Military Planning

Inside the Chaco War, which faced Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935), it has been analyzed, first, that component factors of the Operational Environment exerted more influence on the military leadership of Paraguay at the Operational level and how this materialized in the plans and operations developed. As a result of this analysis, it is possible to establish that the elements that conditioned the plans and operations to a greater extent were, on the one hand, the geographical environment, where water availability was vital and, on the other hand, military factors.
Also, in the framework of planning and conducting operations, the different Elements of Operational Design were identified and analyzed, emphasizing their application and the results achieved during the conflict. As a corollary to this process, it can be determined that the Paraguayan operational commander within his conception of the campaign, put into practice the so-called Operational Art, where he played the different elements of the operational design and managed to efficiently structure the actions in space, time and purpose to create and then maintain the necessary conditions to achieve the Operational Objective and consequently, reach the Desired Final State.
Therefore, it is feasible to assert that the right application of the Elements of Operational Design, within a difficult and complex Operational Environment, allowed Paraguay to successfully wage the military campaign.
Keywords
Operational Design - Elements of operational design - Operational environment - Campaign

Defeat Mechanisms either in concept or in practical application are intended to provide stratagems for achieving victory over an opponent, how to articulate desired effects on the enemy, describe singular action or patterns of activities by which a force defeats his opponent, and are complimentary to Centre of Gravity analysis. In reality they are an intangible concept intended to assist in sequencing effects to render an enemy force incapable of operating at the operational or the tactical level.

Against the backdrop of Morini's 2010 article focused on the need to take regional perspectives into account when articulating an Afghan strategy, and in light of the harried 2021 withdrawal, argues for the use of what Dr. Jeffrey Reilly calls, "Strategic Design," taught within Air Command & Staff's Joint All-Domain Strategist Concentration (JADS), a parallel process designed to either validate strategy as received or propose one when it is missing, in preparation for the more familiar operational design process.

Esta investigación incursiona en un nivel de guerra poco conocido en 1982, y ampliamente estudiado en el día de hoy: el nivel operacional de la guerra en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur.(Autores: de Vergara, Evergisto, Demierre, Luis A y Ortiz, JU)

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) evolved rapidly after the mid-1990s because of advances in technology. Joint doctrine attempted to respond to the advances in technology and the growing power of geographical information system (GIS) tools. However, the doctrine changes did not address the planning requirements for GIS. Planners need guidance that enables them to specify requirements and parameters needed by GIS analysts to exploit GEOINT.

Exploiting GEOINT supports timely and accurate decision-making across the range of military operations. To determine specific guidance for planners, the research first needed to identify common operational decisions that require GEOINT support. Faced with a large number of operational missions, the research was narrowed to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). The research further was limited to HA/DR operations that respond to natural disasters, specifically earthquakes. John Boyd's concepts helped conceptualize an approach to model time-critical decisions muddled by complexity. The research examined a specific earthquake event to determine the linkages between GEOINT support, timely decision-making, and human suffering. The 7.0-magnitude 2010 Haiti earthquake case study revealed the common operational decisions that require GEOINT support. The Haiti case study also identified factors that delayed HA/DR decision-making. However, Haiti's observations did not fully validate HA/DR requirements. Further validation required comparing a hypothetical disaster scenario with the Haiti experience to determine whether the Haiti lessons could be generalized. The selected scenario focused on a great earthquake near Juba, South Sudan. Using ArcGIS Desktop 10.2, the author populated a geodatabase with real-world GEOINT, designed GIS-based spatial analysis models, and fused the model outputs into a common operational picture (COP).

The research revealed three common operational decisions tied to logistics that emerge during HA/DR operations that require GEOINT. The decisions affect campsite selection, food distribution point (DP) selection, and landing zone (LZ) and drop zone (DZ) selection. These decisions must be accurate and occur within the first seventy-two hours after an earthquake. The decisions directly aid survivors while earning the population's support. The South Sudan scenario validated the utility of GEOINT and GIS tools in support of the common HA/DR decisions. The research also illuminated the instructions planners must communicate to GEOINT analysts to enable their work.

