Iran nuclear program

In June 2016, the European Union launched its new ‘Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy’. In less unusual times, it would have been received as merely the latest iteration of the main tenets and ambitions of EU external action, this time with an enhanced dose of pragmatism to respond to a more challenging international environment. However, with the contours of ‘Brexit’ becoming clearer and the start of the Trump Presidency in the United States, the EU’s Global Strategy has acquired a whole new level of significance. This paper argues that while meant to express a largely uncontroversial consensus, it now needs to be recontextualized as a distinctive vision in the face of trends of anti-globalism and Euroscepticism. This concerns in particular its emphasis on rules-based global governance. Challenged by both President Trump ‘America First’ policy and the British government’s course for a ‘hard Brexit’, the Global Strategy represents a blueprint and rallying point for a continued pursuit of a liberal world order based on the rule of law.

The security apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran-that is the combination of those institutions and organizations that are responsible for internal and external security including matters of national defense and intelligence-differs slightly from other authoritarian regimes as it combines revolutionary and state institutions. Hence forces like the army and police are balanced by ideological units like the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Corps), the revolutionary committees and irregular forces (Hezbollahis). The result is a cohabitation of a numerically strong but technologically obsolete conscript army and police force with an overlapping network of intelligence and paramilitary forces. Limited military capacities are compensated with anti-imperialist revolutionary rhetorics. Hence the US remains enemy no: 1 notwithstanding the completion of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA Joint Common Plan of Action) with the E3+3. Until now, US-Iranian alignements of interests in the region (the stabilization of Iraq, the fight against the Islamic State) were not sufficiently substanciated to result in strategic reassessment. National Security is largely defined as regime security. As commander-in-chief the Supreme Leader appoints the higher echelons of military commanders, some of them on suggestion of the president. Parliamentary oversight of the armed and security forces is ensured as all ministers including the ministers of defence, intelligence and interior must be confirmed by parliament. By law the minister of intelligence must be a cleric occassionally the ministry of Interior too has been led by clerics. Political oversight and ideological indoctrination are the responsibilities of the representatives of the Supreme Leader who are present at all echelons and ideological and political offices. The latter are responsible for the obligatory ideological review of all public servants (gozinesh). Additionally in all private and public organizations and institutions the establishment of security offices (daftar-e herasat) is mandatory. In military organizations protection and intelligence organizations or offices (daftar/sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat), function as intelligence and counter-intel force. In the army, these units exist in addition to the staff positions responsible for military intelligence and security. The Corps' protection and intelligence organization (sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat SHE) has developped an organizational and political life of its own; at the Law Enforcement Forces (police NAJA) a similar SHE exercises the functions of internal audit and state police. Additional surveillance units are the parastatal Basij and the irregular Hezbollahis. The latter act as moral police but proofed difficult to control. Since 1992, they are organized in a private umbrella organization called Ansar-e Hezbollah, whose influence the Ruhani government tries to curb. Coordination and separation of responsibilities is regulated by a number of laws. The main strategic decision making body is the "Higher National Security Council HNSR" chaired by the President. In HNSR key ministers and military commanders are represented. Sensitive security policy decisions are taken in the informal " Council of the heads of the three powers " (legislative/head of parliament, executive/president and judicial/head of justice). Matters of internal security are taken in the "State Security Council" headed by the Interior Minister. Conflicts of competence exist between the Ministry of Interior, the Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence and the Corps' intelligence service SHE. The development of the Iranian intelligence services is not yet complete it is a unification of most departments of the old SAVAK with revolutionary forces. According to the law the

Despite the historic distrust between Iran and United States, signing of a landmark nuclear deal emerged as a hope for regional and international stability. This deal is supported by global powers and covered by UN Security Council Resolution but the unilateral withdrawal of Trump administration and Iran's partial withdrawal raised serious concerns for all stakeholders. However, Joe Biden's election as the US president brings hope that the deal will be revived. The victory of Iranian hardliners in the Parliamentary Elections of 2020 and the success of a conservative president in 2021, presents a gloomy scenario. The paper addresses the factors responsible for mutual distrust between the two nations and how, Tehran and Washington managed to overcome it for reaching a nuclear deal? The paper looks into the future of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It highlights the attempts made to halt the Iranian nuclear program and emphasizes the significance of an Iranian Nuclear Deal. The options for Iran in the nuclear context are also under discussion in the wake of a recent rapprochement between Israel and Arab States.

