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ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T.

LIM, GREGORIO
D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER
WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of
the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Facts: Tobias et al. questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong"
which separates the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan which
previously belonged to only one legislative district.
Tobias et al. have 3 arguments against constitutionality.
1. It contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article
VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution because it has two principal
subjects, namely:
(A) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and
(B) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2. They argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution and that no census was made
to show that the population requirement of a city was met.
3. Tobias et al. state that Section 49 of R.A. 7675 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution.
Issue: Is the law Constitutional?
Ruling: Yes, the law is constitutional.
As to the 1st argument:
The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec, we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should
be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to the 2nd argument:
A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), shows
that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition
of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Now as to the census, the SC ruled that: “The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative
districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.”

As to the 3rd argument:


The said argument borders on the absurd since Tobias et al. overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Tobias et al.s' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to
favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of
the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
in his capacity as Senate President et al.
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-
ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead
and in behalf of the President of the Philippines

Facts: The Senate was conducting an inquiry into the NorthRail


Project and the so called "Gloriagate Scandal" where the President was
allegedly wiretapped regarding “Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential
Election of May 2005”. In line with these inquiries it sent notices to several
officers under the executive branch to appear before the respective
committees.
The President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes". (The EO was probably issued to circumvent the notices
to appear before the committees.)
The order requires some officers of the executive branch to ask
permission from the President before appearing prior to an appearance
before either House of Congress in hearings in aid of legislation. The order
also states that officers shall “not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public to prejudice the public interest.”
Ermita sent Drilon a letter informing him "that officials of the
Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the
NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of
the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not
secured the required consent from the President."
Drilon et al. wanted the order declared unconstitutional. They argue
that E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; E.O.
464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and Ermita et al. have committed grave abuse of discretion when
they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation..
Issue: Is E.O. 464 consititutional?
Ruling: It is partly constititutional.
The portions requiring that department heads of the Executive
Department have the permission of the President before appearing before
an inquiry and the non-disclosure of confidential or classified information
acquired by public officers in their line of duty are valid. The provisions 2 (b)
and 3 are not.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI
of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of
said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a
way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.
For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be
present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress
that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however,
even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an
implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch,
by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily,
there is an implied claim of privilege.

Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion


that the executive branch, either through the President or the heads of
offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the
information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In
fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.
The Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that
executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the
doctrine. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific
categories of information and not to categories of persons.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to
Section 2(b) is invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied (by
means of the letter of Ermita). Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
invalidated.
SECTION 2- (b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by
this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. –
All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure
prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation
of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect
for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By
the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.
For
“[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old
presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings
and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity,
based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.”
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch
could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise,
we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into
the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of
much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

THE POWER OF INQUIRY


Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.
[T]he power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information
possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning,
Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
[H]owever, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or
judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the
inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus
beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not
usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to
avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to
the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of
inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would
be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether
the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that
proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the
inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly
published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional
infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.
Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the
proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the
executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances,
none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the
legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable
violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of
each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may
be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still
recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under
the rubric of "executive privilege."

EXECUTIVE PRIVELEGE vs. THE POWER of INQUIRY


Executive Privelege
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress."
Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-
level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."
The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is
similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements
applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such
exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic
secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy
making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank
expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative
communications.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not,
however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all
instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information
falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt
from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive
officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Sarmiento v. Mison

FACTS:

Ulpiano Sarmiento and Juanito Arcilla seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Mison and Carague, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of


Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE: Is the appointment of Mison as the Commissioner of Customs


constitutional even when such appointment was not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments?

RESOLUTION:
Yes, the appointment of Mison as the Commissioner of Customs is
constitutional.
Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the


Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These 4 groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,


other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose


appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to


appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the


Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated
by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the
intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in
Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other


officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-
ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of
such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is
so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should
be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that
the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments
that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the


Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

While the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is


one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by
law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining there
Case ni Migs

Evardone VS COMELEC

Facts: These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin in en


banc Resolution No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated 20 June 1990 which approved the
recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold
and conduct the signing of the petition for recall of the incumbent Mayor of
Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990
G.R. No. 95063 is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of the respondent COMELEC
nullifying the signing process held on 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar
for the recall of Mayor Evardone of said municipality and en banc
Resolution No. 90-0777 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, on
the basis of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 12 July
1990 in G.R. No. 94010.
Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of
the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the
position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately
after proclamation.