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, a military theorist of the twentieth century, started to formulate his concept of the strategy of indirect approach based on the analysis of military history, which was summarized in the study of warfare theory published in 1941 and reprinted in an enlarged edition of 1954. According to B. H. Liddell Hart, an indirect approach is an essence of the strategy because of its advantages over direct military action. The goal of an indirect approach is the dislocation of the enemy’s forces before attempting to defeat him. Thus, the indirect approach can be defined as a whole of applicable measures that can be used in peace and at war while avoiding a costly direct frontal assault.   
In the interwar period, the state of Lithuania had to face a wide range of threats to its nationhood that were directed against Lithuania by eventual enemies in a full-scale manner. In its turn, Lithuania also applied measures of the indirect approach seeking to defend its statehood and strategic interests. Territorial losses and Soviet occupation resulted neither from military defeats nor a poor preparation by the armed forces for an armed resistance; indeed, it was an outcome of an effective use of the strategy of indirect approach by the aggressors.
The monograph provides an analysis of how a symbiosis of conventional and unconventional warfare methods can be and have been effectively used at different stages of the war and confrontation. The interwar period saw the application of an indirect approach with the use of both conventional and unconventional methods. The research has been done based on the case study of Lithuania in the interwar period using methodological approach of the strategy of indirect approach with its adaptation to the conditions of a small state in the first half of the twentieth century. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned warfare concepts, the research into military history of interwar Lithuania has been conducted by bringing in an analysis of the activities not only of regular forces and paramilitary organisations but also of a wide range of indirect approach, when there is no direct fighting involving armies of adversary states but a state is exposed to external attacks whereby it is sought to weaken its defence capabilities (moral, conceptual (planning), physical and material). 
The chronological framework of the research encompasses a period from 1918 to 1940, i.e. from active war efforts aimed at the consolidation of the independence of Lithuania to Soviet occupation and the liquidation of the Lithuanian army and paramilitary organisations. The main objective of the research is to study actions involving the strategy of indirect approach (relying on both conventional and unconventional warfare methods) used by the adjacent states (Poland, Germany and Soviet Russia (USSR)) targeted against Lithuania, and their impact on the loss of Vilnius and Klaipėda regions and the loss of statehood in 1940, and the capability to apply the strategy of indirect approach by the Lithuanian state. The aims of the research include an analysis of the cases of using the strategy of indirect approach through the use of conventional weapons; an examination of the impact on the Lithuanian society exerted by social and economic problems; a study of the activities of the national minorities and the Communist underground as well as pro-German individuals directed against Lithuania; and the identification and assessment of military solutions undertaken by the Lithuanian state in the late 1930s when the inevitability of war and incapacity of a direct resistance under conditions of conventional war came to be realised.

The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated.
This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design.

