Early Modern Science and Philosophy

This paper is on Descartes' account of modality and, in particular, his account of the necessity of the laws of nature. He famously argues that the necessity of the "eternal truths" of logic and mathematics depends on God's will. Here I suggest he has the same view about the necessity of the laws of nature. Further, I argue, this is a plausible theory of laws. For philosophers often talk about something being physically necessary because of the laws of nature, but this necessity is thought to be metaphysically contingent. However, they struggle to explain how the laws could be genuinely necessary while being metaphysically contingent. The chief advantage of Descartes' view, I argue, is that God's will can plausibly explain both the necessity of the laws (because God made them necessary) and the contingency of the laws (because God could have done otherwise). So, Descartes' theistic account of laws provides a plausible explanation, perhaps the best explanation, of the contingent-necessity of laws of nature.

RESUMO. A iconografia dos frontispícios dos tratados anatômicos de Mondino, Vesalius e Realdo Colombo, aqui sucintamente apresentada, permite acompanhar um aspecto central da revolução científica dos séculos XVI e XVII: o processo ao longo do qual a autoridade da palavra (dos textos da tradição escolástica) cede lugar para a evidência dos fatos (estabelecidos mediante observação experimental). O notável desenvolvimento científico-tecnológico subseqüente à consolidação do método matemático-experimental não se realizou, porém, livre de contradições. Inquietações associadas a questões controversas do progresso científico ulterior, como a redução do corpo vivo à matéria inerte e manipulável (própria do mecanicismo) e a sobrevalorização do poder de controle (própria da compulsão tecnológica), podem ser pressentidas desde muito cedo. É o que sugerimos pela interpretação de uma notável obra de arte do século XVII: a pintura “A Lição de Anatomia do Dr. Tulp”, de Rembrandt.

ABSTRACT. The iconography of anatomical treatises frontispieces of Mondino, Vesalius and Realdo Colombo, briefly presented here, let us follow a central aspect of the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries: the process by which the authority of the word (of the scholastic tradition texts) gives way for the evidence of the facts (established by experimental observation). The remarkable scientific-technological development subsequent to the consolidation of mathematician-experimental method didn’t carry out, however, without contradictions. Unquietness associated with controversial issues of further scientific progress, such as the reducing of the living body into inert and manipulable matter (proper to mechanicism) and the overvaluation of the controlling power (proper to technological compulsion), can be foreseen very early. This is suggested here by the interpretation of a notable work of art of the 17th century: the painting The anatomy lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp by Rembrandt.

Course Description: A continuation of the Classical Mind, the Modern Mind is an introduction to modern philosophy focusing on texts from selected early modern and modern thinkers. The class builds upon the history, thought concepts, and themes developed in the Classical Mind and traces the development of Western philosophical thought from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. In particular, this course deals with philosophers that consider the nature of thinking and reasoning, the idea of metaphysics and the foundations of human knowledge, the idea of a universal moral law, the nature of political society and the concept of right, and the idea and value of historical thinking. This course utilizes canonical philosophic texts situated in the history of philosophy to establish the structure and methodology of philosophical thinking. As the second course of the introductory sequence of philosophy classes, this class culminates not only in the identification of philosophic issues, concepts, and questions, but also the practical examination and analysis of fundamental human questions as preparation for students' continuing engagement with their liberal arts education. — Prerequisite for PHIL 202: successful completion of PHIL 201.

Modern philosophy of physics debates whether motion is absolute or relative. The debate began in the 1600s, so it deserves a close look here. Primarily, it was a controversy in metaphysics, but it had epistemic aspects too. I begin with the former, and then touch upon the latter at the end.

In this monograph, Steffen Ducheyne provides a historically detailed and systematically rich explication of Newton’s methodology. Throughout the pages of this book, it will be shown that Newton developed a complex natural-philosophical methodology which encompasses procedures to minimize inductive risk during the process of theory formation and which, thereby, surpasses a standard hypothetico-deductive methodological setting. Accordingly, it will be highlighted that the so-called ‘Newtonian Revolution’ was not restricted to the empirical and theoretical dimensions of science, but applied equally to the methodological dimension of science. Furthermore, it will be documented that Newton’s methodology was far from static and that it developed alongside with his scientific work. Attention will be paid not only to the successes of Newton’s innovative methodology, but equally to its tensions and limitations. Based on a thorough study of Newton’s extant manuscripts, this monograph will address and contextualize, inter alia, Newton’s causal realism, his views on action at a distance and space and time, the status of efficient causation in the Principia, the different phases of his methodology, his treatment of force and the constituents of the physico-mathematical models in the context of Book I of the Principia, the analytic part of the argument for universal gravitation, the meaning and significance of his regulae philosophandi, the methodological differences between his mechanical and optical work, and, finally, the the interplay between Newton’s theology and his natural philosophy.

From antiquity to our present day, scientists specifically cosmologists and physicists, are still on their relentless pursuit to understand the nature and structure of universe with all it’s components. We all know of  or at leat have heard of brilliant minds such as Albert Einstein, Max Planck and others who have contributed to our present conception of the nature of reality. One of those brilliant minds of the 20th and 21st century upon whose work I am going to give an overview is Stephen Hawking. Professor Stephen Hawking who studied at both Oxford and Cambridge University, held the Chair Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge England, a chair that was once held by Isaac Newton. He is without a doubt the leading cosmologist of our time. He is to the 20th and 21st century what Charles Darwin was to the 19th century with his mechanism for the theory of evolution. Even though Professor Hawking is bound physically by ALS or Motor Neurone Disease, yet this did not cause an impediment to his cognitive faculties. That’s why we have several books to which he is the author of and it my aim to give an overview of one of his most iconic books which was a bestseller for 237 weeks. This book is  entitled ‘A Brief History of Time - From the Big Bang to Black Holes.’

