Hayahay
Hayahay
Hayahay
LIM, GREGORIO
D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER
WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of
the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Facts: Tobias et al. questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong"
which separates the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan which
previously belonged to only one legislative district.
Tobias et al. have 3 arguments against constitutionality.
1. It contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article
VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution because it has two principal
subjects, namely:
(A) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and
(B) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2. They argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution and that no census was made
to show that the population requirement of a city was met.
3. Tobias et al. state that Section 49 of R.A. 7675 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution.
Issue: Is the law Constitutional?
Ruling: Yes, the law is constitutional.
As to the 1st argument:
The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec, we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should
be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to the 2nd argument:
A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), shows
that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition
of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Now as to the census, the SC ruled that: “The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative
districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.”
FACTS:
Ulpiano Sarmiento and Juanito Arcilla seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
RESOLUTION:
Yes, the appointment of Mison as the Commissioner of Customs is
constitutional.
Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These 4 groups are:
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated
by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the
intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in
Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-
ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of
such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is
so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should
be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that
the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments
that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining there
Case ni Migs
Evardone VS COMELEC
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by
the Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July
1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the
telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing
process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010) avers that:
FACTS
Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative
during the national and local elections held on May 13, 2013. On May 24,
2013, the COMELEC proclaimed fourteen (14) party-list groups, which
obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and
were thus entitled to one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 and so there were still fifty-eight (58)
available seats for party-list.
Petitioner further argues that the allocation of additional seats did not
conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 and this Court's ruling in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
COMELEC. Consequently, COMELEC seriously erred in computing the
values and interpreting the results in the second round leading to the
invalid and unjust allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters to the
prejudice of other party-list groups such as the petitioner. Petitioners-in-
intervention, ABANTE KA, claims that an incomplete canvass of votes is
illegal and cannot be the basis of a proclamation and here only 110 out of
301 COCs had been canvassed or reported when COMELEC proclaimed
the party-list winners.
RULING:
COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the
remaining uncanvassed election returns will not affect the result of
the elections
In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for
party-list. As of May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and
ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of
July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to 165,784 votes
while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no significant
change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC
had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and
reserving only five buffer seats.
Facts: Imelda Marcos was running for the House of Representatives seat of
the 1st District of Leyte. She originally stated in her Certificate of Candidacy
that she had resided in the 1st district for 7 months.
Montejo, Marcos’s competition, filed a petition to disqualify Marcos
alleging that Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Montejo contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He also avers that
after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there again. Montejo prayed that
"an order be issued declaring Marcos disqualified and cancelling the
certificate of candidacy.
Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". She averred that
she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood" and that “she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.”
The COMELEC 2nd division disqualified Marcos based on (among
other reasons) the entries on her Voter's Registration Record, which shows
7 months, and by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in their Permanent List of
Voters.
The COMELEC also ruled that “the term "residence" has always been
considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.” When Marcos returned
to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
The COMELEC en banc upheld the decision of its 2 nd division,
reversed itself by issuing a Resolution to declare Marcos as Representative
if she got the highest votes then reversed itself again by issuing a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of Marcos be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
Marcos won but could not take her seat because of the Resolution.
Marcos presented the following issues for resolution:
Issues:
1. Was Marcos a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections?
2. Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not Comelec,
assume exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Marcos's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections and hence only the
HRET may question her qualifications?
Ruling:
1. Marcos was a resident, for election purposes.
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES:
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification
for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that
when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually
means only "domicile".
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to
the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
Marcos held various residences for different purposes during the last
four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while Marcos
was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various
reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin
by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives
held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of
Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of Marcos's domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
We are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily
in favor of a conclusion supporting Marcos's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
2. Marcos’s argument that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives, in accordance
with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution, is untenable.
With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does
not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case
under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. With Marcos, not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET
at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Case 3: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
"the Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during
the proceedings of the NBC.
Issue/s:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to
qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties
be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
Ruling:
1. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of
the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In
fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-
22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a
political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or
affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same
for the urban poor.
Table 3.
Distribution
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Party-List
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find
their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as genuine
functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this
underlying premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded
in the Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my dissent to
the entry of major political parties to the party-list system.
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec1 with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the
formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I
regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with
respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of
party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence this
dissent.
To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI,
Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 2
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the
disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented,
and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled through then
Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly registered
political party, organization or group may participate, the role of the
Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-
style" party-list elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a social
justice vehicle, the Court batted for the empowerment of the masses, thus
—
Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic
victory achieved by the marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list
system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list
system is open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors. 3 Buttressing his view, Mr.
Justice Carpio notes that the major political parties also fall within the term
"political parties" in the Definition of Terms in Republic Act 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he holds that the
qualifications of a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the said
law do not specify any financial status or educational requirement, hence, it
is not necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity."5 It is then concluded that major political parties may now
participate in the party-list system.