On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and


Noel A. Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for
the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat.

In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC


issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr.
Vedasto B. Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on
14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor
Evardone of the said Municipality.

On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for


prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No.
94010.
On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order (TRO), effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the
signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent
COMELEC's Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May 1990.

On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by
the Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July
1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the
telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing
process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.

In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the


respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern
Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No.
94010. Apelado, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 August
1990, the respondent COMELEC denied said motion holding that

Issue: The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the


constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent
COMELEC on 23 May 1990 by virtue of its powers under the Constitution
and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code). The resolution
embodies the general rules and regulations on the recall of elective
provincial, city and municipal officials.

SC: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution


repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by
Congress. Said Section 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall


provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization operation of
the local units.
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local
government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected
government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case
at bar is premature.

The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010) avers that:

The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government


code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions
of the present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the
amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains
operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the
provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly
irreconciliable with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this
case, Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are
operative. 3

We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that


all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain
operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the
present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code,
the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus—

Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the


mechanism for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly
authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the
process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.

The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of


conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall
be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections,
unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus,
pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it
promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
Case 6

G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA VS COMELEC

FACTS
Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative
during the national and local elections held on May 13, 2013. On May 24,
2013, the COMELEC proclaimed fourteen (14) party-list groups, which
obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and
were thus entitled to one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 and so there were still fifty-eight (58)
available seats for party-list.

Petitioner then contends that COMELEC's allocation of additional seats for


those two-percenters as initial winners greatly prejudiced its interest and
those other parties or organizations as potential winners. It points out that
the proclamation of initial winners with additional seats on the second
round was hasty and premature because at the time the canvassing for
party-list was still ongoing, there were still uncanvassed and untransmitted
results from Mindanao, as well as uncanvassed overseas and local
absentee votes, and the results from special elections in several areas of
the country had yet to be transmitted.

Petitioner further argues that the allocation of additional seats did not
conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 and this Court's ruling in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
COMELEC. Consequently, COMELEC seriously erred in computing the
values and interpreting the results in the second round leading to the
invalid and unjust allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters to the
prejudice of other party-list groups such as the petitioner. Petitioners-in-
intervention, ABANTE KA, claims that an incomplete canvass of votes is
illegal and cannot be the basis of a proclamation and here only 110 out of
301 COCs had been canvassed or reported when COMELEC proclaimed
the party-list winners.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC erred in proclaiming the said partylists?

RULING:
COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the
remaining uncanvassed election returns will not affect the result of
the elections

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a


subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits
none. However, this is true only where the election returns missing or
not counted will affect the results of the election.

In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for
party-list. As of May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and
ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of
July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to 165,784 votes
while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no significant
change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC
had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and
reserving only five buffer seats.

COMELEC's allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance


with our ruling in BANAT

In BANAT v. COMELEC, we laid down the following procedure in


determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the


highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent


(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in


paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than


three (3) seats.
It is clear from the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than
2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round.
This conflicts with the interpretation of petitioner that those party-list
groups with product of the percentage less than one, and hence not
an integer, are not entitled to one seat in the allocation of additional
seats. Indeed, following petitioner's interpretation would result in the
remaining party-list seats not being filled up. For that same
reason, BANAT declared unconstitutional the continued operation of
the two-percent threshold, as it was deemed "an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the 'broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.' Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the
statement in BANAT disallowing fractional seats insofar as the
additional seats for the two-percenters in the second round should
also apply to those party-list groups with less than 2% votes. But as
demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never
be filled up if the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the
maximum representation will not be achieved if those party-list
groups obtaining less than one percentage are disqualified from even
one additional seat in the second round.
Case 2:
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective


operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the election." The mischief which this
provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that community."

