Future Warfare

In this chapter, we look to the future of special operations and special operations research, focusing on the role of special operations forces (SOF) in an era of great power competition. As China and Russia continue to counter Western and US interests globally, and national and regional threats to peace and stability continue apace, the role of SOF might be more important than ever. But such a move will not go uncountered by competitors of the United States. Whatever the
role of special operations in the future, one thing is for certain: they will
be a critical contribution to the ability of all major global player to protect their interests and project their power globally.

In recent years, militaries around the world have recognised the need to rapidly increase investments in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and examine the potential ways it may be employed in future warfighting. Over time, AI will likely infuse most military equipment and enable the battlespace. Yet, there is still much to be determined in terms of the application and management of AI as a military capability.

This paper considers these issues and proposes operational level defensive and offensive concepts for an AI-enabled battlespace. He then explores how these concepts may be applied to the traditional sea, land and air domains. The intent is to stimulate discussion and new ways of thinking about how AI may be employed in the future and how to begin preparing for that future now.

It's about time. From the perception of the imminence of threats at the political level to the seizing of initiative through proper timing at the tactical level, temporal considerations are of the essence in war and warfare. However, while International Relations scholarship has recently started to explore the importance of time in understanding international politics, such approaches are rarer when it comes to the study of war. Yet it is worth exploring how different understandings of time shape the preparation and the conduct of war, as such understandings have important implications for security policies, force structures and operational planning. This article aims to launch a discussion about this issue. It argues that since the Cold War western warfare, from force structure to the conduct of operations , has been guided by a specific 'wartime paradigm' combining an optimization for speed and an understanding of war as risk management. It shows how the changing character of warfare directly challenges this wartime paradigm and why, if western forces are to prevail in future conflicts, the establishment of a new wartime paradigm guiding technological improvements and operational concepts is of critical importance.

All training short of actual combat is simulation. During the 1st Century AD, the Roman Legions were masters at training. They consistently produced disciplined legionaries who had mastered the skills of combat. The soldiers of Rome trained in a Live-Virtual- Constructive (LVC) paradigm, just as we do today. Their battle drills, often fought with wooden swords in place of steel blades, made one ancient historian, Flavius Josephus, say that the key to the legion’s success lay in their disciplined approach to training. Flavius observed that, for the Romans, their “exercises were bloodless battles so that their battles were bloody exercises.” For centuries, the legions of Rome epitomized the value of intense and realistic training. Today, the US Army realizes that training overmatch is the key to victory. With world- wide commitments, the US Army must create trained and experienced adaptive leaders and organizations that can rapidly generate dominance through better training, tactics and equipment.

Tanks and armored vehicles are essential to conducting combined arms operations, even in an era where the increasing effectiveness of Long Range Precision Firers (LRPF), combined with multi-domain sensor networks, are making the battlespace extremely lethal. The old designs of most legacy armored vehicles, with their limited SA, restricted connectivity, and the inability to mask from enemy sensor networks, are increasingly making those vehicles irrelevant. Upgrading existing platforms with enhanced SA derived from see-through-armor systems is a promising first step to address this challenge. As AI assisted sensor-shooter neural networks evolve in the next decade, transparent armor will become essential. The ability to have crew members operate inside the protection of the vehicle’s hull, where the armor is strongest, will become essential. The vehicle commander’s ability to see and understand his surroundings and the key objects in his battlespace, will make the difference between being the hunter or becoming the hunted. As these technologies mature, the role of armored vehicles in future wars will be enhanced. In peer- on-peer combat, rather than becoming obsolete in the battlespace of 2030 and beyond, MBTs and IFVs will become essential fighting components and nodes in an increasing powerful kill-web, but only if new, clean-slate designed systems are developed.
The new era of enhanced armored vehicle SA is just beginning. The next step in armored SA will be to see both near and far, connect with every intelligent weapon system within range, visualize a holistic view of the battlespace in real-time, and do all this without increasing the cognitive load on the vehicle commander and crew. Combining the recent advancements in SA, with improved battlefield connectivity and intelligent weapons lays the foundation for a major shift in warfighting. The armored vehicle SA systems described above are the genesis of the cognitive enhanced systems that will lead the way to redefine the future of armored warfare and multi- domain operations.

