Human Needs

Der vielbeschworene Paradigmenwechsel hat in der Regelschule vor 30 Jahren begonnen, als Pädagogik und Didaktik versuchten, die Schülerperspektive einzunehmen und den Lernprozess aus der Sicht des Schülers zu gestalten. Man fing an, für den Schüler Lernumwelten zu strukturieren, die genug Appellcharakter besaßen, um ihn zu einer aktiven Auseinandersetzung mit Lerngegenständen anzuregen. Das Ziel wies damals eine stark individualistische Komponente auf, denn der Akzent lag auf der Selbstverwirklichung-wenn auch in " sozialer Verantwortung ". Im Zuge der Globalisierung gewinnt die soziale Dimension ein neues Gewicht. Um die Probleme, die auf die globalisierte Menschheit zukommen, anzugehen, brauchen wir alle verfügbaren intellektuellen Ressourcen. Die neuen Lernziele heißen: Fähigkeit zu kommunizieren, Bereitschaft, sein Wissen weiterzugeben, Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft, kollektiv Wissen aufzubauen und dieses Wissen zur Problemlösung einzusetzen. Dank der rasanten Entwicklung im Bereich der neuen Kommunikationsmittel rückt die Verwirklichung dieser Ziele heran. Im Folgenden möchte ich an einem konkreten Beispiel aufzeigen, mit welchen didaktischen Maßnahmen Schüler dazu gebracht werden, sowohl im Klassenzimmer als auch außerhalb des Unterrichts gemeinsam Wissen aufzubauen und zur Lösung auftretender Probleme einzusetzen.

The Declaration of Human Rights was drawn up in 1948 and was subject to different premises than those prevailing today. The terminology remains philosophical and religious, as can be seen from the blurred terms. Thus the central concept of dignity is indeterminate, opens up scope for countless interpretations and can hardly be operationalised. This also applies to other key concepts of current human rights such as brotherhood, equality and justice. A reference to basic needs opens up other possibilities for implementation in everyday life and in legislation. If a human condition of happiness consists in reflection and participation in collective reflection on the future of humanity (Martin 2009), this activity should be a prominent part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This chapter focuses on out-of-school suspension examining the relationship between behaviour, antecedent school and family factors. In this analysis, the biological, biopsychological and biopsychosocial-cultural needs of a secondary school student are viewed within the UN framework of Children's Rights. I argue that when basic human needs are not met, this can result in disruptive student behaviour. In order to provide and maintain a safe and inclusive educational environment conducive to social and emotional wellbeing, social workers and teachers are required to address the relationship between basic human needs and children’s rights. This includes the development of school policies and disciplinary protocols, which promote and foster a culture of dignity for all students. This has not always been the case with suspension policies and practices in Austria. Currently, the use of out-of-school suspension is losing ground as a provision to protect students and teachers from serious harm; especially when students are suspended for minor infractions associated with a low risk of harming self or others.

We present evidence that although inequality is increasing in some circumstances, the entire human power hierarchy has shifted upwards, such that even many subordinated groups are sufficiently empowered, in absolute terms, to advocate for a converging ideal of empowering participatory governance in ways they previously could not. We then assess how well governments meet this heightened popular standard. We conclude that the combination of the empowerment of the lower rungs of many states’ social hierarchies and the normalization of the ideals of empowerment by government, and overall failure of governments to meet this demand, produces a measure of distrust in authority, particularly among the disadvantaged. Disadvantaged people and groups, given their current and past experiences, may have very good reasons to distrust authority. It would be a mistake to pathologize distrust without taking such considerations into account. What the effects of this distrust are on democracy and social progress overall is a more difficult question than one might expect.

Using the history of political thought and real world political contexts, including South Africa and the recent global financial crisis, this book argues that power is integral to freedom. It demonstrates how freedom depends upon power, and contends that liberty for all citizens is best maintained if conceived as power through political representation. Against those who depoliticize freedom through a romantic conception of 'the people' and faith in supposedly independent judicial and political institutions, Lawrence Hamilton argues that real modern freedom can only be achieved through representative and participative mechanisms that limit domination and empower classes and groups who become disempowered in the conflicts that inevitably pervade politics. This is a sophisticated contribution to contemporary political theory that will be of interest to scholars and students of history, politics, philosophy, economics, sociology, development studies and Southern African studies.
The attached documents include proofs of the book's introduction and a discount flyer.

