generation: ‘the visibility of black youth in popular
culture, globalisation, the persistent nature of segregation, public policy surrounding the
criminal justice system, media representations of black youth, and the general quality of
life within the hip-hop community’. Since the nascence of the genre in the streets of the
Bronx, hip-hop culture has been harnessed as a powerful tool of social critique. Today,
hip-hop continues to be one of the most common expressions of youth culture; even
being touted as the ‘“Black folks” CNN’ (according to a rapper from Public Enemy,
quoted in Gilyard, 2008: 98). Such expressions attest to the role of hip-hop music in
representing a fragment of social reality, and also serve as a response to the conventional
media’s distorted portrayals of these groups.
The universal appeal of hip-hop largely stems from its ability to give a voice to those
who are at the margins of society and to offer a form of social critique on issues such as
unemployment and lack of attention given to the youth. Todd Boyd postulates that,
despite its African American origins, hip-hop can be the vehicle for the rest of America
to assimilate with black culture (Boyd, 2004: 12). In fact, Boyd’s predictions may be
considered rather modest. As I will argue later in this article, even beyond the American
context, Muslim youth can assimilate with black culture when they perceive their predicament to be similar to that of black people in America. Such homological imagination
can be seen in the way hip-hop is commonly appropriated by these urban minority youth
to advance human rights (Kamaludeen, 2012).
This article is necessarily an exegesis of the culture and consciousness of a particular generation of Muslims, termed the September 11 generation (Edmunds and Turner,
2005). As Karl Mannheim (1952) proposes, members of a generation galvanize
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themselves by the experience of historical events from similar vantage points, and a
particular generation can influence society by challenging conventional norms as well
as offering new cultural visions when faced with traumatic experiences. Edmunds and
Turner (2005) argue that while generations identify themselves in terms of historical
and cultural traumas, these are produced by a diversity of social processes by members of national, social or global groups. They contend that generations act strategically to bring about change and shift from being a passive age cohort to a self-conscious
one when they utilize their economic, political and educational circumstances to innovate in the cultural, intellectual and political spheres (Edmunds and Turner, 2005:
562). Young Muslims of the present generation find themselves increasingly constructed as a transnationalized category of risk and danger and at the same time subjected to greater securitization (Humphrey, 2010). Therefore, it is important to
examine the Muslim youth as a unique generation in itself. This offers a broader
perspective to their status and identity that goes beyond a nation-state narrative,
allowing us to see connectivity on a global platform.
Heightened Islamophobia and ethnic profiling in the post-September 11 era have led
to a myriad practical implications for Muslim youth (Poynting and Mason, 2008). Youth
respondents frequently lamented about how their Muslim identity and ethnic appearance
can affect their life chances. Globalization plays a great part in generating the apprehension of the larger society towards Muslim migrants. Documenting his findings on
Australian youth, Moran posits that the conflation of concepts such as ‘the illegal
migrant’ and ‘Muslim’ as ‘one symbolic threat to the nation’ arises even among those
who are not against migrants of other social groups (Moran, 2005). Among the reasons
his interviewees cited are the perceived incompatibilities with Christianity, the Muslims’
alleged lack of loyalty, as well as the Muslims’ desire to change Australian society and
not leave it as it is. Although Moran’s work is specific to Australia, similar tensions exist
in global cities with a significant presence of Muslim migrants. My research also uncovered a significant number of youth going by pseudo-English names as they are hesitant
to publicly declare themselves as Muslims. Hence, it is common for one to encounter
‘Bob’, the Iraqi electrical appliances manager or ‘Michael’, the Indonesian convenience
store owner. Only when relations had gone beyond the professional, and upon learning
that the researcher is Muslim, did they reveal their real identities. Some youth also
changed their names and residential addresses in their job applications in order to disguise their Muslim identity. When probed, they talked about their discomfort at being
labelled a terrorist. In addition to the everyday discrimination that these Muslim youth
had been experiencing, such manipulations of identities had caused the September 11
event to be entrenched in the consciousness of the Muslim youth in an unprecedented
way. Although the manner in which these dynamics unfold may vary for Muslim youth
in different parts of the world, a large part of their responses can be collectively understood as a form of activism for their basic rights.