This dissertation concerns two controversial aspects of Descartes’ philosophy. The first is the meaning of the distinction between the material and objective senses of the word “idea.” The second is an alleged tension between the Fifth Meditation’s claim that the real natures are mind-independent and the claim of the Principles that universals are mind-dependent.

In the first chapter, I take up the material sense, and argue against those interpretations which see it as a category for the contentless ontology of ideas. I argue that the textual evidence points to the material sense being Descartes’ category for phenomenological description of how things seem to be to a given mind when it has a given idea. In particular, I argue that he deploys the material sense in his discussions of abstractions and that this points to the material sense being a category for content that lacks existential implication for the extramental world.

In the second chapter, I take up the ontology of the real natures, and suggest that there is no tension between the Fifth Meditation and the Principles because Descartes accepts two things under the term “nature,” namely, universals and individual essences. I suggest Descartes is committed to Platonism about individual essences in the Fifth Meditation, and that in the Principles he is concerned only with universals, about which he is a conceptualist. I further suggest that individual essences play key roles in both singular and universal thought.

In the third chapter, I take up the objective sense, and the widespread interpretation of this sense of ideas as concerning current presentational or phenomenological content. I suggest that this account struggles with cases where there is stability in the object of thought paired with changes in the associated phenomenology. I propose that we ought to reject a straightforward equation of the objective sense with current presentational content, and instead adopt a scheme according to which what has objective being in an idea is the sum total of thinkable, essential features of the object, and that when an idea is clear and distinct, what we perceive has objective being in the idea.

Intuition can be seen as the primordial and pre-verbal faculty by means of which the mind gains immediate epistemic access to the phenomena. The concept of structural intuition is premised on the basic principle that an infallible resonance exists between internally intuitive and externally phenomenal structures; it generally proves to be compositional in that it unifies mathematical formality with me- chanical and material phenomenality. The present work is an attempt to extend the doctrine of structural intuition with regard to its epis- temological potential to an epistemic-structural intuition and, accord- ingly, to substantiate it as the characteristic trait of axiomatic intui- tions in the early modern mathematical and material sciences.


Intuition lässt sich als ein primordiales und vorsprachliches Ver- mögen betrachten, anhand dessen der Geist einen unmittelbaren epistemischen Zugang zu den Phänomenen erhält. Die strukturelle Intuition baut auf dem Grundprinzip auf, dass zwischen innerlich intuitiven und äußerlich phänomenalen Strukturen eine unfehlbare Resonanz besteht; sie erweist sich gemeinhin als kompositorisch, in- dem sie die mathematische Formhaftigkeit mit der mechanischen und materiellen Phänomenalität vereinheitlicht. Die vorliegende Abhand- lung ist ein Versuch, die Lehre der strukturellen Intuition hinsichtlich ihres erkenntnistheoretischen Potenzials auf eine epistemisch-struk- turelle Intuition zu erweitern und sie demnach als den Grundzug axiomatischer Intuitionen in den frühneuzeitlichen mathematischen und materiellen Wissenschaften zu begründen.

The image of the mythological shape-changing sea-god Proteus was used in several contexts relating to natural philosophy in early modern Britain. These uses derived from different ancient sources, including Homer, Plato, and Diodorus Siculus. Proteus's use as an image of nature itself, most common among writers on alchemy and natural philosophy, disproves the common idea that images of nature were always female. Coercive relations between the natural philosopher and nature were not dependent on gendering nature as female, but were also expressed through the metaphor of the "binding of Proteus." Proteus was treated by mythographers as representing the investigator of nature, and by antioccultists as an image of the magician making false claims to natural knowledge. The use of the image of Proteus in relation to natural philosophy declined in the late seventeenth century with the rise of mechanical philosophy. IDEAS ABOUT NATURE IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD were often expressed through metaphor. This article discusses the varied uses of one classical image, that of sea-god Proteus, in relation to natural philosophy in early modern Britain, roughly from the late Elizabethan era to the Restoration. Proteus came into writing about natural philosophy and natural knowledge from a number of sources, including mythographies, alchemical writings, and antioccultist polemic. Not as well known as the mother figure Natura, or the clockwork universe of the mechanical philosophers, Proteus was a surprisingly common image, revealing the importance of the humanistic and classical vocabulary in natural-philosophical writing. Examining the uses of Proteus, both by natural philosophers and by writers who were not natural philosophers themselves but connected Proteus with natural philosophy also reveals that the assertion of much recent, feminist-inspired scholarship that personifications of nature are always female is greatly exaggerated.' Proteus, who despite his shape-changing ability was never considered a sexually ambiguous deity, was used as a symbol for nature, showing that nature was not necessarily gendered 1"From ancient to modern times, nature-the object of scientific study-has been conceived as unquestionably female"

