Carl von Clausewitz

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

The present monograph examines post-revolutionary Iran’s grand strategy by way of its adjustments at three key inflection points. The first spans the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the bipolar order and the First Gulf War, along with internal structural changes following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death (1988-91). The second inflection point encompasses the events of 11 September and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-3). The third corresponds to the more recent Arab uprisings and the increasing internal and external pressures Iran faced over its nuclear program (2011-15).

Given the epistemic challenges inherent in any reckoning of intentions or ends, as opposed to capabilities or means, a strict focus on the notion of ‘grand strategic adjustments’ instead permits an empirically-grounded analysis of grand strategy as opposed to a more sweeping but potentially speculative reading. In examining these inflection points, the author adopts Neoclassical Realism as a theoretical framework to structure the narrative, furnishing a systematic account linking systemic pressures and incentives (independent variable), via domestic filters (intervening variables), to final outcomes or grand strategic adjustments (dependent variable). Given the prominence and predominance of ideas and the structure of rule in the Islamic Republic, the focus of domestic factors specifically falls on the ‘ideational-constitutive’ (national identity, regime ideology, status aspirations and state interests) and ‘institutional-competitive’ (elite interfactional bargaining) aspects.

The author concludes that while Iran’s leaders have over the decades proven the capacity to both reconcile ends and means, and identify and respond to grand strategic threats and opportunities, they have ultimately yet to transcend the vicious circle of self-manufactured challenges.

Many academics and policy-makers have misunderstood or ignored this trinity, however, and in different ways. Firstly, the the trinitarian analysis is a tool, not a ‘formula’ or doctrine, 3 secondly the trinity of the state – the ‘Summersian Trinity’ – has been misused,4 thirdly, that armies since the 1990s have attempted to forgo the trinity and its effects.5 This essay, elaborating on these misunderstandings and ignorance, will firstly illustrate where Clausewitz’s critics go wrong, then highlight how the trinity, both as a whole and in its individual elements, is still of such value in the twenty-first century.

States need to benefit from some persuasion techniques especially at wars. Besides on military superiority, it is important to control both rivals and allies psychology and way of thinking. Thanks to developments in communication technologies, states reach their actions and desires to public more effectively and more rapidly; however, these improvements are not unilateral process, while states' potential to permeation public sphere improves, people's capabilities to access diversified sources increase correspondingly. United States of America, which defines itself as a defender of liberal and democratic world, takes advantage of psychological means of war either. These means had shown itself especially at Vietnam War, First Gulf War and eventually, Iraq War in 2003. Iraq War counted as a turning point regarding usage of media, because during that war, while technological equipments increased ways of journalist

A nagy francia forradalom, majd a napóleoni háborúk a hadviselésben új korszak beköszöntét jelentették. Elengedhetetlenné vált új általános érvényű összefüggések megállapítása és rendszerbe foglalása. Ezt a korszak kétségtelenül legjelentősebb katonai teoretikusa Carl von Clausewitz oldotta meg leginkább időtállóan.

The aim of this paper is to show Carl von Clausewitz influence on Vladimir Lenin writings and actions. We especially want to analyse this influence on bolshevik’s theory of war, warfare and revolutionary struggle. We think that Clausewitz writings on strategy and tactics played important role in marxist-leninist theory of just and unjust war’s. They have also important role in defending the October Revolution in Russia because beliefs of prussian general helps bolshevik with creation of the Red Army as mighty and powerful revolutionaly tool. At the end we want to show actuality of „clausewitzian” theory of war in modern marxism. We would say also few words about importance of marxist investigations of war as instrument of capitalist culture.

Are non-human animals our friends or enemies? In this provocative book, Dinesh Wadiwel argues that our mainstay relationships with billions of animals are essentially hostile. The War against Animals asks us to interrogate this sustained violence across its intersubjective, institutional and epistemic dimensions.

Drawing from Foucault, Spivak and Derrida, The War against Animals argues that our sovereign claim of superiority over other animals is founded on nothing else but violence. Through innovative readings of Locke and Marx, Dinesh Wadiwel argues that property in animals represents a bio-political conquest that aims to secure animals as the “spoils of war.” The goal for pro-animal advocacy must be to challenge this violent sovereignty and recognize animal resistance through forms of counter-conduct and truce

With a Foreword by Matthew Calarco.

The definition of terrorism and its differentiation from war and guerrilla warfare has been a problem for science, international relations and legal systems for decades. This article posits that defining terrorism requires also the definition of other warlike phenomena, so as not to conflate the acts or events. Therefore, the proposed criteria for defining terrorism and guerrilla warfare are presented as a means to differentiate their definitions from that of war. The methodology is a review of the concepts of the nature and essence of war, as described in the Carl von Clausewitz book, Vom Kriege (in the standard German edition of Hahlweg and its widely accepted English translation by Howard and Paret). These concepts were cross-analyzed with recent scientific discoveries about the behavior of social animals, with a focus on humans. The resulting classification allows historical or contemporary events to be evaluated to determine what kind of conflicts they are. Keywords: Definition of terrorism. Definition of guerrilla warfare. Definition of war. Carl von Clausewitz. International law.

مقایسه دیدگاه های ژومینی و کلازویتس در باب جنگ(حسین اژدر:پارسا
تهران ۱۳۸۴/باشگاه اندیشه جوان
قابل دست رس در
Irthink.com(اندیشه کده روابط بین الملل)
ناپلئون یک نابغه عملی استراتژیک بود .
از اواخر قرن هیجدهم و اوایل قرن نوزدهم به بعد با بروز انقلابها و قیامهای سیاسی و اجتماعی و بروز جنگهای ناپلئون، مفاهیم استراتژی و تاکتیک دچار دگرگونی شد. جنگهای ناپلئون تاکتیکهای نظامی را به کلی تغییر داد . ناپلئون موفقیتش را در جنگها مرهون تدابیر یا حیله های فرمان دهی خود (فرماندهان) و در حقیقت به کار گرفتن تاکتیکهای دقیق و پیروزمند میدانست
بر اساس تجارب ناپلئون استراتژی تعریفی وسیع تر از آنچه در روم و یونان به کار میرفت به خود میگیرد و با عنوان علم حرکات و طرح های نظامی یا علم جنگ و تهیه ی طرحها و خط مشی واحدهای نظامی مطرح میشود .در واقع، خط مشی واحدهای نظامی همان حرکات است که این واحد های نظامی انجام میدهند و امروزه علم “تاکتیک” این حرکات را برای کسب در نبرد بررسی میکند.