We are racing into the cognitive age. Humanity spent several million years as hunter gathers, several thousand years in the agricultural age, several hundred years in the industrial age, several decades in the information age, and now we are accelerating into the cognitive age. Warfare changed in each of these eras. The cognitive age is defined as an era where objects become smart, share information, and learn from each other through machine learning. As Kevin Kelley, the founder of Wired magazine, stated, Artificial Intelligence (AI) "will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize."

The goal of the study is to examine hybrid warfare's role and place in the Russian military thought. Hybrid warfare is a Western term and was largely missing from the Russian military literature until 2014. Russian theorists have started to use the notion broadly only after hybrid war has become the popular Western term to label the Russian warfare seen in Ukraine. Ironically, in the Russian understanding it is the West (i.e. the United States) that wages hybrid war, and as such the notion is a synonym for Russian expressions like "new type" or "new generation" war. While Moscow's perception on events of the Arab Spring-which are seen as cases for Western warfare-is distorted, Russian military thinkers probably correctly evaluate how the development of technology (particularly information technology) will change the content of war. Russian forecasts on the primacy of information domain in high-tech future wars preceded Western thinking about the subject. However, today similar thoughts on the preeminent role of information space are widely held by Western military thinkers, too. The paper argues, that in the Russian understanding the so-called hybrid war is the general form of future war.

The US and NATO define Electronic Warfare as “a military action that exploits electromagnetic energy, both actively and passively, to provide situational awareness and create offensive and defensive effects.” The Alliance views EW operations in three categories: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Defense (ED) and Electronic Surveillance (ES).Information superiority is vital to modern war. He who controls the Electromagnetic Spectrum, wins the war. Until recently, the US and NATO have enjoyed information dominance. When that dominance is contested, as we have seen in operations in Syria, the surprise comes to us as a terrific shock. During the first two decades of the 21st Century, US and NATO military forces expected information dominance as a normal condition of combat and became complacent with regard to the invisible weapons of EW. The Russians are working tirelessly to create the possibility of employing EW as a vital combat multiplier.

Globalization, the technological interconnectedness of societies, and America’s military prowess have created the opportunity and motive for future peer competitors to exploit Unrestricted Warfare (URW) strategies.  This holistic approach to warfare employs coherent and integrated multidimensional actions, synchronized in time and space, combining all available means, including military and civilian, violent and non-lethal force, targeting adversary’s wide-spectrum domains, aiming to affect opponent’s will and capabilities during times of real or perceived conflict.  Shifting the emphasis from military to political, economic, information, and cultural engagements, future peer competitors will aim to constrain the US’s response within a regional or global sphere of interest, degrading its combat effectiveness, by collapsing government organizations, and disrupting the normal flow of society.  Such perspective produces several strategic implications, exposing legal and moral dilemmas, the increasing civilianization of war, and risk society challenges.
The fact that warfare is expanding beyond the military domain continues to constrain Western thought, challenging military and political decision-makers.  Therefore, it demands a shift of mindset in order to understand that the main strategic differences towards warfare are cultural, and that warfare should be viewed as a holistic endeavor.  Hence, the importance of a coherent integration of US’s national security strategy.  This involves a three step approach based on renewed strategic thought, the purposeful adaptation leading to a holistic-agency approach, and a people-centric perspective enhancing the education of the national security practitioners.

POOR MAN’S NAVAL POWER PROJECTION


This paperl examines the prospects and possibilities for the development of affordable naval forces comprising small ships with limited crew members that will operate in a network-centric manner and be in a position to undertake missions and the geo-strategic role, which are traditionally the domain of large naval forces. We will also examine the extent to which a similar model based on the action of small naval forces may be better protected within a network-centric against emerging threats like ASBMs.
Also examines various weapon systems that may be possibly used to arm such small warships, such as low cost cruise missiles, guns with long range, high-accuracy projectiles, VTOL UAV armed with ‘smart’ rockets, and in general weapon systems, which at low cost may used in place of high-cost systems for power projection on land like Tomahawk missiles and tactical strike aircraft taking off from aircraft carriers.
Finally examines the capabilities for the development of versatile local “aerospace architecture” network-centric operations by swarms of small warships allowing ISR, communications, etc. Similar architectures may be based on systems like very high autonomy UAVs being developed within the Vulture program, near space airships and networks of low cost small satellites.