La prima traduzione italiana integrale del trattato Astrologia Cristiana di William Lilly, comparso a Londra nel 1647 e subito diventato opera di riferimento fondamentale per la storia e la pratica dell’astrologia oraria.  In questo volume, il secondo della serie, le domande relative alle prime sei case, che comprendono argomenti quali: la durata della vita, la datazione degli eventi, l'aspetto fisico delle persone, il ritrovamento e il destino di persone scomparse, la sicurezza in viaggio, la ricchezza e la fortuna, fratelli e sorelle, trasferimenti e spostamenti, voci e dicerie, oggetti smarriti, tesori nascosti, proprietà, terreni e coltivazioni, compravendita di immobili, eredità familiari e rapporti con i genitori, fertilità e sterilità, gravidanza e figli, ambasciatori e messaggeri, servitù e altro ancora. Del massimo interesse la sezione molto dettagliata e consistente dedicata alle domande sulla salute e alle carte di decubito, alla diagnosi e alla prognosi delle malattie, alle terapie e ai medicamenti.
Seguono tre saggi di Patrizia Nava sulle origini storiche della pratica oraria in epoca ellenistica, sul metodo di analisi di Lilly e sul suo debito, pienamente riconosciuto dall’autore stesso, nei confronti di un altro grande medico-astrologo del XVI secolo, Claude Dariot.

This chapter explores the prospects and consequences of various ways to forge Newton ian connections to Hume's philosophy. Two points of view are offered from which these connections are visible and evaluable: first, Hume's experimental method for the studying of the mind, particularly his reliance on analysis, synthesis and successive approxima tions in relation to Newton's method and Newton-inspired methodologies; and second, the relation of Hume's model of the mind to Newton's model of the natural world, particu larly the congruence of Hume's theory of association with the chemical idea of elective affinities as opposed to gravity. In conclusion, the chapter summarizes the significance of these connections for competing interpretations of Hume's science of the mind.

Early modern scholars and statesmen were acutely aware of the need for improved standards of measurement, albeit for differing reasons. The variety of man-made units across territories and histories was, by the seventeenth century, already a sceptical commonplace, and was understood in terms of the mutability of human institutions. The late seventeenth century saw many scholars advance possible candidates for a universal standard. The most promising of these was the use of a seconds pendulum as a standard for length, a project which was actively pursued by the French Académie Royale des Sciences in the 1670s and 1680s, and remained a goal cherished by savants through the eighteenth century. This paper’s first section places the Académie’s early metrological projects in the context of the scholarly community’s ideal of a universal measurement standard, which was often expressed in ways combining political, theological, and humanistic concerns. Melchisédech Thévenot’s ludic proposal that honeycombs might be a length standard is explored as one example. The second section examines the Académie’s attempts to test the seconds pendulum as a universal length standard, by taking the missions to Uraniborg (1671) and to London (1679) as case studies in the practice of metrological work.

This article is devoted to the treatise Esperienze intorno alla generazione degl’insetti (‘Experiments on the generation of insects’) published in 1668 by Francesco Redi. The latter is today celebrated as the first scientist to have experimentally disproved the thousand-year belief in spontaneous generation, a theory commonly attributed to Aristotle. 
In the introduction, I present Redi and his treatise: Redi spent his whole life at the Medici court as personal physician of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and attended the Accademia del Cimento (‘The Academy of Experiment’), the scientific society founded by the Grand Duke Ferdinand II and his brother Leopoldo to make Galileo's legacy revive. The Esperienze is not written in Latin, but in the vernacular, while the introduction to the treatise displays a plea for experimental method that is today considered a manifesto of New Science.
I start analysing Aristotle’s definition of ‘spontaneous generation’, pointing out how, according to the Stagirite, spontaneous generation is an exceptional sort of generation, exclusively due to material principles and occurring by chance, that is, without a formal principle (semen, egg). Then, I remark that Redi’s target is not Aristotle’s explication for spontaneous generation. In fact, no critic has ever noticed that in his treatise Redi polemically hints (albeit in very allusive manner) to contemporary theories on spontaneous generation, namely the ones by Fortunio Liceti and Pierre Gassendi.
Redi is mostly known for the experiment of the sealed jars with which he would have demonstrated that rotten meat doesn’t breed maggots and, more broadly, that living beings are always generated by parents. However, I stress some important inconsistencies in Redi’s experimental accounts. For instance, he claims that eggs laid by flies on rotten meat are perfectly visible to the unaided eye. They look exactly like small bird eggs, complete with shell and albumen. He even reports that, after the hatching, one will find the empty shells of fly eggs. I suggest that with his narration Redi is not giving us an objective scientific account, but rather trying to disproof the most advanced theories on spontaneous generation of his time. As for the above-mentioned example, I think that Redi’s insistence on the visibility of fly eggs was dictated by the desire to contrast Gassendi, according to whom spontaneous generation is due to invisible primordial seeds floating in the air.
In the second part of his treatise, Redi deals with parasites that apparently originate from living beings (plants, animals). Redi argues that in this case it is the soul of the host organism that generates the insects (zoogenetic theory). For instance, as for gall-flies, he considers galls as eggs laid by plants and gall-flies as the genuine offspring of the plants. Critics have suggested different explanations to justify such a shocking stance supported by the man today celebrated as ‘the father of experimental biology’. I examine Redi’s theory on gall-flies and come to the conclusion that, again, to fully understand Redi’s treatise we need to situate it in the context of the contemporary debate on spontaneous generation. More specifically, we need to concretely situate it in the context of the Medici court. Thanks to Redi’s private correspondence, we know that Leopoldo de’ Medici endorsed the zoogenetic theory – that actually is not even an original elaboration by Redi.
Further, by thoroughly analysing Redi’s version of the zoogenetic theory, I show how the Tuscan naturalist tried to accord it with the principle of parental generation that he had firmly asserted in the first part of his treatise. In fact, Redi tries to establish a regular correspondence between plants and insects, that is, that each plant has its specific parasite. Moreover, he insists on the non-casual nature of such generations. In this manner, he presents the generation of insects from plants as perfectly regular from an Aristotelian point of view, that is, as non-spontaneous.
In the conclusions, I underline Redi’s ability in fashioning himself as a modern scientist, a posture he assumed in all probability to appeal the taste of his patrons. However, I also underline how historiography has tended to focus on Redi’s aspects that are best suitable to our scientific culture, neglecting the polemical essence of the Esperienze as well as Redi debt towards the Aristotelian tradition.

