Hayek

Law here, law there, law everywhere. The first nine months of the Trump administration have thrust questions about the force of law, legal strategy and tactics, and the role of judges in the United States' much-vaunted system of constitutional checks and balances to the fore of public attention. Debates about legal statutes, precedents, and institutions have raged intensely and with near-

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Il lettore non cada in equivoco: benchè il titolo di questo saggio sia alquanto puntuto, on di velenoso pamphlet si tratta, ma di libro ragionato, riflettuto, che non indulge mai al gusto invasato della provocazione e che sempre, al contrario, muove rilievi ed appunti all'"anomalo" liberalismo di Hayek derivandoli da uno studio minuzioso dei suoi testi, scomposti e frugali anche nei loro più appartati diverticoli. Il tutto, peraltro, dispiegato senza torbide tortuosità, senza burbanze erudite e con il piglio di una conversazione diretta, immediata, che coinvolge il lettore e fin da subito lo rende partecipe di questa analisi critica. Che poi, in fondo, è l'analisi che si conviene ad un "grande" come Hayek non già per abbassarlo ma per intenderlo meglio.

In March 2007, BBC2 screened The Trap, a series of films by Adam Curtis. Curtis had previously won attention for documentary series such as Century of the Self (on the influence of Freud) and The Power of Nightmares (on neo-conservatives’ use of the threat of Al-Qaeda). In The Trap Curtis turned his attention to the post-war political cult of individual freedom, arguing that the theories on which this was based viewed humanity as a collection of atomised and selfish individuals; simultaneously, they held that any other view of society was to be opposed as a hypocritical and dangerous cover for sclerotic statism or totalitarian dictatorship. As our social institutions have been remodelled under the influence of these ideas, Curtis argued, so trust in authority has broken down, society has become more atomised, individuals have begun to feel ever more helpless in a world devoid of beliefs, and the possibilities of politics have been reduced merely to administrating the status quo.

Many scholars have written about F.A. Hayek’s influence on postwar Anglo-American political thought, and many scholars have written about how interwar economic debates informed his turn from socialism to liberalism, but few have analyzed the philosophical foundations of his political thought. Those who have given cursory attention to this subject have mischaracterized it. For example, Louis Hartz (1955) erroneously claimed that Hayek was a Lockean liberal. In truth, Hayek’s political thought was grounded more upon eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers like Adam Smith and David Hume than seventeenth-century English philosophers like Locke. This article shows how Hayek saw himself building upon, and departing from, previous political philosophers and their foundational ideas.

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Hafeez Jamali, "Ludwig von Mieses." October 19, 2012.
For anthropologists, the term neoliberal often becomes a shorthand for indicating all that is wrong with the present. But such usage of the term can foreclose our ability to imagine different futures. In this article, I go back to a time before neoliberalism, when economists and philosophers were engaged in debates about the rationality of economic planning within market economies, and in which the concept of “tacit knowledge” was pivotal. These 1920s and 1930s thinkers, especially Hayek and von Mises, were convinced that collectivism and planning would not work, and their work is cited still today as having established the basis for laissez-faire (neoliberal) capitalism. I critically juxtapose their findings with a historical analysis of the public sector in Egypt, with a short excursis into management theory (and research on tacit knowledge), and with my own ethnography. Looking at the case of a successful public sector banker I worked with in Cairo, I show how he relied on tacit knowledge as a collective inheritance that was embodied in collective subjects and “secrets of the trade.” My findings thus call into question Hayek's argument about the irrationality of collectivism and economic planning. They also point to the importance of tacit knowledge practices as collective and public goods in our economic imaginary of the future.

A short series including a distinguishing terms, i.e. ‘moral,’ ‘ethic,’ and ‘Justice.’ I shall defend using animals for human consumption, the current popular problems of big game hunting, and a possible solution to the issues giving as close to a win-win as possible throughout this work. Overall, the running theme will contend that humans are not “equal” to other species of animals, especially not under the law.