In this article, my main goal is to explore the leadership aspects of future warfare and show why integrating unconventional leadership is a key aspect for all organizations that deal with massive disruptions and complex problems. I also contend that embracing the concept of integrated leadership is a must for all future leaders. My case study, which focuses on the cultural shift within one particular organization of the U.S. Special Operations Forces, Joint Special Op-erations Command (JSOC), seeks to understand how a networked organizational culture operating within a bureaucracy can be a model both for operations and for developing future leaders.

Armed forces are now in a race to exploit the technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. Viewed as force mul- tipliers, these technologies have the potential to speed up decision making and roboticise warfighting. At the same time, however, these systems disintermediate military roles and functions, creating shifts in the relationships of power in military organizations as different entities vie to shape and control how innovations are implemented. In this article we argue that new innovation processes are sites of emerging forms of public–private interaction and practices. On the one hand this is driving entrepreneurialism into government bureaucracy even as it forges new bonds between defence and industry. On the other, as technologies replace soldiers, a new martial culture is emerging, one that reframes the warrior geek as an elite innovation corps of prototype warrior. We seek to map these relationships and explore the implications for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century.

Large, imposing warships always capture the mass media's attention. Less in the public spotlight is the accelerating rise of unmanned naval vessels. These are the result more of push factors, the militarisation of commercially devel­oped information technology, rather than pull factor responses to well-defined military needs. Modern naval unmanned vessel de­velopment, then, is somewhat erratic, with much experimentation underway to try to work out what it all means.
(This is just my article in the April 2022 Maritime Defence Monitor, the full edition is at https://lnkd.in/gkizZstc)

The changing nature of warfare could see a future in which placing human soldiers in harms way is untenable in instances where autonomous unmanned underwater, surface and air vehicles can perform the same tasks (Leys, 2018, p. 63)

Two definitional policy challenges facing the deployment of autonomous weapons involve the speed at which these systems operate, and the degree of oversight and control which they require (Ibid, p. 50). Human Rights Watch focuses on the control paradigm to refer to three classes of weapons systems: ‘Human-in¬-the-Loop” (humans select targets), “Human-on-the-Loop” (robots select and engage with human supervision) and “Human-out¬-of-the-Loop” fully autonomous weapons systems that involve no human oversight (Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, 19th Nov 2020 cited in Leys, 2018, p. 51)

Every major military force in the world today is maintaining and upgrading its tanks. Tanks provide protected, mobile striking power that has been the centerpiece of modern ground combat since WWI. There is a famous saying: "The only thing better than a tank is two tanks." If you look at the tank inventories around the world, you understand the truth of this maxim. Russia maintains around 20,216 tanks. China boasts about 6,457. North Korea reportedly has 5,025. The US has approximately 5,884. Israel has 2,620.

Rapid advances in disruptive technologies and new emerging threats has impelled the US Army to rethink how it prepares for near-peer and peer-on-peer competition. In 2018, the US Army unveiled its concept of "Multi-Domain Operations" (MDO) and, as with the previous doctrine of AirLand Battle, MDO is influencing the way that the US Army will equip and fight future wars. MDO is not yet doctrine, but it has the potential to be a driving force in the development and procurement of weapon systems for the US Army. MDO is the visualization of the interaction of five domains of modern warfare. These domains are the traditional domains of land, sea and air; combined with the newer warfighting domains of space, and cyber. MDO visualizes the future fight as a contest in all five domains, simultaneously, across the breadth

Objectives: This paper attempts to forecast the future of methods of warfare in the forthcoming decades of the 21st century. The predictions reflect on the current trends observed in the development of military and civil (dual-use) technologies and changes in thought constructs developed for hostilities.

Methods: Empirical and theoretical research methods were utilised in the study. The research data, obtained from a review of source materials, was subsequently subjected to examination through analysis, synthesis and comparison.

Results: The methods of warfare of the 21st century are likely to reflect the technological evolution of the modern age. Considering the present-day trends, it is very likely that our technology-driven lives will transform people into hybrids of biological organisms merged with the technological environment, integrated with the body. Therefore, hostile action against human soldiers could be taken on three major levels: the biological organism, the mass communication technology integrated into the body, and the mental level-both in the conscious and the subconscious sphere. The study into how the soldier's mental sphere can be influenced to anticipate and shape behaviour may contribute to further research on the third level impact on enemy soldiers.