Anton Wilhelm Amo, an 18th Century African slave who lived, studied and taught philosophy in Germany, formulated a considerable critique of Descartes’ mind/body distinction. The history of philosophy has neglected to a fault Amo and his role in-and-for the history of philosophy. I strive, here, to remove this omission and to present a clear explication of Amo – the philosopher, the African, the unnoticed.

*This is a translation of Amo's dissertation.

The introduction and translation are meant to be a resource (PLEASE CITE &/OR INVITE ME TO PRESENT MY RESEARCH) until Justin E. H. Smith and Stephen Menn Critical Edition of Amo’s first two works is published in the next year or two.

Written in 1714, the “Monadology” is widely regarded as a classic statement of much of Leibniz’s mature philosophical system. In just 90 numbered paragraphs, Leibniz outlines – and argues for – the core features of his system, starting with his famous doctrine of monads (simple substances) and ending with the uplifting claim that God is concerned not only for the world as a whole but for the welfare of the virtuous in particular. This essay begins by considering the circumstances of composition of the “Monadology” and its publication history before offering a detailed analysis of the claims and arguments found therein; I suggest the text is best read as dealing with three distinct realms, the metaphysical (§§1-60), the physical (§§61-82), and lastly the moral (§§83-90). The essay concludes with a consideration of the fate and influence of this seminal text.

Il primo volume del celeberrimo Christian Astrology di William Lilly, l’astrologo inglese ricordato per la spettacolare previsione del grande incendio di Londra del 1666, è qui presentato per la prima volta in versione integrale in lingua italiana, annotato e commentato.
L’autore andava particolarmente fiero di questa sua Introduzione all’Astrologia, e a ragione. È in questa prima parte del suo trattato in tre libri, infatti, che Lilly produce «la più facile e completa introduzione all’intera arte astrologica». Qui pone le basi della pratica generale e di quella oraria in particolare, l’arte di rispondere a domande specifiche grazie all’esame delle posizioni planetarie al momento del consulto. Qui insegna le tecniche proprie dell'approccio tradizionale e definisce la terminologia, dettaglia i significati dei pianeti e delle case, presenta la teoria degli aspetti (con un accenno, storicamente intrigante, alle distanze angolari kepleriane, la moda del momento), le dignità planetarie, i gradi debilitanti e molto altro. È qui che stabilisce le corrispondenze mediche e anatomiche ed elenca quella serie di significazioni, che comprendono aspetto fisico, malattie, mestieri, animali, erbe, pietre, città e luoghi, che, utilizzate in modo magistrale nella sua pratica quotidiana, sono alla base di alcune sue stupefacenti previsioni. È nel primo libro, infine, che esamina i diversi modi in cui la questione raggiunge perfezione, ovvero come giudicare la realizzazione degli eventi con la tecnica oraria. Ma soprattutto è questa l’opera che più di ogni altra assolve il compito che si è proposto: democratizzare l’arte astrologica, far parlare in inglese Tolomeo.
Fu grazie al travolgente successo di questo trattato che, a soli quarantacinque anni, William Lilly poté affermare con orgoglio di aver formato più astrologi competenti di chiunque altro in Inghilterra.

This essay begins by arguing that discussions of interdisciplinarity between literature and science have been overly preoccupied by problems of counting: the issue is not that there are or are not Two Cultures, but that we start from defining and delimiting specific numbers of disciplines. It then suggests that that the works of Margaret Cavendish, a philosopher, scientist, playwright, and poet from the mid-seventeenth century, offer two concepts that may help us escape the traps of counting. With her concepts of grounds, she insists on fiction or literature as a mode of rationality parallel to and comparable to reason or science. She also attempts to re-orient contemporary debates about the possible grounds of scientific knowledge, insisting that Nature herself, in all of her variety, must serve as the ground or basis of nature. The essay then shows that the concept of the creature, as Cavendish develops it in her late works, offers a generative model for thinking about combination, cooperation, and association, and might therefore be a useful concept for helping us think beyond the numbering of disciplines.

Robert Hooke fue uno de los miembros más activos durante los primeros años de la Royal Society. Sus trabajos experimentales e inventos mecánicos lo colocan como una de las figuras principales en la filosofía natural de la segunda mitad del siglo XVII. Sin embargo, sus posiciones epistemológicas son menos claras y han dado lugar a diferentes e incluso contradictorias posiciones historiográficas sobre estas cuestiones. En este trabajo se exponen estas posiciones y se analizan los textos de Hooke para intentar entender la causa de las divergencias historiográficas y esbozar posiciones superadoras.

