Practical knowledge

Este artículo parte del trabajo de Clarà y Mauri: El conocimiento práctico. Cuatro conceptualizaciones constructivistas de las relaciones entre conocimiento teórico y práctica educativa, y añade otras voces al debate planteado por Infancia y Aprendizaje, con un doble propósito. En primer lugar, argumentar que algunos de los límites teóricos entre las perspectivas revisadas no constituyen barreras infranqueables, más allá de las que los propios discursos imponen, puesto que no difieren excesivamente en los mecanismos explicativos del cambio y no responden a opciones epistemológicas distintas. En segundo lugar, esbozar algunas alternativas recientes que podrían ayudarnos a superar esas barreras y que, desde posiciones socioculturales, proponen conceptualizar las situaciones de desarrollo profesional como situaciones de aprendizaje entre iguales en las que operan mecanismos explicativos del cambio diferentes a los analizados por Clarà y Mauri. Como conclusión, se considera que el avance y la integración de enfoques es posible si se articula en una única perspectiva el estudio de los mecanismos de cambio representacional -individual y colectivo-con la consideración de los procesos de enculturización identitaria en contextos profesionales. Palabras clave: Conocimiento práctico, comunidades de aprendizaje, teorías implícitas, cambio representacional, enculturización identitaria.

In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances).  If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) turn out to constitute exercises of one and the same capacity for knowledge, as I will argue they do, this will give us strong reason to believe that what is known in the two cases (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.

In examining the relation between practical knowledge of one’s own intentional actions and practical knowledge of what is good to do I draw from two traditions of thought on practical epistemology.  The first is the tradition of Anscombe’s conception of knowledge in action and the second is the tradition of Murdoch’s conception of knowledge in the circumstances.  What is striking about these traditions is that they tend to understand practical knowledge by reference to the possible involvement therein of perception.  Thus Anscombe claims in her Intention[1] that knowledge in action is specified as knowledge without observation; a claim to the effect that the epistemological status of knowledge in action is determined by reference to the lack of a certain sort of involvement therein of perception.  And Iris Murdoch in her Sovereignty of the Good[2] proposes that what makes knowledge in the circumstances knowledge is a form of sensitivity to particular features or aspects of the circumstances in which the agent finds herself.  Thus, for Murdoch, knowledge in the circumstances owes its status as knowledge to the capacity of the agent to perceive what she ought to do in particular circumstances.

In this paper I will argue that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge.  But the question now arises.  How can we both claim that the two forms of practical knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge and that perception plays such a diverse role in their epistemological grounding?  In the main body of this paper I will show how to interpret the Murdochian and the Anscombean claims so as to provide the materials with which we can answer this question.  If the argument of this paper works, it will transpire that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge.  This account of practical knowledge opens the way for understanding intentional action and the moral fabric of the world as knowable as the self.  And it is thus that what is known in the two forms of knowing (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
[1] Anscombe, 1957.
[2] Murdoch, 1970.

Systematic research in the field of practical knowledge is a recent phenomenon. In this paper, the approaches which have been developed in the main centres of research into practical knowledge in Norway and Sweden are compared with an emphasis on their potential for the study of ethics. The focus on narratives and reflection based on the researcher's own professional experience which is the distingushing feature of the Centre for Practical Knowledge at the University of Nordland is seen as a very promising addition to the traditional repertory of ethical studies.

Quality education is an indispensable instrument for national development. However the provision of quality education depends largely on the quality of teachers. Similarly, teacher education programme is designed to produce teacher with requisite training and sound professional background which requires a favourable attitude and certain specific competencies .Teacher Education refers to the policies and procedures designed to equip prospective teachers with the knowledge, attitude, behavior and skills which they require to perform their task effectively in the classroom. To achieve this, one must go through a proper learning process. If it is provided only then a prospective teacher can do his / her best in academic achievement. A balance between theory and practice provides multi-dimensional development for prospective teach

Tools are critical in the development of practical knowledge and in the formation of social worlds. Not only do tools bring the maker into relation with the material in terms of technique, they also inform the maker about the quality of the material itself. This article is an ethnographic exploration of the variations of the maker-tool-material relation in glassblowing, informed by Bourdieu's logic of practice as well as phenomenological considerations of on the body's dispositions towards and interactions with the material world. Relations form the backbone of the glassblowing studio, and more importantly provide the subject matter of 'tool talk', studio talk about tools, which forges feelings of empathy and consequently contributes to the formation of the glassblowing social world. Through this exploration, we come to understand how material, the subject of much studio discourse, is a structuring force of the glassblowing studio.