The Yemen, is the birth place and hub for a number of monotheistic religious convictions . In its North West region, just 243 kilometers away from San'aa, the official capital of the Republic of Yemen , lies a spiritual center, a holy metropolis known as Saa'da  .
It is to Zaidi Islam as Qum is to Shia Islam and Mecca is to Sunni Islam. It is where the scholars dwell, to read, learn and teach their disciples to carry on the doctrine and preserve the faith throughout history.
It is here that the Houthi phenomenon first appeared.
This study focuses on the very beginnings of Houthism as a phenomenon, it's source and affiliations. It is but the first part of a series of papers that will delve into the movement as it expands over time.

السؤال الأساسي للورقة وفق ما تمّ تكليفي به هو "هل سيصمد الاتفاق النووي الايراني؟". طبعا لا يمكن أن تكون الإجابة على هذا السؤال الافتراضي قاطعة في ظل المعطيات الحالية التي تتضمن كمّا هائلا من المعطيات المجهولة و/أو المتحرّكة، لكن من الممكن تحديد العوامل التي ستؤثر الآن او لاحقا على الاتفاق النووي وبالتالي توصلنا الى الاجابة على السؤال هل سيصمد الالتفاق النووي مستقبلا ام لا؟

الاجابة على هذا السؤال تعتمد بالدرجة الأولى  برأيي على أربعة عناصر أساسية هي:
1) توجهات الرئيس الأمريكي القادم: وهو امر لا نعرفه حتى الآن، ولكننا نعرف على الاقل دوافع الرئيس الحالي لعقد الاتفاق.
2) سلوك النظام الايراني ونواياه الحقيقة: وهو أمر نعرف على الأقل بعض جوانبه من خلال تاريخ النظام الايراني الحالي ومن خلال تجاربه لاسيما في البرنامج النووي ومن خلال دوافعه.
3) موقف الاطراف الاقل استفادة من الاتفاق النووي او الاكثر تضررا منه: ولدينا فكرة مبدئية عن موقف هذه الاطراف كروسيا واسرائيل وبعض الدول العربية.
4) بنية الاتفاق النووي نفسه: هل هي قوية متماسكة واضحة، مزوّدة بضمانات تجبر الاطراف على الالتزام به ومسلّحة بنظام رادع يجبر الاطراف على التفكير مرتين قبل خرقه أو تجاوزه او التلاعب به؟ أم انها ضعيفة فيها الكثير من الثغرات والحلقات المنفصلة عن بعضها البعض التي تتيح خرق الاتفاق او تشجّع على التلاعب به او الغش والخداع؟

أي عنصر من هذه العناصر منفردا أو بالاجتماع مع العنصر الآخر أو مع جميع العناصر من شأنه ان يحدد مصير الاتفاق وعمّا اذا كان سيصمد أو لا.  باستطاعتنا ان نناقش كل نقطة من هذه النقاط وكيف يمكن ان تؤثر على الإتفاق.  لكن بسبب طبيعة الورقة التحليلة وحجمها المحدود، سيتم التركيز بشكل أساسي على النقطة الاخيرة وهي بنية الاتفاق النووي نفسه لانها الشي الوحيد المثبت والنهائي والواضح حتى الآن.