In 2013 the President of Uganda Yoweri Kaguta Museveni launched Uganda " s Vision 2040, a thirty-year development master plan which has received both praise and criticism from Ugandans. Although Vision 2040 has received both praise and criticism in almost equal measure, in this article I argue that Vision 2040 does not adequately promote the satisfaction of the human needs of Ugandans, yet the satisfaction of these needs is a prerequisite for achieving genuine development. Using a human needs framework in general, and Doyal and Gough " s intermediate needs in particular, I show that the Vision " s strategies adequately promote the satisfaction of only three intermediate needs of Ugandans, partially promote the satisfaction of seven intermediate needs of Ugandans, and that there is no single strategy to promote the satisfaction of one of the intermediate needs. This is because some of the Vision strategies do not adequately tackle the current and likely future challenges and bottlenecks to the satisfaction of the human needs of Ugandans. This is mainly due to the central role placed on the private capital (sector) in Vision 2040. I argue that in order for Vision 2040 to adequately promote the satisfaction of the human needs of Ugandans, all and not just some of the needs must be adequately satisfied since human needs are interrelated and interdependent. In addition, Vision 2040 should also be in position to satisfy the human needs of all Ugandans and not just some. Résumé En 2013, le président de l " Ouganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, a lancé la Vision 2040 de l " Ouganda, un plan directeur de développement de trente ans qui a reçu des éloges mais aussi des critiques de la part des Ougandais. Bien que la Vision 2040 ait reçu des éloges et des critiques à parts presque égales, je soutiens dans cet article que la Vision 2040 ne favorise pas suffisamment

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Herbert Marcuse’s claim that people may have superimposed “false needs” (vs. authentic “true needs”) has been criticized by a number of commentators. These critics argue that if all human needs are sociohistorically conditioned, as Marcuse believes, that effectively means that all needs are superimposed on us, and are thus, “false.” I defend Marcuse’s distinction by drawing attention to his expressed definition of false needs as those which perpetuate harm upon satisfaction. Marcuse’s distinction between true and false needs is not a reiteration of the distinction between needs and wants, as his critics claim, but is rather a recognition that in our society, we are forced to need things that ultimately do not lead to our individual (or collective) benefit.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. This article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct social syste...

I elicit some of Foucault’s insights to provide a more realistic picture than is the norm in social and political theory of how best to identify and overcome domination. Foucault’s vision is realized best, I argue, by combining his account with two related conceptions of domination based on human needs and realistic accounts of politics that focus on agency, power and interests. I defend a genealogical, inter-subjective account of how the determination of needs and interests forms the basis of ascertaining, on a continuum, the extent to which relations of power generate states of domination. To that end I propose institutional changes that would empower citizens in positive and negative ways: power over legislation in district assemblies and via veto and repeal; real control over representatives through various means; and decennial constitutional plebiscites.

A recent major shift has broadly impacted the evolution of electronic commerce: Web 2.0. This paradigm shift represents the change of the Internet from a market for goods and services to a socially centered and user-driven marketplace. The authors argue that by applying the fundamental principles of basic psychological need theory, we can better understand how the Web 2.0 technologies and applications have made possible these transformative changes in electronic markets. We provide an underlying conceptual needs-focused model helping us understand today's commerce and consumer behavior on the web. These observations are scrutinized within the Web 2.0 context and demonstrate how the world of conducting business has changed and how this world must link and embrace the unfolding new world of social relationships, developing communities and networks on the web.

Los autores abordan diferentes aspectos de la transición energética en México desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria. 
La publicación comienza por discutir los co-beneficios y retos para una transición energética sustentable en el contexto de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sustentable. A través de los capítulos, los autores discuten:  1) Los retos del desarrollo energético en América Latina 2) Derechos humanos y responsabilidad empresarial en el sector energético 3) Retos para el crecimiento económico sustentable en México y la paradoja de la abundancia 4) Energía y carbono en el consumo de los hogares mexicanos 5) Ampliando el concepto de pobreza energética desde una perspectiva de necesidades humanas fundamentales 6) Evolución regulatoria del sector energético en México y 7) La consulta previa en México y la gobernanza global del desarrollo.