Carl von Clausewitz  is  a  prominent  military  theorist  in  history,  whose achievements are comparable to the contributions (on war issues) of the famous ancient thinker  Sun  Tzu  and  modern  outstanding  theorist  of  the  sociocultural  dynamic processes  and  the  researcher  of  the  war/peace  issues –Russian-American  scholar Pitirim Sorokin. Clausewitz’s famous treatise On War sought to investigate the nature of  war;  and  how  to  realize  best  the  preparatory  efforts  and  the  result  of  achieving victory on the battlefield. Herein, he introduced the famous notion of “trinity”. The latter becomes the subject  matter for the  given  research and  its comparative analysis with Sorokin's dynamic triadological approach that includes the study of war and peace issues. The results obtained in this research could serve a deeper comprehension of the present-day concerns related to the phenomenon of “hybrid warfare”. In general, the author  hopes  that  the  findings  will  facilitate  the  identification  of  social  and  cultural forces able to break vicious cycles leading to war and related calamities.

https://biocosmology.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Stephen-T.-Satkiewicz_Vol10Nos34.pdf

The paper presents the reflections about war of Michel Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari and their different positions about the possibility of reversing the famous Clausewitz formula that states that war in the continuation of war by other means

Esta es una versión abreviada de un texto utilizado para presentar en el 2do. Foro 2021, organizado por el Grupo: Psicólogos en formación en Grupos Operativos.  Al paso del tiempo, mi cercanía a la obra de Pichon Riviere se ha ido estrechando, y en las relecturas que he hecho de su trabajo en el campo de la psicología social, he ido descubriendo algunos escritos que han articulado su pensamiento, con el de algún otro autor con el que comparte ciertos puntos de vista, en la medida en que el planteo de Pichon es construir una "epistemología convergente" (Pichon, R., 1971 a p. 10), de ahí la diversidad de autores y temas, relacionados con los planteos de Pichon Riviere.

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après):
This article (as all my other articles on Clausewitz) isn’t a discussion “around” the thoughts of Clausewitz, which would be first based on Clausewitz – an attractive name! – in order to speak thereafter in a prospective manner, as we see quite often. My article is an analysis focussed on what Clausewitz actually wrote in his lectures on the “kleinen Krieg” [I would say here “small war” to be short, even if I don’t like this translation]. The aim is, first, making a synthesis of the thoughts of Clausewitz on the relations between the “kleinen Krieg” and insurrectional wars; and, second, explaining the context of that days which underlain his thoughts, in order to better understand them: the context related to 1) the wars on which Clausewitz bases his speech, 2) the military culture of the officers of that days (and also the military culture of Clausewitz) and 3) the reflection of his time on the “kleinen Krieg” and on insurrectional wars.

Indeed, Prussia's military defeats in 1806 led in this country to a reflection on national defence, on the question of armed citizens, and on the “petite guerre” as the appropriate tactic for popular uprisings. The lecture upon the “petite guerre” that Clausewitz delivered at the War College in Berlin between 1810 and 1812 is part of this framework. Moreover, the Revolutionary War, which was an insurrection against the British homeland, is one of the examples Clausewitz did choose to feed his thinking, just like the Wars of the Vendée and the Tyrolean events during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars – which were other uprisings with insurrectional characteristics. In his lecture, Clausewitz doesn’t distinguish between the two words and the two realities of “petite guerre” and “guerrilla warfare”; however, he shows from time to time the particularities of the civil wars and of the wars with armed citizens. Our article studies the lecture on the “petite guerre” from Clausewitz with a new point of view, in order to point out the parts which are related to the popular wars and to the insurrections; indeed, as Raymond Aron expresses it, the thinking of Clausewitz has been built on watching how the extreme violence of passions could not be separated from people's wars.

RESUME en français :
Cet article (comme tous mes autres articles sur Clausewitz) n’est pas une discussion « autour » de la pensée de Clausewitz, qui partirait de Clausewitz – un nom porteur ! – pour parler de façon prospective, comme on le voit souvent. C’est une analyse centrée exclusivement sur ce que Clausewitz a écrit dans son "Cours sur la petite guerre". L’objectif est, premièrement, de saisir et de synthétiser la pensée de Clausewitz sur les rapports entre petite guerre et guerre insurrectionnelle ; et, deuxièmement, d’expliciter le contexte de l’époque qui a nourri cette réflexion, pour mieux la comprendre : le contexte concernant 1) les guerres sur lesquelles Clausewitz appuie son discours, 2) la culture militaire des officiers de ce temps (donc la sienne) et 3) la réflexion de son temps sur la petite guerre et la guerre insurrectionnelle.

Les défaites subies en 1806 engendrèrent en effet, en Prusse, une réflexion sur la défense nationale, sur l’armement du peuple, et sur la petite guerre comme tactique du peuple soulevé. Le « Cours sur la petite guerre » donné par Clausewitz à l’École supérieure de guerre de Berlin, entre 1810 et 1812, s’inscrit entres autres dans le fil de cette impulsion. Au reste, la guerre d’Indépendance américaine, insurrection contre la métropole anglaise, est au nombre des exemples choisis par Clausewitz pour alimenter sa réflexion, comme les guerres de Vendée et les épisodes tyroliens de la Révolution et de l’Empire, autres soulèvements à caractère insurrectionnel. Si Clausewitz n’opère pas pour ses auditeurs la distinction entre « petite guerre » et « guérilla », il pointe de temps à autre les particularismes des guerres civiles et des contextes guerriers avec armement du peuple. Cet article revisite le Cours sur la petite guerre de Clausewitz pour y relever la part redevable aux guerres populaires et aux insurrections, si tant est que, comme l’exprime Raymond Aron, la pensée de Clausewitz sur la guerre s’est construite en considérant le déchaînement des passions inhérent aux guerres populaires.