The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be explained most convincingly by realist theory. Although other theories may have seemed to offer insight into Iran’s foreign policy decisions and behavior following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, they are inferior in their contemporary explanatory power. This paper contends Iranian state behavior since 1979 has moved from one guided primarily by Islamic revolutionary zeal that, over time, has yielded to the power realities with which most modern states must contend. Specifically, Iran’s choices and consequent actions thirty-three years hence reveal realist proclivities, while simultaneously maintaining the rhetoric of Islamic revolutionary appeal for domestic (and transnational) consumption. Further, where threatening public pronouncements raise the specter of an irrational regime seeking nuclear weapons, it is far from certain to be so. At the core, such inflammatory rhetoric is more apt to be the product of efforts toward domestic power consolidation coupled with a public relations campaign, which seeks support in the form of ideological consonance abroad. The net result seems to be an effort directed at state survival and power maximization in the face of a self-perceived security deficit.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Part III: Biological Weapons Programs

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

October 28, 2008

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Adam C. Seitz, that summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The third working draft in the series is also now available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081028_iranbw_chapterrev.pdf

It covers the capabilities and uncertainties of Iran’s biological weapons program, as well as the problems posed by the ease of access to dual-use technology, and Iran’s ambiguous BW strategy and intentions. It also lays out biological attack scenarios, as well as the obstacles to weaponization of biological agents and possible delivery options for Iran.

The State Department's comprehensive analysis of the threats emanating from the Iranian regime across its missile program, support for terrorism, illicit financial activities, nuclear program, human rights abuses, threat to cybersecurity, and environmental exploitation.

The lengthy negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program finally ended with the signing of the agreement on July 14, 2015, with Iran and the six countries that have negotiated with Iran over Iran's nuclear program since 2006 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany - known collectively as P5+). 1) Finalize the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Now in 2021, we observe another round of these more complex sets of negotiations, following the fallout from the 2015 agreement.
While the most difficult negotiations are underway in Vienna, the so-called Round Seven, we try to anticipate the results in light of the expectations of the key players.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Part V: The Broader Strategic Context

by Anathony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

December 8, 2008

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The most current draft is now available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_IranNucStratCon.pdf
This draft is key to understanding the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD programs.
Iran has found that an overall asymmetric strategy would be most beneficial to maintaining balance of power and expanding its power and influence in the Middle East region. This strategy has also enabled the Iranian government and military to operate more covertly, both in terms of building capabilities for covert, proxy, and indirect warfare, and in developing a possible nuclear weapons program.

Tehran focused its defense efforts on creating a force structure to pursue an asymmetric strategy which focuses more on the use of proxies to create greater regional instability and export its revolution, while at the same time it has pushed the limits in its missile programs, and pursued the research and development of chemical and biological agents as well as a suspect nuclear program; which together have the makings of a very dangerous and WMD program. 

This is why any assessment of Iran’s motives and capabilities must look beyond the previous assessments of the military balance. Whatever Iran’s actual motives may be a combination of its emerging strengths in asymmetric warfare and nuclear-armed missile forces that can deter or limit conventional reprisals can do much to compensate for its lack of modern conventional forces. 

Iran can exploit a combination of carefully selected precision guided munitions systems, weapons of mass destruction, and the widening use of asymmetrical warfare strategies to make up for shortcomings in conventional warfighting capabilities. Its long-range missiles and WMD programs can both provide a powerful deterrent and support its asymmetric strategies.

This draft covers the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD real and potential capability. It covers how all of the aspects of Iran’s WMD programs fit into the broader strategic context with Iran’s conventional military forces, the IRGC, use and support of proxies, and ambiguous statements and actions.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the consequences of nuclear proliferation by critically elaborating the current literature over the Iranian nuclear crisis. Nuclear weapons have always been a significant source of debate in international security literature due to their enormous impacts on the interstate relations and geopolitical rivalries. This thesis investigates whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons engenders cumulative effects or whether proliferation has mixed consequences. The current literature mostly deals with the issue either with utilizing proliferation optimism or proliferation pessimism which unfolded a simple binary that causes to overlook important consequences of proliferation. This study discusses the two major schools of thought on nuclear proliferation, namely proliferation optimism and proliferation pessimism, examines their hypotheses in detail and elaborate on their arguements over the Iranian nuclear crisis. From this point of view, the relation of nuclear weapons with the important concepts and variables such as the causes of wars, deterrence and defense, offense-defense balance, regime type and civil-military relations were analyzed. Finally, the study proposes that the possible consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be more coherently and accurately explained by the stability-instability paradox rather than the optimistic-pessimistic binary. The thesis, which takes the Iranian nuclear crisis as a case study, argues that despite cumulative approaches of the optimist and pessimist schools in the current literature, if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, the likely results will be more sophisticated. Based on the stability-instability paradox, the thesis argues that Iran's acquiescence of nuclear weapons would enhance strategic stability but would undermine sub-strategic stability. By reaching that conclusion, the thesis also argues that stability-instability paradox has more explanatory power than both Waltz's neorealist international relations theory as well as Sagan's organizational theory on the issue of nuclear proliferation where the latter two are providing partial explanations.