Transición energética; Objetivos de Desarrollo Sustentable; co-beneficios; pobreza energética; desarrollo; consumo de hogares; necesidades humanas fundamentales, gobernanza, derechos humanos; extractivismo; regulación energética; Consulta pública; Responsabilidad Corporativa, inter-disciplinario; México

This study addresses the integration of Computer-Aided Design (CAD), Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ), and Customer Needs for the sake of product development. TRIZ can generate plausible product alternatives, while CAD can produce the digital data for those alternatives. Thus, the TRIZ-CAD outcomes can be organized to produce a questionnaire. When the questionnaire is disclosed to potential customers (respondents), the individual preferences of the respondents can be obtained. However, aggregating the diverse preferences of all respondents and making decisive conclusions based on these is difficult. In this study, we introduce statements regarding the nine fundamental human needs (subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity, and freedom) and TRIZ-CAD outcomes in a questionnaire. As the respondent is human, the product exemplified by the TRIZ-CAD outcomes should fulfill one or more of the fundamental human need. Responses regarding statements of the nine fundamental human needs can be used to aggregate the diverse opinions of all respondents and thereby make a decisive conclusion. We have shown the effectiveness of the abovementioned approach by using a product development case in which the problem is the determination of a car's external shape. Field data is discussed showing the applicability of the proposed approach.

In responding to the five excellent articles on Freedom Is Power collected here, I argue that my account of representation in politics runs all the way down, as does my associated views on needs and institutional critique aimed at diminishing domination. I take on board some of the other criticisms levelled at me, but resist the notion that my account of freedom as power constrains resistance. Liberty through representation requires and depends upon resistance; it also institutionalises it.

The label ‘human security’ has attracted much attention since the 1994 Human Development Report, but there are numerous conflicting definitions and agendas, and widespread scepticism. The Ogata–Sen Commission report Human Security Now has proposed a unified yet flexible definition and agenda. This paper specifies the Human Security Now concept as the intersection of: a concern with reasoned freedoms; a focus on basic needs; and a concern for stability as well as levels in key human development dimensions. Second, it specifies other elements of this human security discourse: a normative focus on individuals' lives and an insistence on basic rights for all; and an explanatory agenda that stresses the nexus between freedom from want and indignity and freedom from fear. Third, it clarifies where the human security discourse repeats the basic human needs conception, and where it adds and shows the consistency of the human security, human needs and human rights languages. Fourth, it specifies the types of intellectual ‘boundary work’ that the concept and discourse attempt: mobilizing attention and concern, connecting explanatory and normative agendas, and linking diverse intellectual and policy communities. Finally, it assesses human security as a boundary concept, including the particular label chosen, and diagnoses the threats as well as opportunities implicit in security language.

The role of architecture is to create spaces that meet the needs of users. Architecture of buildings is influenced by many factors such as behavioural, socio-cultural and physical which affect the design, meaning and use of space to different individuals and group of people. In view of this, some courses that deal with man-environment behaviour studies were incorporated into the curriculum of architecture schools, but it has been observed that the guiding principles of the curriculum formulation and implementation of these courses are yet to establish institutional ideology; to enforce the context relevance, and implementation in the instructional plans so that architects under tutelage can create environments that will respond to the need of users. Using secondary data from literature and curricula of four architectural schools in Southwest Nigeria, this paper examines how adequately students are sensitize on the relationship between man and environment as an important way of meeting his needs. It was discovered that aspects of Environment-Behaviour studies were rarely incorporated into the curricula of the schools investigated. This paper recommended that curriculum review be done parametrically in favour of EBR pedagogic dynamics.

Recently, parks have been recognized as one of the main contributors in the strategic objectives of urban projects, since they provide job opportunities, place attractiveness, increase the real estate market and property values, tourist development, increase the since of social belonging between the residents, improving the public health and the quality of the residents' life. The presented research is aiming to investigate the effect of Landscape features on the quality of life (QOL) inside Egyptian parks. This study has been inspired by early theorists like "Maslow" and other theorists who have followed Maslow's footsteps. They analysed and measured the concept of quality of life (QOL)into two well-known terms "human needs" and "well-being". The study explores the impact of landscape features towards "human needs and well-being". Lately, Egypt is suffering from inflation and economic crisis which affect the Egyptians life style. Most of the Egyptian society is living a stressful life; this study will examine whether the Egyptian parks help Egyptians as an escape way where all the negative vibes are going to meet with nature resulting in a positive outcome. This research used qualitative investigation method to measure the impact of implementing landscape features in Egyptian parks on enhancing the quality of the Egyptian life by measuring the (QOL) with regards to "human needs and wellbeing". The presented research investigated the impact of landscape elements implemented in Al-Azhar Park and Family Park on "human needs and well-being". That shall pave the way to investors, policymakers, architecture and civil practitioners to realize the potentials of designing and constructing parks in Egyptian urban environment, as an efficient tool to improve the quality of Egyptian life.