How can we understand the role of movement and kinaesthetic resonance in shaping our experience and knowledge? This paper gives a brief introduction to my current doctoral studies at Metanoia Institute/Middlesex University, where I am researching the experiences of psychotherapists. I have discovered my area of interest falls within Studies in Practical Knowledge, a growing research tradition in Scandinavia. This article presents some of the material I have gathered so far, focusing on working with embodied awareness in online Gestalt psychotherapy.

Theories of post-industrial society have since their earliest formulations had a questionable relation to actual processes of social change. This article explores why they nonetheless continue to hold influence. Drawing on Mannheim, it argues that theories of post-industrial society were originally formulated as utopia – hopeful speculations about the future. When their core concepts are used to describe present conditions, however, they take on the role of ideology, in
Mannheim’s sense of this term. The ideology of post-industrial society represents a specific world view in relation to work, knowledge and education. It elevates and celebrates ‘knowledge work’ and renders invisible existing forms of industry and workers’ knowledge necessary for practical work. When the present is viewed through the lens of these theories, practical work is cast as the work of yesterday and the people who do it as yesterday’s people.

Equilibrium Art of Mastering Self  suggests empowering methods for increasing holistic intelligence.  Focusing comprehensively on inherent systematic abilities and practical methods of growth, the text aims to help people evaluate their current strengths and weaknesses, then reflect, and then evolve.

Further, the book examines the physiological aspects on three exponentially more impactful levels: the spiritual/conscious; the mental/psychological; and the physical/biological.  In its early portions, Equilibrium hones in on what is necessary to develop a greater connection of the twelve systems of the human experience, calling such work critical, as many who can’t recognize their lives are being impacted, or impeded. This recognition of the expanding impact of conscious growth stands to be transformative.

Equilibrium Art of Mastering Self makes intangible practical ideas easy to understand via true-to-life composites, showing how one’s cellular life impacts their lives and relationships.  It uses clear explanations to break down its central ideas, as of the individual elements of intelligence, like comprehensive awareness and equilibrium.  It mixes positivity with realistic thinking and rationale.  Further, there are helpful summaries at the end of each chapter for enhancement, which couple with frequent suggested takeaways to build one’s personal understanding.

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Philosophers commonly talk of Anscombe's book Intention as a single unified account produced at a particular moment in time. Yet we share a tendency to refer to the text of the second (1963) edition while citing the first (1957) one.  Between these two there also lies the 1958 second impression of the first edition, which already contained some significant alterations noted by Anscombe herself.This paper offers a detailed consideration of the differences between these three publications, as well as her earlier Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society article 'Intention'. In what follows I catalogue the various changes she made with the aim of clarifying whether it makes sense, in light of them, to talk of an early and late Intention. I conclude that while this would be going too far, Anscombe’s views on action description and practical reasoning have changed in ways in which it would be profitable for philosophers of action and moral psychology to track.

A Cultural History of Sport in the Age of Enlightenment covers the period 1650 to 1800, a period often seen as a time of decline in sporting practice and literature. In fact, a rich sporting culture existed and sports were practised by both men and women at all levels of society. The Enlightenment challenged many of the earlier notions of religion, gender, and rank that had previously shaped sporting activities and saw the beginning of the commercialization, professionalization, and associativity which were to define modern sport.

