Aram Nerguizian
Aram Nerguizian is a senior associate with the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he conducts research on strategic and military dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa.
Nerguizian is also senior advisor to the Program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States at the Carnegie Middle East Center, where his work focuses on the Lebanese security sector, long-term force transformation in the Levant, and efforts to develop national security institutions in post-conflict and divided societies.
Nerguizian is a leading authority on the Lebanese armed forces and advises civil-military leadership within bilateral and multilateral efforts tied to Lebanon. He is the author of numerous publications, including most recently: The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy (2017), The Military Balance in a Shattered Levant (2015), Between Sectarianism and Military Development: The Paradox of the Lebanese Armed Forces (2015), The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability (2014), and U.S-Iranian Competition in the Levant (2013). His books on Israeli-Syrian military balance and force developments in the Maghreb appeared in 2008 and 2009.
Nerguizian received his M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and his B.A. in political science from Concordia University in Montreal. He has also received security assistance training from the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS).
Nerguizian is also senior advisor to the Program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States at the Carnegie Middle East Center, where his work focuses on the Lebanese security sector, long-term force transformation in the Levant, and efforts to develop national security institutions in post-conflict and divided societies.
Nerguizian is a leading authority on the Lebanese armed forces and advises civil-military leadership within bilateral and multilateral efforts tied to Lebanon. He is the author of numerous publications, including most recently: The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and Military Legitimacy (2017), The Military Balance in a Shattered Levant (2015), Between Sectarianism and Military Development: The Paradox of the Lebanese Armed Forces (2015), The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability (2014), and U.S-Iranian Competition in the Levant (2013). His books on Israeli-Syrian military balance and force developments in the Maghreb appeared in 2008 and 2009.
Nerguizian received his M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and his B.A. in political science from Concordia University in Montreal. He has also received security assistance training from the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS).
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This chapter first provides a brief overview of the postwar LAF. It then unpacks the multisectarian character of Lebanon’s military before describing Lebanese civil-military relations. Next, it describes some of the broader touchstones of US Lebanon policy before describing some of the key drivers of current patterns of US security assistance/cooperation to the LAF. The chapter proceeds to describe some of the principal lines of effort the United States is engaged in with the LAF. It then assesses some of the main limits of US security assistance/cooperation to the LAF before conversely exploring some of the LAF’s challenges in absorbing aid from the United States. The chapter then looks at Iran’s own parallel effort to support its own local ally Hezbollah, followed by concluding observations.
Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War shows how a dangerous new conflict between both nations would cripple all strides in strategic gains and Israeli-Syrian diplomacy. On the other hand, peace negotiations would offer a safer, more productive relationship. Israel and Syria need to consider the true nature of their military balance and the undermining effect to both nations as well as the costs and risks of any future conflict. Although Syria does retain important options in terms of asymmetric and proxy conflicts, it would fail in its attempt to recapture the Golan. While Israel would almost certainly win a future war, it cannot make gains from acquiring more Syrian territory and a new war would create major problems with its neighbors and in dealing with the Palestinians.
The risk of a new Israeli-Syrian conflict is so serious that both sides need to understand the true nature of their military balance, and the costs and risks of any future conflict. Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War shows how dangerous a new conflict could be, that neither side can make lasting strategic gains from a future conflict, and that peace negotiations offer a far safer and more productive option. It provides a detailed and current picture of the military capabilities of Israel and Syria, reflecting the changes and lessons of the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006 and other recent conflicts. Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War provides extensive analysis, supported by tables and charts, on the trends in military spending, arms imports and technology transfers, military manpower, weapons, and orders of battle. By going beyond military balance analysis, Cordesman examines the probable nature and results of a future war and how the readiness, capability, tactics, and technology on each side would shape its outcome.
Papers by Aram Nerguizian
As the LAF works towards its third CDP (2023–2027), it faces overlapping challenges tied to human capital, strategic direction, governance, and socioeconomic instability. These coincide with the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on foreign assistance budgets, which only further complicate a prepandemic waning of international interest in Lebanon.
The commander’s speech was the first open criticism voiced by a senior military official against the political class since Lebanon’s collapse began in late 2019. It was also a signal that the military had crossed the Rubicon. The commander spoke at 10:00 AM. At noon, President Michel Aoun called on the army to clear the streets. By 5:00 PM no action had been taken. Therefore, Lebanon appears to have entered the unknown in terms of civil-military relations.