This ambitious and lively book argues for a rehabilitation of the concept of 'human needs' as central to politics and political theory. Contemporary political philosophy has focused on issues of justice and welfare to the exclusion of the important issues of political participation, democratic sovereignty and the satisfaction of human needs, and this has had a deleterious effect on political practice. This book develops and defends a compelling positive conception of human needs: the evaluation of needs must be located within a more general analysis of institutions, but can in turn help to justify forms of coercive authority that are directed toward the transformation of political and social institutions and practices. The argument is animated throughout by provocative and original discussions of topics such as autonomy, recognition, rights, civil society, liberalism, democracy, constitutionalism and land reform. The book will interest a wide range of readers in political and social philosophy, political theory, law, development, policy and Southern African studies.

The attached document includes the contents page and the book's introduction.

Alles siis, kui kõik vajadused on eemaldunud, saab kõike hakata nägema, mõistma ja tundma juba päriselt, mitte mängult. Mitte mängides oma soovide ja tahtmistega, mitte lastes neil ennast juhtida ja valitseda, vaid nähes ja tundes ning mõistes tegelikkust nii, nagu see just on – puhtalt ja päriselt, ilma hinnaguteta, ilma iseennast ja oma vajadusi sellesse segamata.

2008-ban Garai László levélben fordult Heller Ágneshez, Márkus Györgyhöz, Vajda Mihályhoz és az 1960-as évek Marx-reneszanszának még néhány résztvevőjéhez annak kiderítésére, van-e valami összefüggés aközött, ahogyan József Attila Marx-követő barátai, a Lukács-iskola és Althusser köre a szükségletek nagyon fontosnak tartott s ugyanakkor elutasított kérdését kezelte. A levélre HÁ nem válaszolt, az egyik válaszoló pedig (aki indokoltan nevének ideiglenes elhallgatását kérte) erre kínált egy magyarázatot egy nagyon érdekes tudománytörténeti előzményben. HÁ ezt a levelet, amely pedig becsületébe vágott, szintén kommentár nélkül hagyta, s a jelen levélváltás ennek a történéssornak a motívumait próbálja tisztázni, az eddigiek közzétételével úgy, hogy a tudománytörténetileg fontos tisztázásba a Web 2.0 eszköztárát is bevonja.

In responding to the five excellent articles on Freedom is Power collected here, I argue that my account of representation in politics runs all the way down, as does my associated views on needs and institutional critique aimed at diminishing domination. I take on board some of the other criticisms levelled at me, but resist the notion that my account of freedom as power constrains resistance. Liberty through representation requires and depends upon resistance; it also institutionalises it.

The role of architecture is to create spaces that meet the needs of users. Architecture of buildings is influenced by many factors such as behavioural, socio-cultural and physical which affect the design, meaning and use of space to different individuals and group of people. In view of this, some courses that deal with man-environment behaviour studies were incorporated into the curriculum of architecture schools, but it has been observed that the guiding principles of the curriculum formulation and implementation of these courses are yet to establish institutional ideology; to enforce the context relevance, and implementation in the instructional plans so that architects under tutelage can create environments that will respond to the need of users. Using secondary data from literature and curricula of four architectural schools in South-west Nigeria, this paper examines how adequately students are sensitize on the relationship between man and environment as an important way of meet...

The current study presents the analysis of Baluchistan conflict with a lens of Human Needs Theory (HNT) and tries to find out the possible resolution of conflict in accordance with the parameters given by HNT. The first part deals briefly with the major issues of the conflict in Baluchistan, which provides an insight to the conflict. The second part outlines the ideas of HNT theorists; i.e. John Burton and Abraham Maslow. The third part provides the application of HNT to the conflict in Baluchistan, which aims at to find out a mechanism that may help to reach at a possible resolution of the conflict. The study also takes into account the matters regarding Baloch grievances, the sense of deprivation, lack of trust, the issues of perception and enemy images. The analysis of Baluchistan conflict through Human Needs Theory and having awareness about the effect of enemy images and perceptions after more than a decade of conflict, study recommends that a needs-based solution is within rea...