Facts: Imelda Marcos was running for the House of Representatives seat of
the 1st District of Leyte. She originally stated in her Certificate of Candidacy
that she had resided in the 1st district for 7 months.
Montejo, Marcos’s competition, filed a petition to disqualify Marcos
alleging that Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Montejo contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He also avers that
after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there again. Montejo prayed that
"an order be issued declaring Marcos disqualified and cancelling the
certificate of candidacy.
Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". She averred that
she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood" and that “she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.”
The COMELEC 2nd division disqualified Marcos based on (among
other reasons) the entries on her Voter's Registration Record, which shows
7 months, and by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in their Permanent List of
Voters.
The COMELEC also ruled that “the term "residence" has always been
considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.” When Marcos returned
to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
The COMELEC en banc upheld the decision of its 2 nd division,
reversed itself by issuing a Resolution to declare Marcos as Representative
if she got the highest votes then reversed itself again by issuing a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of Marcos be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
Marcos won but could not take her seat because of the Resolution.
Marcos presented the following issues for resolution:
Issues:
1. Was Marcos a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections?
2. Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not Comelec,
assume exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Marcos's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections and hence only the
HRET may question her qualifications?

Ruling:
1. Marcos was a resident, for election purposes.
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES:
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification
for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that
when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually
means only "domicile".
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to
the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
Marcos held various residences for different purposes during the last
four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while Marcos
was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various
reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin
by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives
held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of
Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of Marcos's domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
We are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily
in favor of a conclusion supporting Marcos's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
2. Marcos’s argument that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives, in accordance
with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution, is untenable.
With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does
not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case
under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. With Marcos, not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET
at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Case 3: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
"the Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during
the proceedings of the NBC.
Issue/s:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to
qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties
be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Ruling:
1. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of
the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

2. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in


the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated
20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

3. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the


continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

4. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives


under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked


from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least


two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the


ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not


more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall


no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do


not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum
seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available
seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-
list candidate is entitled.

See table on page 5

5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In
fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-
22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a
political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or
affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same
for the urban poor.
Table 3.
Distribution
of Available
Party-List
Seats
V
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s

G
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du i pp
a
t l p
or i l
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e
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V Te
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o od t
e,
t t h
S a
ea e
e t i
sl
P s nt
R
a Va
a G o t wh
r a t ( ( hr
n
t r e F S oe
k
y nsi el e
e r ce
r fs o s
e ot n i e
d r R d na
o t t
Pu R e c
a n o ga
r d u ep
t ) nr
y ( d s(
) E
B
L) ( ( )
i CD
s ) )
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:

History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find
their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as genuine
functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this
underlying premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded
in the Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my dissent to
the entry of major political parties to the party-list system.

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec1 with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the
formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I
regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with
respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of
party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence this
dissent.

To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI,
Section 5 of the Constitution reads:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not


more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 2
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the
disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented,
and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled through then
Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly registered
political party, organization or group may participate, the role of the
Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-
style" party-list elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a social
justice vehicle, the Court batted for the empowerment of the masses, thus

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our


midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not
only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the
fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic
victory achieved by the marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list
system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list
system is open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors. 3 Buttressing his view, Mr.
Justice Carpio notes that the major political parties also fall within the term
"political parties" in the Definition of Terms in Republic Act 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he holds that the
qualifications of a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the said
law do not specify any financial status or educational requirement, hence, it
is not necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity."5 It is then concluded that major political parties may now
participate in the party-list system.