There is obviously soo much more that can be said on this topic. Hopefully, this sparks thought provoking conversation.

John Rawls ve Hayek Sarmalında Adalet Karşılaştırması Üzerine Bir İnceleme " Adalet toplumsal kurumların ilk erdemidir " Adalet kavramı siyaset felsefesi alanındaki ana tartışma konularından biridir. Adil toplumun ne olduğu ve nasıl düzenlenmesi gerektiği yönündeki tartışmalar binlerce yıl öncesinde olduğu gibi günümüzde de güncelliğini korumaktadır. Bu çalışmada Adalet üzerine iki önemli düşünürün yaklaşımları ele alınacak ve açıklanacaktır. John Rawls Bir Adalet Teorisi (A Theory of Justice)'nde doğrunun iyi olana öncüllüğünden hareketle adalet ilkelerinin herhangi bir ahlakî, dinî ya da metafiziksel iyi anlayışından bağımsız olarak herkesin kabul edeceği normlara göre belirlemiştir. Çünkü ona göre, ahlâkın en temel formda muhakemeyi yapana göre değişmeyeceğidir. Bu durumda ahlâkın haklılaştırması muhâkemesinde Tanrı'ya gerek yoktur. Tanrı varlığı, ahlâki gerekçelendirmenin gerekli kurallarını belirleyemez. Dolayısıyla adâlet ve ahlâk, Tanrı'nın onaylamasına gerek olmaksızın yeryüzündeki insanların makul muhakemesiyle gerçekleştirilebilir. Rawls'un teorisinde-Kantçı yapısalcılıktan yola çıkarak-liberal rasyonel birey sadece kendi çıkarları peşinde koşarken, makul olan birey ise diğerlerinin çıkarını ya da düşünceleri dikkate alan bireydir. Klasik liberallerin David Hume'dan bu yana terk ettiği toplumsal sözleşme kuramı Rawls'un Bir Adalet Teorisi'nde tekrardan canlanırken, bu toplum sözleşmesine göre, bireyler rasyonel olarak kendi çıkarları peşinde koşarken birbirinin kurdu olmalarını engelleyen, bireyin amaç olarak kabul edildiği bir ahlâk ile sınırlıdırlar. Rawls'un ulaşmaya çalıştığı yapısalcılık formu diğer etik konuları dışlayan fakat adâlet üzerine odaklanan siyasal bir yaklaşımdır. Bu yaklaşım, evrensel ya da kozmopolit bir toplumdan ziyâde, kapalı bir toplum içinde savunulmaktadır. Bu savunma demokrasiyi ve sınırlarını benimsememiş, marjinalize olmuş, vatandaş olmayan diğerlerine hitap etmez. Teori aslen yerel olana aittir. Onun düşüncesine göre ise, tüm değerlerin âdil dağıtılmasıyla ilgili bir yapısalcı form oluşturmak vardır. Sadece basit olarak gelir ve refah ile sınırlı değildir; özgürlükler, siyasal güç, fırsatlar olmak üzere bir çok değeri içermektedir. Rawls'un adalet teorisi doğrunun iyi karşısında öncelikli olduğundan hareketle adım adım Orjinal Pozisyon, Bilgisizlik Peçesi, Düşünümsel Denge, Maximin Kuralı, Pareto Optimumu, Adaletin İki İlkesi, İki İlke Arasındaki Lexical Düzen'den Oluşan Düşünsel halkalardan soyut bir zincir oluşturulmasına ve böylece adalet teorisinin inşa edilmesine imkan vermektedir. Rawsl'un amaçlarından bir tanesi her zaman, her yerde kabul görecek olan evrensel adalet ilkelerini kabul gördürmeye çalışmaktır. Bu yüzden, belli bir iyiyi maksimize etmek amacıyla bir doğruyu tanımlayan etik teorilerinin ahlâki olarak geçersiz olduğunu savunmaktadır. Çünkü insanların iyileri farklıdır ve çeşitlidir. Ona göre, ilk doğru olan bulunmalı, daha sonra doğruya dair ilkeler farklı ahlâki iyileri tanımlamak için kullanılmalıdır. Rawls'un teorisinde, birey toplumsal yapı içine gömülüdür ve toplumsal kurumlar tarafından belirlendiği açık şekilde kabul edilmektedir. Doğrunun iyiye önceliği bireyin iyisini, belirlenmiş doğru çerçevesinde sınırlamaktadır. Doğrunun iyi karşısında öncelikli olması, hakkaniyet olarak adalet teorisinin farklı hayat planları arasında nötr olmasını garanti etmektedir. İnşa edilecek adalet teorisinin kamusal bir haklılaştırmaya dayanması gereklidir. Adaletin iki ilkesi, orjinal pozisyondaki taraflarca belirlenmektedir. Rawls'un düşünsel yolculuğunda orjinal pozisyon, metodolojik olarak ilk uğraktır.

