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David Firester

Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Political Science, Graduate Student

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David Firester, Ph.D., is founder and CEO of TRAC Intelligence, LLC (Threat Reporting and Analysis Consultants - https://tracintelligence.com/), which provides threat analysis to the corporate security and corporate travel industry. He also teaches a course on terrorism at Hunter College (CUNY) as an Adjunct Lecturer and has taught as a Graduate Teaching Fellow at Baruch College (CUNY) Queens College (CUNY) and as an Adjunct Instructor at John Jay College (CUNY).

David has been working as a Senior Intelligence Analyst at LookingGlass Cyber Solutions since February, 2018, until its Cyveillance division was acquired by ZeroFox in October, 2020. He specializes in Corporate Security, Executive Security, Physical Security, Brand Intelligence & and has written a host of specialized internal training publications.

David occasionally writes for a variety of publications, to include the Daily Wire, the Middle East Forum, Association for the study of the Middle East and Africa, Lima Charlie News (Associate Editor/Intelligence and National Security Correspondent), The Times of Israel, and The Jerusalem Post.

Among David's many assignments, he has worked at Jihad Intel (http://jihadintel.meforum.org/), presented by The Middle East Forum, as an analyst and trainer.

David consulted as a Policy Analyst and Intelligence Analyst at the State of New Jersey's Regional Operations Intelligence Center (NJ ROIC, or Fusion Center); a collaboration run by the Department of Homeland Security, New Jersey State Police and a variety of federal, state and local law enforcement and intelligence entities.

His broad areas of academic specialty include International Security, National Security, American Politics, Public Policy, COIN (Counterinsurgency)/Insurgency, counter-terrorism, and the regional Arab-Israeli conflict. He has harnessed his expertise as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to write an award-winning MA Thesis (2011) and is presently working on a Ph.D. dissertation that centers on violent non-state organizations that use suicide bombing as an operational-level tactic in insurgencies.

Highly proficient skills include data analysis, report writing, briefing, open-source (online and social media) collections and conducting unique, bespoke, investigations.

David is always fielding new offers, accepting new clients and looking forward to new opportunities.
Address: New York, New York, United States

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Papers by David Firester

Critical Summary and Some Questions on McCauley and Moskalenko

This short paper is a critical summary of McCauley C. & S. Moskalenko. 2001. Friction: How radi... more

Navigating the “Drones” Debate

Proponents of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), otherwise referred to as “drones,” argue tha... more Proponents of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), otherwise referred to as “drones,” argue that they are an effective tool of war that diminishes threats at nearly no human cost for the force employing them. Opponents argue that the use of such a strategy entails disproportionately high human costs at the receiving end, which ultimately tends to generate more threats in the form of a recruitment tool for at-risk populations that are prone to dislike the users of such technology. In one respect, this is a cost-benefit calculation, as are many decisions about strategy selection. In another, however, there is a clear disconnect between advocates and adversaries of UAVs. This paper will explore some of the extant literature on UAVs, in order to synthesize the essence of the debate. The ultimate objective here, however, is to move in the direction of explicating a research design proposal. The underlying intent centers on understanding why “drones” are seen in such a negative light by so many civilians, despite their more benign uses both inside and outside the combat milieu.

COIN and CAP: Evaluating the Efficacy of Counterinsurgency Through the Prism of a Combined Action Program in Vietnam

Over the last several years, a debate regarding the efficacy of a Counterinsurgency (COIN) strate... more Over the last several years, a debate regarding the efficacy of a Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has ensued. The general contours of the argument seem to suggest that the application of a population-centric COIN strategy by the U.S. military may not rest on firmly established historical ground. If this is true, the policy implication is that it may be dangerous to view the most recent war-fighting doctrine as the key to winning future conflicts. Further, if COIN is relied upon as a means to serve policy ends then it must be rigorously vetted in terms of its appropriateness and usefulness. This paper begins by looking at both sides of the COIN (pardon the pun), in order to gauge the veracity of its proponents’ claims versus the arguments put forth by its detractors. Following this task, it will then attempt to expose the weaknesses, if any, that may obtain from either. In endeavoring to perform this task, a consideration of mostly secondary (and a few primary) sources will be considered. The aim of this effort is an attempt to resolve the discrepancies between the opposing perspectives. A more narrow focus on the oft-overlooked U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam will then ensue. Finally, the paper will terminate with a simple policy implication that may be generated by the findings.