Human rights in hip-hop
Hip-hop is the best way to grasp our present and future. Martin Luther King’s ‘I Have a Dream’
speech is less important today than DMX’s ‘It’s Dark and Hell Is Hot’. (Boyd, 2004: 12)
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Issues of racism, rights and Islam form the cornerstone of Muslim hip-hop music
(Gazzah, 2008; Solomon, 2005). Hip-hop’s social commentary and its antagonistic style
offer ideal platforms for articulating public misconceptions of Islam as well as the everyday injustice that Muslims face locally or globally.
These causes manifest in the music of many Muslim hip-hop activists all over the
world. In an interview, Australia’s Muslim hip-hop group, the Brothahood talked about
their strong Muslim identity amidst their detachment from both traditional culture and
an ultra-misogynistic brand of hip-hop. The group deploys their music as an attempt
‘to break down stereotypes and barriers that we face as Muslims’.1 In addition to
expressing their everyday religiosity, the Brothahood exert their rights to citizenship in
the light of the challenges they face in the post-September 11 era. Through tracks such
as ‘The Silent Truth’, they articulate issues related to migration, xenophobia, media
prejudice, Islamophobia and the exclusionary treatment that Muslims experience under
the rubric of national security. As Miguel d’Souza (quoted in Maxwell, 2003: 115)
perceptively puts it:
in the Australian context, hip-hop’s movement has come out of the ranks of suburban and
migrant youth whose dissatisfaction with the isolation of suburban living, unemployment,
racism and the Anglo-Saxon dominance of Australian culture has caused them to identify with
similar sentiments coming from African-American rap.
Nonetheless, this is not unique to the Australian landscape as human rights activism
through hip-hop has been an important arena for anti-Islamophobic mobilization for
Muslims in other parts of the world. In his study on England’s Fun-Da-Mental and
France’s IAM, Ted Swedenburg (2002: 16) states:
in both countries Muslims are attempting to construct cultural, social and political spaces for
themselves as ethnic groups (of sorts), and are massively involved in anti-racist mobilizations
against white supremacy. Hip-hop activism has been an important arena for anti-Islamophobic
mobilization for both French and British Muslims.
Elsewhere, he says that: ‘Fun-Da-Mental’s expressions of pride in Islam appealed to
Muslim youth who had been raised on British popular culture yet also felt wounded by
British Islamophobia’ (Swedenburg, 2001: 58).
Not merely verbal mujahidin (Alim, 2006), Muslim hip-hop groups also participate in operationalizing Islam. The Brothahood, for example, performed in Free Gaza
benefit concerts in offering their support to the Palestinian cause. On top of performing for the first time a specially composed track called ‘Act on It’, all funds raised on
the night were donated to the Palestinians. To be sure, the hip-hop activism of some
Muslim hip-hop groups goes beyond advancing the issue of human rights within the
Muslim community. They present a global message and cosmopolitan stance that
would occasionally be embodied in their performance such as through the manner that
they dress. In a 2008 Islamic concert in Sydney, one of the singers from the Brothahood
came up on stage wearing a ‘Free Burma’ t-shirt, jeans, zikr beads and a skullcap.2
The Australian Human Rights Commission has also recognized the group’s social
activism.3
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Hip-hop’s popularity among non-Anglo migrants globally was in large part to do
with their feelings of alienation and the oppositional image embodied in the genre
(Bennett, 2000). However, this also applies to the non-migrant Muslim youth community. While specific urban multicultural contexts produce locally promulgated forms of
hip-hop culture, hip-hop enables its practitioners to claim social solidarity with a
global hip-hop ummah as they participate actively in addressing the concerns of
Muslims post-September 11.