This study seeks to determine how the Islamic Republic of Iran (‘the IRI’) has survived despite the multitude of forces seeking its ouster and vulnerability of prior twentieth century Iranian governments to regime change.  The IRI’s survival has puzzled many analysts especially due to the regime’s reported domestic unpopularity.  That the IRI has survived longer than any other twentieth century Iranian regime is even more unusual when compared to its predecessors.  Pre-1979 Iranian regimes enjoyed foreign support and fell when those external forces became hostile in 1921, 1941 and 1953 or wavered in 1979.  In contrast, the IRI has not only lacked substantial foreign support but has faced formidable external challengers like the United States.
Two relationships effectively explain the IRI’s survival.  The first is between the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC’).  This ensures that the regime has the enforcers to quell domestic unrest and project power internationally to weaken actors seeking regime change.  The nature of this relationship prevents a military takeover, as the IRGC’s ideology requires the pre-eminence of the Supreme Leader.  The second is between the regime and the general public (particularly the poor).  This ensures that the regime does not face mass dissatisfaction, as the last Shah did in 1979. 
The IRI has balanced repression, populism, pragmatism, and popular legitimacy (frequently with elections) and appeasement.  Further, the Islamic Republic began with an advantage: regimes resulting from mass revolutions are traditionally difficult for foreign powers to overthrow due to the regime’s dedication and popular support. 
After the Shah’s overthrow, the clerics contended with numerous armed post-revolutionary factions.  As a result of superior popular support, unifying the country behind anti-Americanism and the war effort against Iraq’s invasion, the clerical regime won the post-revolutionary struggle against its domestic armed opponents.
After the war with Iraq and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, the IRI moderated its policies while promoting socio-economic populism to prevent mass discontent.  The new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, addressed his legitimacy shortcomings by turning to the IRGC.  Although no longer an IRGC member upon his appointment as Supreme Leader, Khamenei had positive personal relationships with IRGC officials due to his supervision of the organization in its early days. 
Internationally, the IRI projected power and exploited American foreign policy blunders to forge a geopolitical situation that made it prohibitively costly for foreign powers to topple the Islamic Republic.  Further, the Iranian landmass is difficult to invade due to its unique and formidable geography.  Additionally, the IRI, by fostering relations with militias throughout the Middle East (e.g. the Lebanese Hezbollah), has created asymmetric trip wires that would cause intense instability against an invading power throughout the Middle East.  An overt military action against the IRI then, would not only result in the invader facing an intensely difficult campaign on Iranian soil but also a series of pro-Iranian guerrilla campaigns outside Iranian territory.

Ten things you need to know about the nuclear capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to offer cogent analysis of Iran’s compliance with the existing Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and/or ongoing negotiations by the U.S. to adapt that agreement before joining it once again as a participating party.

Based on a recent International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Iran Verification and Monitoring Report of March 3, 2022 [1], and subsequent Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) analysis [2],  Iran is continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities, hide nuclear research facilities, and thwart international inspections.