On December 9, 2019, Human Rights Day, the Süddeutsche Zeitung published an article with the headline: "The Dignity of the Individual - The UN Declaration of 1948 is based on an image of humanity shaped in Europe and America - this does not suit everyone" [1]. This becomes particularly clear in Article 1 of the Cairo Declaration [2], adopted by 45 Muslim states in 1990: "All human beings form a family whose members are united by submission to God and all are descended from Adam. In contrast, Article 1 of the UN Declaration emphasizes the autonomy of the individual and his or her freedom. How do such different conceptions of being human come about? From a political point of view, different images of humanity lead to different goals and priorities. And to other human rights.

Climate change poses great challenges to modern societies, central amongst which is to decouple human need satisfaction from energy use. Energy systems are the main source of greenhouse gas emissions, and the services provided by energy (such as heating, power, transport and lighting) are vital to support human development. To address this challenge, we advocate for a eudaimonic need-centred understanding of human well-being, as opposed to hedonic subjective views of well-being. We also argue for a shift in the way we analyse energy demand, from energy throughput to energy services. By adopting these perspectives on either end of the wellbeing-energy spectrum, a " double decoupling " potential can be uncovered. We present a novel analytic framework and show-case several methodological approaches for analysing the relationship between, and decoupling of, energy services and human needs. We conclude by proposing future directions of research in this area based on the analytic framework.

This article presents findings from a research study that examined the impact of a staff education programme on aggression as displayed by people with dementia living in residential aged care. The staff education programme was designed to change staff attitudes and perceptions towards their care management of the person with dementia. A simple interrupted time series, with the resident acting as his/her own comparison, was used to measure residents' aggressive behaviour both before and after the education intervention -Emotional Responses as Quality Indicators (ERIC). Forty-three residents and 85 staff were involved in the study. Staff attitudes to their work were assessed before and six weeks after the education intervention using the Attitude to Elderly Severely Mentally Infirm Care Scale. Findings indicate that people with dementia display cues about impending physical aggression, but such cues are often ignored by staff, as they may not see or understand anger as a legitimate human emotion within the context of the disease process.

‘Theoretical considerations on the study of cultural “needs”’, Sociology 13 (2) 1979: 235–57.
Abstract: In discussions of cultural policy, a great deal hinges on how cultural 'needs', or 'wants' or 'aspirations' are to be conceptualized,and on how they are to be empirically discovered and studied through social research.By analogue with Steven Lukes's discussion of power, three views of 'cultural needs' are examined: A 'one-dimensional' view is implicit in the methods commonly used by many public authorities in making policy: consultation with existing interest groups, survey research, and PPBS. Illustrations are drawn from some of the towns which took part in the Council of Europe's Fourteen Towns Project. The 'one-dimensional' approach, however, is atomistic and utilitarian, and largely ignores the possible existence of latent 'needs'. A 'two-dimensional' view is seen in the practice of animation socio-culturelle,which seeks to make latent 'needs' evident by exposing people to new cultural experience.The logic of animation is experimental and reformist, but it is doubtful whether it amounts to a theoretically informed and directed praxis. A 'three-dimensional' view of cultural 'needs' is seen in the writings of the Frankfurt School. For Adorno and other Frankfurt theorists, latent 'needs' are more deeplv rooted in the structure of modern societv. They reject current popular taste as a yardstick for policy. But their theories also involve making a distinction between 'true' and 'false needs,' and 'true' and 'false' enjoyment, a distinction fraught with difficulties.

Neoclassical economics has been built on the assumption of limitless human needs and limited natural resources. The essay aims at challenging this thesis by presenting how scarcity is the result of the surplus production. It introduces the notions of initial advantage, cumulative advantage, and class surplus. It highlights that the way of producing surplus has undergone a basic change when capitalism has become the ruling mode of production: the production of surplus has become subordinated to the objective laws of the market competition instead of the subjective needs of the holders of advantage. This has allowed an enormous increase of the production of surplus expropriated by the propertied class, which is other than the working class. As a result, nowadays enough class surplus is produced to eliminate scarcity overall. The necessity of this elimination is emphasised by the fact that accumulation of advantages based on surplus production that coincides with the production of scarcity and accumulation of disadvantages perpetually rushes to crisis and has devastating impacts both on the society and nature.