Le début de l’essai II, 12 est bien connu, qui affirme à la fois que « c’est à la vérité une très-utile et grande partie que la science » sans qu’il faille pour autant en faire une valeur absolue, et que la « maison » de Montaigne « a esté dès longtemps ouverte aux gens de savoir et en est fort cogneue », son père prisant « l’accointance des hommes doctes ». Sans même entrer plus avant dans l’« Apologie de Raimond Sebond », l’ouverture de l’essai permet de poser des questions importantes pour qui se penche aujourd’hui sur la question de « Montaigne et la science ».
Le sens exact du mot « science » lui-même d’abord fait problème ; il est ici mis en relation de parasynonymie par Montaigne avec « sçavoir », d’antonymie avec « bestise » et « ignorance » et se démarque conceptuellement tant de la « sagesse » (partage déjà clairement énoncé par Augustin) que de « vertu ». Mais ce n’est pas une spécificité montanienne, et le mot, on le sait, est porteur d’une polysémie qui le rend particulièrement délicat dans son usage renaissant  ; il est par ailleurs, dans les Essais, en concurrence avec d’autres termes, comme « doctrine ». À l’époque de Montaigne, l’extension du nom va de son strict sens aristotélicien – « ce que l’on sait par démonstration » – qui le distingue nettement à la fois de l’opinion et la sagesse, jusqu’au sens très lâche de « connaissance », en passant par « ensemble des sciences et des arts », définitions qui ne relèvent pas de flottements d’usage mais de conceptions pensées des notions de disciplines, sciences et arts. Enfin, on voit se dégager également ce qui est devenu le sens contemporain du mot, pour désigner certaines disciplines ou certaines pratiques, mais ici le rapport à l’histoire (au sens de l’enquête), la séparation de science et de philosophie sont également des étapes importantes.
Lorsqu’on parvient au sens moderne du terme, et que l’on utilise en pensant à Montaigne le mot « science » au sens contemporain du terme, d’autres problèmes se posent. L’article « science » du Dictionnaire Montaigne, classé grâce aux hasards heureux de l’ordre alphabétique juste après … « scepticisme » et qui constitue une synthèse récente des travaux sur le sujet, est rédigé à la lumière des travaux de H. Blumenberg et de ses critères d’établissement de la « science moderne ». Il conduit son auteur à considérer que Montaigne « composa les prolégomènes de la réflexion scientifique moderne » et rappelle que « selon Villey, Montaigne esquisse les prolégomènes d’une science axée sur les faits empiriques et la méthode expérimentale, telle que Francis Bacon la conçut », voyant dans les Essais une « première ébauche de la pensée scientifique » qui « va de pair avec une méfiance poussée des scientifiques de l’époque ». Le rapport de Montaigne à la science est ici pesé selon une vision de la science renaissante et classique et, implicitement, une conception de la supposée « révolution scientifique », qui ne correspond plus à ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui de la science des années 1560-1590, ni à l’idée même de révolution scientifique, largement battue en brèche : les notions d’expérience et d’observation ont été réévaluées, le rôle et la nature réelle de l’aristotélisme revus, et les notions de monde « pré-scientifique » ou de « précurseurs » ont été bannies des méthodes de l’histoire des sciences et des savoirs. Les études récentes ont remis en question le cadre conceptuel de la période tout entière, et donc celui dans lequel s’inscrit Montaigne : l’aristotélisme tant rejeté dans les discours humanistes n’est pas la « pré-science » ou la « non-science » que l’on a dit, ni un système figé dans son dogmatisme, l’évolution de la logique autant que celle de l’expérience en témoignent, et l’on sait par ailleurs que le discours anti-aristotélicien est largement une posture, d’humaniste aussi bien que de gentilhomme.
Dans ce contexte, poser la question de « Montaigne et la science, Montaigne et les sciences » permet de suivre plusieurs pistes d’études, qui peuvent éclairer la question de manières très différentes :
- l’expression de la notion elle-même, en particulier à travers une analyse précise du lexique utilisé dans les Essais ; sa définition, ses limites, ses marges, ses extensions peut-être inattendues….
- la mise en jeu de de ces notions dans le texte, le rapport à d’autres notions, théorisées ou non, nommées ou non, mais présentes, comme la curiosité, le doute, le vérité, l’erreur, le hasard, la preuve, la démonstration, la réfutabilité, mais aussi la nouveauté, le progrès… ;
- le rapport de Montaigne à « l’expérience et à la raison », formule usuelle sous la plume des philosophes naturels de son temps, ainsi qu’à l’observation et à l’autopsie, toutes données usuelles de la science de la deuxième moitié du siècle. Sans doute convient-il ici de relire Montaigne par rapport aux apports récents de l’histoire des sciences en corrigeant une lecture encore bien trop marquée par l’idée d’un Montaigne « en avance » dans une période « pré-baconnienne ».
- l’intérêt de Montaigne pour différentes disciplines, son degré de maîtrise des connaissances réelles de son temps et l’usage qu’il en fait dans les Essais et le Journal. Les travaux récents sur la médecine, en particulier, ont montré qu’au-delà de la critique et de la satire de la médecine et des médecins, immédiatement visibles, Montaigne a une bonne connaissance de nombreux textes médicaux, pas toujours identifiés, peut-être dissimulés. On peut se poser la question pour d’autres disciplines, qu’elles relèvent, au sens de l’époque, des sciences théorétiques, des arts – c’est-à-dire les technaï – ou encore des disciplines hybrides : la médecine, bien sûr, mais aussi l’astronomie, la cosmographie, la zoologie, la botanique, l’anatomie, pour les sciences, mais aussi l’hydraulique, l’art des jardins, la pharmacopée, l’hygiène, la balnéothérapie …, ou encore la géographie, en train de se constituer (il va de soi que certains des noms sont anachroniques, mais les notions existent, autre enquête possible).
- ses lectures « scientifiques », en particulier ses sources contemporaines, souvent négligées au profit des sources anciennes, et ses relations avec les savants actifs de son temps, pas toujours bien explorées ; l’état de ce que l’on pourrait appeler sa « culture scientifique », sa représentativité par rapport à celle de son milieu.
- les limites de la science et de la « rationalité » : tant le statut des disciplines elles-mêmes (astrologie, magie, physiognomonie) que l’existence d’autres modes possibles d’explication du réel ou pouvant modifier le réel, comme bien sûr, l’imagination et sa place dans le dispositif de rationalité par rapport à l’intellect et à la mémoire.
- la part de l’éthos et de la rhétorique dans le discours de méfiance vis-à-vis des sciences et des savants (l’exemple le mieux connu, celui de la médecine, montre à quel point ces relations sont plus ambiguës qu’il n’y paraît). On peut ici s’interroger sur la nature même de la vision que Montaigne développe de la science : est-ce que sa vision ou sa présentation de ce qu’il critique n’est pas elle-même datée ou volontairement caricaturée ?