In 1992, the Chicago School economist Milton Friedman was asked about the original purpose of the neoliberal Mont Pèlerin Society, founded in 1947. There is “no doubt”, he replied, that its original purpose was “to promote a classical, liberal philosophy, that is, a free economy, a free society, socially, civilly and in human rights.” Coming from a thinker who described the authoritarian regime of Chile’s General Pinochet as an economic and a political miracle this evocation of human rights appears out of place. According to a dominant view, neoliberal emphases on competitive markets and austerity are self-evidently at odds with human rights.My new book The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism, published by Verso, nonetheless argues that Friedman’s position deserves to be taken seriously. http://ppesydney.net/the-morals-of-the-market/

While neoliberalism and its history constitutes now a contested yet ever-expanding field of research, little remains known about the origins of neoliberalism before WWII. Too often, the Mont-Pèlerin Society first meeting in 1947 serves as a departure point, with a reference to the Walter-Lippmann Colloquium of 1938 thrown in for good measure. This event however, already constituted an achievement to materialize and institutionalize the convergent lines of thought early neoliberals had been developing since the beginning of the decade. Far from laying in self-proclaimed isolation, they were well-acquainted with each other while being supported by international funding agencies.
More importantly, the set of problems and issues they delineated through their publications, correspondence, and meetings, covered different grounds than those developed within neoliberalism after the war. In many ways, early neoliberalism was a child of the Interwar, while the later neoliberalism was a reaction to the post-WWII settlement. Going from one to another implied a much larger shift in terms of values, arguments, and personnel than has been noted before. Many early neoliberals were or became " epistemologists: " Lippmann, etc. who thought that proper social thought derived from sound epistemological premises, and attributed the failures of liberalism to its obsolete scientific premises. In various ways, they all granted that questions of how to acquire, distribute and reflect knowledge were essential elements of any scientific, economic or social theory.
This article aims to give a first comprehensive account of the period of early neoliberalism, running from 1931 to 1945. It will present both the historiographical need for such an inquiry as well as organizing its findings around four main themes: 1. the institutional network in place; 2. The political project of modernizing liberalism through law; 3. The moral necessity to tackle the social question; 4. The urgency to update the science of liberalism. We conclude that early neoliberalism converged around a strong preoccupation for science and the scientific method as a critical wedge against ideological opponents (collectivism), and, equally, as a mean to recode the obsolete 19th century liberalism (laissez-faire) according to the epistemological and scientific advances of the 20th century (conventionalism).

Liberalism is a term employed in a dizzying variety of ways across the humanities and social sciences. This essay seeks to reframe how the liberal tradition is understood. I start by delineating different types of response – prescriptive, comprehensive, explanatory – that are frequently conflated in answering the question “what is liberalism?” I then discuss assorted methodological strategies employed in the existing literature: after rejecting “stipulative” and “canonical” approaches, I outline a contextualist alternative. On this (comprehensive) account, liberalism is best characterised as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time. In the remainder of the article I present an historical analysis of shifts in the meaning of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950, focusing in particular on how John Locke came to be seen as a liberal. I also explore the emergence of the category of "liberal democracy". I argue that the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the twentieth century, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. This capacious (and deeply confusing) understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both inherit and inhabit it.