In the midst of massive, rapid and all-encompassing global changes in 21st century, the environment of conflict, nature of warfighting and even the character of warriors are also transforming from sole conventional state-based mode to multiple modes of war. Traditional operational art and design with their origins in Western Europe appear to be too simplistic in comparison to twenty-first century conflicts. Operational art and design, and corresponding campaign planning tools, which are being taught in military courses in modern armies, do not accommodate few contemporary issues like the effect of nuclear deterrence, ubiquitous and unprecedented influence of Internet-based media platforms in war, the capability of non-state actors in waging wars and cyber as the fifth domain of warfare. It seems that conventional operational art and design are incompatible and less relevant with regards to the changing characteristics of future warfare. It necessitates a shift in our thinking about traditional operational art and design.

The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offers a very different vision of war from that known in the Western tradition. Sun Tzu’s work is influenced by the Taoist faith (Lonsdale, 2008: 47). For Sun Tzu war is a necessary evil that represents a departure from cosmic harmony. (Ibid). Western tradition is about consecutive conquests of evil and backwardness through absolute victories according to the just war theory. Sun Tzu presents a contrasting approach to the one introduced by Clausewitz with emphasis on violent clashes of arms and decisive victory (Ibid.) “When the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasising feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.” (Kissinger, 2011: 23). This paper will attempt to show that although Clausewitz’s work remains “not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war” there are still plenty of lessons to be learned from the ancient Chinese military philosopher. Some of these lessons such as elegance, balance and flexibility could be applied in the context of present-day conflicts. If we follow some of the teachings of the great, Chinese sage we may find that there is a timeless dimension to his knowledge that could be, to some degree, applied to modern conflicts, not to increase deception in war; but rather to lead to more humane victories, end protracted wars of attrition, develop respect for the enemy while encouraging adoption of win-win solutions that make peace mutually acceptable and desirable. Thereby showing, even the greatest of our enemies some alternative pathways to change. This is the power of persuasive diplomacy, to bring about a consensual solution since ultimately the way you win matters not only that you win. Sunzi pointed out that being skilled at making war requires the commander to know his enemy. While the ruthlessness of the Clausewitzian military mindset is encapsulated in the words of the main character of the Ender's Game series, when Ender says, "In the moment when I truly understand my enemy, understand him well enough to defeat him, then in that very moment I also... I think it is impossible to really understand somebody, what they want, what they believe, and not love them the way they love themselves. And then, in that very moment when I love them... I destroy them." Ender was both loving enough to know his enemies and ruthless enough to defeat them. His empathy and compassion allowed him to think like his enemies anticipating their actions. Ender's ruthlessness drove him to defeat his enemies in ways they could not recover from. But if so, he was guided not by love, but by stubborn doggedness or violent vengeance. Ender possessed a genial, tremendous strategic-military talent, but it was a double-edged sword, he is a hero only to his lieutenants not in his own eyes. Although he saved the Earth and the human species, he lost morally because his emotions took charge. As a consequence, he has forgotten the proportionality of response. As a result of Ender's Clausewitzian victory, an entire race has been annihilated through genocide (in this case, extraterrestrial species, so that would be xenocide). He killed thinking that his space campaign was a game. Afterwards, he has regretted his decision. He admitted that had he known that it was not a game he would not have done it. Clausewitzian victory reveals the brutal ways of war and how it destroys soldiers' conscience and innocence by turning them into ruthless killing machines without any compassion or deeper thought process. Gandhi said that "an eye for an eye would make the whole world blind." Thus, it seems that tolerance is the highest degree of strength and desire to take revenge is the first sign of weakness. Militarism and revanchism usually lead to war which in the extreme becomes a mechanical mass murder process causing unnecessary human suffering. War and cruelty were the fate and occupation of many ruthless dignitaries and conquerors, e.g.: Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan or Alexander the Great. Mostly, they were cold, heartless killers desiring nothing but conquest and fame. Post factum they regretted their decisions. Alexander, for instance, came to regret the destruction that many of his invasions caused. Coming across the plundered tomb of Cyrus the Great in Pasargad near Persepolis, he was much distressed by what he found and immediately ordered repairs to be made. The most difficult task for any leader who aspires to change the world is both to win the support of the peoples, but more importantly, to win in the race with time. Retrospectively, people had to appreciate all the wonderful works the leader has initiated even if they were not fully completed. This is a considerable challenge for contemporary leaders because often they wrongly choose decisions that are in essence not humanistic and not sufficiently inclusive, i.e. taking into account the common good or the well-being of the entire planet. Most contemporary political leaders are clearly unable to address key critical issues including climate change. Such leaders focus on current issues, often discounting the future of the children, they are beholden to tribal loyalties, lack understanding of the complexity of issues posed by surging science and technology (Dror, 2017: 19). Many leaders are also morally corrupt giving more weight to staying in power, to materialistic values and to enriching themselves and their close families rather than appreciating the urgency of the global challenges (Ibid.). To address global issues effectively such leaders need to overcome political divides and put into action the idea of bipartisanship what requires a degree of farsightedness, long-term thinking and abandonment of egoism, tribalism and fame. In some cases, this may seem like a Herculean effort, but nothing is impossible when motivation is soaring and there is hope to pursue our dreams. It is achievable, but requires consistency and sticking to the leader's guiding principles. To solve the world's biggest problems requires also a measure of unity within civilisation and not only paying attention to the personal character traits of individual leaders, what visits they make and what cars they travel in. These global challenges seem to be like a Rubik's Cube-like puzzle that could be solved if only people could find determination and if leaders or their advisers could swivel the right blocks of the ultimate solution in the right order and time sequence. Reducing food waste, using urban gardening, adopting better supply chains and popularising solar-powered air travel are small pieces in this puzzle. Together, they showcase how innovative technologies can emerge and pave the way for a wider change in sustainability. The top priority is to upgrade the grand-policy crafting qualities of leaders so they could abandon their ego-centred character traits and equip themselves with the sensitivity towards the Earth - recognition of the raison d' humanite and the need to build bipartisan solutions for foreign policy challenges what hopefully could result in avoiding chaos (Dror, 2002). Civilisation needs to unite and one hopeful idea is that the change-enabling force is in the collective power of millions of voices calling for change to shape political outcomes. Therefore, this paper treats the Chinese sage's approach to be much more civilised and more compassionate than the Clausewitzain approach. If humanity wants to transition from a planetary species to an interstellar species while ushering an age of exploration and expansion on an unimaginable scale, then we must eliminate short-term political gains and conflicts between countries or block of countries (alliances) that will not matter in the long-run, in categories of the bigger picture for the planetary preservation. If this assumption is true, namely that to progress to a more advanced level of civilisation (Kardashev Scale) humanity must eliminate what sets us apart and focus attention on unity in the name of solving common challenges, then ancient Chinese ideas alongside with Western ideas could help us to build a more sustainable civilisation, which will be more peaceful. Humanity must find a ways to end wars and build empires of peace. Innovation and creativity could help along the way since they are the wellspring of improvements in a society. The future commander must be skilled in peace since in the Nuclear Age, the true enemy is war. When human imagination is joined by intelligence magical things can happen, the two have proved to be engines of progress leading to many breakthroughs and innovations. So if humanity solves the challenges that are necessary to be solved while uniting the East and the West, the North and the South, then we could potentially become the first species in the universe to create a structure with the scope of the star. If we do it, the only limitation left will be our imagination.