(download to read more)

Policymakers must now assume that Iran has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon. Containment is a failure as Iran’s breakout time is now essentially at zero. [Additional background for non-scientists is appended]. According to estimates prepared from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  reports and Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),  Iran now has sufficient stores of highly enriched uranium (e.g., HEU or 60 percent enriched uranium ) to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. [1] As I predicted in March, Iran now has sufficient HEU, the required centrifuges, and the skill to rapidly increase enrichment of weapon-grade uranium (e.g., WGU or 90 percent enriched uranium) within a few weeks. [2] … (download to read more)

The crisis symbolised by the withdrawal from Doha of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain in March, 2014, was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore set a precedent in terms of dispute resolution between the six member states. The disagreement that sparked the ambassadors’ withdrawal was among the most serious in recent years, and threatened to seriously undermine relations between the GCC states. The crisis certainly affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.
This chapter discusses causes of the crisis, and a review of its development and eventual resolution with the signing of the Riyadh Supplementary Agreement on 16 November 2014. This chapter suggests that the crisis will continue to affect the GCC in future. While the immediate crisis has passed, the loss of trust between the GCC states is likely to take some time to resolve. Nevertheless, the resolutions that emerged from the 35th GCC summit held in Doha on 9 December 2014 indicate a kind of convergence in understanding among the GCC countries on a number of regional issues. This convergence was arrived at in the context of various regional pressures on the member states and the Gulf region as a whole, stemming particularly from concerns around the emergence of the Islamic State and Iran’s nuclear programme. Finally, the chapter argues that resolution of the crisis is indicative of the maturity of the GCC states, and reflects their ability to focus on prioritising their own local interests. In the longer term, it seems likely that this maturity will enhance integration and strengthen the GCC.

Abstract

Any assessment of Soleimani's acts, expenditures, and influence in creating satellite militias across the Middle East over the past decade, especially with his expenditures made possible by the economic boost to the Iranian economy after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (hereafter referred to as the Iran nuclear agreement), will quickly dispel any assertions that recent escalations in tensions with Iran are the result of the U.S. pulling out of that deal. That's Tehran's line, and those who push it become pro-terrorist propagandists. The Iranian nuclear agreement, with the economic boost and cash it brought Iran–along with the Obama administration's weakness toward Iran–fueled the regional instability and terrorism orchestrated by Iran.

Iran will, of course, threaten retaliation, and because they can only fight asymmetrically, Iran will probably mount a violent response, most likely through proxies, against innocent civilians or U.S. diplomatic missions. "Death to America" will once again be the chant du jour. In the end, however, allowing Iran to dictate or constrain our policy and actions by threat of asymmetrical warfare is capitulation to terror.

Courage is required. We must see through those proxy smokescreens and hold Tehran accountable by ensuring that the price for such acts is ultimately too steep a price to pay even for a theocracy exhorting martyrdom. Cost versus benefit calculus must be made to apply to both sides.
…
Questions about presidential notifications to Congress are inherently contextual, and the requirements surrounding notifications to Congress rely on several factors, the first being whether an action is a Title 50 covert action that requires prior congressional notification...However, even if one determines that the U.S. structured the airstrikes on Soleimani to allow potential deniability if things went wrong (thus making the operation potentially classifiable as a covert operation), many exceptions exist to the Title 50 notification requirements.  "Traditional military activities" are exempt and, as defined under 50 U.S.C. 3093(e)(2), provide an exception that would apply in the killing of Soleimani.  This was an attack by U.S. military forces in a defined theater of operations (Iraq) against an Iranian military commander of a group designated an enemy and/or terrorist group. As the strike was conducted by U.S. armed forces under U.S. military command, the airstrikes count as traditional military activities. That makes the killing Title 10 action, not a Title 50 action. (See footnote 2.)  (continued… download to read more)

The how and when the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) obtained several Soviet-era nuclear-capable cruise missiles, the Kh-55, Tehran’s reverse engineering of Soviet Nuclear Cruise Missile, the Kh-55.A closer look at Iran’s Nuclear Capable Cruise Missiles, Hoveizeh & Soumar  Could the IRI miniaturize a nuclear warhead ?  And the deadly Iranian cruise missile threat.

IAEA safeguards regime has been instrumental to identify non-compliance cases of safeguards obligations under the NPT and safeguards agreements and to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. However, Iraqi case showed that existing safeguards were not sufficient for thorough verification. In order to strengthen the safeguards system, a new instrument, Additional Protocol has been negotiated.