Still, the eighteenth century did not simply prepare the way for the nineteenth century, as a modernization-theoretical perspective suggests. In various respects, it differed from the ensuing era: in many countries, there was—despite all the ambivalences, contradictions, and contemporary limits on Enlightenment thinking—a greater tolerance, a greater willingness to experiment, a more intensive international exchange, and a greater permeability for women who wished to participate than in the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, we do not find an antagonistic, ideologically charged juxtaposition of sport and physical exercise, as is characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first sports clubs were founded in England, while English authors also advocated physical exercise. Gerhard Ulrich Anton Vieth did not even make a distinction between competition-oriented sport and health-oriented physical exercise, and a differentiation on the basis of sporting disciplines can only be made to a limited extent from a contemporary perspective ...

This volume takes the reader into the world of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sport, which appears both foreign and familiar to us today.

Aim. The aim of this paper is to offer an alternative knowing-how knowing-that framework of nursing knowledge, which in the past has been accepted as the provenance of advanced practice. Background. The concept of advancing practice is central to the development of nursing practice and has been seen to take on many different forms depending on its use in context. To many it has become synonymous with the work of the advanced or expert practitioner; others have viewed it as a process of continuing professional development and skills acquisition. Moreover, it is becoming closely linked with practice development. However, there is much discussion as to what constitutes the knowledge necessary for advancing and advanced practice, and it has been suggested that theoretical and practical knowledge form the cornerstone of advanced knowledge. Design. The design of this article takes a discursive approach as to the meaning and integration of knowledge within the context of advancing nursing practice. Method. A thematic analysis of the current discourse relating to knowledge integration models in an advancing and advanced practice arena was used to identify concurrent themes relating to the knowing-how knowing-that framework which commonly used to classify the knowledge necessary for advanced nursing practice. Conclusion. There is a dichotomy as to what constitutes knowledge for advanced and advancing practice. Several authors have offered a variety of differing models, yet it is the application and integration of theoretical and practical knowledge that defines and develops the advancement of nursing practice. An alternative framework offered here may allow differences in the way that nursing knowledge important for advancing practice is perceived, developed and coordinated. Relevance to clinical practice. What has inevitably been neglected is that there are various other variables which when transposed into the existing knowing-how knowing-that framework allows for advanced knowledge to be better defined. One of the more notable variables is pattern recognition, which became the focus of Benner's work on expert practice. Therefore, if this is included into the knowing-how knowing-that framework, the knowing-how becomes the knowledge that contributes to advancing and advanced practice and the knowing-that becomes the governing action based on a deeper understanding of the problem or issue.

Aristotle has been continuously at the frontier of philosophical reflection for almost 2400 years. Throughout the 20th century the influence of his practical philosophy has been growing. His «non-modernist» concept of phrónêsis or practical wisdom is attracting increasing interest as an alternative to both «modernism» and «post-modernism». This book is a meticulous study of Aristotle's phrónêsis and its applications to the fields of personal development or character formation and of ethical virtues. It also relates phrónêsis to the wider context of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy and of his different ways of knowing, and to both theoretical and practical concerns within modern social and action research. The whole of Aristotle's thinking is radically practice-based and directed. However, it never loses its theoretical focus. His theoretical philosophy is fundamentally dialogical. Hence, the relevance of Aristotelian thinking is striking for the current reconfigurations in the social organisation of learning and knowledge production.

Introduction to Hermeneutics ‒ Monographic reference volume, which can also be used as a university textbook; an outline and exposition of the antecedents, formation process, and content of philosophical hermeneutics, based on the interpretive hermeneutic procedure.
x  x  x
Egyetemi tankönyvként is használható, monografikus igénnyel megírt szakkönyv; a filozófiai hermeneutika előzményeinek, kialakulási folyamatának és tartalmának az értelmező hermeneutikai eljárás alkalmazásával történő felvázolása és kifejtése.

