My research is primarily in metaethics and metanormative theory, especially the nature of normativity, practical reasoning, moral psychology, and the semantic and metaphysical foundations of ethics.
Stephen Finlay argues in this chapter that Angelika Kratzer’s influential introduction of an orde... more Stephen Finlay argues in this chapter that Angelika Kratzer’s influential introduction of an ordering source parameter into the semantics for natural language modals was a mistake, at least for English normative modals such as ‘ought’. A simpler semantics in a dyadic framework, motivated by the need for a satisfactory treatment of instrumental (or ‘anankastic’) conditionals, also provides the resources for a better accommodation of gradability and ‘weak necessity’, information-sensitivity, and conflicts, with three moves: (i) an end-relational analysis of normative modality, (ii) an analysis of ‘ought’ or ‘weak necessity’ in terms of most, and (iii) an appeal to the same pragmatic resources utilized by Kratzer. The chapter ends with metasemantic observations about what we should want from a semantics for ‘ought’
A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) norm... more A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the...
1 The publication of this paper is unfortunately untimely. Since it was originally written (2000-... more 1 The publication of this paper is unfortunately untimely. Since it was originally written (2000-2003), there has been an explosion of scholarly work on instrumental normativity. But while the progress in the dialectic makes some of this paper‟ s emphases and omissions seem ...
Value and reasons for action are ofien cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a de... more Value and reasons for action are ofien cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation ofien deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to sorne perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for sorne action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, 1 attack the alIeged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of oue desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between yalue judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the cennection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made frem the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motiyation. But ofien we conversationally bOITOW external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a cornmon practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, anaIyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests oyer others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent-in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to sorne particular set of desires. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 thank the members ofmy cornmittee, James Wallace, Gary Ebbs, Richard Schacht, and Jeff McMahan, for the many different ways in wmch they have helped me. 1 also received helpful advice on parts of the content from Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Linda Radzik, and Bill Schroeder, and have been rescued from administrative entanglements innumerable times by Judy Short. My greatest debt 1 owe to my wife Sarah and daughter Ashleigh, for their love, trust, and unselfish sacrifices. Any accomplishment in these pages has been achieved at greater cost to them than to me, and 1 am more grateful than 1 know how to express.
ABSTRACT: Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on... more ABSTRACT: Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements. As a New Zealander, my earliest forays into metaethics drew me inexorably towards error theory, that characteristically antipodean view.1 (One might idly speculate that this tendency explains why another New Zealander, Ar...
This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of n... more This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While it is suggested that the term may be multiply ambiguous, reasons are identified for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. Three main fissures are explored: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive normativity, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.
An initial, naïve formulation of the natural idea that disagreement requires inconsistent proposi... more An initial, naïve formulation of the natural idea that disagreement requires inconsistent propositions is Inconsistent Belief: B's assertion/belief that p disagrees (agrees) with A's assertion/belief that q iff p and q are logically inconsistent (equivalent). If an assertion or belief of B's disagrees with one of A's, then by extension B himself can be said to disagree with A herself in that respect. This can be said in a familiar sense even where there isn't any interaction between them, though talk about "disagreement" may sometimes suggest it. Consider the following scenario 1 : Two Gun Roulette. Angie has been kidnapped by Sadie, who tells her that Angie will be tortured to death unless she plays a special game of Russian Roulette. She must choose between two six-chambered revolvers, L to her left, and R to her right. L has been loaded randomly with one round, R with three rounds. Angie must aim her chosen revolver at her head and pull the trigger once. If she survives she will be released unharmed. She has no other realistic options. Evidently, Angie could appropriately conclude her deliberations by saying, A: 'I ought to use L, not R.' (Deliberation) The end-relational semantics (ERT) accommodates this as assertion of the true proposition that she is more likely relative to her information to survive unharmed if she uses L than if she uses R. Now let's supplement the scenario: Advice: Bertie is a fellow captive who has all Angie's information plus the following: since the revolvers were loaded, five captives have played Sadie's game. (In this version, the cylinders are spun once upon loading but not between each use.) All five chose L and survived. Bertie has one opportunity to whisper briefly in her ear, but not enough time to share this information.
David Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity... more David Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (c) their lack of moral responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in his argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths' emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgments. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. I then propose an alternative perspective on psychopaths' moral and criminal responsibility.
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing "detaching problems" by their failure to license... more Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing "detaching problems" by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for "ought". The semantics for "ought" that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for "ought" provides a more satisfactory solution. Certain intuitive normative principles raise puzzles about the meaning of "ought" that continue to vex ethical philosophy. These principles take the form of conditionals, but detaching their consequents by modus ponens yields unacceptable results. Section 1 examines three principles and the detaching problems they present. I show that solving these problems forces us to postulate indefinitely many different senses for "ought", which presents a further problem. How can the one word have so many different meanings? How can we manage to distinguish all these different senses, so as to be able to identify the relevant one in any case? This paper is partly remedial; I point out that the standard semantics for "ought" widely accepted by linguists (following Kratzer 1977, 1981), of which ethical philosophy is still largely ignorant, provides resources that allow us to (i) accommodate and differentiate these different senses of "ought" in a single semantic theory, and (ii) explain why the troublesome principles do not license detachment of their consequents. But I also demonstrate that a variant on the standard semantics (combining a comparative probabilistic [CP] theory of the semantic core of "ought" with an end-relational [ER] theory of normative or "deontic" content) can satisfy these and additional desiderata, providing an account that is also (iii) semantically simpler, (iv) more unifying, (v) better able to accommodate and explain the principles examined in Section 1, and (vi) metaethically reductive, analyzing "ought" sentences without using normative terms. This
Stephen Finlay argues in this chapter that Angelika Kratzer’s influential introduction of an orde... more Stephen Finlay argues in this chapter that Angelika Kratzer’s influential introduction of an ordering source parameter into the semantics for natural language modals was a mistake, at least for English normative modals such as ‘ought’. A simpler semantics in a dyadic framework, motivated by the need for a satisfactory treatment of instrumental (or ‘anankastic’) conditionals, also provides the resources for a better accommodation of gradability and ‘weak necessity’, information-sensitivity, and conflicts, with three moves: (i) an end-relational analysis of normative modality, (ii) an analysis of ‘ought’ or ‘weak necessity’ in terms of most, and (iii) an appeal to the same pragmatic resources utilized by Kratzer. The chapter ends with metasemantic observations about what we should want from a semantics for ‘ought’
A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) norm... more A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the...
1 The publication of this paper is unfortunately untimely. Since it was originally written (2000-... more 1 The publication of this paper is unfortunately untimely. Since it was originally written (2000-2003), there has been an explosion of scholarly work on instrumental normativity. But while the progress in the dialectic makes some of this paper‟ s emphases and omissions seem ...
Value and reasons for action are ofien cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a de... more Value and reasons for action are ofien cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation ofien deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to sorne perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for sorne action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, 1 attack the alIeged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of oue desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between yalue judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the cennection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made frem the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motiyation. But ofien we conversationally bOITOW external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a cornmon practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, anaIyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests oyer others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent-in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to sorne particular set of desires. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 thank the members ofmy cornmittee, James Wallace, Gary Ebbs, Richard Schacht, and Jeff McMahan, for the many different ways in wmch they have helped me. 1 also received helpful advice on parts of the content from Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Linda Radzik, and Bill Schroeder, and have been rescued from administrative entanglements innumerable times by Judy Short. My greatest debt 1 owe to my wife Sarah and daughter Ashleigh, for their love, trust, and unselfish sacrifices. Any accomplishment in these pages has been achieved at greater cost to them than to me, and 1 am more grateful than 1 know how to express.
ABSTRACT: Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on... more ABSTRACT: Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements. As a New Zealander, my earliest forays into metaethics drew me inexorably towards error theory, that characteristically antipodean view.1 (One might idly speculate that this tendency explains why another New Zealander, Ar...
This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of n... more This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While it is suggested that the term may be multiply ambiguous, reasons are identified for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. Three main fissures are explored: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive normativity, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.