Conclusions: The conclusions formulated in this analysis may carry significant implications for work on an innovative methodology of future warfare, accounting for the technological progress in the next decades of the 21st century, and a methodology for countering future military threats.

It was for a planned future section of his war museum entitled “Storia dell’avvenirismo – Precursori della Futurologia” (“History of Futurism – Forerunners of Futur- ology) that in 1957 Diego de Henriquez, ex-soldier and passionate collector, bought fifteen of Albert Robida’s original sketches for Pierre Giffard’s La Guerre infernale (1908) from a bookstand in Rome. Of these original illustrations (today at the Civico Museo di guerra per la pace “Diego de Henriquez” of the City of Trieste), eight are reproduced in Law, Justice and Codification in Qing China. Accompanying and drawing on their publication, this essay critically assesses Giffard and Robida’s work, outlining precedents and coeval trends as regards the representation of Chinese tortures and the Yellow Peril in early science fiction and Western public discourse.
La Guerre infernale is an early work of science fiction which offers, today, a graphic example of the collective imagery of coeval times related to future wars and technologies, Chinese punishments and atrocities, and fears of the Yellow Peril. By 1908, the theme of Chinese torture, and the topos of Oriental cruelty was not unprecedented in Robida’s work, nor was it an isolated case in popular French and Western publications. Be that as it may (and perhaps precisely because it taps into broader cultural currents), the clash, in La Guerre infernale, between ethnic stereotypes, which informed the representation of Oriental brutality and sadism, and visions of a future driven by technological progress, offers a unique vantage point from which to observe and critically assess Sino-Western cultural relationships at the dawn of the Twentieth century (or at the end of a “long” Nineteenth century).

En la serie "Cosmos: Mundos Posibles" (2020), presentada por el Dr. Tyson, en el último capítulo, sale una niña en el año 2029 imaginando cómo se podría desarrollar el futuro, bajo el tema de "cómo se sanó la tierra".
Y la niña apunta: 2033-Primer contacto con ballenas azules. Canciones traducidas. ¡Están furiosas! 2035-La Amazonia triplica su tamaño. 2037-Por primera vez desde 1966 no hay ingresos en la lista de especies en peligro de extinción. 2040-El décimo coloso de carbono se erige en la Ciudad del Cabo. 2042-El último motor de combustión interna es donado a museo. 2045-Los casquetes polares crecen. 2047-Moluscos que comen plástico de desayuno, avanzan considerablemente en la limpieza de los océanos. 2050-La temperatura global media regresa al nivel de principios del Siglo XX...
La del Dr. Tayson es una visión optimista y sana del futuro del desarrollo humano. También está la otra visión del futuro, la pesimista. De aquí al 2080 un planeta tierra en pleno colapso progresivo...

With the exponential growth of technological change accelerating, it is
imperative to understand these disruptive trends. The focused examination of future possibilities is the first step to developing credible solutions. Some optimists say that major wars will never occur because the thought of war with these new technologies is too terrible to contemplate. Besides, they add, people today are much more sophisticated and intelligent than in past generations. This is the flawed view of almost every new generation. The best and brightest minds of 1914 thought the same thing in their time, and the unthinkable occurred in spite of their best wishes. Others may argue that war never solves anything, that the futility of conflict is apparent, and that we live in an unprecedented era of peace and progress that makes major power conflict very unlikely. This is another fallacy. Ask the descendant of a Carthaginian the question of whether war ever solves anything — but of course, you will not be able to, as Rome completely destroyed Carthage, the culture, and the people. The Carthaginians hoped for peace
as the Romans prepared and executed war. There is an important lesson in both of these examples. “Tripwire” forces will no longer deter an aggressor determined to change the calculus of world power in its favor. Only combat credible forces in range, ready, and capable of striking the adversary after a first strike, will offer any tenable deterrent. The likelihood of future wars between major powers and the ever-developing technologies of war must be studied and understood if war is to be averted. It is possible to examine current technological trends to mentally project alternative concepts to gain an insight into the future. Contemplating the battlefield of 2035, therefore, should be a serious effort to create awareness today that could
generate tomorrow’s deterrence.