PRACTICAL INTENTIONALITY, REASONS AND CAUSES
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

What is an intentional action? How do intentionality, rationality and having a reason to act
relate? The debate between reasons and causes is badly put: the real question is not whether
the relationship between intention and action is causal or not, but whether what makes an
action intentional is a natural fact or a form of description (Anscombe). Acting intentionally
does require possession of the description under which the action is intentional, so intentional
action is best approached by reasons.
Having an intention is not willing: the intention is not the start of action but a first-personal
action-thought or “practical knowledge.” The antinomy between reasons and causes really
stems from the asymmetry of psychological verbs (Wittgenstein). For action verbs too are
psychological verbs, even though they relate to happenings that take place outside our bodies.
Causal explanations of action are typically third-personal, whereas reasons are always firstpersonal.
Confusions between theses two standpoints lead to tremendous errors about practical
rationality.
The distinction between reasons and causes really becomes insightful when applied to moral
psychology: it sheds light on the relationship between reason and motivation. Practical
reasoning leads to action, and therefore motivates; but it is also defeasible (or non-monotonic).
If reasons for action are never complete, why act on them? Various forms of skepticism are
envisioned. I conclude that practical reasoning is a genuine form of inference, but that it is a
material, not a formal one, in which will and intelligence melt (Aristotle). In the end, I
advocate an expressivist account of practical reasoning.

This study examined the attitude and academic performance of public single-sex (Boys' and Girls' only) high school students in the teaching and learning of Agricultural Science in the aspect of practical knowledge of Agriculture. We investigated whether there were significant differences in the mean achievement test scores of students in practical Agriculture in the selected schools. We also examined the relationship between their academic performance in practical agriculture and their attitude to the subject. The study was a descriptive survey design carried out at Ibadan Metropolis, Nigeria. Six public single-sex (Boys' and Girls' only) schools were randomly selected from three Local Government Areas (LGAs) within Ibadan Zone comprising eleven LGAs in 2018. Sixty-nine Senior Secondary School (SSS III) students were randomly selected in Boys' only (3) schools while ninety-seven students were randomly selected in Girls' only (3) schools giving a total of 166 students that participated in this study. Practical Agricultural Science Students' Achievement Test (PASSAT) and Students' Attitude towards Practical Agriculture Questionnaire (SATPAGQ) were used for data collection. The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics, One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Multiple Comparison techniques and t-test for equality of means. The ANOVA test was significant (p = .00). Post Hoc (Tukey HSD) test, a multiple comparison technique on the ANOVA showed that PASSAT mean scores obtained by one Girls' only school was significantly different from one Boys' only schools another two Girls' only schools' mean scores at 5% significant level. It was found that availability of school farm, use of instructional materials were not enough to bring about significant boost in academic success in PASSAT especially in three of the schools with less than average mean scores of 34.51, 40.23 and 44.07. The study therefore recommended that government and relevant stakeholders (Parents-Teachers Association, Old Boys' and Girls' Association among others) should provide human resources and needed infrastructural facilities for effective teaching and learning of Agricultural Science in both single-sex and Coeducational schools for better academic performance.

The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly practical in having world to mind direction of fit and the essential function of guiding as yet uncompleted action. While practical knowledge is fundamentally different from theoretical knowledge in terms of mind-world relations, the practical and theoretical domains are still parallel in terms of justificatory and inferential relations, they are like mirror images of one another. It is shown that if this view of practical knowledge is accepted, convincing Gettier cases for practical knowledge can be constructed. An extensive analysis of these cases demonstrates the usefulness of the notions of practical deduction, abduction, and induction.

A central idea in Anscombe's philosophy of action is that of practical knowledge, the formally distinctive knowledge a person has of what she is intentionally doing. Anscombe also discusses 'practical truth', an idea she borrows from Aristotle, and which on her interpretation is a kind of truth whose bearer is not thought or language, but action. What is the relationship between practical knowledge and practical truth? What we might call the 'Simple View' of this relationship holds that practical knowledge is essentially knowledge of practical truth. But the Simple View isn't obviously available, since we have practical knowledge of all of our intentional actions, whereas an action manifests practical truth in Aristotle's sense only if it is a case of doing or living well. I suggest that we distinguish a thicker ethical version and a thinner action-theoretical version of each notion. This allows us to maintain a - complex - version of the Simple View, on which practical knowledge in the thick ethical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thick ethical sense, and practical knowledge in the thin action-theoretical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thin action-theoretical sense. Although Anscombe did not make these distinctions explicitly, I argue that she nevertheless commits herself to them in her discussion.

