Moral Error Theory

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of making such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical implications than reflections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgement has any effect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgement that individuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfil these conditions, and is thus neither beneficial nor harmful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral motivation to act against climate.

Introduction : la motivation morale 1. Les variétés de l'internalisme a. L'Internalisme Moral b. L'Internalisme du Jugement moral c. L'Internalisme des Raisons d'Agir 2. Une explication par la nature des faits moraux a. L'Internalisme Moral Non Naturaliste i. Les faits moraux causent une motivation nouvelle ii. L'objection de « l'étrangeté » des faits moraux b. L'Internalisme Moral Naturaliste i. Des faits moraux constitués par des états motivationnels ii. Quelques problèmes de l'Internalisme Moral Naturaliste 3. Une explication par la nature des jugements moraux a. Le Non-Cognitivisme i. La syntaxe des jugements moraux ii. Les raisonnements moraux valides iii. Les désaccords moraux b. Le Cognitivisme i. Le problème de la motivation morale ii. Un désir de dicto de « faire ce qui est juste » iii. Le désir d'avoir une image positive de soi iv. Une multiplicité de désirs favorables à l'action morale 4. Une explication par la nature des raisons d'agir a. Trois conceptions des raisons d'agir i. Le passage de la morale au normatif en général ii. Externalisme et Internalisme des Raisons d'Agir iii. Universalistes et individualistes b. Les raisons d'agir et la motivation c. Un argument en faveur de l'Internalisme des Raison d'Agir i. L'explication de l'action par les raisons ii. Critiques de l'argument aux trois niveaux d. L'Externalisme des Raisons d'Agir i. Les raisons d'agir existent indépendamment des états motivationnels des agents ii. Quelques difficultés de l'Externalisme des Raisons d'Agir iii. La normativité, les possibilités et les mathématiques Conclusion Bibliographie fiable et régulière à un changement dans les motivations. Formellement, la donnée empirique initiale s'exprime ainsi :

Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying 'Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it', which seems paradoxical. In defense of error theory, some have claimed that the word 'reason' in that statement is ambiguous between 'normative reason' and a purely descriptive sense of 'reason' that the error theorist can accept. I argue, however, that there is no descriptive sense of 'reason' that can prevent the paradox from re-emerging. Moreover, these implications of error theory probably provide good grounds for rejecting the view.

John Mackie argued that objective moral values and principles are queer and that we should not believe in their existence. As opposed to some more simplistic readings, in my paper I off er an interpretation of the argument as one that appeals to parsimony. In this interpretation the argument says that by believing in objective morality we break the principle of parsimony, according to which one should not postulate unnecessarily many and unparalleled kinds and particulars. I argue against this view by pointing out that the rules of reasoning would lead to the same kind of problems Mackie suggests objective morality leads to. In the paper I try to deal with several possible nuances of the argument from queerness and answer important counter-objections.

Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.

Anthropogenic climate change has already caused tremendous harm. However, without large-scale mitigative and adaptive measures, the current situation will prove to be only a weak foretaste of what is to come. Heat waves, storms, floods and droughts will be the death of millions of human and non-human beings. There will be migration movements across the globe, mass starvation and wars over water. Plant and animal species will die out. In the remote future, even the human race may become extinct.
Despite these horrible prospects, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did.
What can we do to overcome this collective inaction? In order to be able to develop effective measures it is first necessary to get clear about its. In this thesis I ask whether moral nihilism - the denial of moral truths - is a significant cause of climate change inaction. As far as I can see, the answer to this question primarily depends on three issues: first, on how many people in general are moral nihilists; second, on how many political and economic decision makers are; and third, on whether/to which extent being a moral nihilist reduces one’s likelihood of taking action against climate change at all.
Considerations about all three issues suggest that moral nihilism is far from significantly contributing to climate change inaction. Only few people are moral nihilists. The proportion does not seem to be higher among decision makers. And being a moral nihilist has only a very small effect on one’s climate related actions. 
Thus, in order to overcome humanity’s climate change apathy we should not fight moral nihilism. Rather, we should educate people about the existence and nature of the problem, we should make capitalism more sustainable, we should make climate change a moral issue and appeal to people’s moral and social emotions.

This essay compares two cognitivist accounts of ethical language, ethical naturalism and error theory. The essay concludes that ethical naturalism provides a stronger explanation of ethical language as Mackie's narrow definition of 'objectivity' is not sufficiently compelling to suggest that we should adopt the (less intuitive) view that all ethical statements are false.