Since the end of the Cold War, the West's militaries have been engaged in a series of protracted and persistent low-intensity counterinsurgency campaigns. For air forces, this has broadly meant involvement in campaigns where there have been few serious challenges to control of the air and air dominance was assumed. However, as we move further into the twenty-first century, that scenario is likely to change with the likelihood of peer-on-peer high-intensity conflict increasing. In such conflicts, air dominance will have to be fought for, and maintained, to utilise the full spectrum of capabilities afforded by the exploitation of the air domain.

Technonauka świetnie wykorzystuje nasze pragnienie ciągłego udoskonalania się i pracuje nad coraz większym usprawnieniem człowieka. Literatura science fiction od lat pełna była bohaterów cyborgów, lecz naukowcy nie mogli za nią nadążyć. Dziś jednak fantastyka coraz dynamicznej przeistacza się w rzeczywistość, a nowoczesne technologie wkraczają nie tylko w życie wojska, ale również w naszą codzienność.

Mimowolne cyborgi Łukasza Kamieńskiego to fascynująca wyprawa do świata ludzi-maszyn i najnowszych osiągnięć nauki. Sięgając po twarde dane z zakresu technologii i bioinżynierii oraz odwołując się do popkultury, Kamieński opisuje długą drogę od superwojownika Achillesa do dystopijnych wizji niedalekiej przyszłości. Próbuje też odpowiedzieć na najbardziej palące pytania – jak wiele ulepszeń przyjmą ciało i umysł? Czy natura sama określi granicę, po której przekroczeniu pojawią się niemożliwe do przewidzenia skutki uboczne? A może przeciwnie – ciało zacznie się dostosowywać do ingerencji, aż do momentu pełnej technoewolucji?

Człowiek od wieków próbował poprawiać swoje zdolności i wykorzystywał najnowsze osiągnięcia techniki. Od teleskopu po mikroskop, od okularów po noktowizor, od kompasu po GPS. Czas na kolejną ewolucję. Od człowieka do cyborga.

Masking is the active and passive ability to make military systems difficult or impossible to identify and target. Masking is more than camouflage and stealth. It employs next-generation active and passive means to reduce the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) signature to render the system difficult to locate and hard to target.  Military leaders and technology developers should think carefully about the character of the future battlefield and then take steps to address what is needed to survive and win on that battlefield. We should not make the mistake of under-rating the firepower of our potential adversaries. Masking is a logical necessity and should become a priority for land-power systems development, just as stealth became essential for the survival of our airpower platforms.

Recent advances in Li+ battery cells have been focused on increasing energy density for longer duration use for cell phones, laptop computers, and other portable consumer electronics. At the same time, new emphasis is being given to battery development and manufacture for advanced Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicles of all types. While cost has been a major deterrent to more widespread use of Li+ technology in the automotive industry, new research and manufacturing methods are attacking this hurtle well. As these developments unfold, and as high power military applications mature, some new Li+ cells are being produced with significantly reduced internal impedance. This attribute not only increases the efficiency of charge and discharge processes, but is enhancing the opportunity for use for pulsed power. Because combat vehicle applications are typically higher power level duty profiles, new interest in load levelling for these platforms with pulsed electrical loads is being found. This paper provides a look at the new power performance of some sample battery cells and outlines potential utility for combat vehicle load levelling.

This article was selected 8th July 2016 as the best PhD paper in ECCWS 2016 conference out of 11 PhD papers, although together with an other technical paper.

This article introduces and extends a less known model of history of warfare. It is based on one of the largest academic research projects ever carried out on warfare. It also evaluates the extended version for postmodern warfare as an application and a prediction of the model. The original work is a model of the evolutive phases of warfare. It was published in 1942 as a part of a book " A Study of War " , in two-volumes by Quincy Wright, a pacifist and professor of law. The evolutive phases of warfare were animalistic warfare (up to 50,000 BC), primitive warfare (after 50,000 BC), historical warfare (after 3000 BC) and modern warfare (after 1500 AD). New information technology made it possible to create bigger human organizations and caused bigger wars in these phases. These technologies and their levels were protolanguage (clan), language (tribe), writing (state) and printing press (cultures?). This article points out that cybernetics and systems theory support the interpretation of the Wright's model of history of warfare although both cybernetics and systems theory have been introduced after the publication of Wright's book. The presented model predicts the warfare of our time in a surprisingly accurate, though general manner. The next mega phase of warfare, the postmodern warfare, will have at least the following qualities:
- It will introduce a new kind of communication technology following the printing press
- Its main organizational level is global
- Its main accounts are not science and technology, as they were the main accounts for the fourth phase (1500–2000 AD), but something else
- As a new mega phase, its application and patterns are new and emergent and thus a surprise to us all
- It will be a short phase which will only last some 50 years
- Its ongoing transition period will include change and chaos and a rearrangement of everything we know.