The aim of this paper is to display an alternative to the familiar decompositional approach in action theory, one that resists the demand for an explanation of action in non-agential terms, while not simply treating the notion of intentional agency as an unexplained primitive. On this Anscombean alternative, action is not a worldly event with certain psychological causes, but a distinctive form of material process, one that is not simply caused by an exercise of reason but is itself a productive exercise of reason. I argue that to comprehend the proposed alternative requires an account of the temporality of events in general. An event does not simply have a position in time, but is itself temporally structured. With the inner temporality of events in view, the Anscombean conception of action as a specifically self-conscious form of temporal unity is made available for critical reflection.

A B S T R A C T I Becoming a proficient glassblower involves an indispensable shift away from cognitive readings of practice towards corporeal readings. In learning glassblowing myself in the course of an ethnography of handicrafts in New York City, the subtleties of apprenticeship, the modes of reading and understanding the practice, both cognitive and corporeal, have emerged, making more complex our understanding of the transmission, development, and modalities of practical knowledge. Such ethnographic dissection brings phenomenological considerations to bear on the question of achieving proficient practical knowledge, and enables us to sharpen our understanding of the role of meaning in practice.

This paper provides answers to one of the most commonly asked questions in architecture Education, which focuses on a lack of coherence resulting in a fracture between theory and practice in architecture, and highlights philosophical ponders of its concepts and assumptions. A look into Aristotle’s views about practice and theory reveals a new meaning of “practice," dimensions of which have been beautifully demonstrated in “Phronesis” or practical knowledge. Gadamer’s analysis of Phronesis shows the importance of this view in understanding the relation between the universal and the particular,ergo the relation between theory and practice. Understanding practice as a concept that relies on delibration and decision corrects understanding of practice as rather the application of theory in our assumptions and makes the particular situation which us, architects, deal with, and require evaluation deliberation and decision, the focal point where one should seek to find the relation between theory and practice.
Deep understanding of dynamic incidents of decision and practice in architecture suggests that we should alternate our understanding of theory, practice and their relationship. If we insist on the common meaning of practice and theory and the application of theory model in practice, one can never overcome the distance between theory and practice. However, if we deeply understand the dialectics between theory and practice and between the universal and the particular that happens in the incidents of deliberation and decision, we can finally say that we have overcome the fracture between theory and practice.

Keywords: Coherence in Architecture, Theory and Practice in Archiecture, Phronesis, Practical Knowledge, decision in Architecture.

The main subject of this article is the shift of meanings of the term " philosophy " in the different historical periods. " Philosophy " in ancient Greece was used in its literal sense – the love of wisdom – to explain the special cult " knowledge for the sake of knowledge ". It was believed that this " love " is the mother of all sciences. In the future, the word " philosophy " meant mostly " the love of knowledge " and a set of theoretical science. The word " philosophy " began to be used to refer to a particular branch of knowledge with its own issues (different than the issues of special sciences) only in the 19th century.

In this paper, I develop and defend an interpretation of Anscombe's philosophy of human action as a philosophy of practical knowledge. This is a philosophy which reframes questions of moral obligation as belonging to the grammar of our talk of human action. But, Anscombe's account of the grammar of human action is not fully in view in her action-theoretic works. In the first part of the paper, I argue that to get her account of the grammar of human action fully into view we need to turn to her view of the spiritual nature of man in her religious writings. In the second part of the paper I offer an interpretation of her view of the spiritual nature of man which shows that, contrary to popular interpretations, hers is a spiritual and not an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian philosophy of practical knowledge. I close this paper with a sketch of a spiritual philosophy of practical knowledge which moves along Anscombean lines but abandons talk of God.