Despite the enduring interest in the written work of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) there appears to be shortage of studies focusing specifically on what he had to say about the matter of civilians or non-combatants in war. After extensive consultation with primary and secondary sources this dissertation will argue that Clausewitz wrote a lot more on this subject than is commonly acknowledged. He was aware that civilian suffering was not simply an accidental by-product of war but also the result of deliberate strategic intent to compel an enemy to do one’s will. Clausewitz did not endorse such methods because he had a moral and theoretical preference for decisive battles between conventional armed forces. He tended to dismiss violence against civilian persons and property as morally wrong, militarily ineffective and politically counter-productive.

Cuenta el Coronel Harry Summers que en abril de 1975 sostuvo conversaciones con los líderes norvietnamitas a quienes les dijo: Ustedes saben que nunca podrán vencernos en una batalla. La respuesta de la contraparte fue: Puede ser, pero eso es absolutamente irrelevante". 2 "La montoneras de Güemes hicieron una guerra sin cuartel que ha pasado a la historia como Guerra Gaucha. Cada uno de sus miembros serviría como modelo para fundir en bronce la figura del soldado irregular, del guerrillero". 3

The main research idea of this thesis is to develop a strategic IT investment framework using primarily military concepts as a basis.
On the one side we discuss the most influencing military thinkers in Belgian Defense Carl von Clausewitz and in the USA John Boyd (together with Carl von Clausewitz). On the other hand, the causes and consequences of a fairly new concept Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) are investigated because NCW has dramatically changed the way in which military operations are undertaken and it is based on an intensive use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).
The first group of research questions deals with the relevance of military theories (von Clausewitz, Boyd’s OODA (Observe – Orient -Decide - Act), United States Marine Corps Command-and-Control (USMC C2) spectrum and NCW) for a contemporary company.
The second major group research questions whether it is good idea to combine Complexity Thinking (CxT) and Systems Thinking (ST) to study Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). We believe ST is necessary in addition to CxT because ST focuses also on the design of human-made CAS (based on restrictions imposed by humans in the organization and in the environment). Special attention is given to the extension of the Cynefin Framework which is a generic sense-making framework (situational awareness). It defines different spaces each with specific characteristics for management (as IT-investments) and leadership.
The purpose of our CAS*T framework (Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking) is to determine leverage points in the organization in general and IT in particular (adapting Enterprise Architecture). Since situational awareness is essential, we propose our Intelligence Base.
Concerning the research methods, we note that specific to this study we start from the military sciences to create an IT investment framework in the business domain. This requires abstraction of military concepts to transform them into business concepts. That is why we have only used qualitative methods for this reason based on our own experiences (in Defense), literature (mainly military as previously indicated), interviews (open questions, exchanging experiences) and correspondence (article, e-mail).
We have used the scientific inquiry version of John Boyd's OODA: Observe – Orient – Formulate Hypotheses (Decide) – Test (Act).
The testing was done through publications (articles, chapters), conferences (presentation papers), interviews (feedback) and correspondence (feedback).
Keywords: Complex Adaptive System, CAS, Systems Thinking, ST, CAS*T, Cynefin Framework, Observe-Orient-Decide-Act, OODA, USMC, Command-and-Control (C2), Investments, Information Technology, Mental Models, Intelligence Base, Systemic hierarchy of leverage points.

SEE PUBLICATION
STATS
Clausewitz, Marx, Engels e Lenin: Rupturas, Continuidades ou Parentescos Intelectuais na Relação entre Guerra e Revolução? Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Lenin: continuity or intelectual connection in the relationship between war and revolution?

