Belt and road initiative

RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Mr Yang Razali Kassim, Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

Organizational timely investments determine the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), yet few studies have explored the antecedents of those speed decisions. Based on a dataset of Chinese-listed firms over 11 years, we address this research paucity by incorporating the push and pull antecedents of OFDIs. The study revealed that industry competition significantly facilitates organizational BRI investment speed after the launch of the initiative, but such facilitative effects become weaker for firms located in the key BRIparticipating provinces. Intriguingly, firms with greater state equity are slow after the launch of the BRI, and their slow gestures become more severe in those key provinces. The additional tests implicated that this result occurs because of inadequate positioning of those inland provinces. Overall, the study clarified the nature of the BRI by exploring the speed dimension. The findings also challenged the conventional wisdom of treating firms with greater state equity as obedient extensions of the government by unmasking their conservative attitudes toward the BRI, highlighting some fallacies of contemporary BRI policy. Third, the temporal and geographic aspects should be applied simultaneously to examine the policy effects of the BRI.

The report presents an analysis of the impact that international freight traffic barriers have on logistics, transit potential, and development of transport corridors traversing EAEU member states. Restrictions discussed in this report include infrastructural (transport and logistical infrastructure), border/customs-related, and administrative/legal barriers. The authors also provide the recommendations regarding removal of barriers that hamper international freight traffic along the China-EAEU-EU axis.

Since the late 2010s, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been becoming
increasingly significant in the international political arena. In August 2016,
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a policy of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) as Japan’s new diplomatic vision at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI held in Kenya. The FOIP strategy was supported by the Donald Trump administration followed by the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. However, China has viewed the FOIP as a containment strategy against the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The FOIP vision is unclear for general observers, and it might cause a security dilemma with the Chinese BRI. Is it possible for the FOIP vision to coexist with China’s BRI, or are these two strategic visions destined to clash with each other? In an attempt to answer these questions, the article aims to provide multiple perspectives of the FOIP concept by applying international relations (IR) theory. This article warns that the FOIP and the BRI are likely to bring about diplomatic tension that could be escalated into a military skirmish over the territorial dispute. In order to avoid the
possible military clash, it finally seeks to explore possible future pathways of the peaceful coexistence of the two visions in the Indo-Pacific region.

China is dramatically changing the strategic environment in Eurasia. What does it all mean for the EU’s China policy? While there is little to suggest that China aims and is able to perform as an ideological counter-model and an agenda-setting actor in Europe and its periphery, or even endanger the coherence and stability of the EU, such worries are voiced more often as China engages Europe more intensively and ever-closer to home. Whether policy-makers in the EU and the individual European countries take these concerns in calculus as they craft the response to OBOR will greatly influence how Sino-European relation is shaped. However, despite a slow start, various uncertainties and potential problems, Europe will find it impossible not to engage with OBOR and China and hard to resist the prospects of benefits a cooperative approach promises to bring.

After the entry of China into the United Nations Security Council in 1971, relations between Turkey and China officially began. The 2000s was the period of recovery and restructuring for Turkey-China relations. With the One Belt One Road Project announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, Turkey-China relations with a history of about 45 years have entered a new turn. In this study we will evaluate the historical progress and development of relations between Turkey and China within the scope of OBOR Project.

Özet
1971 yılında Çin'in Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Daimi Üyesi olmasıyla birlikte Türkiye-Çin ilişkileri de resmen başlamıştır. 2000'li yıllar Çin-Türkiye ilişkileri için iyileşme ve yeniden yapılanma dönemi olmuştur. 2013'te Çin Devlet Başkanı Xi Jinping tarafından açıklanan OBOR Projesi ile yaklaşık 45 yıllık geçmişi olan Türkiye-Çin ilişkileri de yeni bir döneme girmiştir. Bu çalışmada OBOR Projesi kapsamında Türkiye ile Çin arasındaki ilişkilerin seyrini değerlendireceğiz.

