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Eric Sampson

Purdue University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Philosophy, Graduate Student

Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, Faculty Member

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I'm an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. Previously, I was a postdoc at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics (2020-2021) and Rhodes College (2021-2023).

I received my Ph.D. in philosophy in 2020 from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I'm interested in ethics, epistemology, PPE, and analytic philosophy of religion.

My research is unified by, and is a response to, the nagging thought that we might be wrong about everything we think is important. I've written about whether the existence of widespread moral and political disagreement discredits our views about those topics, whether morality is invented or discovered, arguments for and against moral nihilism, existential risk, the epistemology of political partisanship, and the nature of intellectual courage.

Website: erictsampson.com

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Papers by Eric Sampson

Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context

Acta Analytica, 2022

People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lot... more People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is "yes." But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues "no." On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent's resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical rationality apply to all agents needs revision. I argue that Morton's arguments fail on empirical and philosophical grounds. What's at stake? If Morton is correct, poverty relief agencies ought to redesign their incentives so resource-scarce agents can rationally respond to them. If I'm correct, resource-scarce agents do act irrationally in the cases under discussion, and we shouldn't be shy about saying so. Instead of declaring them rational, we should try to understand the causes of their irrational behavior and help them better succeed by their own lights.

What if Ideal Advice Conflicts? A Dilemma for Idealizing Accounts of Normative Practical Reasons | Philosophical Studies

One of the deepest and longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro ques... more One of the deepest and longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro question: are choiceworthy things choiceworthy because agents have certain attitudes toward them or are they choiceworthy independent of any agents' attitudes? Reasons internalists, such as answer in the first way. They think that all of an agent's normative reasons for action are grounded in facts about that agent's pro-attitudes (e.g., her desires, valuing states, normative judgments). According to the most popular brand of internalism, idealizing internalism, an agent's reasons are grounded, not in her actual pro-attitudes, but rather in what her pro-attitudes would be in suitably idealized conditions. Idealizing internalists presuppose that, for any agent with an irrational set of attitudes, there is one uniquely rational set that that agent would have if she were to undergo the relevant idealizing process. I argue that this assumption is false and that it raises two puzzles for idealizing internalism: one about the existence of practical reasons and another about their normative weight. I argue that idealizing internalists have an adequate solution to the first puzzle but not the second. Indeed, when they try to solve the second puzzle, they confront a dilemma. This second puzzle and the associated dilemma thus constitutes a powerful, but so far unnoticed, difficulty for idealizing internalism.

The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement | Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 14

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 2019

Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) ... more Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. I argue that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the other premises. On reflection, this should not be surprising. Proponents of these arguments seek to derive a very strong metaphysical or epistemological conclusion about morality (e.g., that there are no moral facts, that none of our moral beliefs are epistemically justified). They must therefore employ very strong metaphysical or epistemological premises. But, given the pervasiveness of disagreement in philosophy—especially about metaphysics and epistemology—very strong premises are almost certain to be the subject of widespread, intractable disagreement. And this is precisely the sort of disagreement that proponents of these arguments think undermine moral claims. If so, then these arguments undermine their own premises. If the argument presented in this paper is sound, it provides realists a single, unified strategy for responding to arguments from disagreement. It also provides a challenge for any future arguments from disagreement that philosophers might advance.

Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons | JESP

We often speak as though reasons for action come in various strengths or weights. But the notions... more We often speak as though reasons for action come in various strengths or weights. But the notions of normative strength and weight are metaphors for some underlying normative reality. Any plausible theory of reasons and their strengths will need to cash out these metaphors. In Being Realistic about Reasons, T.M. Scanlon offers a novel theory of strength. On Scanlon's view, the strengths of reasons are often determined by counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that Scanlon’s appeal to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view and that we should, therefore, look elsewhere for a theory of normative strength.

On Believing the Error Theory | Journal of Philosophy

In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it i... more In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. In particular, in sections 2-4, we offer several objections to Streumer’s argument for the claim that we cannot believe the error theory. In section 5, we argue that even if Streumer establishes that we cannot believe the error theory, this conclusion is not as helpful for error theorists as he takes it to be.

Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness

by Justin Morton and Eric Sampson

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the a... more In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.

Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness | Res Philosophica (a special issue on moral nonnaturalism)

by Eric Sampson and Justin Morton

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the a... more In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.

Drafts by Eric Sampson

Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense | Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 17

Here are some highly revisionary philosophical views: nihilism about motion, time, truth, conscio... more Here are some highly revisionary philosophical views: nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage such views. They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it's true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (error theorists), too. Recently, error theorists have recognized Moorean arguments as a powerful challenge and have tried to meet it. They've argued that moral Moorean premises seem highly credible to us, but aren't, by offering various debunking explanations. These explanations all appeal to higher-order evidence-evidence of error in our reasoning. I argue that drawing attention to higher-order evidence is a welcome contribution from error theorists, but that the higher-order evidence actually counts further against error theoretic arguments-including their debunking explanations-and further in favor of Moorean arguments and the commonsense views they support. Along the way I answer a few prominent objections to Moorean arguments in general: that they are objectionably question-begging, rely on categorizing some facts as "Moorean Facts", and that reports of one's credence in a proposition bears no interesting relation to that proposition's credibility.

Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context

Acta Analytica, 2022

People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lot... more People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is "yes." But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues "no." On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent's resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical rationality apply to all agents needs revision. I argue that Morton's arguments fail on empirical and philosophical grounds. What's at stake? If Morton is correct, poverty relief agencies ought to redesign their incentives so resource-scarce agents can rationally respond to them. If I'm correct, resource-scarce agents do act irrationally in the cases under discussion, and we shouldn't be shy about saying so. Instead of declaring them rational, we should try to understand the causes of their irrational behavior and help them better succeed by their own lights.

What if Ideal Advice Conflicts? A Dilemma for Idealizing Accounts of Normative Practical Reasons | Philosophical Studies

One of the deepest and longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro ques... more One of the deepest and longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro question: are choiceworthy things choiceworthy because agents have certain attitudes toward them or are they choiceworthy independent of any agents' attitudes? Reasons internalists, such as answer in the first way. They think that all of an agent's normative reasons for action are grounded in facts about that agent's pro-attitudes (e.g., her desires, valuing states, normative judgments). According to the most popular brand of internalism, idealizing internalism, an agent's reasons are grounded, not in her actual pro-attitudes, but rather in what her pro-attitudes would be in suitably idealized conditions. Idealizing internalists presuppose that, for any agent with an irrational set of attitudes, there is one uniquely rational set that that agent would have if she were to undergo the relevant idealizing process. I argue that this assumption is false and that it raises two puzzles for idealizing internalism: one about the existence of practical reasons and another about their normative weight. I argue that idealizing internalists have an adequate solution to the first puzzle but not the second. Indeed, when they try to solve the second puzzle, they confront a dilemma. This second puzzle and the associated dilemma thus constitutes a powerful, but so far unnoticed, difficulty for idealizing internalism.

The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement | Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 14

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 2019

Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) ... more Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. I argue that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the other premises. On reflection, this should not be surprising. Proponents of these arguments seek to derive a very strong metaphysical or epistemological conclusion about morality (e.g., that there are no moral facts, that none of our moral beliefs are epistemically justified). They must therefore employ very strong metaphysical or epistemological premises. But, given the pervasiveness of disagreement in philosophy—especially about metaphysics and epistemology—very strong premises are almost certain to be the subject of widespread, intractable disagreement. And this is precisely the sort of disagreement that proponents of these arguments think undermine moral claims. If so, then these arguments undermine their own premises. If the argument presented in this paper is sound, it provides realists a single, unified strategy for responding to arguments from disagreement. It also provides a challenge for any future arguments from disagreement that philosophers might advance.

Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons | JESP

We often speak as though reasons for action come in various strengths or weights. But the notions... more We often speak as though reasons for action come in various strengths or weights. But the notions of normative strength and weight are metaphors for some underlying normative reality. Any plausible theory of reasons and their strengths will need to cash out these metaphors. In Being Realistic about Reasons, T.M. Scanlon offers a novel theory of strength. On Scanlon's view, the strengths of reasons are often determined by counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that Scanlon’s appeal to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view and that we should, therefore, look elsewhere for a theory of normative strength.

On Believing the Error Theory | Journal of Philosophy

In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it i... more In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. In particular, in sections 2-4, we offer several objections to Streumer’s argument for the claim that we cannot believe the error theory. In section 5, we argue that even if Streumer establishes that we cannot believe the error theory, this conclusion is not as helpful for error theorists as he takes it to be.

Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness

by Justin Morton and Eric Sampson

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the a... more In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.

Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness | Res Philosophica (a special issue on moral nonnaturalism)

by Eric Sampson and Justin Morton

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the a... more In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.

Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense | Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 17

Here are some highly revisionary philosophical views: nihilism about motion, time, truth, conscio... more Here are some highly revisionary philosophical views: nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage such views. They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it's true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (error theorists), too. Recently, error theorists have recognized Moorean arguments as a powerful challenge and have tried to meet it. They've argued that moral Moorean premises seem highly credible to us, but aren't, by offering various debunking explanations. These explanations all appeal to higher-order evidence-evidence of error in our reasoning. I argue that drawing attention to higher-order evidence is a welcome contribution from error theorists, but that the higher-order evidence actually counts further against error theoretic arguments-including their debunking explanations-and further in favor of Moorean arguments and the commonsense views they support. Along the way I answer a few prominent objections to Moorean arguments in general: that they are objectionably question-begging, rely on categorizing some facts as "Moorean Facts", and that reports of one's credence in a proposition bears no interesting relation to that proposition's credibility.