CHAPTER · NOVEMBER 2015
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.5134.2804
In book: Lenin: Teoria e Prática Revolucionária, Edition: 1st, Chapter: 11, Publisher: Cultura Acadêmica; Oficina Universitária, Editors: Anderson Deo, Antonio Carlos Mazzeo, Marcos Del Roio, pp.299-314

1st Rodrigo Passos
5.28 · São Paulo State University
ABSTRACT

O ponto de partida do texto toma o pensamento de Clausewitz no que concerne à sua formulação sobre a guerra e a política. A sua definição de política não considera uma continuidade ou descontinuidade absoluta no que se refere à paz e à violência. Tal relação dialética entre ações pacíficas, como a diplomacia, e as violentas, como a guerra, dão o ensejo para a discussão da validade de pontos da guerra para a política, levantando a discussão sobre a pertinência não somente da tipologia clausewitziana de guerra real e guerra absoluta, como também sobre a política real e a política absoluta, ainda que estas últimas não tenham aparecido explicitamente no pensamento do autor de "Da Guerra". Esta última teria na revolução um de seus exemplos. Dado que Clausewitz foi lido e estudado por Marx, Engels e Lenin, que também se debruçaram sobre o tema da revolução, o texto busca refletir sobre eventuais parentescos intelectuais e ecos que o general prussiano possa eventualmente ter proporcionado nos autores anteriormente arrolados. Isso posto, a questão central a ser respondida por esta comunicação é a seguinte: a relação dialética entre guerra e política no pensamento de Clausewitz possibilita identificar uma influência direta, um parentesco intelectual ou uma formulação distinta sobre o pensamento de Marx, Engels e Lenin? Os objetivos da presente reflexão são: a) efetuar uma leitura orientada pela hipótese de validade de pontos fundamentais da guerra para a política na perspectiva de Clausewitz, apontando alguns vínculos entre revolução e guerra como pontos altos da política; b) demonstrar que há ao menos um parentesco intelectual de Marx e Engels em alguns aspectos com as formulações de Clausewitz tanto no que confere à guerra como também no tocante à política e à revolução; c) Elaborar análise sobre a proximidade (com as devidas particularidades) entre Clausewitz, Marx e Engels e Lenin nos escritos sobre a guerra e da revolução. Tais objetivos são sustentados pelo tratamento de Marx, Engels e Lenin do tema da política e da revolução como guerra ao longo de todas as suas obras.

The text´s starting point takes the thought of Clausewitz with regard to its formulation on war and politics. His policy setting does not consider a continuation or absolute discontinuity with regard to peace and violence. Such dialectical relationship between peace actions, such as diplomacy, and violent, like war, gives the opportunity for the discussion of the validity points from war to politics, raising the discussion not only for the relevance of Clausewitzian type of real war and absolute war, but also about the real political and absolute policy, even if the latter have not explicitly appeared in the thought of the author of " On War". The war would have in the revolution one of its examples. Since Clausewitz was read and studied by Marx, Engels and Lenin, who also turned to the subject of the revolution, the text seeks to reflect on possible intellectual kinship and echoes the Prussian general could possibly have provided the authors listed above. In this way, the central question to be answered by this reflexion is as follows: the dialectical relationship between war and politics at the thought of Clausewitz possible to identify a direct influence, an intellectual kinship or a distinct formulation of the thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin? The objectives of this reflexion are: a) make a reading guided by the assumption of validity of key points from war to politics in Clausewitz's perspective, pointing out some links between revolution and war as highlights of the policy; b) demonstrate that there is at least an intellectual kinship of Marx and Engels in some respects with Clausewitz formulations both concerning the war but also with regard to politics and revolution; c) Prepare analysis of proximity (with the necessary particulars) from Clausewitz, Marx and Engels and Lenin in the writings on war and revolution. These objectives are supported by the treatment of Marx, Engels and Lenin's political theme and revolution as war over all his works

A decade after 9/11, the new generation of U.S. officers continues to postpone -or altogether shun -assignments to the various war colleges in favor of a second, third, or fourth deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. As Major-General Robert Scales, the former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, put it in 2010, Throughout the services officers are avoiding attendance in schools, and school lengths are being shortened. The Army's full-term staff college is now attended by fewer and fewer officers. The best and brightest are avoiding the war colleges in favor of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average age of war college students has increased from 41 to 45, making this institution a preparation for retirement rather than a launching platform for strategic leadership… Sadly, atrophy has gripped the school house, and what was once the shining light of progressivism has become an intellectual backwater, lagging far behind the corporate and civilian institutions of higher learning. 1

Abstract (en)

This thesis attempts to examine elements of the strategy of emancipation from Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective of the minority. It is about showing how the "becoming-minoritarian" developed in A Thousand Plateaus works as a revolutionary "minoritarian strategy". Its opposite is the "majoritarian strategy" represented by the Gramscian theory of "hegemony". In order to define these two strategies and formulate their "antinomy", we first take Balibar’s reflection on "strategies of civility" as a guide for research. The thesis has three moments. The First part deals with the concept of "strategy": from the 12th Plateau of A Thousand Plateaus on the "War machine", we bring out the concept of "pure strategy" which distinguishes the two strategies in terms of the concept of strategy. In the Second part, the Gramscian theory of subalternity and the "historical bloc" is translated into the Guattaro-Deleuzian perspective, so that we conceive of subalternity and minority as constituting a "block of becoming". Thus, it turns out that Gramsci’s strategy consists of a double movement of hegemony and becoming-subaltern. This translation allows us to understand the relationship between the two strategies as an antinomic coexistence. First, there is an impossibility of articulating between them: a minor social group will declare in the majoritarian strategy that "we are all human", while a revolutionary power of the minoritarian strategy consists in asserting that "we are not human, neither are you, and we all become savage, animal, inhuman and molecular". However, these two antinomic strategies coexist in the current struggles of minorities against the world capitalist axiomatic. Finally, the Third part examines problems that arise from this coexistence.