Realism in Practice: the Underlying Logic of Brinkmanship

The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be expla... more The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be explained most convincingly by realist theory. Although other theories may have seemed to offer insight into Iran’s foreign policy decisions and behavior following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, they are inferior in their contemporary explanatory power. This paper contends Iranian state behavior since 1979 has moved from one guided primarily by Islamic revolutionary zeal that, over time, has yielded to the power realities with which most modern states must contend. Specifically, Iran’s choices and consequent actions thirty-three years hence reveal realist proclivities, while simultaneously maintaining the rhetoric of Islamic revolutionary appeal for domestic (and transnational) consumption. Further, where threatening public pronouncements raise the specter of an irrational regime seeking nuclear weapons, it is far from certain to be so. At the core, such inflammatory rhetoric is more apt to be the product of efforts toward domestic power consolidation coupled with a public relations campaign, which seeks support in the form of ideological consonance abroad. The net result seems to be an effort directed at state survival and power maximization in the face of a self-perceived security deficit.

Missteps, or Missed Steps? Countering a Syrian Insurgency in the Midst of a Broader Transnational Arab Insurgency

Defecting Authoritarian Militaries in the Arab World

This short paper will deal with some of the key characteristics and conditions for military defec... more This short paper will deal with some of the key characteristics and conditions for military defection, in light of recent events in the Arabic-speaking region. Two articles on this subject will be examined here. A brief discussion of the methodological approach will be interwoven and some critical commentary will conclude this paper. The first article looks at six cases in which the military chose to side with the incumbent regime, side with the protesters or split between the two sides. The second article explores three of the above cases, but with a view toward nonviolent protesters' ability to influence some incidences of defection.

The Syrian Arab Republic since 2000: Individual Rule vs. Elite Choices

This paper seeks to compare and contrast two articles, which pertain to Syria under the rule of B... more This paper seeks to compare and contrast two articles, which pertain to Syria under the rule of Bashar al-Asad. In this endeavor, we will first look at an article by Carmen Becker followed by a more recent article by Joshua Stacher. Each author approaches the interplay between the rule of a single individual, in the personality of Bashar al-Assad, and the remaining elite centers of power. After reviewing the works of Becker and Stacher individually, the paper will conclude with an assessment of how each of them may coalesce or distinguish themselves on theoretically relevant grounds. Finally, a short appraisal of their academic undertaking will conclude.

Violence in the Interest of Good, or Good Violence

Liberal Academia and My Struggle for Survival

Policy Proposal to Arm the Teachers

Battlefront Maghreb

On 6 October 1973, the combined armies of Syria and Egypt attacked the State of Israel on her nor... more On 6 October 1973, the combined armies of Syria and Egypt attacked the State of Israel on her northern and southern fronts, respectively. In an effort to revise the status quo established in the Six Day War of 1967, an effective deception plan had preceded the commencement of hostilities. In order to prepare their adversary to become the "victim" 2 of a surprise attack, the Arabs (particularly Egypt's Anwar Sadat) had carefully constructed a misinformation campaign designed to lull Israel into a false sense of security. This objective was achieved by exploiting her predispositions vis-à-vis Arab capabilities and intentions to wage a successful and decisive offensive (Herzog, 1982: 227-230). The deception plan had mainly hinged on the constraints facing Israeli elites, as being averse to incurring the requisite political and economic costs of mobilizing her reserves absent a clear indication of war. Equally as important for the surprise attack, however, were Israeli cognitive limitations. It is toward this aspect of pre-war misperceptions that we now turn.

Roots of Conflict: A Multi-level Analysis of the South Atlantic War of 1982

ICJ vs. HCJ: The advisory opinion regarding the Israeli Security Fence and its implications

FAILURE TO ADAPT Intelligence Failure and Military Failure as Functions of Strategic Failure?