Additional Protocol gives the IAEA a new mandate to verify undeclared nuclear material and activities. The fact that so far there have been no non-compliance cases identified in States with AP in force, explains the increased legal authority of the IAEA, States commitments to abide with norms and follow patterned behavior.

AP measures showed that their implementation is sufficient for robust and effective safeguards regime and it makes a great contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, AP is not a legally binding instrument and after 20 years of its adoption the numbers of ratifications are still disappointing.

This raised certain questions that this research tried to answer. Based on comparative study of regime analytical elements pertaining to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol as well as operationalizing mainly regime theory assumptions on various features and elements of regime, this dissertation tried to find out whether the last verification standard Additional Protocol is a new verification regime or evolution of the rules of the regime. As IAEA needs more legal authority to carry out its verification mission and to conclude not only on declared nuclear material but also on undeclared material, states having Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements have to sign Additional Protocol. In order to understand the prospects of universalization of AP, which would significantly increase the robustness and effectiveness of the regime, case studies have been carried out.

The main findings show that Additional Protocol is not a new verification regime. Analysis of principles and norms of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol didn’t reveal any changes or new developments in the normative framework of the regime. Evolution of the rules of the IAEA safeguards regime has been observed. Based on theory assumptions changes within the IAEA safeguards regime has been identified only.

Though selected case studies show that there are serious difficulties for certain states to join AP, for some states such a possibility is visible. Results of analysis showed that the full potential of strengthened safeguards can be achieved only via universalization of AP, which is now rests with States to demonstrate their willingness to have an effective safeguards regime and with the IAEA to pursue all prescribed measures in all AP States.

A Preemptive Strike Weapon  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force unveiled on 9 Feb. 2020, a short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Raad – 500 (thunder). Iranian television showed a ceremony during which IRGC commander Major General Hossein Salami and Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of its aerospace force. They inaugurated the new missile’s production line. Missiles were seen at various stages in the manufacturing process, including a motor body made using a carbon fiber winding machine. The Zoheir solid-propellant motor section with a thrust-vectoring nozzle was also unveiled and shown tested on a stand.
 This short seven-page report summaries the events, with links, pictures of the Iranian video TV show.
 Also, covered, Zoheir solid-propellant motor, Salman engines, Thrust Vector Control, Canard Control, the IRGC ballistic missile on its attack on the US Airbase of Al Assad in Iraq 8 Jan. 2020.
 There are also links to other reports concerning The Islamic Republic armed forces.

This chapter focuses on the security challenges and perceptions that Iran was facing during the early 2000s. Being isolated by the international community, and with a weakened rival Iraq to its West, Iran did not appear to have an immediate security concern, which from a security perspective would neces- sitate a clandestine nuclear program. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan in bring- ing down the Taliban regime. The ‘axis of evil’ speech escalated the hostility between Iran and the United States. Iran’s Eastern neighbor Afghanistan and Western neighbor Iraq were both occupied by the United States who were referring to Iran as a part of an axis of evil. Given this geostrategic setting, this chapter explores whether or not Iran’s nuclear program was put in effect with possible security concerns.
The chapter advances two Realist hypotheses—one defensive, the other offensive. From a defensive Realist perspective, the regional and structural conditions in Iran’s region increase its threat perception and, therefore, Tehran understands that it must increase its military capabilities. The con- tention surrounding Iran’s nuclear program is not solely due to Tehran itself and the defensive Realist hypothesis only partially explains the escalation of Iran’s nuclear program into a ‘crisis’.
From an offensive Realist perspective, the United States as the sole regional hegemon in the international system wants to prevent the rise of another regional hegemon in the international system by offshore balanc- ing, which means allying with regional states to curb the rise of a potential hegemon in the Middle East. Interestingly, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused a dramatic change in the balance of power in the Middle East. The region was suddenly transformed from a tripolarity (Iraq–Iran–Saudi Arabia) to an evolving bipolar regional order with the elimination of Iraq as a stakeholder. Iran was not only relieved of a historic rival that fought a bitter war in the 1980s, but also now had an opportunity to  ll in the “power vacuum” and use its in uence among the Shiite population of Iraq to expand its in uence. Given this regional bipolarity, the offensive Realist perspective we advance argues that the United States is allying with anti-Iranian factions and states within the region to prevent Iranian hegemony. An Iranian nuclear capability would dramatically increase Tehran’s position in the strategic situ- ation. Consequently, the United States is using its military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities to offshore balance and prevent a possible nuclear Iran that would change the balance of power in the region.