In the fateful years of 1938 – 1940 the Lithuanian Government failed to resort to armed resistance. It is still being argued whether Lithuania had any chances and was prepared, on its own, for the armed defence of its sovereignty. There is no answer as yet to what extent Lithuania was prepared to offer armed resistance and whether the plans developed for such eventuality by the army headquarters would have proved effective. The historiography dedicated to the armed forces of the First Lithuanian Republic insufficiently dealt with the issues related to the headquarters’ activities and strategic plans. The defence plans in case of war between Germany and Klaipėda region (Memel Territory) or entire Lithuania had not been investigated. The article, therefore, aims to investigate the strategic plan developed by the Lithuanian army headquarters for the eventual war with Germany.
Until the changes in the military authorities of 1934, Lithuania was not actually ready for effective defence. In 1935 the army headquarters developed two strategic plans, “L” (Poland) and “V” (Germany), and continually improved them. Mobilization schemes No. 11, 12 and 14 were drawn up for mobilization needs. The mobilized army at
the beginning of 1939 was intended to include 5 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry regiments, 12 border guard battalions, air force, technical corps, 6 reserve battalions with artillery and military services.
The headquarters foresaw a possible attack by Germany aimed at the occupation of Klaipėda region or entire Lithuania. The border guard battalions composed of border police and riflemen units in concert with covering forces were supposed to stage defence by retreating, thus securing the mobilization of the main forces. The intended main line of defence was to be located on the Dubysa – Nemunas – Kaunas line using rivers and the obsolete military fortress of Kaunas. Germany could have blocked up the port of Klaipėda and launch an assault, while Lithuania, without naval forces and coastal artillery supply roads at its disposal, would have been incapable to prevent such scenario. Due to the animosity of Klaipėda region to the government of Lithuania, the military authorities planned covering actions in the territory of Greater
Lithuania only. From 1939 onwards, the headquarters did not plan to announce mobilization in Klaipėda region in the event of war.
The main lines of advance by German forces were supposed to be: the Kybartai – Kaunas, Tilsit – Tauragė –Šiauliai lines, since it would have taken 5–7 days for the Germans to reach the Kaunas – Dubysa – Šiauliai line.

After the withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces from Lebanon in 2005, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to operationalize their capability development. Despite the lack of top-down, strategic policy guidance to inform force posture, doctrine, and resourcing, the LAF has worked with external security assistance donors to produce two five-year Capabilities Development Plans (CDPs), for 2013–2017 and 2018–2022.


As the LAF works towards its third CDP (2023–2027), it faces overlapping challenges tied to human capital, strategic direction, governance, and socioeconomic instability. These coincide with the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on foreign assistance budgets, which only further complicate a prepandemic waning of international interest in Lebanon.

The article deals with the Lithuanian Army Headquarters defence plans for the Klaipeda Region (Memel Territory) and Klaipeda city against Germany of the 1930’s, providing for their implementation options in the event of military conflict between Lithuania and Germany.  The article also provides data on the Lithuanian armed forces at disposal in 1939, the size of the forces deployed in the Klaipeda Region and on its border, the Army Headquarters plans to use these military forces and possible scenarios of the events.  Seeking for connections with the military doctrine, an overview of the condition and potential significance for the sea frontier defence of the Lithuanian Navy is given.

Military decision-making is, at its core, about making predictions.  Current military decision-making doctrine, however, does not support the making of good predictions.  This doctrine is overly dependent on the expertise of influential and hierarchically powerful individual commanders.  But hobbled by their own limited understanding of their environment, commanders are forced to rely on heuristics to provide some boundaries to the complex scenarios in which they are forced to operate.  The staffs assigned to support the Commander suffer from institutional biases, which while they can help protect against the foibles of individuals stricken with cognitive biases, they suffer from parallel institutional faults which similarly hinder their ability to make correct predictions, and thereby correct decisions.  Prediction markets overcome the cognitive and group decision making biases endemic to military decision-making better than other predictive techniques.

This report presents the review of workforce planning applications of operations research and explores potential modelling of military training. We classify the operations research techniques applied in workforce planning into four major branches: Markov chain models, computer simulation models, optimisation models and supply chain management through System Dynamics. For each of these, we outline the underlying mathematical formalism and concepts, overview models published and discuss potential limitations. The prospect of modelling training forces via System Dynamics is demonstrated by a causal-loop analysis of the military officer system and a simulation model based on a stock-flow diagram for a one-rank officer training system.