Preface Significance Methods Sources Declaration of Personal Biases

Book Reviews by David Firester

Book Review of The Field of Fight

To begin with, I will say that the book is not exactly what one might expect from a recently reti... more To begin with, I will say that the book is not exactly what one might expect from a recently retired General. For starters, there were numerous spelling errors, an assortment of colloquialisms and some instances in which the prose took on a decidedly partisan tone. The means of documenting sources was something akin to a blog-posting, in that he simply copied and pasted links to pages, right into the body of the work. I would have liked to have seen a more thoroughly researched and properly cited work. All of this was likely due to the fact that General Flynn released his book in the days leading up to Donald J. Trump's announcement of his Vice Presidential pick. As Flynn is apparently a close national security advisor to Trump, I can understand why his work appears to be somewhat harried. Nonetheless, I think that the book's timeliness is useful, as the information it contains might be helpful in guiding Americans' election choices. I also think that despite the absence of academic rigor, it makes his work more accessible. No doubt, this is probably one of Mr. Trump's qualities and one that has catapulted him to national fame and serious consideration for the office he seeks. General Flynn makes a number of important points, which, despite my foregoing adverse commentary, gives me the opportunity to endorse it as an essential read. In the introductory chapter, General Flynn lays out his credentials, defines the problem, and proceeds to inform the reader of the politically guided element that clouds policy prescriptions. Indeed, he is correct to call attention to the fact that the Obama administration has deliberately exercised its commanding authority in forbidding the attachment of the term " Islam " when speaking of the threat posed by extremists who advocate and carry out violence in the religion's name. As one who suffered at the hands of the administration for speaking truth to power, he knows all too well what others in the Intelligence Community (IC) must suffer in order to hold onto their careers. In chapter one, he discusses where he came from and how he learned valuable lessons at home and in service to his country. He also gives the reader a sense of the geopolitical context in which Radical Islamists have been able to form alliances with our worst enemies. This chapter also introduces the reader to some of his personal military heroes, as he delineates how their mentorship shaped his thinking on military and intelligence matters. A key lesson to pay attention to in this chapter is what some, including General Flynn, call 'politicization of intelligence.' Although he maintains that both the present and previous administration have been guilty of this, he credits the Bush administration with its strategic reconsideration of the material facts and a search for better answers. (He mentions this again in the next chapter on p.42, signifying this capability as a " leadership characteristic " and later recalls the president's " insight and courage " on p. 154.) Chapter two of The Field of Fight features an excellent summary of what transpires in a civil war and the manner in which Iraqis began to defect from al-Qa'ida and cooperate with U.S. forces. In this task, he explains for the layperson what many scholars do, but in far fewer pages. Again, this makes his work more accessible. He also works through the process of intelligence failures that are, in his opinion, produced by a superordinate policy failure housed in the upper echelons of the military structure. In essence, it was a misperception (willful or not) that guided thinking about the

Drafts by David Firester

Book Review of The Field of Fight

This book review takes a non-partisan approach to reviewing what some might see as a partisan-ori... more

Reflecting on the Wisdom of an Intelligence Professional, by Way of a Book Review

This is an exercise in conveying to the layperson the wisdom gained in the intelligence community... more

Books by David Firester

Evolutions in Suicide Bombing: Exploring the Relationship between the Tactic and Its Application by Non-State Armed Groups Across Various Conflict Zones Over Time

Evolutions in Suicide Bombing: Exploring the Relationship between the Tactic and Its Application by Non-State Armed Groups Across Various Conflict Zones Over Time, 2023