Money is one of mankind's earliest and greatest inventions. Money, as we know it today has a long
evolutionary history. The process started from barter in ancient times and evolved into
cryptography-based money in modern times. The evolution process of money has always been
closely connected with the technological advancements in an economy and modern economy is
high-tech. The global economy is inevitably moving towards a digital eco-system which requires
a new and auspicious payments solution that better address the needs of the people involved. Over
the last couple of years, cryptocurrencies have gained rapid market growth as well as serious public
attention. The creator of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto,
wrote a white paper titled ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ and in his paper he
describes Bitcoin as a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash (Nakamoto, 2008). The
motivation of the creator behind Bitcoin was to develop an alternate payments solution to cash
while retaining the advantageous properties of cash.

« Théorie (de la théorie) du complot », Kairos 49, avril/mai 2021, pp. 10-11

Peut-on penser le complot ? Les médias « mainstream » considèrent que l'impensable doit rester impensé. Derrière eux se rangent, cela va sans dire, les bienpensants, toutes tendances confondues. Mais de quoi parle-ton au juste ? D'une réalité qui appartiendrait au domaine (philosophique) de la raison pure ? Des conditions de possibilité (politiques) de la démocratie ? Ou de la difficulté (psychologique) extrême de comprendre, et de révoquer, les manipulations perverses 1 ? Commençons par planter le décor lexical.

Neoliberals do not believe in
the liberation but in the encasement of markets. The encasement or protection is staged not
only by the state but, crucially, by a law understood at the global level. This is not only the
public international law between states but the private international law that protects
individuals and corporations and its synthesis in the so-called International Economic Law
(IEL) ascendant since the 1980s. Neoliberals, especially those from what I call the Geneva
School as opposed to the Chicago School, share a foundational belief in the need for what
they call the visible hand of the law as the necessary supplement to the invisible hand of the
market. This essay introduces the idea of ordoglobalism as a way of describing this inherently political school of thought.

Michael Polanyi’s part in the creation of neoliberalism is an unlikely one. Born in Budapest in 1891, he emigrated a first time from Hungary to Germany before leaving the Continent to seek a more open and tolerant workplace in England, arriving in Manchester in 1933 from the famous Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute in Berlin-Dahlem. Polanyi had left his chemistry laboratory in Berlin dissatisfied with the lack of public engagement of fellow scientists – Fritz Haber in particular – in speaking out either for their Jewish colleagues being dismissed, or against the evolution of the political situation. Berlin, where science was practiced in tightly-knit independent communities, epitomised the ideal workplace Polanyi would never find elsewhere. At that time however, England herself was facing a grave economic and moral crisis, questioning the very foundations of its long-standing traditions. As the decade progressed, Polanyi progressively lost interest in chemistry and scientific matters and became preoccupied with the necessary conditions for free science and the political and ideological determinants required for the pursuit of discovery as he understood it.

Faced with a concerted movement promoting the planning of science, Polanyi became an important public figure in the English discussions around the opportunity to increase state oversight over scientific research. I will purport to show how his (neo)liberalism was consolidated within this epistemological quarrel over the nature of knowledge, and the conception of what science is and does. In this dispute, questions of how to organize the community of researchers became relevant to the kind of political system one wished to defend and promote. Conflicting visions of the nature of science – its historical development and its relation to truth – became entangled with economic positions and programs. Most visibly, concerns about the role of science in society were tied up with the most pressing political question of the day: the rise of fascism and totalitarianism. From 1931 onwards, intellectual claims about the nature and character of scientific knowledge were translated in organizational forces which had a pivotal impact not only on government policy, but on the future capacity for neoliberal ideas themselves to be institutionalized and carried out. The Mont-Pèlerin Society, which Polanyi contributed to found, was but a late-comer – ultimately the most successful one – in a movement which started more than a decade earlier. The history of neoliberalism is one of paradoxes and dead-ends, not least because its enemies turned out ironically to be its best allies.