The focus of this encyclopedia entry is on the visual imagery found first in Western alchemical manuscripts and later in print publications from the introduction of alchemy into Europe in the twelfth century until the heyday of emblematic alchemy in the seventeenth century.

If you are interested in short descriptions and analyses of images from alchemy, magic, Kabbalah, and tarot, please take a look at my Instagram page @petrus.malus

In 1629, a strange treatise was published in Paris: the Curiositez inouyes ("unheard-of curiosities"), a survey of the astrology of the ancient Hebrews and the talismanic art of the Persians. Its author, the Orientalist Jacques Gaffarel (1601-1681), was a rising figure of French scholarship and a friend of Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653). The originality of his treatise, one of the last defences of astrology authored by a French scholar in the seventeenth century, lay in its antiquarian approach to knowledge based mainly on a corpus of rabbinic sources. In this article, I address one of the essential aspects of the Curiositez inouyes: the re-establishment of astrology based on the doctrines of the ancient Hebrews. I show how Gaffarel used, not without ambiguity, the rhetoric and resources of historical scholarship to introduce a new legitimisation of astrology through the Jewish Kabbalah. Through this analysis I wish to explore how the attitude toward Antiquity shaped the conception of astrology in early modern France.

Introduction At present our historical studies of Renaissance color philosophy and science resembles the pieces of a mosaic, only some of which have been assembled to form a larger picture. The task is difficult: the sixteenth century saw an explosion in Aristotelian commentaries and textbooks, most of which have not been carefully examined by modern scholars. The medical tradition saw a similar deluge in printed works, including new commentaries on Avicenna, the revival of Hippocratic and Galenic medicine and philosophy, the ascendency of the discipline of anatomy, and new challenges to traditional medicine – all of which were opportunities for reexamining the importance of color in health, disease, theories of complexion and the four humors, anatomy, and natural processes generally. New philosophical systems came to the fore, notably the alchemical philosophies inspired by Paracelsus; the Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and magical directions inspired by Marsilio Ficino and others; the revival of ancient Scepticism; the Christianized Epicureanism of figures such as Pierre Gassendi; and eclectic philosophies that combined Aristotelian, Stoic, Platonic, and Hermetic, ideas with Renaissance animism – often, as in Bernardino Telesio or Francis Bacon, cast as anti-Aristotelian philosophy. The European conception of the natural world affected by the projects of exploration and colonization, and devising new methods of getting a handle on this wealth of new information became paramount. The science of mechanics developed dramatically, and during the first half of the seventeenth century the mechanical philosophy was ascendant, effecting radical changes to the notions of density, rarity, transparency, and opacity – concepts that were fundamental to how color was theorized. The status of painters and painting rose significantly. Intellectual reflections on painting, including color, became common, both because training in drawing and painting became widespread among the learned, and because painters themselves entered the orbit of the litterati. Mining and minerology was increasingly important in Europe, and works (such as Georg Agricola's De re metallica) on metals, stones, and gems were written that combined the philosophical and the practical (see chapter 10). The increasing popularity of Kunstkammer, or cabinets of curiosity, offered a new locus for knowledge transfer among different groups. The science of optics was, moreover, transformed by advances in ocular anatomy together with the quest to mathematically comprehend devices such as the telescope and camera obscura; alongside this, philosophers began to rethink what the act of seeing entails. For all of the above, particularly its relevance to color, our current knowledge is incomplete. One way to make sense of these myriad changes is to focus on the fact that the color worlds – consisting of practices, concepts (including language), and objects – of various artisans and intellectuals began to overlap during this period, with major consequences for philosophical and scientific reflections about color (Baker et al, 2016). Social and disciplinary boundaries became increasingly porous, even while many disciplines themselves underwent transformations.

Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain both diverse and controversial in our neurocentric age. The history of these ideas is significant both in its own right and to aid our understanding of the complex sources and nature of our concepts of mind, cognition, and psychology, which are all terms with puzzling, difficult histories. These topics are not the domain of specialists alone, and studies of emotion, perception, or reasoning have never been isolated theoretical endeavours. As Francis Bacon described human philosophy or ‘the knowledge of our selves’, within which he located the study of body, soul, and mind, it ‘deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly’ (1605/ 2000: 93). The history of ideas in these domains is
particularly challenging given the practical dimensions and implications of theories of mind. Because theories of human nature and debates about body and mind do ‘touch us’ so ‘nearly’,
they attract and can thus reveal, in specific historical contexts, interconnected discourses or associations which may be quite unlike our own. This chapter retains a focus, however, on the history of theories of mind: we address an array of distinctive positi
ons inmetaphysics and psychology which emerged in wider British debate, each with potential religious, moral, and political implications. We proceed by selectively surveying the conceptual inheritance and challenges for British philosophers in the early seventeenth century with regard to both the soul and the humoral temperament of body and mind. We look at some of the eclectic systems developed by British philosophers of the soul in the mid-century period, and at different ways new ideas in both medicine and metaphysics were integrated.