Review of P.W. Singer and August Cole's "Burn-In: A Novel of the Real  Robotic Revolution. Rapid technological change presents profound challenges to all sectors of society.
Technology is a disruptive force that can be harnessed for non-zero progress or
used as a driver of fear and oppression. These potentials are the topic of P.W. Singer
and August Cole’s exploration of rapidly emerging Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Robotics, drones—such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and semi-autonomous
vehicles—and near ubiquitous surveillance (images, facial recognition, and a range
of sensors)—are also examined. Exploitation of big data culminating in a
fragile, extractive, just-in-time society ties these together.

Soldiers will have to be training to urban warfare. Military Units will be deployed in megacities in which they have to face technologically advanced risks. General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis, US Secretary of Defense, included psychological and information blocks over the Krulak’s Three Block War. These kinds of risks will increase soldier’s vulnerability and it will make more difficult missions success. For this reasons urban training and military adaption process is been more important for the near future.

In this article warfare is studied as a multi face, evolutionary, information and acting based system. Central element of this study is Quincy Wright's evolutionary theory of war. It lets us to predict the future, which is based on technology, complexity, specialization, increased size of systems and increased information content. Warfare as an evolutionary system is an adaptive system, a chameleon. This also predicts a change of warfare in the future. We are in a middle of the global change towards global information warfare. But what is the role of global war against terrorism?

Wykorzystanie robotów na polu walki stanowi jeden z najbardziej obiecujących trendów rozwoju techniki wojskowej, zwiastując rewolucję w sposobie prowadzenia wojen (robolucję). Roboty charakteryzują się wie-loma przewagami w stosunku do ludzkich żołnierzy, które, co ciekawe, dotyczą nie tylko sfery skuteczności, ale potencjalnie także wymiaru etycznego. Zastosowanie maszyn będących robotami w pełnym znaczeniu tego słowa, czyli charakteryzujących się możliwością działania autonomicznego, zdolnych przy tym do podejmowania decyzji o selekcji i porażeniu celów (czyli decyzji dotyczących życia i śmierci), wymaga jednak rozwiązania szeregu dylematów sytuujących się na styku techniki i etyki. Artykuł koncentruje się na ukazaniu wyzwań oraz potencjalnych rozwiązań w zakresie budowy architektury sztucznej moralności dla autonomicznych systemów bojowych. Wysiłki w tym kierunku dzielą się na podejście odgórne i oddolne oraz stanowią przy tym odbicie dwóch stanowisk etycznych: rygorystycznego i sytuacyjnego.

The application of autonomous combat systems is one of the most promising directions of military technology development, heralding a revolution in waging wars (the so-called “robolution”). Robots present a set of advantages over human soldiers. Interestingly, they are related not only to the sphere of operational efficiency, but also, potentially, to the sphere of ethics. However, a great deal of technological and ethical dilemmas should be resolved when using combat machines being robots par excellence: capable of operating autonomously
(including making life and death decisions).
The article focuses on the challenges and possible solutions in building the artifi cial morality of autonomous combat systems. There are two development approaches – top-down and bottom-up – reflecting two ethical stances: rigorism and situationism.