In combat, commanders and their staffs fight a battle against time. Today, more than ever before in the history of warfare, rapid decision-making is required at the tactical level of war. The increased tempo of 2 1st century warfare will demand that the commander and his staff rapidly execute a command-staff process that assesses, analyzes, decides and provides a plan-of-action in minimum time. Developing a workable plan in minimum time requires well-trained staffs and decisive commanders. It is a task that takes extensive education and effective training. Thorough understanding of the methods to train the command-staff team in the art of battle command, therefore, are matters of primary interest to military professionals. Surprising little has been written on how to train military staffs in the command-staff process at the tactical level of combat. "While much has been written about how great commanders and their troops respond to war, comparatively little work has been done on how a modem staff plans, coordinates and conducts operations." Most of what is written concerning staff training in theUnited States Army and Marine Corps involves training for analytical decision-making -- a process that is often inappropriate in fast-tempo, time-constrained combat operations. Repetition in producing orders is as far as most training programs go to prepare commanders and staffs for combat command­ staff operations. There is little information on how to train a commander and staff in rapid, recognitional decision-making.

The first military doctrine in Lithuania during the interwar period was
drafted in 1922. The doctrine is the basic belief on which the state military system is based and where the rules on how to train soldiers and how they must fight are laid down. Having summarised the experience of war and of other operating armed forces and technology innovations, the guidelines for the development, maintenance, armament, planning, education and military training of armed forces in order to ensure national security were provided in the military doctrine. Military doctrine itself can be understood as the theory of warfare and its implementation (compliance) in view of rapid time changes – as practice. The reparation, development and implementation of doctrines require one to think about the future, to consider the time issues and opportunities, and to rely on historical experience.
During the inter-war period, the Lithuanian Army followed and reflected on the theory of warfare of European countries. Within two decades, almost 150 officers were sent to study in Western European military schools; the majority of them studied in France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. In this way, the traditions and experience of the French military school, with consideration to the specifics of Lithuania, were adopted. In 1934, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Kazys Grinius assessed the Blitzkrieg strategy in the Lithuanian military periodicals stating that it was the possibility of industrialised countries, and a small country such as Lithuania was able to respond to it by rapid mobilisation involving paramilitary and sports organisations. Having summarised the experience of the fights for Lithuania’s independence and of European warfare, in 1939, Major of the General Staff Vytautas Bulvičius, who prepared a textbook for university students, comprehensively discussed the theory of Total War by General E.F.W. Ludendorff, the theory of Tank (mechanized) War by Major General J.F.C. Fuller and the theory of Air War by Major General G. Douhet, and the military capabilities of Lithuania.

Vojni načrti Kraljevine Italije proti Avstro-Ogrski do vstopa v prvo svetovno vojno
I piani di guerra del Regno d’Italia contro l’Austria-Angheria fino
all’entrata nella Prima guerra mondiale
Italian War Plans against Austria-Hungary before entry into World War On

This report is a practical guide for military staff officers involved in the planning, execution and assessment of military operations where protection of civilians is or may become an objective. It aims to help bridge the gap between the importance of protecting civilians in today’s military operations and the lacking ability to do so on the ground. This guide provides guidance on which aspects to consider during different phases of a regular planning process, as well as advice on ‘how’ military forces can be used to protect civilians.