As uncertainty transforms into a protracted cycle of civil unrest, the military faces a key test: It can either maintain the confidence of the large number of protesters, or it can backtrack and trigger a potential catastrophe on a scale few can predict, let alone fully understand.
This chapter first provides a brief overview of the postwar LAF. It then unpacks the multisectarian character of Lebanon’s military before describing Lebanese civil-military relations. Next, it describes some of the broader touchstones of US Lebanon policy before describing some of the key drivers of current patterns of US security assistance/cooperation to the LAF. The chapter proceeds to describe some of the principal lines of effort the United States is engaged in with the LAF. It then assesses some of the main limits of US security assistance/cooperation to the LAF before conversely exploring some of the LAF’s challenges in absorbing aid from the United States. The chapter then looks at Iran’s own parallel effort to support its own local ally Hezbollah, followed by concluding observations.
Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War shows how a dangerous new conflict between both nations would cripple all strides in strategic gains and Israeli-Syrian diplomacy. On the other hand, peace negotiations would offer a safer, more productive relationship. Israel and Syria need to consider the true nature of their military balance and the undermining effect to both nations as well as the costs and risks of any future conflict. Although Syria does retain important options in terms of asymmetric and proxy conflicts, it would fail in its attempt to recapture the Golan. While Israel would almost certainly win a future war, it cannot make gains from acquiring more Syrian territory and a new war would create major problems with its neighbors and in dealing with the Palestinians.
The risk of a new Israeli-Syrian conflict is so serious that both sides need to understand the true nature of their military balance, and the costs and risks of any future conflict. Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War shows how dangerous a new conflict could be, that neither side can make lasting strategic gains from a future conflict, and that peace negotiations offer a far safer and more productive option. It provides a detailed and current picture of the military capabilities of Israel and Syria, reflecting the changes and lessons of the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006 and other recent conflicts. Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War provides extensive analysis, supported by tables and charts, on the trends in military spending, arms imports and technology transfers, military manpower, weapons, and orders of battle. By going beyond military balance analysis, Cordesman examines the probable nature and results of a future war and how the readiness, capability, tactics, and technology on each side would shape its outcome.
As the LAF works towards its third CDP (2023–2027), it faces overlapping challenges tied to human capital, strategic direction, governance, and socioeconomic instability. These coincide with the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on foreign assistance budgets, which only further complicate a prepandemic waning of international interest in Lebanon.
The commander’s speech was the first open criticism voiced by a senior military official against the political class since Lebanon’s collapse began in late 2019. It was also a signal that the military had crossed the Rubicon. The commander spoke at 10:00 AM. At noon, President Michel Aoun called on the army to clear the streets. By 5:00 PM no action had been taken. Therefore, Lebanon appears to have entered the unknown in terms of civil-military relations.
As uncertainty transforms into a protracted cycle of civil unrest, the military faces a key test: It can either maintain the confidence of the large number of protesters, or it can backtrack and trigger a potential catastrophe on a scale few can predict, let alone fully understand.
After Dawn of the Jurds, LAF senior commanders and their U.S. and U.K. counterparts are more than comfortable stating that the campaign was conducted with no cooperation or coordination between the LAF and Hezbollah. On the contrary, the LAF’s solo campaign was so successful, that elements close to Hezbollah sought to actively take credit retroactively for the LAF’s successes, and/or promote a narrative of secret coordination between the LAF, Hezbollah and the Assad regime.
Dawn of the Jurds may have lasting implications for a national security debate long-dominated by Hezbollah’s military preeminence. The LAF’s rapid and professional execution of the counter-ISIS campaign – without anyone’s help, and certainly not with the help of the Syrians or Hezbollah – has shattered the narrative in the minds of many Lebanese that Hezbollah is Lebanon’s sole preeminent national security actor. Presented with such a singular challenge to its self-styled resistance and national security narrative, Hezbollah needed a cease-fire agreement to hasten the withdrawal of ISIS from the Lebanese-Syrian frontier and to consolidate its own reputation. In short, the battle against ISIS in Lebanon may be over, but the war over Lebanon’s national security narrative has only just begun.