With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid
grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to the
democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the
text of the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of
the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. In Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and


proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms
of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.6

Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to


harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause. 7 We should
strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid
rendering some words idle and nugatory.8 The harmonization of Article VI,
Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent
of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the
Transitory Provisions,9 the President was permitted to fill by appointment
the seats reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system
from a list of nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the
result of historical precedents that saw how the elected Members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to
torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral
representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled
status of dignity as those elected by the people. 101avvphi1 To avoid this
bias against sectoral representatives, the President was given all the
leeway to "break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral
representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be
part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law which will stipulate
and provide for the concept of sectoral representation." 11 Similarly, limiting
the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political
parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned
with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good"; 12 the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making;13 the right of women to
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize
their full potential in the service of the nation; 14 the right of labor to
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic
force;15 the right of teachers to professional advancement; 16 the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures,
traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and
policies,17 and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national
economy.18

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to
our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the
party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially
allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission 19 that
major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political
parties20 made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an
accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an
average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average
of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties21 or 42.8% of the total number
of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes
each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-
list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the
remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than
2%.22

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people
at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It
is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this
systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how
the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated
by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to
dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely
suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as
the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major


political parties into the party-list system.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SEPARATE OPINION

NACHURA, J.:

I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the
inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to
a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 1 is
unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the
Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the
enabling law, to allow the people’s broadest representation in
Congress,2 the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Article VI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not


more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per


centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,


contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section. 3

This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system 4 of
representation by allowing different sectors, parties, organizations and
coalitions to win a legislative seat. It diversifies the membership in the
legislature and "gives genuine power to the people." 5 As aforesaid, the
Constitution desires the people’s widest representation in Congress.

To determine the total number of seats that will be allocated to party-list


groups based on the foregoing constitutional provision, this Court, in
Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 6 declared:

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the


determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list
lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives, including those under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district


representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.

On the basis of this formula, the number of party-list seats is not static; it
could add up to a substantial figure depending on the additional number of
legislative districts which Congress may create. Thus, for instance, the
ponencia states that "since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220
district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives," based on the following computation:

220
x .20 = 55
.80

To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system,


Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 117 of which sets, among others,
the inviolable parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition,
must obtain at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to claim one seat in the House of Representatives. This is
referred to as the threshold vote, or the minimum vote requirement.

Here lies the crux of its unconstitutionality.

Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the
House of Representatives which may be occupied by party-list
representatives can never exceed fifty (50), because:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list system)
= 50
2%
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list
representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district
representatives.

I see a scenario in the future when, because of the inexorable growth in the
country’s population, Congress should see fit to increase the legislative
district seats to 400. If that happens, there would be a corresponding
adjustment in party-list representation that will translate to 100 party-list
seats, applying the formula in Veterans Federation Party, viz:

400
x .20 = 100
.80

Yet, by virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of seats


that the political parties, organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50.

This is not an unlikely scenario. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this
Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th
Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the
Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the
2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have
more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system can never exceed 100%.

This, to my mind, stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A.


7941. A legal provision that poses an insurmountable barrier to the full
implementation and realization of the constitutional provision on the party-
list system should be declared void. As Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno says
in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, "(W)e should strive to make
every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some
word idle and nugatory."8

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a


threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote
requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice
Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I
fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed —
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the
party-list system as a fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not


ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the
elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work


hard, and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same


majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative
body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political


party groups and those who have not really been given by the
people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial


following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the
party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional
legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the
fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately
respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact,
inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law
from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party,


that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it
merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But
when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise
purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition
that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally
impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition
as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the
wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court
to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule
of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that
renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, what then do we use as the norm for a
minimum vote requirement to entitle a political party, sectoral organization
or coalition, to a party-list seat in the House of Representatives?

I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment


to the minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we abide by the sensible
standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive
threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the
number of party-list seats. Thus, at present, considering that there are 55
seats allocated for party-list groups, the formula should be:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1.818%
55 party-list seats

The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of


party-list seats increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we presented above
should ever come to pass, and there are 100 seats allocated for party-list
groups, then the threshold vote should be 1%, based on the following
computation:

100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1%
100 party-list seats

This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond
to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of
Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people’s
representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it
would not violate the Constitution.
Time changes and laws change with it.10 And the Constitution ---

must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with
the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from being a petrified rule, a
pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation. 11

Thus, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A.


No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all
enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated. 12

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice

Case 4:
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
Facts of the Case:
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.

Pertinent Issues in the case:

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and


underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

Resolution of the Supreme Court:

2. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be


disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,


political parties may be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition


shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the


party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. 