Résumé (fr)

La présente thèse se propose d’examiner les éléments de la stratégie d’émancipation dans la perspective guattaro-deleuzienne de la minorité. L’enjeu est de montrer comment le « devenir-minoritaire » élaboré dans Mille plateaux opère comme « stratégie minoritaire » révolutionnaire. L’opposé de celle-ci est la « stratégie majoritaire » que représente la théorie de Gramsci sur l’« hégémonie ». Afin de définir ces deux stratégies et de formuler leur « antinomie », nous prenons d’abord la réflexion de Balibar sur les « stratégies de civilité » pour guide de la recherche. Cette thèse a trois moments. La Première partie porte sur le concept de « stratégie » : du 12ᵉ des Mile plateaux sur la « machine de guerre », nous dégageons le concept de « pure stratégie » qui distingue les deux stratégies au niveau du concept de stratégie. Dans la Deuxième partie, la théorie gramscienne de la subalternité et du « bloc historique » est traduite en perspective guattaro-deleuzienne, si bien que nous concevons la subalternité et la minorité comme constituant un « bloc de devenir ». Il s’avère ainsi que la stratégie gramscienne est constituée par un double mouvement de l’hégémonie et du devenir-subalterne. Cette traduction nous permet de percevoir le rapport entre les deux stratégies comme une coexistence antinomique. Il y a d’abord une impossibilité d’articuler entre celles-ci : un groupe social mineur déclarerait dans la stratégie majoritaire que « nous sommes tous humains », tandis que la puissance révolutionnaire de la stratégie minoritaire consiste à affirmer que « nous ne sommes pas humains, vous ne l’êtes pas non plus, et on devient tous sauvage, animal, inhumain et moléculaire ». Toutefois, ces deux stratégies antinomiques coexistent dans les luttes actuelles des minorités contre l’axiomatique capitaliste mondiale. Enfin, Il s’agit dans la Troisième partie d’examiner les problèmes qui se posent dans cette coexistence.

Bu makale, Prusyalı bir general ve düşünür olan Carl von Clausewitz’in savaş düşüncesini felsefî yönleriyle ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Clausewitz, başarılı bir general olmasının yanı sıra, sahip olduğu savaş düşüncesiyle, politik felsefe açısından önemli bir düşünürdür. Özellikle, Clausewitz ve Hegel'in savaş düşünceleri arasındaki benzerlik dikkat çekicidir. Her iki düşünür de savaşı; devletler arasında, politik, sosyolojik ve psikolojik yönleri olan kaçınılmaz bir eylem olarak görmektedir. Clausewitz, bir asker olmasına rağmen, savaşı düşünürken yalnızca deneyimlerinden değil aynı zamanda farklı teorilerden de yararlanmaktadır. Çalışmamızın temel amacı, Clausewitz’in neden bir politik düşünür olarak kabul edilmesi gerektiğini ve Clausewitz ile diğer politik filozoflar arasındaki düşünsel benzerliklerin neler olduğunu açıklamaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda yaptığımız çalışmamız, Clausewitz’in önemli bir politik düşünür olarak savaşa ilişkin özgün fikirler ileri sürdüğünü göstermektedir. Aynı zamanda, bu çalışmamızdan hareketle, Clausewitz’in savaş düşüncesinin, Machiavelli ile başlayıp Hobbes ile şekillenen, sonrasında ise Rousseau ve Hegel ile hukukî dayanakları oluşturulan politik-realist düşünce hattı üzerinde değerlendirilmesi gerektiği anlaşılmaktadır.

La realización de la obra The Chasseur in the Forest, cuadro de Caspar David Friedrich, coincide con la Campaña de Otoño de 1813, cuando los Aliados avanzaron a Francia, pero antecede a la ocupación de París en abril de 1814. El cuadro sugiere imágenes kinestésicas de un caminante solitario que se interna en la profundidad del bosque, en medio de una sutil nevada. Sus movimientos son apenas perceptibles en la contigüidad de tres signos de desesperación y muerte: raíces muertas, ramas rotas y un cuervo avizor. A juzgar por su aspecto, un hombre de sable, con botas y la cabeza cubierta con un yelmo de cresta, se trata de un chasseur à cheval [cazador a caballo, soldado de los que formaban los batallones de tropas ligeras]. Su caballo no lo tenemos a la vista; al parecer está muerto. Ya no se divisa la fortaleza del cazador de otros tiempos. Envuelto en su guerrera verde, avanza solitario, a espaldas de su pasado, confundiéndose con la espesura del bosque alemán, en lontananza con su fe, rumbo a una probable muerte. Es uno más entre los otros miles de soldados franceses, alemanes o rusos que sobrevivieron a las atrocidades de las guerras napoleónicas. Se encuentra solo, sumido en su crisis y en conexión con la naturaleza. El cuadro pinta la soledad intrínseca de cada soldado en batalla y la terrible fragilidad de la condición humana en tiempos de guerra.

It is commonly believed that the great military theorist Carl von
Clausewitz maintained that "genius rises above the rules." This note demonstrates to the contrary that, in his view, a good theory of war could and should describe rules of universal explanatory (though not prescriptive) value, while the statement "genius rises above the rules" actually denied the utility of military theory. Geniuses violate only the incorrect or oversimplified rules of bad theory; they succeed because they understand the true rules better than "blinkered" theorists who try to explain the phenomena of war without taking
account of moral forces.

A draft paper that looks at what Clausewitz had to say about the campaign against the Polish uprising in 1830-1. These are just my rough research notes for a possible journal article on the broader topic of Clausewitz, civilians and counter-insurgency.

Joseph Conrad’s “The Duel” (1908) is a short story that is usually read as a “historical fiction” concerned with the violence that animated the Napoleonic Wars. But if this tale looks back to past, total wars, it also looks ahead to more contemporary, global wars. In fact, Conrad’s dissection of the intersubjective dynamic of the “duel” via the trope of the homo duplex outlines mimetic principles concerning the “escalation of violence” that resonate strikingly with René Girard’s Battling to the End (2010). I argue that Conrad’s mimetic diagnostic of the mimetic logic of war cuts both ways. On the one hand, Conrad’s dramatization of the Doppelgänger allows him to focus on the unconscious, mirroring pathos responsible for the “escalation to extremes” in abstract war. On the other hand, Conrad suggests that mimesis opens up a way out from the logic of violent escalation outlining what Clausewitz calls a “short-cut to peace.” If Conrad agrees with Girard that violence is mimetic and, at least in theory, has the potential to lead to pathological duels to the end, he also considers the patho-logy that, in practice, is potentially responsible for ending the duel. If Conrad agrees with Girard that violence is mimetic and, at least in theory, has the potential to lead to pathological duels to the end, he also considers the patho-logy that, in practice, is potentially responsible for ending the duel. Reading “The Duel” in the company of both Clausewitz and Girard allows us to articulate the double sides of mimesis, understood both as an infective pathology and as a logical account of mimetic pathos.