The Western Ghats is a contentious landscape described in the familiar language of disciplines and boundaries, a language that has influenced the way in which development and environmental projects have been designed. It is possible the contentions arise from a particular ontology, created by a way of seeing the Ghats that divides nature from culture, relying on a view from above that distances one from place, an outsider's view. This way of seeing differs from an understanding that emerges when engaging in the Ghats on foot. This paper grapples with this difference through a literary engagement with one of Kuvempu's epic novels, Malegalalli Madumagalu. The novel reveals two different ontologies through an unraveling of text and imaging: one that privileges the colonial eye requiring skies and eyes to be clear, and another that privileges a local experience structured by the everyday practice of walking in a monsoon terrain.

On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. There is an overwhelming consensus that this aspiration is not met, but there is an interesting disagreement about the extent, the nature, and diagnosis of this failure, which encourages us to rethink the practical import of the categorical imperative. This paper is an attempt to make some progress in this debate by relating the practical function of the categorical imperative as the form of practical reasoning to its practical function as governing the dynamics of moral agency. I begin in section 1, by stressing the complementarity of the three formulas of the CI, aiming to uncover Kant's general view of rational agency. In section 2, I illustrate Kant's theory of incentives, understood as the theoretical apparatus that makes sense of the dynamics of moral agency. Finally, in section 3, I explain how moral knowledge obtained by observance of CI counts as practical knowledge, that is, knowledge that guides rational agents in action. The conclusion of the argument is that the CI represents a distinctive informal mode of practical reasoning, which carries knowledge of what one ought to do and, at the same time, knowledge of oneself as a practical subject. This interpretation appeals to a (non proceduralist) form of construction, and aims to show that Kant's conception of practical reason is minimal but far from empty.

The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self- knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition, but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed.

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing.  Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this ‘the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis’ (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence 2011, Schmid 2016, Rödl 2015, 2018) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means‐end structures and  proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. It then discusses the differences between the proposed approach and those due to Schmid 2016 and Laurence 2011 and the reasons why it should be preferred.

The plot of the Jason Bourne novels and films begins with its title character being retrieved, half-dead, from the ocean by the crew of a fishing boat. When Bourne regains consciousness, he cannot recall his name, his home, his profession, or any other biographical facts. The trauma he has suffered from several gunshot wounds and floating in the ocean for many hours has caused amnesia. He eventually learns-long before he actually remembers-that he was a spy/assassin working for the United States government. He is first led to this knowledge by discovering that he possesses the skills of such a profession. Although he has lost his memory, he has-as a character in the second novel of the trilogy puts it-"retained the ability to infiltrate and kill" (Supremacy 27). Bourne quickly discovers that he can speak several languages, easily breakdown a firearm (Identity 22), bare-handedly disarm and incapacitate two gun-wielding gendarmes, elude pursuers by foot or in a car, as well as dissimulate, charm, persuade, and manipulate very effectively. While Bourne does not know how he acquired these skills, and he initially performs them to his own surprise, they are apparently performed with the same deft and facility as before his amnesia. They are examples of what Gilbert Ryle calls knowledge-how, also known as practical knowledge. A criterion for the possession of such knowledge is the ability to do something, that is, one knows to Φ if one is capable of Φ-ing. The other sort of knowledge is knowledge-that or factual knowledge. According to Ryle, it is exercised in the "propounding of propositions" (195).

This paper aims to give a charitable and comprehensible interpretation of the concept of practical knowledge in Intention, G. E. M. Anscombe's famous monograph. In particular, it focuses on her claim that practical knowledge is present even if the agent fails to execute his intention. I argue that (1) a rejection of this claim is unacceptable, and that (2) the content of practical knowledge should be formulated as "I am X-ing", with which this concept can be coherently interpreted.

　ECEC teachers are considered to develop creative practical knowledges though the learning processes of realizing and overcoming challenges and problems which are faced in their practice.  Dialogues and collaborations with other teachers often facilitate the learning processes. This paper introduces pattern languages as a new tool for supporting these learning processes of ECEC teachers. 　First, the previous research findings and challenges on practical knowledges of ECEC teachers are reviewed. Second, pattern languages are introduced. Third, the possibility of pattern languages for visualizing and sharing practical knowledges of ECEC teachers is considered. Fourth, the “ECEC Chief Teacher Patterns” project is explained. Finally, the future directions of pattern languages for ECEC practice are discussed.