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation


of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may


participate in the party-list elections.

3. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished


member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in
Congress. 35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is,


in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may
be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional


representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers


Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional


representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations


and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate


legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation,"


"marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined
constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in


a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope.
Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the


marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a


traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos
who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people,
not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by
enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with
this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear:
"to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House
of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be
applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under


the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a


party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not


exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can
be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by
those in immediate association.

NOTE:
-The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more
law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

-The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice


principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The
party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in
life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine
power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to
those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for
them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec
and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them.
It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating
hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

-AS TO OSG CONTENTIONS:

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the


Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation
in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing
the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of


the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to
enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to
be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even
the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our


midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher
folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement – to come
out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win
in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood
when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature
allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for
the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open
party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the


remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to
the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool
to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants


The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec
for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court
finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record --
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA


7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected
to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. 

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang


Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the
Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system.  NOTE: NOT THE PRIEST
RUNNING AS A CANDIDATE

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6


of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association


organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political


party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project


organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. The participation of the government or its
officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair
to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. 

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent


marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political


constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.

Case 5:
5. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 20, 2013
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
COMELEC in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but
primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations using the criteria laid down
by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT); NO
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. NO

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because it merely followed the prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court
(Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT) in disqualifying the petitioners. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC since the
Supreme Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The 1987
Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more


than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of


the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

In short, the party-list system is composed of three different groups:


(1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations;
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral
lines and need not represent any particular sector.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in ANG BAGONG BAYANI and
BANAT that major and national parties are not allowed to join the
party-list is abandoned.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and


subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)


national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations


do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they


register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and


underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” [a] either must belong to their respective
sectors, or [B] must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be


disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

THUS, an individual who does not belong to a particular


marginalized group may validly become the nominee of said sector
provided he must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors.

National parties are now qualified to join the party-list elections,


abandoning the ruling in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT, where the Supreme Court answered the same in the negative.

In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has


always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But,
since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition,
major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided
that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the
party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending
their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to
those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the


Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT
case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)

However, the Supreme Court also emphasized in this case that the
party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator between sectoral and non-
sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for


marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should


not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups
of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are
still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-
defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

Case 7:
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT vs. ISMAEL MATHAY

FACTS:

Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of


the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms
covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
"fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the
national government" was enacted and took effect on July 1, 1964. The
salaries of members of Congress were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum. The Court in its unanimous decision
in Philconsa vs. Mathay held "that the increased compensation provided by
Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the
full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June
20, 1964 will have expired".
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term and filed a claim
for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or
employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."
The House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in
petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum but respondent Velasco, the Congress Auditor,
requested petitioner to return the warrant for recomputation.
Petitioner's contend that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum was already operative when his retirement took effect on December
30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s retirement gratuity should be based on the


increased salary pursuant to an act enacted during his term.

RESOLUTTION:

Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that "No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase."
No. Petitioner’s retirement gratuity should not be based on the
increased salary. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum which they were prohibited by
the Constitution from receiving during their term of office would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to
do indirectly what cannot be done directly."
The petitioner was unable to receive the increased salary precisely
because of the, constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount
in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason
that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the
service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his
retirement."
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum
after the expiration of his term of office would effectively give him the
benefits of increased compensation to which he was not entitled during his
term, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against increased
compensation of legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI,
Const.) Which was presumably in the mind of Congress when it stated in
Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed shall be in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Case 9:
Philippine Judges Association vs Prado

Facts:

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as


implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.

Issue:

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds
that: I. its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; II. it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; (iyong pangatlo equal protection
clause iyong issue kaya di ko na isasama)

Ruling:

Issue I: The petitioners' contention is untenable.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the
Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"


legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing
for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith." The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads
as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders,


executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed
or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed,


except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265,
Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular
No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President,
under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse
or unauthorized use thereof.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the
general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only
be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has
been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in


its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the
title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view,
may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create
in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to
remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters
are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the
effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect
of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed
in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend
it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule
would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of
R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal
service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law.