Goal-The aims of the research are to identify the most significant internal and external factors affecting the economic security of China and assess the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative for China's future development. Research methodology-In order to organize internal and external determinants of economic security of China, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis was applied. Moreover, an important element of the research process was an attempt to verify hypothesis that the Belt and Road Initiative is a key instrument of China's economic security strategy. Score-China has transformed from a poor rural country into one of the main economic powers as a result of the economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s. However, we can observe that the economy of China is slowing down. In order to ensure economic security and maintain a stable economic growth as well as avoid the middle income trap China has introduced the Belt and Road Initiative. Since its announcement, the concept has been gradually gaining in importance and has finally become the key instrument of the Chinese foreign policy and a major element of economic development strategy. The main motive behind this project is to develop transport and energy infrastructure which will allow China to gain access to natural resources and new markets. An efficient transport network will facilitate trade, while energy infrastructure will prevent problems with energy and resource supply, which the Chinese economy needs. The Belt and Road Initiative is a way of boosting economic development of China through improving infrastructure from Asia to Africa and Europe and the establishment of trade links among all partner countries. The New Silk Road concept aims to use the advantages of the Chinese economy and the states participating in the initiative to stimulate its economic growth. Therefore, it is a strategy of providing long-term economic security. Originality/value-The paper raises the issue of the Chinese economic security understood as a long-term ability of the economy to achieve a relatively fast and sustainable economic growth. In this paper, the author defines the concept of economic security and with the help of SWOT analysis presents the strengths and weaknesses of China's economy as well as opportunities and possible threats to its stability. Moreover, the paper includes comprehensive analysis of China's motives behind the Belt and Road Initiative in the context of economic security of China.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is often portrayed as the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative. While much attention has been devoted to its geopolitical repercussions, its impacts on Pakistan’s federal system and interprovincial relations have not yet been explored. Organized around interviews conducted in 2015, 2018, and 2019, this article demonstrates that the construction of the economic corridor is acting as a centripetal force in Pakistan’s federal structure, despite the potential for such a large external investment to redress the disparities between provinces.

China's massive 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI)-designed to build infrastructure and coordinate policymaking across Eurasia and eastern Africa-is widely seen as a clearly-defined, top-down 'grand strategy' , reflecting Beijing's growing ambition to reshape, or even dominate, regional and international order. This article argues that this view is mistaken. Foregrounding transformations in the Chinese party-state that shape China's foreign policy-making, it shows that, rather than being a coherent, geopolitically-driven grand strategy, BRI is an extremely loose, indeterminate scheme, driven primarily by competing domestic interests, particularly state capitalist interests, whose struggle for power and resources are already shaping BRI's design and implementation. This will generate outcomes that often diverge from top leaders' intentions and may even undermine key foreign policy goals.

Since the end of March, China has opened a new front in its global
diplomacy. The Covid-19 virus originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan, from where it rapidly spread around the world. Initial cover-ups about
the extent of the virus by the People’s Republic of China and Beijing’s crackdown on whistleblowers played a role in the slow international
reaction, and Donald Trump has dubbed Covid-19 the “Chinese virus”.

https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2020/04/china-s-new-silk-road

Purpose: The research aims to examine the scope, nature and strength of the EU's relations with China and the United States, under new circumstances created by the development of the Belt and Road Initiative. Design/Methodology/Approach: In pursuance of the goals, three main research fields were identified. The first part of the research covers the EU-China relationship with special regard to the Belt and Road Initiative development. The second part concentrates on the transatlantic relationship under the specific terms of Sino-American competition. The third section is devoted to measuring the strength of economic ties between the EU with China and the U.S. The multidimensional analysis of the EU-China and the EU-U.S. bilateral cooperation is conducted within the framework of the geoeconomic theory. The main tool used in the first and second part of the research is a literature analysis whereas to reflect the strength of geoeconomic relations between the countries geoeconomic v...

Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh (executive and copy editor) (2018), Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS), Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2018 (Special Issue – Geopolitics of Belt and Road Initiative and China’s International Strategic Relations, guest edited by István Csaba Moldicz), pp. 1-282 (282 pp. + xi). [Scopus] <http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/p/404-1131-185709.php?Lang=en> <http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS4(1)-full-issue.pdf> <https://www.dropbox.com/s/brmdehqczm4jpmx/CCPS-V4N1-full-issue.pdf>

State capitalism is attracting burgeoning attention but comes with inconsistent findings toward internationalization. Given its prevalent appearances, the study has investigated the effect of state equity on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which may constitute a challenge to the international business theory and new hope for companies in emerging economies. Anchoring on the agentic perspective of institutional theory and a sample of Chinese public listed firms, we have unveiled that higher state equity pushes greater proactiveness in investing in those BRI destinations. However, state equity generates stronger pushing effects when the equity source is not from the central government whereas the organizational top managers' foreign exposures attenuate such pressures. At the institutional level, furthermore, the coastal locale attenuates the effects of such pressures whereas firms are more likely to invest in countries with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) under the BRI theme. Overall, the study should extend our understandings toward the BRI phenomenon and enrich the theoretical knowledge of state capitalism from a political perspective.