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. (AJP Best Paper Award, 2009)

Moral error theorists argue that moral thought and discourse are systematically in error, and that nothing is, or can ever be, morally permissible, required or forbidden. I begin by discussing how error theorists arrive at this conclusion. I then argue that if we accept a moral error theory, we cannot escape a pressing problem – what should we do next, metaethically speaking? I call this problem the ‘what now?’ problem, or WNP for short. I discuss the attempts others have made to respond to the WNP, and in each case I show that the responses fail to be satisfying. I then propose a new response to the WNP, which I call revolutionary relativism. I define revolutionary relativism, explain why it is preferable to the existing responses to the WNP, and defend it against the most problematic objections I anticipate that opponents might raise. I conclude that revolutionary relativism succeeds where previous WNP responses fail, and that if we accept a moral error theory, we should become revolutionary relativists.

The effects of anthropogenic climate change will be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism (the denial of moral truths) is a significant cause of climate change inaction. The answer to this question depends mainly on the extent to which being a moral nihilist reduces one’s likelihood of taking action against climate change. At first sight, the extent seems to be considerable. I will argue, however, that this assumption is false. Only slightly more non-nihilists than nihilists are led to climate-friendly actions by moral considerations. And in absolute terms, morality plays such a minor role in leading people to act that the difference is barely noticeable.

Conference paper presented at the 2017 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind Association.

Abstract: Richard Joyce defends two metaethical claims: one, that we must embrace an error theory of morality and two, that having done so, we should adopt a fictionalist stance towards moral thought and discourse. Here, I grant the controversial claim that an error theory of morality is unavoidable, but object to the recommendation that error theorists should embrace revolutionary fictionalism.  I begin with a brief outline of the motivation for Joyce’s view.  I then present his view and make my objection to it.  I conclude that error theorists should look elsewhere for their next metaethical move.

The idea of theistic moral nihilism will no doubt strike many as absurd, even fundamentally confused. However, I argue rejecting moral truths is compatible with the fundamental commitments of orthodox monotheism: the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator God whose commands are authoritative. To show that this is not merely a logical oddity, I sketch a development of the view that grounds the authoritativeness of divine commands in a psychological hedonistic theory of sin and God’s omnibenevolence in omnisubjectivity. I then adduce some theoretical benefits of the view that bolster the case for taking it seriously.

My dissertation has three main parts. In the first I develop a commitment model of moral judgment. I argue that moral judgments and the broader discourse in which they take place can be understood in terms of the operation of distinct but interacting commitment strategies. To a first approximation, these strategies operate at the levels of individual and social psychology, and biological and/or cultural evolution. All commitment strategies provide motivational stability by reducing one’s (perceived) flexibility of action. Some such strategies are undertaken deliberately, such as when an addict signs a contract forcing her to donate money to a despised organization if she is caught using.
    However, the commitment strategies associated with moral judgments are rarely if ever conscious or deliberate. In fact, a central aspect of my commitment model holds that the peculiar motivational power of moral judgments is importantly connected to their power to deflect attention away from our actual motivations and values, and that this motivational strategy is undermined by an awareness of its workings. A primary goal of the first part is to explain (away) belief in intrinsic (nonrelational) value and practical reasons that are metaphysically independent of any person’s actual concerns.
    The second part is the third chapter and provides a positive defense of a neo-Humean view of practical rationality according to which all practical reasons and values are relative to some actual concern(s). I defend this view against rationalist (anti-Humean) objections, and then disgnose a common source of confusion among some of the most prominent rationalist conceptions of practical reason, namely their reliance on an untenable near-identification of willpower with rationality. A particular strength of my account is that it naturally explains how this highly problematic claim could seem so obviously correct as not to require any real defense.
    The final three chapters argue that moral discourse, due to its systematic deflection of attention from our motives, threatens to commit us in ways that are both radically at odds with our actual concerns and that motivate self-deception. As part of an an effort to better promote our (highest) values, I favor investigating and evaluating our actual values rather than our ostensible moral obligations.

An increasingly popular response to moral error theory is to deploy a ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy.  The basic idea behind this strategy is to show that moral error theoretic arguments prove too much: if sound, they support an (implausible) error theoretic position in areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie (2014a) has recently defended the very strong claim that CG arguments cannot work.  The basic problem, he thinks, is that there is a tension between two key premises in any CG argument.  I argue here that Cowie fails to show how, exactly, one of the CG arguments he takes as his target (Rowland 2013) does not work, specifically, how it is unsound.  I go on to show why the tension Cowie thinks is fatal to CG arguments evades the fundamental issue at stake in contemporary debates over moral error theory, namely, whether categorical normative reasons exist.