Este es el relato de una experiencia de formación donde comparten espacio las voces de dos estudiantes del Grado en Educación Infantil de la Universidad de Málaga y la de su tutora de prácticas. Desde este lugar, se conjugan para narrar en primera persona, la experiencia vivida a raíz y en relación con la documentación pedagógica. Una estrategia didáctica que no pretende "atrapar" la infancia, sino que estimula y sitúa al docente, en este caso al docente en formación, frente a la singularidad de los niños y niñas como sujetos de experiencia, y que, al mismo tiempo, nos ayuda a pensar en las posibilidades que puede tener no solo como espacio de interpretación, significación y encuentro, sino como estrategia transformadora del conocimiento práctico, singular y biográfico, del docente en la formación inicial. Así, además de entender epistemológicamente el sentido que la documentación pedagógica puede tener para la reconstrucción de la identidad profesional, en este viaje formativo nos hemos encontrado cómo fragmentos de diarios de aprendizaje, historias de niñas y niños documentadas y revisitadas por nuestra experiencia alumbran un nuevo escenario educativo que requiere nuevos modos de habitarlo como docente. Un habitar incierto y no predictivo que impacta de forma sensible, por el desconcierto al que invita "dejarse decir" por las infancias.

Freedom of the will is a never-ending source of puzzlement for academic philosophers. At the same time, it is something deeply familiar to everyone. For the relevant concept of freedom underlies much, if not all, of our ordinary discourse and thinking about ourselves and others. However, our attempt to make sense of the world, through science and philosophy, can itself cast doubt on the validity of this conception of freedom. Are we not ourselves part of the world whose workings we study? And are we not, then, subject to the same laws of nature that we have discovered to govern that world? If so, should we not admit that our actions are simply physical events, mere links in a long chain of cause and effect? So, should we not conclude that the special perspective we take on our own actions and those of others is perfectly illusory? For a long time, this worry was phrased almost solely in terms of the problem of universal determinism. But in more recent times, many philosophers have recognized that the question whether we can somehow reconcile the familiar conception of agency with determinism may be a red herring. Free will, they argue, may be illusory even if our actions are undetermined. For if indeterminism is the absence of determination, what is it but pure randomness of the kind that does indeed exist at the subatomic level? If that is true, the idea that there is a special class of happenings which find their origin in human choice seems to be at least as problematic as it would be under determinism: what we regard as our choices would be nothing but random events, over which we have as little control as over the outcome of a die roll. What we end up doing would be merely accidental, and precisely not up to ourselves. My aim in this thesis will be to show how to overcome this dichotomy between accidentality and causal necessitation. A sound account of agency, I will argue, has to take seriously the idea that in practical deliberation, we are genuinely self-determining. I will show that progress towards such an account has been hampered by the prevalence of a reductive understanding of intentional action, according to which the explanation of an action in terms of an agent's reasons is just a species of the `ordinary' form of quasi-mechanical causation we associate with the laws of nature. On that assumption, non-accidentality can consist only in something's being caused by prior states and events. Instead, I defend a less dogmatic view, on which we can distinguish a number of formally distinct kinds of causal principles, or forms of non-accidentality. One of those is the kind of responsiveness to reasons, or spontaneity, that is exhibited by intentional action. In exercising such spontaneity, I will argue, we are truly self-determining and free.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the notion of a call can bring to our understanding of professional practice and practical knowledge. I begin with a brief consideration of why the notion of a call fell out of favour. I argue that far from being a trivial change in the way we make sense of work, the absence of the call makes it more difficult to integrate subjective and objective senses of the justification of work. Drawing on the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Lévinas, I go on to argue that both subjective identity as well as social practices and institutions are held together by the experience of a call to responsibility which unites subjective and objective moments of justification in the personal/ethical. In the final part of the paper, I show how the notion of the call is not just concerned with the original entry into a practice, but is a structure in everyday practice which helps to make sense of the motivation of students of practical knowledge to make their practice as a whole an object of reflection.