The following dissertation considers variations in the use of suicide bombing by Non-State Armed ... more The following dissertation considers variations in the use of suicide bombing by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), at the organizational level of analysis. It is both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the conditions under which insurgents that accept the practice’s legitimacy have applied it to a range of specified target sets. The broad focus of this endeavor centers on unpacking insurgent groups’ behaviors across a number of unique battlespaces, but the main question I seek to answer is: what decision dynamics accompany violent non-state actors’ use of suicide bombing and how do we interpret their behavioral interaction across various conflict zones, so as to better illuminate why they continue to attack in this way? Put differently, what does suicide bombing, as an operational-level tactic as opposed to a presumably fully developed strategy, reveal about NSAGs who use it? I also explore a more narrowly tailored sub-set of questions that aim to uncover why insurgents that do use it, do so in different ways, which also entails an analysis of non-suicide bombing attacks against the same range of target sets. To that end, I explore the ways suicide bombing is used by several organizations, within a variety of combat venues, as a means for better understanding its uses; namely, adapting to and shaping, unique battlespaces. I find that organizations such as al-Qa’ida (AQ) are more sensitive to branding/re-branding dynamics associated with the targeting of civilians, while others such as Islamic State (IS) incorporate suicide bombing as a key component of their war arsenal against civilian, security, and competitor target sets. This may explain why it generally tended to be the case in multiple venues that AQ didn’t practice suicide bombing against IS, but IS did so against AQ. The exploratory nature of my work can be seen in the methodological approach I take, which extracts data points and re-forms them as variables that can be scrutinized further. This has implications for policy, theory, and epistemology. In policy terms, I elucidate the need to consider suicide bombing as an instrumental means for achieving objectives that are positioned below the threshold of a fully developed strategy. Theoretically, in contrast to a leading explanation for the practice, I am able to say with some confidence that the presence of foreign militaries has had little to no impact on the use of suicide bombing. Epistemologically, disaggregating target types, based on the dataset’s existing narratives, is a viable path for better understanding how suicide bombing violence is used by non-state actors.

Critical Summary and Some Questions on McCauley and Moskalenko

This short paper is a critical summary of McCauley C. & S. Moskalenko. 2001. Friction: How radi... more

Navigating the “Drones” Debate

Proponents of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), otherwise referred to as “drones,” argue tha... more Proponents of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), otherwise referred to as “drones,” argue that they are an effective tool of war that diminishes threats at nearly no human cost for the force employing them. Opponents argue that the use of such a strategy entails disproportionately high human costs at the receiving end, which ultimately tends to generate more threats in the form of a recruitment tool for at-risk populations that are prone to dislike the users of such technology. In one respect, this is a cost-benefit calculation, as are many decisions about strategy selection. In another, however, there is a clear disconnect between advocates and adversaries of UAVs. This paper will explore some of the extant literature on UAVs, in order to synthesize the essence of the debate. The ultimate objective here, however, is to move in the direction of explicating a research design proposal. The underlying intent centers on understanding why “drones” are seen in such a negative light by so many civilians, despite their more benign uses both inside and outside the combat milieu.

COIN and CAP: Evaluating the Efficacy of Counterinsurgency Through the Prism of a Combined Action Program in Vietnam

Over the last several years, a debate regarding the efficacy of a Counterinsurgency (COIN) strate... more Over the last several years, a debate regarding the efficacy of a Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has ensued. The general contours of the argument seem to suggest that the application of a population-centric COIN strategy by the U.S. military may not rest on firmly established historical ground. If this is true, the policy implication is that it may be dangerous to view the most recent war-fighting doctrine as the key to winning future conflicts. Further, if COIN is relied upon as a means to serve policy ends then it must be rigorously vetted in terms of its appropriateness and usefulness. This paper begins by looking at both sides of the COIN (pardon the pun), in order to gauge the veracity of its proponents’ claims versus the arguments put forth by its detractors. Following this task, it will then attempt to expose the weaknesses, if any, that may obtain from either. In endeavoring to perform this task, a consideration of mostly secondary (and a few primary) sources will be considered. The aim of this effort is an attempt to resolve the discrepancies between the opposing perspectives. A more narrow focus on the oft-overlooked U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam will then ensue. Finally, the paper will terminate with a simple policy implication that may be generated by the findings.

Realism in Practice: the Underlying Logic of Brinkmanship

The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be expla... more The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be explained most convincingly by realist theory. Although other theories may have seemed to offer insight into Iran’s foreign policy decisions and behavior following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, they are inferior in their contemporary explanatory power. This paper contends Iranian state behavior since 1979 has moved from one guided primarily by Islamic revolutionary zeal that, over time, has yielded to the power realities with which most modern states must contend. Specifically, Iran’s choices and consequent actions thirty-three years hence reveal realist proclivities, while simultaneously maintaining the rhetoric of Islamic revolutionary appeal for domestic (and transnational) consumption. Further, where threatening public pronouncements raise the specter of an irrational regime seeking nuclear weapons, it is far from certain to be so. At the core, such inflammatory rhetoric is more apt to be the product of efforts toward domestic power consolidation coupled with a public relations campaign, which seeks support in the form of ideological consonance abroad. The net result seems to be an effort directed at state survival and power maximization in the face of a self-perceived security deficit.