Suppose someone is brought up as an orthodox Jew, and so only eats kosher, is very conservative sexually, etc. Suppose they then find out that this Judaism stuff - at least in its orthodox, literal reading - is just all a big mistake. If they then regret all the fun they could have had, all the shrimp the could have eaten, all the sex!, - well, if they regret all this now, this makes perfect sense.
Suppose someone finds out that moral realism is false, or maybe even that Mackie was right. And they now regret all the fun they could have had hurting people's feeling, not helping, etc. – This doesn’t seem to make sense. And even if it does, there's a fairly strong disanalogy between the moral and the religious case. This asymmetry is, on a realist picture of morality, surprising. It calls for explanation.
In this paper, I try to explain it. The discussion engages some of the familiar objections to Robust realism form the literature – the why-be-moral challenge, the question whether it’s virtuous to be motivated by the moral de-dicto, and, perhaps most centrally, the question whether and why we should care about the moral properties, when those are understood along robust realist lines.

I argue that Jonas Olson’s argument from irreducible normativity is not a secure basis for an argument for error theory (section 1) and that a better basis is provided by the argument from supervenience, which has more bite against non-naturalist moral realism than Olson is willing to allow (section 2). I suggest there may be a view which can allow for the existence of irreducibly normative facts while remaining unaffected by the kinds of arguments that work against non-naturalist realism. This view is expressivism. Interestingly, James Dreier has recently suggested that expressivism may not escape these arguments. I very briefly outline (but do not pursue) possible response strategies for expressivists (section 3). I close by discussing Olson’s argument against expressivism. Olson suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that expressivism is a bad fit with a plausible evolutionary explanation of our moral thought. I argue that Olson’s argument does not succeed (section 4).

The possibility that nothing really matters can cause much anxiety, but what would it mean for that to be true? Since it couldn’t be bad that nothing matters, fearing nihilism makes little sense. However, the consequences of belief in nihilism will be far more dramatic than often thought. Many metaethicists assume that even if nothing matters, we should, and would, go on more or less as before. But if nihilism is true in an unqualified way, it can’t be the case that we should go on as before. And given some plausible assumptions about our psychology, it’s also unlikely that we would go on as before: belief in nihilism will lead to loss of evaluative belief, and that will lead to loss or deflation of our corresponding subjective concerns. Now if nothing matters, then this consequence also wouldn’t matter. But this consequence will be extremely harmful if we believe in nihilism but things do matter, an asymmetry that gives us, in Pascalian fashion, pragmatic reasons not to believe in nihilism, and reasons not to try to find out whether it is really true.

Proponents of the Epistemic Companions in Guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons.

Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly far-fetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn’t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue that reflection on this possibility should lead us to revise our understanding of the debate between realists and antirealists. It is not only that the realist’s semantic claim is insufficient for realism to be true, as Mackie argued; it’s not even necessary. Robust metaethical realism is best understood as making a purely metaphysical claim. It is thus not enough for antirealists to show that our discourse is antirealist. They must directly attack the realist’s metaphysical claim.

Herewith my notes to the second section of Russell on Ethics (9780 words) exploring Russell’s contributions to what we nowadays call Meta-Ethics. These deal with:
1) Russell’s admiring but critical response to Moore’s Principia Ethica. Russell  distinguished between  the Open Question Argument proper and what I call the Argument from Advocacy or later, following Russell himself, ‘the Barren Tautology Argument’ (See above, ‘Desiring to Desire’).  He also challenged Moore’ analytic consequentialism with an argument usually attributed to Ross  (though Moore later said print that it was Russell had who convinced him that he was wrong).
2) Russell’s pioneering versions of emotivism and the error theory.  In the case of emotivism, his theory is my view markedly superior to those of his better known successors, Stevenson and Ayer. His version of the error theory is undermined by his own semantic commitments, specifically his belief in what he calls the Fundamental Principle. 
3) Russell’s neo-Humean wobble from Human Society in Ethics and Politics.