In addition to increasing the attractiveness of urban environment, the advancement of living conditions in this environment provides a good basis for achieving the major goals of sustainable development. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of urbanization and other issues related to urban development have raised and augmented problems in these settlements. This situation is well understood in many Iranian cities in which the consequences of rapid urban growth and insufficient financial and human resources in the management process are obviously felt. The purpose of this research is to analyze the livability of Tehran Metropolis in terms of the fulfilment of biological needs with regard to land uses for residential purposes, urban infrastructures, sanitation, green spaces, industry, administration, transportation, military, and commercial purposes. To this end, initially the pattern of distribution of biological services all over Tehran Metropolis was analyzed using the Standard deviational ellipse method; and then, using the SAW technique, the livability of districts in Tehran was measured with respect to the fulfilment of biological needs. The findings of this research show that different districts of Tehran Metropolitan do not have similar conditions of livability regarding their access to biological services and these services have not been distributed among them equitably. The present study introduces the spatial districts which are high on the list of priorities and which require greater attention so as to promote just distribution of biological services in Tehran.

A simple, jargon-free introduction to the concept of needs in politics and political philosophy, with particular reference to South African conditions and examples. This chapter outlines the nature, generation and politics of needs, and their central importance in political philosophy, especially as regards questions of democracy, power, equality, justice, legitimacy, rights, political obligation and progressive political change.

The current study presents the analysis of Baluchistan conflict with a lens of Human Needs Theory (HNT) and tries to find out the possible resolution of conflict in accordance with the parameters given by HNT. The first part deals briefly with the major issues of the conflict in Baluchistan, which provides an insight to the conflict. The second part outlines the ideas of HNT theorists; i.e. John Burton and Abraham Maslow. The third part provides the application of HNT to the conflict in Baluchistan, which aims at to find out a mechanism that may help to reach at a possible resolution of the conflict. The study also takes into account the matters regarding Baloch grievances, the sense of deprivation, lack of trust, the issues of perception and enemy images. The analysis of Baluchistan conflict through Human Needs Theory and having awareness about the effect of enemy images and perceptions after more than a decade of conflict, study recommends that a needs-based solution is within rea...

ABSTRACT The ethics of care addresses aspects of the human condition that other moral theories overlook—our vulnerability to injury, inevitable dependencies, and ubiquitous needs. In the grip of these experiences, we require care from others to survive and flourish. The precarious nature of human existence represents a related experience, one less thoroughly explored within care ethics. Through examination of these occasions for care, this article offers two contributions: First, a map of the conceptual relations between care ethics’ four key concepts: need, vulnerability, dependency, and precariousness. As a subset of these efforts, I investigate the relevance of precariousness and precarity for care ethics by asking what they require of caring relations that vulnerability does not. Second, a more precise articulation of care ethics’ normative foundations and accompanying elucidation of the alternative vision of moral responsibility care ethics advances. Examining need, vulnerability, dependency, and precariousness through the lenses of finitude and embodiment exposes two common forms of conflation: between precarity and vulnerability and between dependency and vulnerability. Analysis of the moral significance of the body as a site for care reveals a novel portrayal of the normative foundations of care ethics and the reasons why we care for one another ethically.

The ethics of care addresses aspects of the human condition that other moral theories overlook—our vulnerability to injury, inevitable dependencies, and ubiquitous needs. In the grip of these experiences, we require care from others to survive and flourish. The precarious nature of human existence represents a related experience, one less thoroughly explored within care ethics. Through examination of these occasions for care, this article offers two contributions: First, a map of the conceptual relations between care ethics’ four key concepts: need, vulnerability, dependency, and precariousness. As a subset of these efforts, I investigate the relevance of precariousness and precarity for care ethics by asking what they require of caring relations that vulnerability does not. Second, a more precise articulation of care ethics’ normative foundations and accompanying elucidation of the alternative vision of moral responsibility care ethics advances. Examining need, vulnerability, dependency, and precariousness through the lenses of finitude and embodiment exposes two common forms of conflation: between precarity and vulnerability and between dependency and vulnerability. Analysis of the moral significance of the body as a site for care reveals a novel portrayal of the normative foundations of care ethics and the reasons why we care for one another ethically.