The world cement production has grown rapidly from 1.67 billion tons in 2000 to 3 billion tons in 2010. Asian economies are the main producers of the cement, making 77.1 percent of the total world cement production in 2010, where China produces more than half of it. Southeast Asian economies including Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand are competing to become the key players in the global cement production.

CHINA'S PROPOSED BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

In this issue:
- An introduction to the BRICS;
- An Introduction to OBOR;
- The Environmental Impact of One Belt, One Road;
- Labour Issues and Workers' Rights;
- An Introduction to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor;
- What might One Belt, One Road mean for people in China?;
- Grassroots Democracy under Globalisation. Opening speech at the One Belt, One Road and BRICS forum;
- One Belt, One Road: Will Chinese capital buy-up the world?;
- Chinese Investments in Sri Lanka;
- The Funders of Cement Industry in Indonesia;
- Displacement in the name of Infrastructure Development;
- Conclusion.

In the beginning of the second week of February 2019, Ladakh became the third division within Jammu and Kashmir to be demarcated as a separate administrative and revenue division, with Jammu division and Kashmir being the other two. What is more interesting than the recent decentralisation, is the uniqueness of Ladakh’s geographical location, one which is positioned to not just act as a bridge between India and China, but also enable India to be interconnected to the ‘heart and soul of [the] Eurasian landmass’. This will enable Ladakh to transform and help ensure that India’s economic, energy and security imperatives are met. The possibilities of integrating into China’s regional and foreign economic policy initiatives, mainly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will open various avenues for India. This mainly posits a future ‘dehyphenation’ from the conventional Chinese conception of linking India with Pakistan, on a regional as well as global level. This commentary argues that India should follow a strategic approach by factoring Ladakh as an ‘economic outpost’ to connect with China through a India–China Economic Corridor (ICEC), and thereby tap into resource-rich Central Asia and Eastern Europe, as well as ‘sophisticatedly’ open its economy for inflow of capital and technology from Western Europe. This will provide India with strategic space in dealing with security challenges from Pakistan and China. The emerging interlinkages of BRI at a regional or trans-continental level can be tapped into the proposed ICEC, through pooling and utilising foreign capital, investment and resources among more than five dozen countries around the world. This can unequivocaly spur the Indian economy with minimal effort and investment, while checking increase in defence spending, one which is mainly focused on deterring China and Pakistan.

India's opposition to China's Belt and Road Initiative arises immediately from the fact that it crosses territory disputed between India and Pakistan.  More widely, India is uneasy about China's new global assertiveness and refuses to accept China as a hegemon.

У ч р е д и т е л и: Научно-образовательный центр изучения стран СНГ и Балтии ИИМО СГУ им. Н.Г. Чернышевского Фонд поддержки научных исследований «Мастерская евразийских идей» Г л а в н ы й р е д а к т о р Голуб Юрий Григорьевич, д.и.н., профессор (г. Саратов, Россия)

China’s massive ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) – designed to build infrastructure and coordinate policymaking across Eurasia and eastern Africa – is widely seen as a clearly-defined, top-down ‘grand strategy’, reflecting Beijing’s growing ambition to reshape, or even dominate, regional and international order. This article argues that this view is mistaken. Foregrounding transformations in the Chinese party-state that shape China’s foreign policy-making, it shows that, rather than being a coherent, geopolitically-driven grand strategy, BRI is an extremely loose, indeterminate scheme, driven primarily by competing domestic interests, particularly state capitalist interests, whose struggle for power and resources are already shaping BRI’s design and implementation. This will generate outcomes that often diverge from top leaders’ intentions and may even undermine key foreign policy goals.