Issue II: These argument are unacceptable. (ipinasok rin dito iyong
doctrine of separation of powers. Sinabi na conclusive at di pwedeng
tignan iyong enrolled bills, unless iyong matters na malalagay sa mga
journals ng congress. Hindi nagfall sa exception iyong issue)

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under
E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it


has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for


compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject


matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In
a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in


question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly
passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Case 10:
COMELEC VS JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA

FACTS:
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with
respect to government contracts, statutes take precedence over the public
officers freedom to contract. Here, the primordial question to be resolved is
-- may a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize
a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?

In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the
modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the
appropriate of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters."

Pursuant thereto, COMELEC promulgated a resolution  approving in


principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS)
Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database
system for the May 2004 Elections. The idea is to have a national
registration of voters whereby each registrant's fingerprints will be digitally
entered into the system and upon completion of registration, compared and
matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and
counterfeit-resistant voter's identification card will then be issues to each
registrant as a visual record of the registration.

COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and
installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for
its VRIS Project.Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation
(PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the
bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the
amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score
and was declared the winning bidder.

However, under RA 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the


COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and
that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of
Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only
P1.2 Billion Pesos.

COMELEC Chairman issued a memorandum to the COMELEC en


banc expressing her objections to the contract.

COMELEC then through various press releases and public statements,


announced that the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or
set aside. 

PHOTOKINA than filed a complaint against COMELEC, claiming among


others that there is already a perfected contract.

ISSUE:

Whether a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a


contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?

RESOLUTION:

NO.

Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no


money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." Thus, in the execution of government
contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the
various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made
by law for each fiscal year.

Furthermore, Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of


Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative Code of
1987," provide:

"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract


involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there
is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of
other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure; and x x x

"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in


the case of a contract for personal service, for supplies for current
consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated
consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-
owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or
authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency
concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the
obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the
current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof,
subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate signed
by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be
attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the
sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any
other purpose until the obligation of the government agency concerned
under the contract is fully extinguished.

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the
existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such
conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract. Using this as our premise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA's
contention that there is already a perfected contract. 

NOTE:
The SC held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom
Environmental Corporation that "the effect of an unqualified acceptance of
the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the
award to the bidder," however, such statement would be inconsequential in
a government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain
conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a
binding contract that would obligate the government in an amount in excess
of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted
to be made.

REMEDY OF PHOTOKINA

Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into
contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and the
officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or
other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if
the transaction had been wholly between private parties." So when the
contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in
excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government
is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case
were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes
personal liability thereunder.63 Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is
unenforceable as to the Government.

Case 11: Bengzon vs. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee


Facts: (Super shortcut eto guys kasi hindi important yung details. Parang
procedural to. Like the discussion of Atty Libiran re political question and
judicial question hehe)
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the
Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG
Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants
and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended
Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan
Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before
the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate
on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First
Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called
upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." **Important – see ruling related to this matter.
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on
the matter. The petitioners were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear
before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six
(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
Some of the petitioners refused to testify so the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee suspended its inquiry and instead ordered the petitioners to file
their memorandum. However, the Committee reversed their next step and
refused to accept the plea of the petitioners to be excused from testifying.
Thus, the Committee voted to pursue and continue the investigation over
the case.
The petitioners then filed the petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief on the following ground:
“The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the
Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”
The Committee then said that the Supreme Court cannot properly inquire
into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations,
much less can it enjoin the Congress or any of its regular and special
committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation citing the principle of
separation of powers.
Issue: Is the Committee correct in using the defense of separation of
powers? Is there a limit as to the power of the Congress regarding inquiries
on matters already before the courts?
Ruling:
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the
Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries;
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
**
Regarding the matter on Enrile’s speech in relation to Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution:
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon committee was to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or
39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically
provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such
as to legislate or to expel a member.
It cannot be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to
conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners,
as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said
complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To
allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an
issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility
of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of
the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on
the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since
congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially
legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking
the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that
are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners
may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and
produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned
inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

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