We hereby draw readers’ attention to two historical sources related to the military history of Lithuania in the interwar period. The first document is a brief overview of the military activities of the Lithuanian armed forces that took place in Lithuania in 1919–1923, prepared in 1926. Based on 1927 data (and subsequently improved) in the struggle against three enemies (the Red Army, the Polish armed forces, and the Western Volunteer Army), the Lithuanian armed forces and the Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga (Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union) suffered 6,167 casualties in
1919–1923. These included 221 officers, 223 non-commissioned officers, 5,282 privates, and 441 riflemen. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, no detailed study on the course and the results of these armed conflicts was published in the interwar period in Lithuania, although research was conducted on the issue, and in 1937 the army even commissioned
a history of the war of independence for Reserve General Kazys Ladiga. We present a chronological list of the military events of 1919–1923 in Lithuania that was prepared for internal military use for several reasons. First, we are trying to address a problem that historians have so far gone no further into than developing a description of the events. At the same time, we ask what the armed struggle for Lithuanian statehood should be called, and how long it lasted. The terms ‘independence war’, ‘struggle for independence’ and ‘wars of independence’ were used simultaneously and synonymously in the interwar period. But none of these terms is used in the published document from 1926. The document is also interesting because its unknown author extends the description of the fighting of 1919–1920, when the most intense battles with the Red Army, the West Russian Volunteer Army and the Polish forces took place, until 1923. Thus, he adds to the previous period the phase of collisions between Lithuanian and Polish paramilitary formations, and armies in the neutral, demilitarised zone. But maybe the war had not finished at all? After all, during the interwar period, Lithuania was at least de jure in a state of war with Poland for two decades, especially since it applied martial law (for internal reasons) for almost all of this time.
Regardless of how we deal with the issues of dating and naming the war of independence, it is clear that neither in 1920 nor in 1923 was the struggle for the desired borders complete. This is evident from the second source, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Operation Plan No 3 ‘L’ (for Lenkija, Poland), approved in 1937. At that time, the Lithuanian armed forces had two more plans at their disposal: No 1 ‘V’ (for Vokietija, Germany) and No 2 ‘V+L’ (Germany+Poland). The document is interesting and valuable for three reasons. Firstly, it allows us to determine what operational ideas the Lithuanian armed forces had developed in the event of a war with Poland. The plan was approved in 1937, so it is likely that the Lithuanian army would have applied it in March 1938, if the government had ignored Poland’s ultimatum and the latter had decided to resort to military force. Secondly, the document reveals the operational concepts of the Lithuanian armed forces, and their general attitude towards warfare in the late 1930s, a period when there were already quite a few senior officers in the Lithuanian armed forces who had studied in West European (mainly French, Belgian and Czechoslovakian) military academies. Thirdly, the document may be a source for analysing why Lithuania did not resist the 1940 Soviet occupation. In the event of an eventual conflict with the Soviet Union, another operational plan had to be carried out, namely Operation Plan ‘R’. We know that it was prepared in 1939, but the document itself has not yet been found. However, from information about its preparation, it is clear that Operation Plan ‘R’ was a slightly modified version of the ‘L’ plan. So, until the ‘R’ plan is found, it is logical to refer to the ‘L’ plan and/or other documents in order to understand its content.

Esse artigo apresenta a relação entre a Ciência e a Arte Operacional, que vem sendo questionada nos Estudos da Guerra por séculos. Ele examina essa relação por meio de uma metodologia que emprega uma pesquisa baseada em revisão literária, explorada com métodos mistos de investigação na busca de respostas. Assim, o artigo conclui que a Arte Operacional proporciona ao Comandante Operacional uma margem de criatividade e influência pessoal no processo de planejamento de uma Campanha ou Operação Militar. Ela permeia toda a Ciência Operacional desse planejamento, onde esta evidencia seu aspecto de racionalidade. Essa Ciência também pode se expressar no Planejamento Operacional por meio do Design Operacional, que tem nos seus conceitos o elo vital entre a Ciência e a Arte Operacional. Entretanto, o Design Operacional britânico ainda apresenta uma abrangência maior que o Desenho Operacional brasileiro, que é apenas uma representação gráfica da síntese da Linha de Ação escolhida pelo Comandante Operacional.

The "study" of 1905, "The next war in Germany" was implemented by the German Army Lieutenant Colonel Baron von der Osten-Sacken-Rhein, and it was published in Berlin in 1905. The purpose of this study was to instill in German public opinion, the belief that Germany had a pressing need to increase the units of the army and navy to be able, if it was necessary to cope with success France and Russia,  relying on its own merits. The formulation of the Schlieffen Plan at the same time, shows that the author wanted to calculate the pros and cons in the light of European political reality. The author believes, with ostentatious security, that the Kingdom of Italy wouldn’t have kept the Triple Alliance, but it would have passed, with all probabilities, to the enemy camp.

Анализ вопроса о том, как британская армия выполняла функцию "имперской полиции" в 1920-е гг., и как это отразилось на ее подготовке ко Второй мировой войне.
The analysis of question, how the British army performed the "imperial police" function in the 1920s, and how it influenced its preparations for the Second World War.