Moral abolitionists argue that ordinary moral discourse has downsides substantial enough to warrant abandoning the discourse in favour of some replacement(s). Their most common critique is that the 'realist' character of moral discourse inhibits important forms of self-awareness. Until recently, metaethicists had operated on the assumption that abolitionism depends on error theory. To this day, there has been no discernible recognition that well-established metaethical views might strongly support abolitionism, despite rejecting error theory. Here I argue that expressivism supports abolitionism and fits very poorly with quasi-realism. That is because (1) the quasi-realist strategy for defeating error theory helps abolitionists by entailing that they have no need of error theory, (2) expressivist interpretations of belief in realism strongly support abolitionist critiques from self-awareness, and (3) there is an inherent instability between expressivism and quasi-realism, while abolitionism and expressivism fit very nicely together.

One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity; and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters (2011). It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe (and less likely to be believing what we ought not to believe, or to be failing to believe what we...

Since John Leslie Mackie's 'popularization' of moral error theories in meta-ethics, increasing attention has been focused on how to escape the conclusion that there are no moral facts. In this essay I argue that a Humean conception of normative reasons, is incompatible with the existence of categorical imperatives, without which morality lacks objectivity, i.e. authority. Finally, I argue that the Humean move to moral subjectivism, is just moral nihilism in disguise, as categorical imperatives are a necessary part of morality. The moral error theory remains inescapable for the Humean.

This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions.

A common line of thought in contemporary metaethics is that certain facts about the evolutionary history of humans make moral realism implausible. Two of the most developed evolutionary cases against realism are found in the works of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. In what follows I argue that a form of moral realism that I call proper-function moral realism can meet Joyce and Street's challenges. I begin by sketching the basics of proper-function moral realism. I then present what I take to be the essence of Street's and Joyce's objections and I show how proper-function realism answers them.

Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved faculty for moral judgement.

This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory or fictionalism though there are different ways of accepting some form of the view that nothing is really write or wrong. A range of different ways of going in the light of such a realization is also proposed. The resulting taxonomy of positions is quite complicated and sometimes surprising. One surprise will be that some positions plausibly classified as error theories or forms of fictionalism do not quite seem to be forms of nihilism.

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.

This is the published version of the paper. The author gratefully acknowledges permission on the part of the publisher (Brill) to post this version.

Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality.

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in  believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many popular versions of the moral error theory incompatible with the standard philosophical accounts of beliefs. Functionalism, normative theories of beliefs, representationalism, and interpretationalism all entail that being sensitive to thoughts about evidence is a constitutive feature of beliefs. Given that many moral error theorists deny that moral beliefs have this quality, their views are in a direct conflict with the most popular views about the nature of beliefs.

In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education.

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„Einen besonders interessanten Beitrag stellt Sara Di Giulios Analyse der Irreführung des Gewissens bei Kant dar. Der Beitrag bezieht zentrale volitionale Phänomene wie die praktische Selbsttäuschung und Selbstlüge sehr differenziert auf das Problem des Gewissens. Sehr zurecht verweist Di Giulio darauf, dass unsere Gewissenlosigkeit „einen Akt der Verweigerung gegen die Gewissensaufrufe oder mindestens ein schuldiges Unterlassen“ voraussetzt (266). […] Sehr überzeugend diskutiert Di Giulio am Ende ihres Beitrags verschiedene „Maßnahmen“, mit denen Kant versucht, unserem Hang zur Selbsttäuschung zu entkommen, und sie zählt dazu die „Herzenskündigung“ und die „Aufklärung der Gründe“ (279).“
(Rez. von J. Noller, in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch I 2022, 139–141.)

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S. Di Giulio geht in ihrem Beitrag der Frage nach, wie das oft zu beobachtende Phänomen zu erklären ist, dass der Mensch trotz Überzeugung von der Richtigkeit einer Handlungsoption eine andere wählt, die dem Eigeninteresse besser zu dienen scheint. Kant habe gesehen, dass dies durch einen Akt des Sichbelügens verursacht wird: Man wendet sich von dem, was man als Pflicht erkannt hat, ab und sucht ange¬nehmere, aber als Pflichtmaxime weniger wahrscheinliche Regeln auf. Dies Verfah¬ren sei kein anderes als das, was der moraltheologische Probabilismus empfiehlt. Darin sei zugleich eine gewissenlose Attitüde mangelnder Umsicht zu erkennen, weil man sich weigert, „alle möglichen Mittel einzusetzen, um zu einer moralisch richtigen Beurteilung zu kommen“ (266); oder eben auch ein Fall selbstverschulde-ter Unmündigkeit, der nur durch Stärkung der „Fähigkeit, die Gründe der eigenen Entscheidung selbständig zu bewerten“, entgegenzuwirken sei. Kant reklamiere daher in aufklärerischer Absicht einen neuen Sinn des kasuistischen Verfahrens als „einer kontinuierlichen, nie abgeschlossenen Übung in der Suche nach Wahr¬heit“ (282). Der Autorin gelingt auf diese Weise, mehrere Problembereiche der Kant- Forschung in einen schlüssigen Zusammenhang zu stellen, der das Feld für einen gelingenden Kongress abstecken konnte.
(Rez. von Burkhard Gerlach, in: Kant-Studien 114 (2023), 174–180.)