Missteps, or Missed Steps? Countering a Syrian Insurgency in the Midst of a Broader Transnational Arab Insurgency

Defecting Authoritarian Militaries in the Arab World

This short paper will deal with some of the key characteristics and conditions for military defec... more This short paper will deal with some of the key characteristics and conditions for military defection, in light of recent events in the Arabic-speaking region. Two articles on this subject will be examined here. A brief discussion of the methodological approach will be interwoven and some critical commentary will conclude this paper. The first article looks at six cases in which the military chose to side with the incumbent regime, side with the protesters or split between the two sides. The second article explores three of the above cases, but with a view toward nonviolent protesters' ability to influence some incidences of defection.

The Syrian Arab Republic since 2000: Individual Rule vs. Elite Choices

This paper seeks to compare and contrast two articles, which pertain to Syria under the rule of B... more This paper seeks to compare and contrast two articles, which pertain to Syria under the rule of Bashar al-Asad. In this endeavor, we will first look at an article by Carmen Becker followed by a more recent article by Joshua Stacher. Each author approaches the interplay between the rule of a single individual, in the personality of Bashar al-Assad, and the remaining elite centers of power. After reviewing the works of Becker and Stacher individually, the paper will conclude with an assessment of how each of them may coalesce or distinguish themselves on theoretically relevant grounds. Finally, a short appraisal of their academic undertaking will conclude.

Violence in the Interest of Good, or Good Violence

Liberal Academia and My Struggle for Survival

Policy Proposal to Arm the Teachers

Battlefront Maghreb

On 6 October 1973, the combined armies of Syria and Egypt attacked the State of Israel on her nor... more On 6 October 1973, the combined armies of Syria and Egypt attacked the State of Israel on her northern and southern fronts, respectively. In an effort to revise the status quo established in the Six Day War of 1967, an effective deception plan had preceded the commencement of hostilities. In order to prepare their adversary to become the "victim" 2 of a surprise attack, the Arabs (particularly Egypt's Anwar Sadat) had carefully constructed a misinformation campaign designed to lull Israel into a false sense of security. This objective was achieved by exploiting her predispositions vis-à-vis Arab capabilities and intentions to wage a successful and decisive offensive (Herzog, 1982: 227-230). The deception plan had mainly hinged on the constraints facing Israeli elites, as being averse to incurring the requisite political and economic costs of mobilizing her reserves absent a clear indication of war. Equally as important for the surprise attack, however, were Israeli cognitive limitations. It is toward this aspect of pre-war misperceptions that we now turn.

Roots of Conflict: A Multi-level Analysis of the South Atlantic War of 1982

ICJ vs. HCJ: The advisory opinion regarding the Israeli Security Fence and its implications

FAILURE TO ADAPT Intelligence Failure and Military Failure as Functions of Strategic Failure?