The Army's vision of a future multi-domain battlefield makes many assumptions about the cognitive demands and capabilities of current and future soldiers. These assumptions, among others, include that soldiers of the current millennial generation are inherently more tech-savvy than their predecessors because of extensive, lifelong exposure to technological devices such as personal computers, virtual gaming, and cell phones. Thus, they should be able to better leverage new technologies to increase their performance in executing military missions. There is also an assumption that sequentially adding technologies into military skills training only after soldiers are trained in fundamentals will be adequate. Our research suggests otherwise. The purpose of this study was to test a set of hypotheses and assumptions that younger cadets and soldiers possess a higher aptitude and familiarity with digital technologies that could be used to increase combat performance. Our research was conducted over the summer of 2017; it entailed a randomized control trial of West Point cadets participating in urban-raid lane training utilizing new technologies such as virtual reality (VR) goggles. The results of our research showed a sample of millennial soldiers with limited experience and proficiency in military tasks were too cognitively overloaded to accept new and unfamiliar technologies while under the stress of military requirements—despite the clear advantage these technologies held for completing their mission. Our results provide preliminary evidence that cadets generally default to analog technologies—namely, a notepad, pen, or paper—under duress or in the heat of battle, even one simulated. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that the need to train and develop spatial-projection skills are even more important than implementing new technology earlier in the training cycle.

The Australian Army is being steadily withdrawn from operations
in Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. The intense operational period of the last decade may be lessening, but the Army remains committed to a long-term capability development program that is progressively reshaping it. This program is two fold....

This paper focuses on the science fiction (SF) novel Cosmonaut Keep (2000)—first in the trilogy Engines of Light, which also includes Dark Light (2001) and Engines of Light (2002)—by the Scottish writer Ken MacLeod, and analyzes from a transmodern perspective some future warfare aspects related to forthcoming technological development, possible reconfigurations of territoriality in an expanding cluster of civilizations travelling and trading across distant solar systems, expanded cultural awareness, and space ecoconsciousness. It is my argument that MacLeod’s novel brings Transmodernism, which is characterized by a “planetary vision” in which human beings sense that we are interdependent, vulnerable, and responsible, into the future. Hereby, MacLeod’s work expands the original conceptualization of the term “Transmodernism” as defined by Rodríguez Magda, and explores possible future outcomes, showing a unique awareness of the fact that technological processes are always linked to pol...

In the past year a series of articles appeared in military journals arguing for the application of strategic raids as a method to bring back decisive military action as an
4
element of strategy.2 U.S. military doctrine defines Strikes and raids as: “Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”3

There are dust clouds on the horizon. A newly formed American force composed of Robotic Combat Vehicles Heavy (RCV-H) are in position and screening a sector on NATO's eastern flank. The robotic systems are 30-tons, carry a lethal automatic cannon, and are easier to deploy than the heavier, legacy M1A2 SEPv3 tanks of a conventional US Army Armored Brigade Combat team (ABCT). The robot systems quietly scan the terrain with steady thermal and infrared "eyes," searching for the lead elements of the advancing enemy force. Their tethered Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) hover overhead, providing additional situational awareness. The RCV-Hs are stealthy and specifically designed with a reduced thermal and electronic signature that makes them nearly invisible to the enemy's sensors. A kilometer to the rear of the RCVs are a group of Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicles (OMFVs). The OMFV is a Next Generation Combat Vehicle designed to control and integrate robotic combat systems. Inside each OMFV is a bank of computers, each manned by an operator who controls an RCV-H. This human-in-the-loop system enhances the RCV's state-of-the-art sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) that enables the vehicle to move across rugged terrain and avoid most obstacles. 1 By 2025, the US Army sees ground troops conducting foot patrols in urban terrain with robots-called Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) vehicles-that carry rucksacks and other equipment. Unmanned aircraft could serve as spotters, according to the Army's new strategy for robotic and autonomous systems. (U.S. Army image) Image Location:

This article presents a comprehensive Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) model that is built on previous RMA research. This model examines the political, strategic, and military situation, and technological developments in the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, and argues that nonlethal weapons have a potential to lie at the core of the next RMA.