Reply to Devin Stauffer's "Remarks on Timothy W. Burns’s *Leo Strauss on
Democracy, Technology, and Liberal Education,*" remarks which appear in *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 48.3, 347-350. I elaborate on the finding that according to Strauss, modernity is fundamentally technological, and that Machiavelli launches that technological project.

Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal perception is a fundamental property of the universe, is one of the oldest theories in philosophy of mind. While it may seem counter-intuitive at first glance, panpsychism deftly avoids many of the glaring problems in the various forms of dualism and materialism. The central challenge to panpsychism is the combination problem: How to integrate fundamental units of conscious experience, which is usually considered an indivisible property, into one larger individual subject; in other words, how to form a macro-subject from micro-subjects. Several authors consider the combination problem to be insurmountable, and to require a retreat from a strong panphsychist view to a neutral monism. I argue that a reappraisal of the work of Leibniz in this area gives an informative perspective on this problem, and moves us further toward its dissolution.

El 29 y 30 de mayo de 2007, en el Aula Magna de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM, se realizaron las Jornadas Cartesianas. Los materiales ahí presentados fueron el origen del presente número del Anuario del Colegio de Filosofía. El evento, además de revisar la obra de un pensador fundamental para el pensamiento moderno, René Descartes, tuvo como objetivo reunir a los especialistas del tema y rendir un pequeño homenaje a los filósofos y filósofas que han formado a un importante número de pensadores y pensadoras, desde la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, en la segunda mitad del siglo XX.

© Za Srbiju, za izbor i prevod, JP Službeni glasnik, 2012 * Jezuati (Jesuati)-red je osnovao Sv. Đovani Kolombini (Giovanni Colombini) oko 1366. Ime su dobili zbog glasnog zazivanja hristovog imena na početku i na kraju svake propovedi. Urban V odobrio je kongregaciju 1367. od 1499. nose ime apostolski klerici Sv. hijeronima (Apostolic Clerics of St. Jerome, Clerici apostolici s. Hieronymi). Godine 1668. Kliment IX ugasio je red. Postojao je i ženski red koji je oko 1367. osnovala Katarina, Kolombinijeva rođaka i koji je opstao u Italiji do 1872. (prema New Catholic Encyclopedia, Washington, D.C, The Catholic University of America Press, 2002, tom VII, str. 777). * Savilska katedra za astronomiju (Savilian Chair of Astronomy) na oksfordskom univerzitetu osnovana je 1619. i nazvana po ser henriju Savilu (henry Savile). * Disputacija-formalna sholastička rasprava na zadatu temu ili grupu povezanih predmeta koja je vođena u skladu s tradicionalnom ili prihvaćenom procedurom (Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, str. 36). * U Katoličkoj crkvi sekularno sveštenstvo jesu religiozni ministranti, kao đakoni i sveštenici koji ne pripadaju religioznom redu. oni ne žive u manastirima, već "u svetu", među svetom, odakle i njihovo ime. * Na veb-stranici A. Dinisa nema podatka da se knjiga pojavila. ** Sada je (i) profesor istorije na Institutu za tehnologiju u Kaliforniji.

It seems to be crystal clear that Spinoza cannot be regarded an atomist given the fact that the Dutch philosopher seems to deny, in his early as well as in his later work, the existence of atoms and vacuum. This paper argues, however, that there are nevertheless elements from atomistic philosophies in his philosophy, and that they are very important in his ontology, his theory of affects, his epistemology, his views on life and death, and in his ethics.

Nella celebre raccolta di saggi Esercizi spirituali e filosofia antica (1981), Pierre Hadot suggerisce, quasi sin dal titolo, che l’aspetto originario della filosofia – un metodo attraverso cui l’uomo si esercita a raggiungere una nuova maniera di vivere e di vedere il mondo – venga meno con l’avvento della modernità. In essa, infatti, la filosofia assume sempre più un aspetto solo teorico, tendente alla forma di sistema. Tuttavia, Hadot stesso intravede agli albori della modernità alcune istanze dell’aspetto originario della filosofia ancora ben presenti e, sulla sua scia, Michel Foucault avverte che tra la fine del XVI e gli inizi del XVII secolo la questione filosofica della riforma dell’intelletto attesti un legame ancora assai stretto tra ascesi e verità. Questo libro intende sviluppare proprio tale idea, analizzando a fondo le opere maggiormente rappresentative della riforma dell’intelletto nella prima età moderna: il Novum organum (1620) di Francis Bacon, il Discours de la méthode (1637) di René Descartes e il Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (1677) di Baruch Spinoza. Da questa analisi emergerà che tali opere moderne meritano a pieno titolo di essere annoverate nella visione originaria della filosofia come esercizio spirituale e maniera di vivere. A ben vedere, le indagini circa il metodo in esse elaborate sono pienamente comprensibili solo se lette alla luce di un’esigenza filosofica più ampia e complessa: stabilire le condizioni spirituali per accedere alla verità e ambire a una piena realizzazione di sé.