La planificación y ejecución de todas las operaciones militares siempre han contemplado entre sus aspectos más relevantes, el concepto de Seguridad. Sin embargo, la evolución de la doctrina, fruto del permanente cambio que caracteriza al arte de la guerra, ha vuelto más compleja la noción tradicional de la Seguridad y ha incorporado la idea de la Protección. Este precepto va mucho más allá de la mera observancia y cumplimiento de las medidas de seguridad de las instalaciones, medios y tropas o de la ejecución de tareas tácticas destinadas a proporcionar la alerta temprana sino que también contempla todas las actividades necesarias para proteger y asegurar el poder de combate propio, el personal, los equipos e información de las acciones del enemigo. Estos nuevos conceptos doctrinarios han tenido su origen en los primeros años del siglo XXI, cuando la creciente complejidad de la guerra y las diferentes capacidades tecnológicas al alcance de un enemigo no convencional, llevaron al ejército de los EE.UU. y luego a las fuerzas de la OTAN, a redefinir los conceptos de Seguridad y Protección. Palabras claves Seguridad, Protección, Funciones de combate, Planeamiento, Operaciones militares, Doctrina militar.
Summary: The planning and execution of all military operations have always considered the concept of Security among its most relevant aspects. However, the evolution of the doctrine, the result of the permanent change that characterizes the art of war, has made the traditional notion of Security more complex and has incorporated the idea of Protection. This precept goes far beyond mere observance and compliance with the security measures of the facilities, equipment and troops or the execution of tactical tasks aimed at providing early warning but also includes all the necessary activities to protect and ensure the own combat power, personnel, equipment and information of the enemy's actions. These new doctrinal concepts have had their origin in the first years of the 21st century, when the increasing complexity of the war and the different technological capabilities within reach of an unconventional enemy led the US Army and then to NATO forces, to redefine the concepts of Security and Protection. Keywords 1 Artículo publicado en la Revista de la Academia de Guerra del Ejército Ecuatoriano (Vol. 13), en Abril de 2020.

Die sicherheits- und geopolitische Situation in Europa nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer 1989 verlangte nach der Mitarbeit der Europäischen Union (EU) in der autonomen Friedenssicherung im europäischen Umfeld. Um ihren heterogenen Mitgliederkreis auf
dieses gemeinsame Ziel einzuschwören, benötigte die Union wiederum einen Aufga­ben- und Regelkatalog: Als Petersberg- oder GSVP-Aufgaben sind diese 1992 aufge­stellten Regeln zu einiger Berühmtheit gelangt. Im Folgenden werden die GSVP-Aufga­ben analysiert, in einen größeren und aktuellen Zusammenhang gestellt sowie Implikationen für die Institutionen der militärischen und öffentlichen Sicherheit bespro­chen. Mit dem Ziel eines besseren Verständnisses dieser Aufgaben gliedert sich dieser Beitrag in vier aufeinander aufbauende Einheiten: Abschnitt 2 zeigt die Entwicklung des Aufgabenkatalogs, der, anfangs von den Ereignissen eingeholt, gegenwärtig einen
vollständigen Raster möglicher EU-Einsätze darstellt. Abschnitt 3 bettet den Katalog in eine materielle „GSVP-Doktrin“ und zeigt Schnittstellen zum Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts, Abschnitt 4 analysiert die GSVP-Aufgaben und die Erneue­
rungen der GSVP nach Lissabon anhand ihrer einschränkenden oder befähigenden poli­tischen Wirkung. Zu guter Letzt entwirft Abschnitt 5 aus den gewonnenen Informatio­nen wahrscheinliche Grundsätze für Szenarien und verbindet diese mit der Diskussion
um die Zukunft der GSVP mit Implikationen für die Institutionen der militärischen und öffentlichen Sicherheit.