This paper will explore the significance and impetus of the Indo-Iranian relationship throughout these phases. Before turning to an analysis of these three periods, it is useful to first understand India’s conception of its strategic environment, within which India has actively launched diplomatic efforts to look east, west, north and south. Therefore, the
first section exposits the features of India’s extended neighborhood and the equities that New Delhi claims in this region. The next section turns to an analysis of the Indo-Iranian relationship in the three chronological periods noted above, drawing out the key drivers and sources of limitations. The final section will suggest ways in which other regional actors (e.g. China, Pakistan, Israel, and the Gulf States) may respond to emergent trends in the Indo-Iranian relationship. This section concludes with a discussion of the implications of this relationship for the United States and its relationship with India.

This edited volume consists of nine chapters that deal with various aspects of the Iranian nuclear agreement reached on 2 April 2015. Opening with a technical assessment of the Iranian nuclear agreement by Sheel Kant Sharma, the monograph has
two chapters focusing on regional reactions: an Israeli perspective authored by Emily Landau, and Gulf reactions written by Kanchi Gupta. Two chapters analysing the three
major-power perspectives are included: the US perspective, written by Sylvia Mishra and Uma Purushothaman; the Russian perspective authored by Petr Topychkanov; and the European perspective, by Britta Petersen. Two chapters in the volume are focused on the Indian perspective, one by Arka Biswas providing an overall assessment of India’s response to the Iran nuclear agreement, and a second one by Akhilesh Sati,
exploring the possible implications on India’s energy security. Lastly, Rakesh Sood has authored a chapter looking into the impact of the Iranian nuclear agreement on the global non-proliferation architecture.

proliferation instead of nuclear proliferation in it. The purpose of this work is to explore the relation between (1) the gradual increase of international cooperation in nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence; and (2) the actual level of global nuclear armament, that which already exists and that which is still being pursued. This study assumes that there is a strong correlation between the strengthening and the persistence of the non-proliferation regime, which celebrates its seventieth anniversary this year, and the non-use of nuclear weapons.
To explore this question, this study aims to explore the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime in the frame of two methodological approaches: a qualitative and a quantitative one. Indeed, this study assumes that the two approaches are complementary to fully grasp the implications of the question. They can resolve an academic debate by answering epistemological considerations on the determination of which approach is the most accurate to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime on the improvement of international peace and security.
The qualitative approach emphasizes the context in which States are proliferating. The quantitative approach on the other side, provides simple statistical raw data determining the relations between proliferation, its monitoring mechanisms, and the actual level of conflict States are facing. In the light of those explanations, this study answers its research question with the following: international monitoring of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has an indirect effect over the outbreak of violent conflicts. Indeed, compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreements does not stop States from seeking nuclear weapons – such as historical experience has shown with the cases of Iraq, or Argentina and Brazil. However, the regime provides a legal basis to counter proliferation when it occurs. However, as shown by the quantitative approach of this study, compliance with the non-proliferation and disarmament regime has no direct relations with the outbreak of violent conflicts, thus validating the null hypothesis exposed previously. Consequently, disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons can be achieved by a strategic control of States over vectors of proliferation in addition of legal constraints.