Hip-hop as poetic jihad
The route to human rights activism through hip-hop for young Muslims is marked by
great challenges that are first played out at the intra-religious level. Muslim hip-hop
practitioners looking to voice their predicament through the genre inevitably find themselves getting into conflict with the gatekeepers of religious dogma. Religious orientations and generational differences also add to the dynamic conversations concerning
hip-hop among Muslim youth.
Hip-hop culture has a tenuous relationship with Islam at a fundamental level. The
most important question concerns the permissibility of music in Islam. The religious
fatwa on the status of music in Islam ranges from a total prohibition of music, to allowing
musical instruments as long as the song complies with Islamic precepts such as the ruling
against uttering profanities.4 The form of music that is in line with the religious rulings
of many Islamic scholars would be nasheed. Nasheed is an Islamic-oriented form traditionally sung acapella in tandem with only basic percussion. The new wave of nasheed
singers, however, has included a diverse range of instruments and has opted to integrate
hip-hop music to advance their craft and this has caused some debates within the Muslim
community.
At an intermediate level, Muslim youth involvement in hip-hop still comes as a challenge to the religious authorities that do not see the elements present in hip-hop as being
in line with Islamic values. Hip-hop is largely seen as a sign of western moral decadence
and a state of normlessness. A number of social critics have also criticized what they see
as a heavy emphasis on ‘bling bling’ (materialism) and ‘bagging honeys’ (sexual relations with beautiful women) in hip-hop music and culture, as hip-hop’s concern with
social causes such as rights and justice, fades into the background. These factors make
the fusion of Islam and hip-hop all the more controversial.
This issue of compatibility of values is also evident when we examine the performativity of hip-hop culture among contemporary young Muslims. One sphere of contention
pertains to the management of the body.
Our deen is not meant to be rocked! … I see these so-called Muslim sistas wearing a hijab and
then a boostier, or a hijab with their belly-button sticking out. You don’t put on a hijab and try
to rock it! Or these brothers wearing Allah tattoos, or big medallions with Allah’s name – Allah
is not to be bling-blinged! (Banjoko, quoted in Aidi, 2004: 37)
The notion of bodily discipline is a strong feature of Muslim and Islamic hip-hop in
contemporary society. Its practitioners strive to conform to a stricter body regimen that
involves performing with less aggressive gyrations during a gig or pulling a ‘hand on a
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crotch move’, dressing modestly with less likelihood of being ‘blinged-blinged’, avoiding tattoos or taking a shirt off, among others. As the ‘Muslim body’ is constructed as a
site of moral judgement, Muslim hip-hop activists avoid the controversial performative
aspects of hip-hop as a way of responding to the disciplining of the body that is embodied
in traditional ‘Islamic’ music.
Although the scope of this article does not allow the author to delve into the topic in
any length, it can be seen that the concepts of ‘Muslim hip-hop’ and ‘Islamic hip-hop’ are
central to the contestations within the hip-hop ummah. Put simply, the latter is used in an
attempt by Muslim hip-hoppers to reconcile themselves with Islamic religious requirements in music. Islamic hip-hop may restrict the types of musical instruments used,
generally does not employ expletives and frequently refers to issues of doctrinal import.
In this way, these hip-hop activists ‘Islamize’ their music and performance, driven by
their belief that hip-hop can be compatible with Islamic convictions as it is merely a
vehicle for self-expression.
While it is essential to take note of these contestations, they do not in any way diminish
the increasing trend of ‘hip-hop activism’ among the September 11 generation as a collective. As a case in point, Mushaben (2008) points to the development of Pop-Islam in Berlin,
spawned in Arabia around the turn of the new millennium, citing the increase in the influence of charismatic imams and the impact of Islamic satellite television in creating idols
and entertainment celebrities. This has created a ‘young, chic and cool’ Islam among marginalized Muslim youth who are deprived of basic rights of citizenship and access to
resources in their countries of birth. Although the elders still hold the reins of power by
which the community is governed, they are increasingly challenged by a more educated
youth population. It is observed that more youthful religious imams (Islamic clerics) or
ustazs (Islamic teachers) are beginning to take the helm of various mosques. Mushaben
posits that tensions within the Muslim community centring on generational gaps had
already appeared pre-September 11. This younger generation speaks the language of their
host country, which many of their migrant predecessors struggle with, and reaches out to
the larger non-Muslim population through dialogue and sports. It has been documented
that the urban Muslim youth see themselves as ‘genuine Berliners’ and do not want to be
restrained and pigeon-holed in an insular homogeneous social group (Mushaben, 2008:
521). With the discourse of human rights having taken root in popular culture in the West,
young Muslims view their participation as a way of integrating into mainstream society.