Artykuł umieszczony jest w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych, tworzonej przez Muzeum Historii Polski w Warszawie w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w Internecie dzięki wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach dofinansowania działalności upowszechniającej naukę. * Problem ten był wielokrotnie podnoszony w literaturze, zwłaszcza pamiętn karskiej; obok relacji wyraźnie niechętnych Piłsudskiemu i jego otoczeniu (np.

The British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 -- Operation Palliser -- offers lessons on peacekeeping, diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and information operations.  "Information and communications" is one of the key four capability sets needed by a mass atrocity prevention force (MAIF).  In this case, audiences included indigenous victims, perpetrators, bystanders, regional actors, members of the force, and the international community.  Fully resourced Public Diplomacy teams must be part of the deployment.

The relations of Lithuania and Poland in the interwar years were tense and even hostile due to occupation of the Vilnius Regions by Poland, thus it is natural that Poland for a lengthy time was identified as the main enemy in the Lithuanian military doctrine. The situation changed roughly in 1934 when Germany joined the list of eventual adversaries and with the lapse of time became the main threat; however, Poland continued to be regarded as a significant threat in the public discourse. Essential structural and planning as well as military training reforms were launched in the Lithuanian Army in 1935, and in 1937 three new operational plans were approved: No. 1 “V” (Germany), No. 2 “V+L” (Germany + Poland) and No . 3 “L” (Poland). The first plan provided for the defensive actions in the event of offensive by Germany and the second plan in the event of the German and Polish joint offensive, this plan, however, was essentially intended for the event of a large-scale warfare in the region. The third plan was designed to counter the threat by Poland. Lithuanian was essentially preparing for defensive war in the thirties of the 20th century. The plans for both operations and financing of war effort and requisition of property in the event of war were prepared; and special regulations were passed to govern relations between the army and civil population in the case of war. In 1938 Lithuania in the event of war planned to mobilise 4 infantry divisions and 2 brigades (16 infantry and 6 artillery regiments), 12 border guard battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, 3 reserve cavalry squadrons, 6 reserve infantry battalions, one reserve artillery regiment, tank, communication and engineering units.  5 infantry divisions, 1 brigade (17 infantry regiments) and the mentioned units should have been made available at the beginning of 1939. In the event of war the numerical force of the Lithuanian army should have reached about 150 000 men plus riflemen units and police.
The comparison of the military strength of Lithuania and eventual enemy Poland clearly demonstrates that due to a different size of the countries the Polish strength significantly exceeded that of Lithuania (1 x 11,8); however, if these data are compared with respect to the population size the ratio changes in favour of Lithuania (1 x 0,86). This, however, does not imply that Lithuania was capable to wage war with Poland and win on her own; this is mere evidence that Lithuanian forces were not relatively inferior to those of the probable enemy and that much attention was given to the armed forces and military security in Lithuania.

To assist officers attending the Combat Officers Advanced Course (COAC), Combat Command Wing (CCW) staff developed tips on both preparation for and performance on the course. While prepared principally for junior officers, this article contains valid lessons for commanders at all levels.

Contributing Authors:
Major Benny Gray
Major Graham Sowiak
Major Keiran Jackel
Major Alex Bearse
Major Jon Bennett
Major Sam Anderson

Our current conflicts require action across all domains: the physical, information and cognitive. However, one must ask if the idea of ‘messaging and narrative’ has been over emphasised to the detriment of real actions. Is Information Operations (IO) the new black?

This online article discusses the importance of social frames and how both physical actions and information operations must interact to create a narrative overall - not just "lethal" and "non-lethal" actions. Such a narrative must align with social frames, else they will be ignored or perceived to be negative. This is relevant to not only operations, but also Building Partner Capacity and Campaign Planning.