I dette kapitel giver vi et bud på, hvordan implementering af kunstig intelligens i våbensystemer både kan og formentlig også vil transformere situationsforståelsen på den militære kampplads, herunder hvilke muligheder, men også hvilke nye problemer, denne transformation potentielt vil medføre. Selvom AI og automatisk måludpegning allerede er under udvikling og anvendelse i en række våbensystemer – såvel i land-, vand- og luftbaserede systemer – vil vi for begrænsningens skyld fokusere på særligt én type kampplads og ét militært domæne; nemlig luftrummet. Luftrummet er det mest enkle domæne at operere i, da det er fri for forhindringer, når man ser bort fra andre fly eller missiler. Her er den teknologiske udvikling med AI-baseret luftforsvar og ubemandede fly (UAVs) også længst fremme. Luftrummet er desuden særligt interessant set med danske øjne, eftersom Danmark fra 2023 modtager de første F-35 kampfly, som er verdens nyeste og foreløbigt mest avancerede kampfly. Flyene, der er produceret af amerikanske Lockheed Martin, har indbygget en række avancerede sensorer og anvender AI og maskinlæring til sensorintegration, selvforsvar, måludvælgelse og databehandling (Masuhr 2019). F-35 er ligeledes omdrejningspunkt for et antal projekter – hvor det mest omtalte bærer det spektakulære navn “Skyborg” – der har til formål at udvikle ubemandede luftfartøjer, som kan operere integreret med og som støtte til F-35 kampflyet.

Historia wojen skwapliwie odnotowuje zmiany, które w sposób rewolucyjny prowadziły do przekształcenia obrazu pola bitwy. Wydaje się, że stoimy obecnie u progu kolejnej rewolucji, związanej z zastosowaniem robotów w działaniach zbrojnych. Zwolennicy takiego podejścia mówią o tzw. robolucji (robolution). Termin ten, powstały z połączenia słów robotyzacja i rewolucja, opiera się na założeniu, że robotyzacja prowadzi do rewolucyjnych zmian i stanowi punkt zwrotny w historii militarnej. Co więcej, zmiany w charakterze wojny powodowane przez roboty są bardziej dogłębne niż wcześniejsze rewolucje – przeobrażeniu ulega bo-wiem nie tyle sposób, w jaki prowadzi się wojnę, ile to, kto ją prowadzi (robot zamiast człowieka). Rozwój robotów bojowych powodować ma podważenie pod-stawowego determinantu wojny, którym bynajmniej nie jest zabijanie, ale ryzyko bycia zabitym. Z drugiej strony robotyzacja jawi się jako przejaw raczej ewolucji niż rewolucji – jako oczywista kontynuacja dążenia do zwiększenia zasięgu uzbrojenia i zwiększenia dystansu między walczącymi, które dotychczas ograniczone były przez spadającą wraz z zasięgiem precyzję. Cała historia uzbrojenia postrzegana może być jako dążenie do zapewnienia wojującemu fizycznego bezpieczeństwa (żeby wspomnieć chociażby postać Achillesa). Roboty bojowe wydają się przeto być spełnieniem odwiecznego marzenia twórców broni – o broni pozwalającej porazić
przeciwnika z dystansu, który czyni nas niewrażliwym na jego przeciwdziałanie. W tym sensie roboty bojowe stanowią ostatnią inkarnację trendu znanego od co najmniej kilkudziesięciu lat i określanego jako broń kierowana lub, co ostatnio jest
modne, inteligentna.

The trend towards robotization of the battlefi eld foreshadows revolutionary changes in the nature of military operations and in the way to conduct them. This article provides an answer to the question on the essence of the changes and explains whether – and, if so, to what extent – they are symptoms of real revolution, or continuation of the existing trends. What is considered a necessary starting point to answer a question formulated this way is defi ning such concepts as those of a robot, artifi cial intelligence, and autonomy. Also, it is pointed out to the qualities setting robots apart, and to the qualities shared by robots with other kinds of weapons termed as “intelligent”.
Next, possible consequences of the use of military robots are discussed, without reducing them to a purely military dimension of the question, but with giving them a wider – social, political and cultural – perspective. They are put in the context of a concept which views war waging as a refl ection of the culture of the society concerned.

S econdo i pensatori militari statunitensi, il campo di battaglia del 2050 sarà molto differente da quello odierno per effetto dell'azione congiunta di tendenze secolari di sviluppo dell'arte della guerra. Infatti, l'aumento della letalità dei sistemi d'arma moderni, unito a quello dell'aumento del volume di fuoco e dalla precisione dello stesso, il tutto inquadrato da una tecnologia sempre più integrativa, accresceranno a dismisura la potenza di fuoco delle piccole unità 1 . Già ai tempi della dottrina dell'AirLand Riccardo CAPPELLI