Retracing Michael Polanyi’s gravitational course around the neoliberal core, we will aim to show how epistemological questions played a decisive role in the consolidation of a neoliberal theory of knowledge (part 1). Liberalism, it was felt from the Colloque Walter-Lippmann onwards, needed to reclaim the mantle of science planners and collectivists had misappropriated (part 2). Yet, the organizational impulses needed to carry out a defence of liberalism materialized themselves within conflicting agendas and diverse institutions, which blurred what neoliberalism actually covered and meant (part 3).

This is the slightly modified text of a lecture that addressed the odd proximity of Hayek and Rawls. The lecture eventually became a paper published in Critical Review (link below).  The CR version backtracks a bit on Hayek's Rawlsian tendencies, particularly with respect to the difference principle, which is less egalitarian when applied intergenerationally (Hayek, Bleeding Heart Libertarians) than intragenerationally (Rawls).

Hayek called the idea of social justice a "mirage", but also said that the differences between himself and Rawls ware "more verbal than substantial." From the left, the argument has been made that if Hayek can agree with Rawls, there's something wrong with Rawls. From the right, Ayn Rand referred to Hayek's views as "poison." In the middle, some hold out hope for a "Rawlsekian" synthesis. The intellectual prospects for such a synthesis are quite good, I think, because at the level of normative principle, Hayek is in many ways a Rawlsian. I will outline four main areas of convergence: the importance of 'pure procedural justice', the irrelevance of merit, the use of a veil of ignorance, and the principle the inequalities should benefit everyone. Hayek manages manages to avoid reaching egalitarian conclusions by making implausible slippery slope arguments about the lack of politically stable intermediate possibilities, between a minimal, nightwatchman state and the totalitarian order that would be necessary to achieve perfect equality, and by equivocating about the meaning of central normative concepts and principles.

O Homem foi concebido de diversas formas ao longo da História: cidadão, pessoal, ser racional e coisa. Essas atribuições estiveram relacionadas com os modos de produção de cada época, com exceção apenas do Cristianismo.  Os modos de produção continuam a ser determinantes para a elaboração do conceito de homem? É um problema que este ensaio pretende levantar...

What is meant by the phrase “rule of law”, and what is at stake in our public discourse about this ideal? The authors conjecture that contemporary attacks to the rule of law resonate within the legal profession because of the influence of instrumentalist thinking on our legal epistemology. Legal instrumentalism, which sees in law a mere means to an end, denies the existence of a specifically legal form of reasoning and rationalizes the law solely by appeal to external, extra-legal perspectives. This introductory chapter reviews several theories of the rule of law, tracing the eclipse of the common law tradition of “law as artificial reason” for the instrumentalist concept of “law as will”. A renewed engagement with law as artificial reason integrates the structural, institutional, and procedural dimensions of legal activity, drawing attention to the role of the legal profession, particularly judges, in sustaining the values of legality and the rule of law.

I use the term "cyberlibertarian" to refer to beliefs shared by people from an apparently wide range of political and philosophical orientations today, beliefs that might be summed up via a slogan like "Computerization will set you free." This slogan is purposely vague, but no less powerful for that; beliefs need not be coherent or clearly-articulated for them to have adherents. While only a small number of people self-identify as cyberlibertarians (for an exception, as well as a typology of thinkers that parallels the one offered here, see Thierer and Szoka 2009), many more subscribe to the belief in practice. Among the corollaries that follow from this core belief include: a resistance to criticism of the incorporation of computer technology into any sphere of human life; a pursuit of solutions to perceived problems that takes technical methods to be prior to analytic determination of the problems themselves; a privileging of quantificational methods over and above, and sometimes to the exclusion of, qualitative ones; the use of special standards for evaluating computational practices that differ from those used in evaluating noncomputational ones; and an overarching focus on the power of the individual and individual freedom, even when that individual is understood to be embedded in a variety of networks. While cyberlibertarianism appears to be and in many ways is a theory of technology, I will discuss it today as a Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of 'Digital Freedom' -2 politics and as an epistemic theory, and above all an ideology, which is to say a belief system that serves purposes other than those goals at which it says it explicitly aims.