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on some of the most sensitive questions surrounding international security. One of these is the US-Iran crisis, where the two countries have been on the brink of a full military confrontation since January. To date, both countries continue a zero-sum game, exploiting the pandemic as an opportunity to mount pressure on the adversary. Will the common threat caused by Covid-19 be able to divert Iran and the US from the collision course and push them towards more cooperative behaviour? This policy brief focuses on the cost that current confrontational strategies could have for both sides amid the Covid-19 outbreak, highlighting the threats and the political and strategic limitations that have emerged as a result of the pandemic. It also shows the potential gains at both the regional and the global levels that could arise for both actors if they were to adopt a new approach, based on health diplomacy and cooperation in health security.

This chapter introduces the history of Iran’s nuclear program by breaking it down into three separable historical phases. The preliminary phase of Iran’s nuclear activities started during the early Shah period where the administra- tion reached several nuclear contracts with French and Canadian companies, dealt with a friendly Washington, and sent its first batch of students to uni- versities in the United States, such as MIT, to become the future nuclear scientists of Iran. The second phase of Iran’s nuclear program can be referred to as a period of stagnation, where after the Islamic revolution the regime was isolated, lost its access to international funds and technology, and was dead- locked in a bitter war of attrition with Iraq. The third phase of Iran’s nuclear program is with the renewed interest of Tehran in constructing clandestine nuclear sites that were exposed to the international community by a group of Iranian dissidents in 2002. This chapter serves as a historical introduction and background to Iran’s nuclear program with emphasis on key turning points, actors, and events.

The most critical aspect of Tehran's capability of not only producing nuclear weapons but miniaturizing nuclear warheads to fit into a variety of the Iran's inventory of missiles is Soviet's Nuclear Weapons Expert Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav. Yet, strangely we hear little about of him.

After 12 years of diplomatic efforts, on 14 July 2015, the P5+1
(permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran finally agreed on a comprehensive deal on the Iranian nuclear issue.
This chapter will assess the potential of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to solve the long-standing Iranian nuclear crisis. The first section will analyse the lengthy and challenging road to the JCPOA, providing a brief background of the decade-long negotiations, which started in 2003 under the helm of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and terminated in Vienna this past July. The second section will examine the provisions and the timeline of the JCPOA, describing the obligations to which both parties accepted to comply until 2025 and outlining the
steps which will be necessary for the implementation of the
agreement and for the closure of the Iranian nuclear question. The third and final section will identify the reasons for which the JCPOA will most likely translate into a long-lasting arms limitation agreement, while also providing opportunities for coordination between Iran and the international powers on issues of mutual concern, beyond the nuclear issue.

Deneyimli akademisyen Fahri Türk Tacikistan gezisini bu ülkenin tarihi kimliği ve Türk tarihindeki konumunu içeren dikkat çekici değerlendirmeleri ile okuyucunun zihin dünyasında Türkiye'de hemen hemen hiç tanınmayan bir ilginç ülkeyi harika bir biçimde canlandırmaktadır. Tacikistan'a seyahat ya da yatırım düşünnenlere, Türkistan konuusnda bilimsel araştırma yapmak isteyenlere tavsiye edilir.

The parties agreed to a joint plan of action setting out measures to be undertaken during an
initial six-month interim period, as well as elements for a long-term comprehensive solution between Iran and the
P5+1 on 24 November 2013 . Therefore,both sidesof the negotiation processcontinueswill depend oncompliance
withtheJoint document. Thiswill resultina shortperiod in May-June 2014. Therefore,otherinternational
factorsaffecting this process, howwillthe attitude of countries, in the light ofthis information, a separateresearch
topicwillbe examined. In this context,the research methodsof this studyappeared inthemedia regardingthe Iranian
nuclearnegotiationsandpublic statementsin the literature is based. In this study,inGeneva, Switzerland,in
2013Iranstarted againnuclear negotiationsin the frameworkof thenegotiationsmanagement approachwillbe examined
and discussed. This approach"Negotiation Management (3K-Yi) PrismModel"has been called.In this study, first, the
negotiation processwhich is the subjectof negotiations betweenP5 +1andIran will be giventhe latest state. In this
study, first, the negotiation processwhich is the subjectof negotiations betweenP5 +1andIran will be giventhe latest
state.