The internet then becomes a powerful medium in which these battles are fought. The
growing role of the cyberspace in the everyday lives of young people, who theoretically
have the freedom of space and place in the internet, has thrown into disarray the efficacy of
state regulation of conventional media such as the television. Although it is precisely this
fear of unknown places and spaces that has been driving states towards regulating the internet space, attempts to curtail the autonomy of the youth are all the more problematic given
the nature of the internet as both ‘global’ and cutting across ‘national boundaries’ (France,
2007: 123). Gary Bunt asserts that a primary role of the internet is to carry on the dialogue
where the traditional sources stop. In addition, these globalized respondents in the Digital
Age also discuss their participation and the salience of the media in their lives, leading to an
unprecedented awareness of their individual and collective relationships with the different
forms of media available. In the context of global cities, ‘the application of the internet is
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having an overarching transformational effect on how Muslims practice Islam, how forms
of Islam are represented in the wider world, and how Muslim societies perceive themselves
and their peers’ (Bunt 2009: 3). Hence, Muslim youth living in urban cosmopolitan cities
who have closed the digital divide play a crucial role in advancing the rights of their diasporic
communities through hip-hop.
These vibrant conversations lead to the global rise of a social group whom I call the
‘poetic jihadis’. Whether the outcome is ‘Muslim hip-hop’ or ‘Islamic hip-hop’ they fuse
hip-hop with Islamic symbolism in an attempt to integrate two seemingly conflicting
cultures. Maintaining their Muslim identity, poetic jihadis defy both the reverence for
misogynistic themes in hip-hop and the traditional nature of Islamic music such as the
nasheed, while incorporating a heavy dose of social reality.
If Islam’s sole interest is the welfare of mankind, then Islam is the strongest advocate of human
rights anywhere on Earth.… It’s about speaking out against oppression wherever you can. If that’s
gonna be in Bosnia or Kosovo or Chechnya or places where Muslims are being persecuted; or if
it’s gonna be in Sierra Leone or Colombia – you know, if people’s basic human rights are being
abused and violated, then Islam has an interest in speaking out against it, because we’re charged
to be the leaders of humanity. (Mos Def, interview with Ali Asadullah in Beliefnet.com)5
As Muslim hip-hopper Mos Def states above, his music, while not devotional in the
conventional sense, is driven by Islamic beliefs such as the need to respect and protect
the basic rights of others, and speak out against cruelty and oppression as God’s vicegerent on earth. Muslim hip-hoppers like Mos Def consider their Islamic identity as a
mandate to push for issues of social justice through socially conscious hip-hop.
The notion of poetry in the term ‘poetic jihadis’ is not coincidental. Notwithstanding
the strong criticisms on hip-hop’s compatibility with Islam that are advanced by the
gatekeepers of the religion, Muslim hip-hoppers tend to couch their craft within the
rubric of the Islamic tradition. Suad recounts how poetry holds an exalted place in preIslamic Arabia and confers on those who master it both social status and symbolic power.
This tradition found continuity in the Qur’an, which is generally seen by Muslims as a
text of superior linguistic pedigree. Seeking to emulate the Prophet, who is regarded as
endowed with the tools that are deemed most appropriate in engaging his audiences, hiphoppers utilized rhymes and idioms of Islamic symbolism to engage the youth of today.