This article takes the case of Uber, a global platform specialized in transport technologies, to reappraise the claims of the sharing economy. The case presents a chronology of the struggles over the regulation of these digital markets in the US and France, using Uber´s self-description and web discourse for additional illustrative purposes. It exposes Uber´s
business model, the key driving actors and their strategies as well as multi-scalar countermovements. The analysis is framed from a Hayekian and a Polanyian perspective, and the potential of the sharing economy to go beyond market fundamentalism. The Polanyian utopia of sharing as more than market relations based on self-interest is mobilized for legitimizing the platform. The Hayekian utopia of a market society which transforms social relations of friendship and community service into market activities is describing actual development. Finally, Polanyian “counter movements” are described and their potentials are discussed.

Frankfurt School Critical Theory is influential on the left; Austrian School Neoliberalism is influential on the right. Their differing perspectives are analogous to the different notions of the unconscious held by Freud and Jung.

Freud thought that the unconscious was our enemy to be brought under control of the conscious; Jung thought that the unconscious was our friend to be respected through a kind of dialogue. Analogously, Karl Marx tended to think that social systems are our enemy, to be overcome through rationality and conscious activity; while Friedrich Hayek tended to think that the spontaneous and unconscious processes of social systems are our friends, to be embraced through respect for complexity and liberty.

The approach here is an integral one involving the synthesis of opposites by appreciating the truth in both. The result is the ongoing development of two major projects: an interdisciplinary social science via the general praxeology of the Austrian School, and an interdisciplinary system of liber(aliz)ation and human flourishing via the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

Join us in exploring the quartet of Freud:Marx::Jung:Hayek.

SATANIC RITUALS DEFINE SATANISM.. RITUAL SEX, RITUAL DRUGS, RITUAL BLOOD SACRIFICE, RITUAL HUMAN SACRIFICE, RITUAL TORTURE, RITUAL BURNING ALIVE, RITUAL PEDOPHILIA, RITUAL CANNIBALISM, RITUAL CASTRATION.

Satanism is gradually being instituted as the New World Religion defined by Satanic Ritual.

72 Empires have been recorded and every one of them has failed in the same way. The facts have been recorded that a totalitarian and satanic elite infil-traitored and took over all these Empires and that 72 once free, flourishing and rich republics were destroyed from within by Satanic Ritual.

Infil-traition of Satanism is the methodology as slowly every Government Ministry and Societal function is taken over. Eventually a Satanist becomes King Emperor President. The Satanist Pillars of Homosexuality, Pederasty, Drugs and Ritual Sex - both Hetero and Homosexual - are introduced overtly. Christianity and Judaism - the bulwarks Against Satanism - are destroyed and then society destroyed through the fear of Ritual Human Sacrifice.

The Ancient Enemy who counts meditation and the mind control psychic arts as one of its main planks of World Domination has used Satanic Infil-Traitors for 10,000 years in every Organisation - Religion, Left and Right Politics, Dynastic Families, Geopolitics, Economics, Universities, Intelligence Services, Think Tanks, Banking, International Companies, Eugenics -

All of them Censoring Worldwide, Advanced Meditation techniques - Alchemical VITRIOL, the Kundalini Key and Energy Blockage Removal from every Meditation Program.. EXCEPT ENERGY ENHANCEMENT!! https://plus.google.com/115914190158095149904