Over the years, military planning has attracted a lot of attention by researchers with the aim of providing automated planning support tools. There have been some successes (e.g., DART system which was used for movement during Gulf war) however, to-date, planning still remains a very human activity with little or no automated support tools. Why? A possible reason for this predicament is that researchers have not fully conceptualized the problem. For instance, a common approach has been to consider planning as a single process or a homogenous set of problems to be solved. Unfortunately, military planning is not a single activity but a set of heterogeneous but interrelated activities that are carried out by different set of planners working at different times and locations. These activities may be conceptually quite different It is therefore proposed that military planning should be viewed as a capability, which consists of diverse activities aimed at producing a set of coordinated pl...

I forkant av frigjøringen utførte den norske militærattacheen i Sovjetunionen Arne Dahl oppgaver som lignet på oppgavene til militærattacheer fra andre antifascistiske land. Den norske militærattacheen koordinerte samarbeidet mellom den norske eksilregjeringen i London og den sovjetiske overkommandoen.

La planificación y ejecución de todas las operaciones militares siempre han contemplado entre sus aspectos más relevantes, el concepto de Seguridad. Sin embargo, la evolución de la doctrina, fruto del permanente cambio que caracteriza al arte de la guerra, ha vuelto más compleja la noción tradicional de la Seguridad y ha incorporado la idea de la Protección.Este precepto va mucho más allá de la mera observancia y cumplimiento de las medidas de seguridad de las instalaciones, medios y tropas o de la ejecución de tareas tácticas destinadas a proporcionar la alerta temprana sino que también contempla todas las actividades necesarias para proteger y asegurar el poder de combate propio, el personal, los equipos e información de las acciones del enemigo.Estos nuevos conceptos doctrinarios han tenido su origen en los primeros años del siglo XXI, cuando la creciente complejidad de la guerra y las diferentes capacidades tecnológicas al alcance de un enemigo no convencional, llevaron al ejérc...

Defence capabilities are hard to gain and expensive to maintain. Therefore, the decisions concerning defence investments are hard to take. Furthermore, even the best investment may become obsolete when adversary finds an asymmetric way to nullify it’s feasibility in battlefield. The process of creating scenarios, assessing military situations, designing system of systems capabilities and wargaming them to see their feasibility in confrontation takes time, expertise, and effort. One wonders if modern computing power, accumulating data and deep neural networks may help in accelerating the evaluation process. Is there a way to automate the evaluation of defence capabilities impact and accelerate the decision making on defence investments?

The article analyses the former prospects of armed resistance to Soviet occupation in 1940. It discusses Plan “R” of the Lithuanian Armed Forces prepared for the case of a military conflict with the USSR. The article reveals the positions in which the Lithuanian Armed Forces were planning to confront the enemy from the east and southeast. It provides theoretical insights on the likely level of resistance to the Soviet occupation, the directions and pace at which military actions could have taken place.

During the interwar period, and bearing in mind its long and open borders, the Lithuanian army was preparing for a war of manoeuvres. In addition, Poland was considered to be one of the main military enemies, which had numerous mobile cavalry forces. Given these circumstances, on the one hand it was necessary to have mobile units. Mass motorisation of the Lithuanian army due to the country’s low level of motorisation, poorly developed road network and limited material resources was impossible. On the other hand, during the interwar period, other European countries had not yet completely abandoned the cavalry, and some had very numerous cavalry forces. This in turn led to attempts to increase the cavalry forces in the Lithuanian army too.

Is the world, truly, into a situation of a clash of civilizations? Or is it into a situation of a world civilization of international cultural misunderstanding? In fact, international relations are in its roots “inter-national “ cultural relations, namely on political and economical issues, and this means finding solutions for problems from a certain cultural point of view diverse from others. Cultural understanding is a true clue to minimize tensions between countries and elude war. Socio-cultural intelligence is a crucial factor in this context, and, from a strictly national point of view, it is a powerful tool to downgrade victims in a war situation and even maximize success of operations. For that - to produce such intelligence - it is necessary to have a comprehensive cultural theory of international relations that foresees its growing complexity and opposed positions and perceptions of what we can define as national cultural powers.