As one prominent former hip-hopper, Napoleon, puts it: ‘Moses was sent with magic,
Jesus with medicine, and Muhammad with poetry’ (2007: 130). Seen in this light, the
poetic jihadis see themselves as progeny of the ‘Muhammadan mission’ as they appropriate hip-hop to galvanize the concerns of urban minority Muslim youth living as part
of the September 11 generation. In addition, the incorporation of the elements of nasheed
into hip-hop has facilitated some Muslim youth, who had considered music as haram and
un-Islamic, to take a more sympathetic view of Muslim hip-hop groups.
Muslims as the new blacks: from civil rights to human rights
Your problems will never be fully solved until and unless ours is solved. You will never be fully
respected as free human beings until and unless we are also recognized and treated as human
beings. Our problem is your problem. It is not a Negro problem, nor an American problem. This
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is a world problem; a problem for humanity. It is not a problem of civil rights but a problem of
human rights. (Malcolm X, ‘Appeal to African Heads of State’, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1964,
emphasis added)
As the voice of the poetic jihadis seems to echo much of the African American hip-hop
lexicon, it is imperative to examine the deeper impetus for this trend. The consumption
of hip-hop culture by urban minority Muslim youth gives rise to a form of homological
imagination (Kamaludeen, 2012) that there exists much common lived experience with
black people in America. This is taking place as young Muslims are increasingly beginning to reinterpret their everyday predicaments not so much as a problem of civil rights
as one of human rights. This is part of a larger development that also saw civil rights
groups reframing their struggle as one of human rights. Kitwana (2005: 11) contends
that, at the rate in which the youth are absorbing hip-hop culture globally, ‘these movements may be the catalysts necessary to jump-start an international human rights movement in this generation, a movement with the potential to parallel if not surpass
yesterday’s civil rights successes’. Groups saw the struggle for civil rights as inherently
limiting, as citizens are left vulnerable to the state’s definition of its peoples, while a shift
to human rights is deemed to be liberating as it starts from the premise that an individual
possess basic rights (Ards, 2004: 321). This shift also allows criticisms to be
internationalized.
Through hip-hop, the struggle for human rights among young Muslims of the
September 11 generation is conflated with the symbolic status of the civil rights movements and the struggle of black people in America. Much of Muslim hip-hop has been
influenced by the oratorical style of Malcolm X, an eminent civil rights leader and Islamic
activist. His ‘jihad of words’, which he successfully employed as a compelling political
and religious strategy (Turner, 2003) during his time, is reborn in today’s Muslim hip-hop
vernacular, with many hip-hop tracks evoking his name and alluding to his speeches. A
study by Turner (2006) deals with male Muslim youth who are influenced by rap music.
The author dubbed hip-hop as North America’s foremost youth culture and shows how the
youth are converting to Islam as a result of hip-hop’s long association with Islam. Young
Muslims also talk about how Muslim rappers such as Common, Talib Kweli, Hitek, the
Roots and Wu Tang Clan are popular role models for the spiritually and politically conscious black youth. Part of the influence of Muslim rappers such as Mos Def, with his
references to piety in his lyrics ‘Allah, the Lord of the worlds’, and Muslim rapper Nas
singing ‘Been blessed with Allah’s vision, strength and beauty’, is that it lends itself to a
‘reconstruction of Black masculinity’ that the youth find appealing. Black Muslim youth’s
drawing on the image of Malcolm X as a galvanizing tool must be emphasized. Turner
underlines Malcolm X’s contribution to hip-hop culture and his influence on the conversion of black youth to mainstream Islam. The cooption of his image as part of popular
culture magnified his influence. Not unlike Che Guevera, we see the symbol of Malcolm
X constantly being evoked as an inspirational figure who speaks truth to power. And this
appropriation is occurring at a time when the youth is besieged by information through the
print and digital media, more than at any other point in history. According to Turner, rap
music transcends the ‘oppositional subcultural music’ stereotype for these youth, who
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seek to make sense of ‘the ultimate spiritual and political concerns in their lives and their
identities are paradigms for global Muslim youth’ (Turner, 2006: 41).