In this paper we try to answer the question in what sense social sciences are subjective and in what sense they are objective. We examine only some aspects of this problem. First, we address the question of intersubjectivity, mainly with the ideas of philosopher K. R. Popper. We proceed by proposing the following working definition of objectivity: we understand objective facts as true propositions, the truth of which are independent from a particular observer. We ask whether facts of social sciences are objective in this sense. Then we examine some possible objections to proposed claims and also some aspects of subjectivity of social sciences. We are concerned with the following issues: distribution, imperfection and inconsistency of concrete human knowledge, importance of human purposes, beliefs and opinions and of relations between people or relations of people to things in social sciences. Regarding these problems we are dealing mainly with the work of F. A. Hayek. We also try to show that claims we made about objectivity and subjectivity of social sciences are not contrary to each other.

The ideal of liberal neutrality and the ideal of equality are often seen as a trade-off. If the State has to be neutral between theinterests of the rich and the poor, it is supposed to not intervene redistributing resources between them. Neutrality is thus associated to the ideal of a laissez-faire free market system, while equality is generally seen as an ideal requiring State policies aiming at equal opportunity. In this book neutrality and equality are presented as compatible and complementary ideals, rather
than antagonist. First, it is shown that the moral justification of neutrality ultimately relies on a particular ideal of equality called “equal respect”. Second, there are principles of justice and State policies aimed at improving equality of opportunity that can be neutrally justifiable. It is also provided a neutral justification of Rawls’ difference principle, showing even how libertarian thinkers may agree on it.

The paper traces three readings (respectively by Poggio Bracciolini, Friedrick August von Hayek
and Maurizio Viroli) of the famous maxim of Cicero «Legum … omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse
possimus» (Cic. Pro Cl. 53.146), highlighting the complex lines of influence that Cicero has had
on modern political and legal thought.

"L'articolo si propone di ripercorrere tre letture politiche della celebre massima ciceroniana '… legum … omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus' (Cluent. 53.146), rispettivamente da parte di Poggio Bracciolini, di Friedrick August von Hayek e di Maurizio Viroli. 
La frase, di sicuro effetto quanto – e, probabilmente, proprio in quanto – generica, andando a definire il ruolo della legge nella vita associata ma anche nella libertà individuale, ha del resto goduto – anche rispetto a più nutrite riflessioni, contenute soprattutto nel de legibus  – di straordinaria ‘fortuna’.
L’analisi condotta porta a osservare come la massima, generica e utilizzata dal suo autore in contesto processuale, si ponga, per le sue caratteristiche stesse e per una lunga tradizione, al centro di una casistica complessa. Ciò contribuisce a sottolineare l’influenza che Cicerone ha avuto sul pensiero politico e giuridico moderno, influenza che si afferma non da ultimo attraverso le ‘non citazioni’. Tale influenza, sebbene sottolineata dalla critica più recente con sempre maggiore incisività, non parrebbe ancora a rischio di sopravvalutazioni."

El propósito de este artículo es analizar el modo en que se
vincula el conservadurismo y el liberalismo económico a partir
de la crítica de Roger Scruton a Friedrich A. Hayek. Primero se
analizan los conceptos de libertad negativa, orden espontáneo y
catalaxia en Hayek; luego, se presenta la crítica del filósofo inglés
al austriaco; y, por último, se presenta la teoría social-económica
de Scruton como un modo de respuesta a las tensiones del
liberalismo económico.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between conservatism
and the doctrine of economic liberalism from the perspective
of Roger Scruton’s critique to Friedrich A. Hayek. We
carry out this attempt through three means: first, Hayek’s concepts
of negative freedom, spontaneous order, and catallaxy are
analyzed; second, the English philosopher’s critique of Hayek is
explained; and finally, Scruton’s social and economic theory is
presented as a response of the inconsistencies of economic liberalism.

The growing market for cryptocurrencies, when viewed through the lens of Nobel Laureate F A Hayek’s radical idea of abolishing governmental monopoly over currency and introducing unregulated private currencies, reveals fascinating insights. Though over four decades apart, the resemblances and the dialectics of the two radical developments are uncanny.