With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid
grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to the
democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the
text of the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of
the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. In Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to
our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the
party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially
allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission 19 that
major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political
parties20 made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an
accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an
average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average
of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties21 or 42.8% of the total number
of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes
each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-
list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the
remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than
2%.22
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people
at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It
is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this
systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how
the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated
by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to
dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely
suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as
the graveyard of the party-list system.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the
inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to
a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 1 is
unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the
Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the
enabling law, to allow the people’s broadest representation in
Congress,2 the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section. 3
This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system 4 of
representation by allowing different sectors, parties, organizations and
coalitions to win a legislative seat. It diversifies the membership in the
legislature and "gives genuine power to the people." 5 As aforesaid, the
Constitution desires the people’s widest representation in Congress.
On the basis of this formula, the number of party-list seats is not static; it
could add up to a substantial figure depending on the additional number of
legislative districts which Congress may create. Thus, for instance, the
ponencia states that "since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220
district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives," based on the following computation:
220
x .20 = 55
.80
Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the
House of Representatives which may be occupied by party-list
representatives can never exceed fifty (50), because:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list system)
= 50
2%
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list
representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district
representatives.
I see a scenario in the future when, because of the inexorable growth in the
country’s population, Congress should see fit to increase the legislative
district seats to 400. If that happens, there would be a corresponding
adjustment in party-list representation that will translate to 100 party-list
seats, applying the formula in Veterans Federation Party, viz:
400
x .20 = 100
.80
This is not an unlikely scenario. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this
Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th
Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the
Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the
2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have
more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system can never exceed 100%.
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the
party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional
legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the
fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately
respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact,
inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law
from ever being fully operative.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, what then do we use as the norm for a
minimum vote requirement to entitle a political party, sectoral organization
or coalition, to a party-list seat in the House of Representatives?
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1.818%
55 party-list seats
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1%
100 party-list seats
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond
to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of
Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people’s
representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it
would not violate the Constitution.
Time changes and laws change with it.10 And the Constitution ---
must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with
the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from being a petrified rule, a
pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation. 11
Case 4:
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
Facts of the Case:
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
3. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos
who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people,
not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by
enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with
this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
"to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House
of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be
applied according to its express terms. 37
NOTE:
-The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more
law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
-The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives."
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win
in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood
when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature
allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for
the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open
party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so.
Case 5:
5. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 20, 2013
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
COMELEC in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but
primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations using the criteria laid down
by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT); NO
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. NO
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because it merely followed the prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court
(Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT) in disqualifying the petitioners. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC since the
Supreme Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
However, the Supreme Court also emphasized in this case that the
party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator between sectoral and non-
sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections.
Case 7:
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT vs. ISMAEL MATHAY
FACTS:
RESOLUTTION:
Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that "No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase."
No. Petitioner’s retirement gratuity should not be based on the
increased salary. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum which they were prohibited by
the Constitution from receiving during their term of office would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to
do indirectly what cannot be done directly."
The petitioner was unable to receive the increased salary precisely
because of the, constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount
in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason
that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the
service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his
retirement."
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum
after the expiration of his term of office would effectively give him the
benefits of increased compensation to which he was not entitled during his
term, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against increased
compensation of legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI,
Const.) Which was presumably in the mind of Congress when it stated in
Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed shall be in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Case 9:
Philippine Judges Association vs Prado
Facts:
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.
Issue:
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds
that: I. its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; II. it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; (iyong pangatlo equal protection
clause iyong issue kaya di ko na isasama)
Ruling:
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the
Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing
for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith." The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads
as follows:
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the
general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only
be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has
been correctly explained:
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the
effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect
of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed
in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend
it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule
would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of
R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal
service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law.
Issue II: These argument are unacceptable. (ipinasok rin dito iyong
doctrine of separation of powers. Sinabi na conclusive at di pwedeng
tignan iyong enrolled bills, unless iyong matters na malalagay sa mga
journals ng congress. Hindi nagfall sa exception iyong issue)
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under
E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
Case 10:
COMELEC VS JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA
FACTS:
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with
respect to government contracts, statutes take precedence over the public
officers freedom to contract. Here, the primordial question to be resolved is
-- may a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize
a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?
In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the
modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the
appropriate of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters."
COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and
installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for
its VRIS Project.Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation
(PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the
bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the
amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score
and was declared the winning bidder.
ISSUE:
RESOLUTION:
NO.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the
existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such
conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract. Using this as our premise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA's
contention that there is already a perfected contract.
NOTE:
The SC held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom
Environmental Corporation that "the effect of an unqualified acceptance of
the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the
award to the bidder," however, such statement would be inconsequential in
a government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain
conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a
binding contract that would obligate the government in an amount in excess
of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted
to be made.
REMEDY OF PHOTOKINA
Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into
contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and the
officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or
other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if
the transaction had been wholly between private parties." So when the
contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in
excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government
is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case
were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes
personal liability thereunder.63 Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is
unenforceable as to the Government.