Scomparire è ancora meglio che tuffarsi sott'acqua: al costume dei ranocchi, preferisco quello dei topi. Non penso, però, a quelli neri e grigi delle case e dei giardini, ma al topo giallo-rosso della foresta tropicale, che somiglia ad un minuscolo scoiattolo. Si nutre di noci, di cui nel primo autunno reca una provvista nel suo nido invernale. Là, dorme ben nascosto per sei mesi o più, mentre le foglie cadono sul terreno boschivo e le ricopre poi la neve. Io ho preso le mie precauzioni secondo il suo modello. Il moscardino, o topo di nocciole, è parente della marmotta: fin da bambino mi raffiguravo la vita di questo sognatore altamente comoda. Non è un caso che, dopo la morte del padre, io mi sia smarrito in questo mondo protettore. Nella mia solitudine, nel solaio di casa, io mi tramutavo in moscardino. Per anni, esso fu il mio animale totemico. Mi sono cercato, ai margini della foresta, un posticino per la mia tana. Il foro d'ingresso non dovrebbe trovarsi al livello del suolo, è meglio una fessura nella roccia o dentro un tronco cavo. Di là iniziai a scavare il cunicolo, giorno per giorno, sempre più in fondo, raschiando fuori il terriccio, che poi sparpagliavo perché non ne rimanesse traccia. Una volta giunto abbastanza in fondo, scavai un secondo cunicolo verso l'alto, come uscita di sicurezza. Per ogni ingresso bisogna provvedere alla sortita, per ogni via pensare al ritorno: questo mi risultava chiaro fin da allora. Il lavoro doveva avvenire in assoluto silenzio e con cautela; dall'alto vi era di giorno la minaccia dello sparviero, e di notte del gufo, al suolo animali ostili, in primo luogo la vipera-il moscardino è sempre minacciato. È il tributo che paga alla sua libertà. Dopo aver scavato i cunicoli, si passava all'abitazione, una comoda cameretta, non troppo piccina, né troppo grande. Che vi potesse stare anche una femmina, non mi veniva ancora in mente. Nemmeno per la mamma c'era da provvedere: era presente ovunque, era la tana stessa. Una volta apprestata la cameretta e levigato bene il suo ovale, scavai il cunicolo di approccio alla dispensa. Questo era più grande, con una curvatura a forma di focaccia: con un granaio

If war is an inherently human phenomenon, then discussion of the human aspects of war is as timeless as the discussion of war itself. One prudent start point for any discussion on military matters is the philosophy of war described by the 19th century theorist Carl Von Clausewitz. In one of the lesser read sections of On War, he described what comprised the penultimate military genius. This article explores Clausewitz’s description of military genius as a point of discussion in the ongoing human dimension dialogue. In Clausewitz, we have a life-long soldier describing what it takes to reach the highest strata of the profession of arms; we would be wise to listen to what he has to say.

Resumen La forma en que se piensa un problema sesga las alternativas de políti-cas públicas. En los últimos años han surgido numerosas categorías ana-líticas que han pretendido dar cuenta de las " nuevas formas de guerra ". Sin embargo, éstas buscan brindar un marco de acción para las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos en las grandes ciudades del mundo en desarrollo: escenario de las futuras guerras por los recursos. Para ello han reciclado las ideas de autores clásicos como Clausewitz y Mao, entre otros. Abstrac The way about a problem is thought limits the alternatives of public policies. In last years numerous analytical categories have arisen that have tried to give account of the " new forms of war ". However, these look for to offer a frame of action for the Armed Forces of the United States in the great cities of the developing world: scene of the future wars by the resources. For this do they have recycled the ideas of classic authors like Clau-sewitz and Mao, among others.

L’embricazione nel tessuto testuale avviene nel conflitto tra la ragione di Stato e le urgenze della coscienza, ovvero un kantiano, ma non supinamente accettato, uso pubblico della ragione, in una forma attiva di dialoghicità, quantunque drammatica. Il dramma insito in Homburg è la possibilità di comunicazione tra gli individui, la cataclasi dei loro mondi interiori con quanto e chi li circonda e la loro ricomposizione in virtù dell’agire altrui e delle relative rhesis («Umschichtung der Gefühle» [riallocazione dei sentimenti], Hrachovec).
Senza discostare la lettura dal contesto storico, conferendo pertanto alle annotazioni un taglio intercontestuale ove necessario, queste si estendono lungo tre assi principali, riecheggianti l’uno nell’altro: la comunicabilità tra i personaggi, la dislocazione delle sensazioni dell’autore nei personaggi, la risemantizzazione dell’ipertesto per mezzo della ricreazione di un momento storico e della dialoghicità come strumento di catarsi corale.

Grazie a che per undici volte, e forse più, ha pazientato davanti ai mie profluvî d'idee, urgenze, revisioni, incoraggiandomi con le sue osservazioni.

Grazie a chi ha fugato insicurezze e dubbî, a chi ha esortato queste pagine e a chi le ha accolte con l'invito ad approfondirle ed ampliarle nella seconda parte dello studio.

Grazie, infine, a tutti coloro i quali, a vario titolo, hanno sostenuto la redazione di questo saggio.

A tutti grazie per la fiducia.