In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. In particular, in sections 2-4, we offer several objections to Streumer’s argument for the claim that we cannot believe the error theory. In section 5, we argue that even if Streumer establishes that we cannot believe the error theory, this conclusion is not as helpful for error theorists as he takes it to be.

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

This paper considers whether theism is compatible with moral error theory. This issue is neglected, perhaps because it is widely assumed that these views are incompatible. I argue that this is mistaken. In so doing, I articulate the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible. According to it, these views are incompatible because theism entails that God is morally good, and moral error theory entails that God is not. I reject this argument. Since it is the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible, I conclude that these views are compatible: one can coherently accept both views.

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. (2022). 14:3 1–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3485

Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's arguments against subjectivism. These defects could be repaired, but only by abandoning Russell's semantics.Russell preferred to revert to emotivism.

I argue that moral judgments function as commitment strategies that rely on a deflection of attention from our motivations and values. Revealing the hidden workings of these strategies allows me to illustrate and explain some of the widely unrecognized practical downsides of moral discourse. I recommend a departure from moral discourse in favor of paying more and better attention to our actual concerns. Important strengths of my approach over contemporary forms of moral abolitionism lie in my ability to sidestep moral error theories, my acknowledgement of the significant value of moral discourse, and thus the restricted target of my recommendation.

Here are some highly revisionary philosophical views: nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage such views. They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it's true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (error theorists), too. Recently, error theorists have recognized Moorean arguments as a powerful challenge and have tried to meet it. They've argued that moral Moorean premises seem highly credible to us, but aren't, by offering various debunking explanations. These explanations all appeal to higher-order evidence-evidence of error in our reasoning. I argue that drawing attention to higher-order evidence is a welcome contribution from error theorists, but that the higher-order evidence actually counts further against error theoretic arguments-including their debunking explanations-and further in favor of Moorean arguments and the commonsense views they support. Along the way I answer a few prominent objections to Moorean arguments in general: that they are objectionably question-begging, rely on categorizing some facts as "Moorean Facts", and that reports of one's credence in a proposition bears no interesting relation to that proposition's credibility.

I. INTRODUCTION 'I do not myself think very well of what I have said on ethics' wrote Russell in extreme old age (DBR, p. 132). And most subsequent philosophers have agreed with him. Either they do not think very well of what he said or they do not think of it at all. Until very recently, Russell hardly rated a mention in most books and bibliographies on 20th Century ethics. His most anthologized paper on the subject is 'The Elements of Ethics' (1910) in which he expounds, not his own ideas, but the ideas of his colleague and sometime friend, G.E.Moore (PE, ch. 1). Even dedicated Russell fans such as John Slater (Bertrand Russell (1994)) and Anthony Grayling (Russell (1996)) are a bit lukewarm about his theoretical ethics, whilst R.M. Sainsbury in his 'Arguments of the Philosophers' book Russell (1979), is positively dismissive: 'I have left aside his work on moral philosophy, on the grounds that in both its main phases, it is too derivative to justify a discussion of it'. In the first phase, represented by 'The Elements of Ethics' (1910), Sainsbury suggests that Russell's ideas were derived from G.E.Moore, and in the second, represented by Human Society in Ethics and Politics, they were 'close to Hume's, with a dash of emotivism'. (Sainsbury (1979), p. x.) In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell's 'work in moral philosophy' had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six 'main phases'; 2 2) that in some of those phases, it was not derivative, but on the contrary, highly original; 3) that Russell was a pioneer of two of the chief forms of ethical anti-realism that have dominated debate in this century, emotivism and the error theory (so that if the theory of HSEP was derived from emotivism, it was derived from a family of theories which Russell helped to create); 4) that the revolt against Hegelianism, which led to the birth of Analytic Philosophy, had an ethical dimension to it; and 5) that Russell played an important part in the debates that led up to Moore's Principia Ethica, the book which he summarizes in 'The Elements of Ethics'.