It is therefore important not to understand the above trend as a mere mimicking of
black culture from America. Hip-hop has provided urban Muslim minority youth with a
medium to access the African American experience. It has afforded young Muslims ‘a
cultural vocabulary and historical experience with which to bond and from which to
draw elements for local repertoires of resistance’ (Aidi, 2004: 119). Global Muslim hiphop culture has to be seen both as a social movement that aims to uphold the tenets of
multicultural living and an endeavour to represent a ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ Islam. This is
achieved in hip-hop through the infusion of elements of nasheed and Islamic devotional
music, coupled with the negation of the Nation of Islam/Five Percenter influences in
early Muslim hip-hop music. Hence, what started off as predominantly a culture that
challenges the supremacy of the white man over the black male is repackaged as a global
movement for Muslim youth of the September 11 generation to express their sentiments.
Globalization, the prominence of black youth in popular culture and the media depictions
especially of young black males reverberate with the sense of marginalization felt by
young Muslims. These images are further reinforced by what is perceived as a prejudiced
criminal justice system and the concerns about living in an age of Islamophobia. Social
commentators have seen the glamorizing of the hip-hop lifestyle and the exposure given
to black music in the MTV generation as the reasons for the adoption of black culture
among young Muslims.
Hip-hop as practised by young Muslims takes on multifarious ‘glocalized’ forms that
illuminate their local habitus. Bennett (2000) advocates that the process of globalization
will not in fact impose homogeneity but rather will emphasize and foster the local.
Bennett argues that their practices assume meaning and social, cultural or structural significance, not solely by virtue of their engagement with dominant social structures such
as the state, but by their embeddedness in local politics and social relations. He contends
that social actors engage critically with popular music but that they do so principally in
the context of the ‘local’. This is defined throughout the text not as a demarcated physical
space but rather as a set of discourses. The specific discursive practices through which
the local is called into being are, Bennett asserts, intimately associated with the production and consumption of popular music. Those musical texts that originate elsewhere are
routinely read through sensibilities that emerge out of a specific understanding of place.
These particular sensibilities are themselves, however, heavily influenced by exposure to
musical texts that originate elsewhere.
Although the African American hip-hop scene has held much clout over the genre, the
nodes of cultural influence in Muslim hip-hop do not emanate from any particular center.
Instead, they are dispersed across the hip-hop ummah and are made distinct as a consequence of attempts by hip-hop practitioners to glocalize their music, adapting it to local
concerns. Diasporic young Muslims in urban settings are not only subjected to official
doctrines of multiculturalism in their host countries but also the socioeconomic status
that is intimately linked to their locality. For instance, Western Sydney, an area with a
significant presence of Muslim migrants, has long been stigmatized as unrefined and is
reputed to be laden with social problems. The accents of these communities are labelled
as ‘woggie’ or ‘westie’ and hold less cultural capital amid a predominantly white
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Christian nation. An amalgamated form of language emerges out of these power relationships. As a diametrically opposed response to conventional decorum, ‘Lebspeak’
(Cameron, 2003) is born among second-generation Lebanese youth by ingesting hip-hop
jargon into their everyday speech. These conversations between hip-hop and local culture lead to the formation of a glocalized jargon using terms like ‘fully sick bro’, ‘awesome, Habib’ (a form of ‘mate’), ‘Yallah’ (let’s go), other than the more colourful
swearing (‘mo-fo’, for example) (Butcher, 2008). The language of hip-hop among
minority migrant young Muslims and their hip-hop activism is inexorably interwoven
with local flavours and draws inspiration from the antagonisms that are reminiscent of
domestic conflicts.