For more than one century Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war has formed a major pillar of the U.S. military doctrine. However, once the iron curtain fell and the Soviet Union came to demise triggering possibly more problems than solutions in the newly emerged bipolar world, the old doctrines became highly obsolete. With the rapid rise of unconventional skirmishes including civil wars, genocide, terrorist attacks etc. the classical war paradigm fell like a house of cards. Instead both academia and the military circles produced numerous conceptual frameworks in attempt to capture the complexity of so-called "new threats". 1 This led to the claim that the age of conventional, or as Martin van Creveld put it "Trinitarian", wars was over. 2 By "Trinitarian" he explicitly referred to Clausewitz's wondrous trinity consisting of violence, chance and policy, 3 which is precisely the subject of Thomas Waldman's book titled War, Clausewitz and the Trinity. This very subject is the element that is not only the most central feature of Clausewitz's writings, but also the most understudied and the most misunderstood.

It is crucial to know what Clausewitz understands politik which is translated differently, depending on the passage towards politics or policy (Brossard). The German word politik is inherently heterogenetic and can refer to policy (will of state), politics (external affairs) and political objectives. Clausewitz in Chapter 6 explains that politik (English policy) is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests against other states. Policy is therefore representation of collective interests and a tool of maintaining external relations. The main idea of the text in Chapter 6B is the paradigm of interaction between politik and war, but its implication is not simplistic and needs further interpretation. According to Clausewitz war cannot be divorced from political life.

Clausewitz wrote a lot more about counter-insurgency than is commonly acknowledged. He supported the idea of popular insurrection during his youth and even accepted the possibility of atrocities against non-combatants and civilians as a necessary sacrifice. After the wars Clausewitz became more sceptical about the chances of a people's war working without the back-up of a state government and regular army. His study of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic campaigns suggested that peasants-in-arms could be neutralised by combat and political initiatives. The widespread incidence of insurrectionary warfare and the targeting of civilians did not change his moral and theoretical preference for decisive battle as the best military way to force an opponent to do one's will.

1 Machiavelli è il primo pensatore, sul bordo esterno della Modernità, a co-gliere la centralità del rapporto tra guerra e politica come perno della sua rifles-sione. Oltre a legare indissolubilmente, sul piano teorico, la politica alla guerra at-traverso la corrispondenza ...

The lecture provided an overview of scholarship as it stood as bicentenary celebrations were just beginning in 2012. At that point there remained a notable difference between American, British and Canadian historical interpretations about why this war was fought, what the effects were of military and naval operations, and to what extent such operations affected the ultimate political results. The lecture pointed out that the war was caused by long-term underlying irritations on both the British and American sides and that the results of military and naval operations during the war resulted in a stalemate that was eventually resolved by public opinion during the peace negotiations.

"War, Clausewitz and the Trinity." Thomas Waldman. Ashgate. February 2013. --- Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history and defence literature, but often in a manner which distorts their true meaning. In this book, Thomas Waldman explores Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for understanding war – the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance and passion. Waldeman displays his formidable scholarly grasp of Clausewitz’s wide-ranging oeuvre, as well as his own talent at depicting it in a gripping, insightful and illuminating manner, writes Ben Mueller.

La traccia insidiosa con cui il tempo si allontana da noi. Voi, predecessori, sangue nella scarpa. Sguardi senza occhi, parole senza bocca. Forme, prive di corpo. Discesi dal cielo, dispersi in sepolcri lontani, resuscitati dai morti, ancora, sempre rimettendo ai nostri debitori, triste pazienza angelica. E noi, ancora, sempre avidi del sapore di cenere delle parole. Non ancora, come dovremmo, muti. Di' per favore, grazie. Per favore. Grazie. Risa antiche, di secoli. L'eco, immane, più volte spezzata. E il sospetto che nulla più verrà all'infuori di questa risonanza. Ma solo la Grandezza giustifica la mancanza contro la legge e riconcilia il colpevole con se stesso. Uno, Kleist, colpito da questo udito troppo sensibile fugge con pretesti che non gli è concesso penetrare fino in fondo. Senza meta, in apparenza, segna la lacerata carta d'Europa con la sua traccia bizzarra. Dove io non sono, là è la felicità. La donna, Gunderrode, confinata in quel cerchio ristretto, meditativa, perspicace, non segnata dalla caducità, risoluta a vivere per l'immortalità, a sacrificare il visibile all'invisibile. Che si siano incontrati: vagheggiata leggenda. Winkel sul Reno, noi l'abbiamo visto. Un luogo adatto. Giugno 1804. Chi parla? Nocche bianche, mani che dolgono, allora sono le mie. Allora vi riconosco e vi ordino di lasciare quello a cui vi siete aggrappate. Che cos'è. Legno, finemente arcuato, bracciolo di una poltrona. La fodera rilucente, di tinta incerta, azzurro argento. Splendente parquet a mosaico sul quale mi trovo io. Persone disseminate con naturalezza per la sala, come i sedili, in bell'ordine. Se ne intendono, bisogna ammetterlo. Non come noi in Prussia. Più sontuoso, più raffinato. Gusto, gusto. Loro lo chiamano cultura, io lusso. Mantenersi cortese e tacere, per quel po' di tempo. Questo mese, è deciso, pensa Kleist, voglio tornare. Silenzio però. Come mi sento io non riguarda nessuno, e me meno di tutti. Una battuta di cui sarei fiero se fosse mia. Eventualmente la userò per

Warum Clausewitz? Es mag befremdlich wirken, sich heute mit einem preußischen Offizier auseinanderzusetzen, der gegen Napoleon kämpfte. Aber Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) hat einen jener klassischen Texte geschrieben, der die Zeiten überdauert. Sein Buch Vom Kriege wurde von Generälen und Strategen genauso gelesen wie von linken Revolutionären und avancierten Theoretikern. Diese Einführung erläutert die grundlegenden Einsichten, die Clausewitz beim Nachdenken über den Krieg gewann. Als Soldat, politischer Reformer und Denker hat Clausewitz ein tiefes Verständnis vom Wesen und Sinn des Kämpfens erlangt. Seine Ideen können dazu inspirieren, für die eigenen Überzeugungen einzustehen, selbst wenn die Hindernisse überwältigend und die Erfolgschancen gering scheinen.