In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.

HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. 

G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006, 
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

Principles of Congress Power of Inquiry

FACTS:

A Senate Resolution was introduced by Senator Miriam Santiago "directing an inquiry in

aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and
Philcomsat Holdings due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors”

Then PCGG (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT) Chairman

Camilo Sabio was invited by the Senate to be one of its resource persons. Chairman
Sabio declined, invoking Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 which provides that "No member or
staff of the [PCGG] shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance"

Notwithstanding the Subpoena Ad Testificandum issued by Senator Gordon to

Chairman Sabio and other PCGG Comissioners, they refused to appear before the
Senate and pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the Senate
Resolution are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan
and the Supreme Court for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under
the principle of sub judice.

Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is challenged on the ground that it tramples upon the Senate's
power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:

No. Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional.

 Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to
the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.  Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the
committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
  It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal.  
 The Court’s high  regard  to  such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that  “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault   that  “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation,  is a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
 Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress’ power of inquiry.  This cannot be countenanced.  Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption.   The Congress’ power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress
to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
 A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power
to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
 Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art.
VI, Sec. 21), the principle of  public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full
disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of  access to public information (Art. III, Sec.
7).
 Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. 

Power of Legislative Inquiry

1. The power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. The power of inquiry - with
process to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
Hence, there need not be any express provision in the Constitution granting such
powers to the legislative since it is already impliedly included in the function of
legislation.

2. Notably, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

3. Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21 as it exempts the PCGG
members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. The Congress' power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
4. Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.

5. Corollarily, Sec. 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions: Art.
II, Sec. 28 (policy of full public disclosure), Art. III, Sec. 7 (right of the people to
information on matters of public concern).

Right to Privacy

6. One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This means that
the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
government action." (i.e. Bill of Rights)

7. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right to privacy. In evaluating a claim for violation of
the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion.

8. The legislative inquiry focuses on acts committed in the discharge of duties as

officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, the directors of POTC,
Philcomsat have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their
offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are
of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.

9. The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest.

10. The right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails
over the right to privacy of financial transactions

Right against Self-Incrimination

11. The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by the said directors and officers
of Philcomsat only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no
way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.

12. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying the
Senate Committees their power of inquiry. When this power is abused, such issue may
be presented before the courts.
Contempt Power of the Legislative

13. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-
preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts
thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis. (citing Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete)

Sub Judice

14. It is contended that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being
litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the
filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop
or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for
being moot. The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is
upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso
Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's
nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers,
petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and
testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 February 28, 1986

CREATING THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here
and abroad;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby

order;
Sec. 1. There is hereby created a Commission, to be known as the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, composed of Minister Jovito R. Salonga, as
Chairman, Mr. Ramon Diaz, Mr. Pedro L. Yap, Mr. Raul Daza and Ms. Mary Conception
Bautista as Commissioners.

Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in
regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to time.

(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be
repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of
adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.

Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and

carry out the purposes of this order.

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession

any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found,
and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction,
concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation
or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.

(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or
dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of
the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President
Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be
disposed of by the appropriate authorities.

(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of facts by any

person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise
make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this
order.
 (e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be material to the
investigation conducted by the Commission.

(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties, following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of
Court.

(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of
the government.

(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose of this order.

Sec. 4. (a) No civil action shall lie against the commission or any member thereof for
anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.

(b) No member or staff of the commission shall be required to testify or produce in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.

Sec. 5. It is hereby directed that, subject to the availability of funds, the amount of Fifty
Million Pesos, or so much thereof as may be needed to carry out the purposes of this
order, be set aside out of the funds of the National Treasury and made available for
expenditure by the Commission.

Sec. 6. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this twenty-eight day of February, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-six.