Aristoteles über techne als Fähigkeit und Wissen Christian Kietzmann Aristoteles über techné als Fähigkeit und als Wissen Für Aristoteles hat jede techné eine merkwürdige Doppelgestalt: Sie besteht einerseits in einer Einsicht, sie ist also Sachkenntnis; andererseits ist sie aber auch eine Fähigkeit. Diese doppelte Identität bringt etwa folgende Passage zum Ausdruck: "Alle Kunstfertigkeiten (technai), das heißt alles produktive Wissen (poitetikai epistemai), sind Fähigkeiten (dynameis), denn sie sind Prinzipien (archai) der Veränderung in anderem oder im Handelnden selbst als einem anderen." (Met. IX.1, 1046b3-5, übersetzt von Hermann Bonitz)

Man wird zugeben, dass Thomas Pynchons dritter Sinnspruch für Paranoiker ebenso für Philosophen maßgeschneidert ist: "Wem es gelingt, dir falsche Fragen einzureden, dem braucht auch vor der Antwort nicht zu bangen." 1 Ich beginne, indem ich zwei Weisen der Formulierung des Grundproblems der Handlungstheorie kontrastiere: den herkömmlichen (dekompositio nalen) Ansatz, der von Wittgensteins Frage "Was bleibt übrig?" ausgeht, und den neoaristo telischen Ansatz, der sich seinem Gegenstand durch die Bestimmung eines besonderen Sinns der Frage "Warum?" nähert. Weder Philosophen noch Paranoiker werden überrascht sein, dass die Form einer Frage die Antwort, zu der man gelangt, bestimmen kann, dass Wege, die in die philosophische Reflektion hineinführen, mit Wegen korrelieren, die aus ihr herausführen. Die zwei handlungstheoretischen Ansätze korrelieren mit zwei wesentlich voneinander verschiedenen Konzeptionen der Natur absichtlichen leiblichen oder physischen Handelns: zum einen als Kompositum aus metaphysisch voneinander unabhängigen inner-psychischen und äußerlich-materiellen Elementen, die durch eine generische Form der Kausalität miteinander verknüpft sind, zum anderen als eine wesentlich selbstbewusste und vernünftige Form materieller Prozesse. 2 Zudem korrelieren diese Ansätze mit einer Reihe typischer, aber selten diskutierter Unterschiede in der Wahl und Gewichtung von Beispielen, Ausdrucksweisen und Argumentationsstrategien. Einige dieser Unterschiede möchte ich beschreiben. Gewöhnlich tauchen diese kontrastierenden Merkmale als harmlose Vorüberlegungen auf und gelten als Bestandteil des vortheoretischen Hintergrundwissens. Ich hoffe, dass solche Merkmale den Anschein ihrer Unschuld und Unvermeidlichkeit verlieren, wenn sie einer Alternative gegenübergestellt werden. Ich ende mit einigen Bemerkungen zu einem Punkt, an dem sich die Differenzen zwischen diesen beiden Ansätzen zuspitzen, nämlich in der Verfügbarkeit der Idee praktischen Wissens: Wo unser Verstehen des Handelns durch Wittgensteins Frage organisiert ist, ringen wir darum, Sinn aus dem spezifisch praktischen oder produktiven Charakter des Selbstbewusstseins im Handeln zu machen. Wo unser Verstehen des Handelns hingegen durch die Bestimmung eines Sinns der Warum-Frage organisiert ist, geraten die Bedeutung * Ich bedanke mich bei Matthew Boyle, Eric Marcus und Ram Neta für die hilfreiche Diskussion von Entwürfen dieses Aufsatzes. 1 Pynchon (1984), 397. 2 Zur Vermeidung von Missverständnissen merke ich an, dass sich die folgende Diskussion mit spezifisch absichtlichem Handeln beschäftigt, obwohl ich gewöhnlich bloß vom Handeln spreche. Dies ist eine terminologische Wahl.