Minority Muslim youth hip-hoppers commonly use terms like ‘outlaws’ and ‘outsiders’ to refer to their perceived estranged social position vis-a-vis the larger mainstream
society. In Germany, diasporic Turkish youth in Berlin (Soysal, 2004) found their voice
amid a limiting discursive space through the landscape of hip-hop that governs their
stories through a ghetto narrative and hip-hop lexicon. The ‘angry street talk’ of Turkish
youth in Berlin fits well with other groups such as London’s Fun’da’mental, America’s
N.W.A. and Paris’s NTM. The use of these terminologies can however be a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, the shared social conditions with the African American
experience might be precisely the factor that gives hip-hop music its appeal to the local
Muslim youth but, on the other, the discursive constraints within the hip-hop vocabulary
necessitates the adoption by Muslim youth of an ‘us versus them’ attitude.
Between the formation of a global Muslim youth hip-hop culture and manifestations
of its glocalized forms, the notion of social justice remains central to Muslim hip-hop
practitioners. It can be surmised that this theme within Muslim hip-hop is likely to thrive
given the social status, real or perceived, of many Muslim minorities. Certain sections
have gone as far as to contend that Muslims are now becoming the most marginalized
members of society, likening their predicament to that of black Americans. According to
one observer, ‘Muslims have then, ironically, become the new “black” with all the associations of cultural alienation, deprivation and danger that come with this position’
(Alexander, 2000: 15).
Conclusion
Young Muslims of the September 11 generation are faced with tough questions over
what it means to be ‘Muslim’ due to the increasing securitization by nation-states and the
focus of the general public on their Muslim minority populations. September 11, as a
global event, has resulted in many young Muslims having to come to terms with their
piety, regardless of whether they claim to be ‘devout’ adherents of the religion. For those
who consider themselves ‘religious’, September 11 presents them with the ultimate challenge of defending their religion as well as religious practices such as fasting during the
month of Ramadhan and performing daily prayers. Nonetheless, even among respondents who concede that they are not ‘practising’ their religion, many find themselves in the
position of having to re-examine their identity amid enhanced scrutiny. Popular youth
culture, hence, often becomes the common arena whereby these acts of piety, in all their
diversity, are performed.
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The manifestation of hip-hop culture among urban minority youth is also an expression of a dialectical relationship between attempts by moral entrepreneurs to manage the
youth through music and the youth’s attempt to advance their human rights activism
through hip-hop. The youth body regimen is constructed as a site of moral judgement,
with policing extended to the body. The performativity of music also tends to be
demonized: the sexual body that is associated with hip-hop music and the violent body
that is associated both with particular dances, and crowds during public performance. In
this regard, performative hip-hop can also be seen as a response to the traditional disciplined bodies of ‘Islamic music’.
Youth dispositions also have to be contextualized to the local field and attempts by
the state, mass media, custodians of religious dogma and the youth themselves, not
only to jostle for moral guardianship but to redraw existing moral boundaries must be
taken into consideration. These practices are not simply the results of dualisms that
illuminate the encounters between structure and agency, but rather highlight the consequence of the youth’s living in a structure. Youth acquire their dispositions, consciously
or unconsciously, from a structural framework. The challenge remains for youth to
reconcile him or herself with the apparently competing social norms. In essence,
Muslim youth have bridged the gap between the seemingly colliding genres of nasheed
and hip-hop, with the notion of jihad, central to their endeavours. It is undeniable that,
for young Muslims, popular culture not only provides important frameworks of social
identity, it also offers the space to form generational and transnational solidarities
revolving around human rights.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
See: http://www.muslimhiphop.com/index.php?p=Stories/11._The_Brothahood_Interview
See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXNNd7VWFmo
See: http://www.humanrights.gov.au/racial_discrimination/partnerships/projects/islamic_spectrum.html
See: http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_LP/ch4s3pre.htm#Singing http://www.
islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=Islamonline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/
FatwaE&cid=1119503544202
See: http://www.beliefnet.com/Entertainment/Music/2001/04/Youre-Gonna-Serve-Somebody.
aspx?p=2
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Author biography
Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Nanyang Technological
University. His current interests include the sociology of religion, popular youth culture and social
theory. Address: School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, 14
Nanyang Drive HSS-05-25 Singapore 639798.
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