Preface Significance Methods Sources Declaration of Personal Biases

Book Review of The Field of Fight

To begin with, I will say that the book is not exactly what one might expect from a recently reti... more To begin with, I will say that the book is not exactly what one might expect from a recently retired General. For starters, there were numerous spelling errors, an assortment of colloquialisms and some instances in which the prose took on a decidedly partisan tone. The means of documenting sources was something akin to a blog-posting, in that he simply copied and pasted links to pages, right into the body of the work. I would have liked to have seen a more thoroughly researched and properly cited work. All of this was likely due to the fact that General Flynn released his book in the days leading up to Donald J. Trump's announcement of his Vice Presidential pick. As Flynn is apparently a close national security advisor to Trump, I can understand why his work appears to be somewhat harried. Nonetheless, I think that the book's timeliness is useful, as the information it contains might be helpful in guiding Americans' election choices. I also think that despite the absence of academic rigor, it makes his work more accessible. No doubt, this is probably one of Mr. Trump's qualities and one that has catapulted him to national fame and serious consideration for the office he seeks. General Flynn makes a number of important points, which, despite my foregoing adverse commentary, gives me the opportunity to endorse it as an essential read. In the introductory chapter, General Flynn lays out his credentials, defines the problem, and proceeds to inform the reader of the politically guided element that clouds policy prescriptions. Indeed, he is correct to call attention to the fact that the Obama administration has deliberately exercised its commanding authority in forbidding the attachment of the term " Islam " when speaking of the threat posed by extremists who advocate and carry out violence in the religion's name. As one who suffered at the hands of the administration for speaking truth to power, he knows all too well what others in the Intelligence Community (IC) must suffer in order to hold onto their careers. In chapter one, he discusses where he came from and how he learned valuable lessons at home and in service to his country. He also gives the reader a sense of the geopolitical context in which Radical Islamists have been able to form alliances with our worst enemies. This chapter also introduces the reader to some of his personal military heroes, as he delineates how their mentorship shaped his thinking on military and intelligence matters. A key lesson to pay attention to in this chapter is what some, including General Flynn, call 'politicization of intelligence.' Although he maintains that both the present and previous administration have been guilty of this, he credits the Bush administration with its strategic reconsideration of the material facts and a search for better answers. (He mentions this again in the next chapter on p.42, signifying this capability as a " leadership characteristic " and later recalls the president's " insight and courage " on p. 154.) Chapter two of The Field of Fight features an excellent summary of what transpires in a civil war and the manner in which Iraqis began to defect from al-Qa'ida and cooperate with U.S. forces. In this task, he explains for the layperson what many scholars do, but in far fewer pages. Again, this makes his work more accessible. He also works through the process of intelligence failures that are, in his opinion, produced by a superordinate policy failure housed in the upper echelons of the military structure. In essence, it was a misperception (willful or not) that guided thinking about the

Book Review of The Field of Fight

This book review takes a non-partisan approach to reviewing what some might see as a partisan-ori... more

Reflecting on the Wisdom of an Intelligence Professional, by Way of a Book Review

This is an exercise in conveying to the layperson the wisdom gained in the intelligence community... more

Evolutions in Suicide Bombing: Exploring the Relationship between the Tactic and Its Application by Non-State Armed Groups Across Various Conflict Zones Over Time

Evolutions in Suicide Bombing: Exploring the Relationship between the Tactic and Its Application by Non-State Armed Groups Across Various Conflict Zones Over Time, 2023

The following dissertation considers variations in the use of suicide bombing by Non-State Armed ... more The following dissertation considers variations in the use of suicide bombing by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), at the organizational level of analysis. It is both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the conditions under which insurgents that accept the practice’s legitimacy have applied it to a range of specified target sets. The broad focus of this endeavor centers on unpacking insurgent groups’ behaviors across a number of unique battlespaces, but the main question I seek to answer is: what decision dynamics accompany violent non-state actors’ use of suicide bombing and how do we interpret their behavioral interaction across various conflict zones, so as to better illuminate why they continue to attack in this way? Put differently, what does suicide bombing, as an operational-level tactic as opposed to a presumably fully developed strategy, reveal about NSAGs who use it? I also explore a more narrowly tailored sub-set of questions that aim to uncover why insurgents that do use it, do so in different ways, which also entails an analysis of non-suicide bombing attacks against the same range of target sets. To that end, I explore the ways suicide bombing is used by several organizations, within a variety of combat venues, as a means for better understanding its uses; namely, adapting to and shaping, unique battlespaces. I find that organizations such as al-Qa’ida (AQ) are more sensitive to branding/re-branding dynamics associated with the targeting of civilians, while others such as Islamic State (IS) incorporate suicide bombing as a key component of their war arsenal against civilian, security, and competitor target sets. This may explain why it generally tended to be the case in multiple venues that AQ didn’t practice suicide bombing against IS, but IS did so against AQ. The exploratory nature of my work can be seen in the methodological approach I take, which extracts data points and re-forms them as variables that can be scrutinized further. This has implications for policy, theory, and epistemology. In policy terms, I elucidate the need to consider suicide bombing as an instrumental means for achieving objectives that are positioned below the threshold of a fully developed strategy. Theoretically, in contrast to a leading explanation for the practice, I am able to say with some confidence that the presence of foreign militaries has had little to no impact on the use of suicide bombing. Epistemologically, disaggregating target types, based on the dataset’s existing narratives, is a viable path for better understanding how suicide bombing violence is used by non-state actors.