An initial, naïve formulation of the natural idea that disagreement requires inconsistent proposi... more An initial, naïve formulation of the natural idea that disagreement requires inconsistent propositions is Inconsistent Belief: B's assertion/belief that p disagrees (agrees) with A's assertion/belief that q iff p and q are logically inconsistent (equivalent). If an assertion or belief of B's disagrees with one of A's, then by extension B himself can be said to disagree with A herself in that respect. This can be said in a familiar sense even where there isn't any interaction between them, though talk about "disagreement" may sometimes suggest it. Consider the following scenario 1 : Two Gun Roulette. Angie has been kidnapped by Sadie, who tells her that Angie will be tortured to death unless she plays a special game of Russian Roulette. She must choose between two six-chambered revolvers, L to her left, and R to her right. L has been loaded randomly with one round, R with three rounds. Angie must aim her chosen revolver at her head and pull the trigger once. If she survives she will be released unharmed. She has no other realistic options. Evidently, Angie could appropriately conclude her deliberations by saying, A: 'I ought to use L, not R.' (Deliberation) The end-relational semantics (ERT) accommodates this as assertion of the true proposition that she is more likely relative to her information to survive unharmed if she uses L than if she uses R. Now let's supplement the scenario: Advice: Bertie is a fellow captive who has all Angie's information plus the following: since the revolvers were loaded, five captives have played Sadie's game. (In this version, the cylinders are spun once upon loading but not between each use.) All five chose L and survived. Bertie has one opportunity to whisper briefly in her ear, but not enough time to share this information.
David Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity... more David Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (c) their lack of moral responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in his argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths' emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgments. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. I then propose an alternative perspective on psychopaths' moral and criminal responsibility.
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing "detaching problems" by their failure to license... more Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing "detaching problems" by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for "ought". The semantics for "ought" that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for "ought" provides a more satisfactory solution. Certain intuitive normative principles raise puzzles about the meaning of "ought" that continue to vex ethical philosophy. These principles take the form of conditionals, but detaching their consequents by modus ponens yields unacceptable results. Section 1 examines three principles and the detaching problems they present. I show that solving these problems forces us to postulate indefinitely many different senses for "ought", which presents a further problem. How can the one word have so many different meanings? How can we manage to distinguish all these different senses, so as to be able to identify the relevant one in any case? This paper is partly remedial; I point out that the standard semantics for "ought" widely accepted by linguists (following Kratzer 1977, 1981), of which ethical philosophy is still largely ignorant, provides resources that allow us to (i) accommodate and differentiate these different senses of "ought" in a single semantic theory, and (ii) explain why the troublesome principles do not license detachment of their consequents. But I also demonstrate that a variant on the standard semantics (combining a comparative probabilistic [CP] theory of the semantic core of "ought" with an end-relational [ER] theory of normative or "deontic" content) can satisfy these and additional desiderata, providing an account that is also (iii) semantically simpler, (iv) more unifying, (v) better able to accommodate and explain the principles examined in Section 1, and (vi) metaethically reductive, analyzing "ought" sentences without using normative terms. This
According to the Reasons-as-Explanations-of-Goodness hypothesis (REG), the concept of a normative... more According to the Reasons-as-Explanations-of-Goodness hypothesis (REG), the concept of a normative reason for an agent S to perform an action A is that of an explanation why it would be good (in some way, to some degree) for S to do A. REG has numerous virtues, but faces some significant challenges which prompt many philosophers to be skeptical that it can correctly account for all our reasons. This paper demonstrates how five different puzzles about normative reasons can be solved by attention to the concept of goodness, and in particular observing the ways in which it—and consequently, talk about reasons—is sensitive to context (ends and information). Rather than asking simply whether or not certain facts are reasons for S to do A, we need to explore the contexts in which it is and is not correct to describe a certain fact as “a reason” for S to do A. These five puzzles concern: (1) reasons for attitudes of the “right kind”, (2) normative facts as reasons, (3) evidence as reasons, (4) subjective reasons, and (5) attitudes as reasons.
Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, K. Toh (eds).
This paper attempts to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of... more This paper attempts to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the term ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for
metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. I explore three main fissures: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive, and (iii) formal versus robust.
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Papers by Stephen Finlay
metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. I explore three main fissures: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive, and (iii) formal versus robust.