« Cet empire que notre âme a sur les esprits animaux, d'où vient-il ? Comment s'y prend-elle pour les faire couler dans toutes les parties du corps ? ». À cette question que lui pose Henry More dans une lettre du 5 mars 1649, Descartes ne répond pas autrement, le 15 avril 1649, qu'en annonçant que son traité à paraître des Passions de l'âme (publié à l'automne 1649) contient les explications demandées. Pourquoi donc More, qui affiche par cette question sa confiance dans la capacité de la philosophie de Descartes à résoudre la difficulté exposée, reprend-il cependant inlassablement, dans ses premières grandes oeuvres philosophiques, An Antidote against Atheism (1653), An Appendix to An Antidote against Atheism (1655) et The Immortality of the Soul (1659), la démonstration que les esprits animaux ne peuvent pas se diriger eux-mêmes, ni être commandés par le cerveau, ou par cette partie du cerveau que Descartes nomme la glande pinéale, mais qu'ils sont l'« instrument général » et « immédiat » de l'âme ? Si la question du principe du mouvement animal ou volontaire revient dans ces différents écrits avec une insistance croissante, c'est que pour More, ce n'est pas de l'union de l'âme et du corps, mais de leur distinction réelle, que témoigne la subordination des esprits animaux au commandement de l'âme. Les esprits animaux constituent à cet égard un rouage essentiel dans la constitution par More de sa première doctrine métaphysique.

Nevertheless, no easy connection between Descartes and Santorio emerges even in Regius’ work.
Subsequently, more than just finding evidences of Santorio in Descartes
or Regius, I try to investigate how much their medical theories could integrate, as Leibniz suggested. A more promising field of investigation is the passions of the soul.2 In this case, while Regius opposed Descartes’ theory of the mind, which I explore in Sect. 2, he especially advanced a theory of soul pertinent to Paduan Averroism and consistent with his medical pragmatism.
Their contrast ultimately results in the publication of two treatises
on the passions of the soul, whose differences and proximities are significant.
These are Descartes’ Traité sur les passions de l’âme (1649), the wellknown attempt to mechanize passions I summarize in Sect. 3, and Regius’ Dissertatio de animi affectibus (1650), a less-known text.3 Both treatises propose a medical interpretation of the mind-body composite4 and deal with the role of temperaments, animal spirits, and humours as bodily causes for passions, which develop as a subject of medical and natural philosophical investigation.5 A main difference however arises from the metaphysical ground Descartes claims necessary for this study, while Regius rejects it altogether and unearths an utterly medical approach to passions.
As I show in Sect. 4 devoted to Regius’ treatise on passions, the latter
combines Descartes’ mechanization of the body with a few aspects derived from his medical training at Padua, and especially from Santorio’s medical knowledge. Still, Regius does not quantify passions as Santorio suggests in Section VII of Medicina statica (1614), entitled De animi affectibus (“The affections of the mind”), which I analyse in Sect. 5. In this text, Santorio indeed provides a medical framework for the passions which is consistent with his theory of insensible perspiration and his attempt to quantify the main bodily processes.
In sum, although no clear connection develops between Descartes and
Santorio, as not even Regius could account for a clear connecting point,
their innovative mechanization and quantification of passions ultimately
reveal two complementary methodologies that shaped a modern medical
understanding of the nature of the human being, as Leibniz claimed. In
exploring their study of passions, Descartes’ mechanization grounded in
metaphysics, Regius’ mechanization embedded within a medical study of
temperaments, and Santorio’s quantification of passions, in this chapter I
aim to outline a significant, though complex (and non-linear) path in the
history of medicine.

Resumo O objetivo artigo é discutir as influências de Aristóteles e Galileu na crise de paradigma oriunda da revolução copernicana, ou seja, discutir a mudança da ciência aristotélica, predominante nas universidades europeias, para uma ciência dita mais empírica e as crises institucionais que se seguiram a isso.

Throughout his life, Leibniz showed serious interest in the construction of clocks and actively contributed to their technical improvement. He described the mechanical and especially the pendulum clock as a paradigmatic kind of machine, and therefore as a suitable model for exploring the nature and boundaries of mechanistic philosophy. After an overview on Leibniz " s technology and physics of clocks (Section 1), this paper reviews the main occurrences of the clock analogy in his philosophical writings. Section 2 considers the epistemological use of the clock analogy and its evolution from an early stress on the hypothetical component of natural science to a later concern with the full inspectability and intelligibility of natural processes. Section 3 details the manifold uses of the clock analogy in metaphysics to illustrate features of the world, of both inanimate and living bodies, and even of God, the soul, and the soul-body union. The possibility of construing machine metaphors in terms of either structure or function solves the apparent ambivalence of Leibniz " s approach to the clock analogy. It also explains his persistent reference to perfection and standards of perfection, thereby bringing to the fore the teleological strand of this concept.

From experimental philosophers in England to workshop managers in Korea, practitioners across the seventeenth-century world developed new ways of investigating nature while studying saltpeter (potassium nitrate), the chief ingredient of gunpowder. Contrary to global histories that emphasize circulation, however, this early modern convergence had less to do with the fluid movement of knowledge and technology than with the very moments when such movement failed. This essay argues that in Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) the problem of adopting a Chinese method of manufacture—a "thing that did not work"—proved productive in unexpected ways. In the process of vetting the foreign knowledge, the Korean saltpeterers (artisans and military officers) discovered solutions that suited the local conditions. They also established a mode of experimentalism that used hands-on trials to investigate the natural world, drew on the artisanal techniques of "experiment" (sihŏm) and "prototyping" (kyŏnyang), and operated in two languages-the vernacular, hangŭl script and literary Sinitic.