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was formally launched in 2015. From the very outset, skeptics raised doubts about its sustainability and meaningfulness for particularly Pakistani society, economy and the state. Nevertheless, the Sharif government in strategic interaction with its Chinese counterpart ably thwarted such controversies and ensured execution of the CPEC projects in different parts of Pakistan. Though within Pakistan, political opposition and certain nationalist political and social forces voiced their related concerns, for instance, to the “route” alignment, the federal and Punjab government led by the Sharifs held ground and accorded priority to sustain the Corridor by engaging local and provincial stakeholders. However, this was not the case with the Khan government whose commerce advisor doubted the negotiated terms and conditions of the CPEC and, therefore, called for its revision to provide a fair deal to the Pakistani side. Why did the Khan government adopt...

The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a key partner in China’s Belt, and Road Initiative (BRI), since it comprises the majority of territories which the BRI’s overland route, the Silk Road Economic Belt, needs to traverse as it crosses Central Asia on the way to Europe. The goal of this article is to explore the BRI in the context of BRI–EAEU coordination. The first part of the analysis focusses on the ways the Eurasian Economic Commission delineates the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” and counterposes it against China and the BRI. Then, the article compares two sets of interpretations of the BRI and “Greater Eurasian Partnership” obtained from interviews with elites in Kazakhstan and Russia. The interviews indicate that the BRI has had a much more forceful impact on local elites than Russia’s idea of “Greater Eurasian Partnership.”

This special issue examines the impacts and implementation of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Asian and European regions towards which the initiative is primarily directed. Introduced by President Xi Jinping in a pair of speeches in late 2013 (Xi, 2014: 315-324), and previously entitled "One Belt, One Road," the BRI was conceived as transport corridors to be constructed based on ancient Silk Road trade routes. Hence, the "belt" is defined as the land route (or routes) from China across Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East to Europe, while the "road" somewhat confusingly refers to the maritime route that passes from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and hence to East Africa and the Mediterranean. The main routes of the BRI, at least as roughly outlined in the National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) publication Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road (2015), are shown in Figure 1. Despite the rhetorical broadening of the BRI since 2016 to supposedly include other regions such as Africa, the Americas, and the Arctic, the transportation "corridors" outlined in the Vision and Actions publication (National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2015) are all in Europe and Asia. This implies that the initiative is primarily Eurasian in its scope and that the core aim of the BRI is to connect China with Europe (Yilmaz et al., 2018). Although no official map of the BRI exists, those circulated by Chinese state media during the BRI's early years invariably emphasise (similarly to Figure 1) land and sea routes from Asia to Europe. Despite Chinese attempts to stretch the initiative's scope beyond its logical geographical limits, the five key BRI

Great and regional powers have been trying to influence/control Central Asia's (CA) political-economic fabric and development for the sake of their own strategic interests via different politico-economic schemes. Especially, Russia, China and the US are competing to inject their individual regional integration models for reducing the influence of other great and regional powers. These models fall in the category of extra-regional integration projects, which promote different structured approaches. This paper explores the viability and major impacts of great power-induced regional integration and their repercussions. It argues that these projects are developed by and biased towards preserving the influence of major powers, and lack viable framework to bring both global and regional players into a path of long-term cooperation. Even if the great powers' regional integration approaches are divergent from each other, their common point the asymmetry they apply when they are approaching the region. Primarily they prioritized their own strategic interests while discarding CA states' expectations to a significant extent. However, if implemented successfully, it cannot be ruled out that these projects may bring socioeconomic benefits to CA countries at the expense of political independence.

Drawing on the literature on strategic hedging and adapting it to China’s use of economic diplomacy in the service of comprehensive national security goals within the regionalised foreign policy approach of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we examine China’s approach to securing and expanding its interests in the Persian Gulf. To implement the trade and infrastructure connectivity goals of the BRI and to secure the continued flow of diversified energy supplies, China needs to boost relations with both regional powerhouses, Iran and Saudi Arabia, without alienating either of them or the regional hegemon, the United States. The resulting strategy of strategic hedging is based in the Chinese approach to economic diplomacy, which utilises Chinese commercial actors in the service of national strategic objectives. Relations require careful and ongoing management if China is to achieve outcomes which benefit all sides while avoiding becoming entangled in the region’s intractable geopoli...

As a late joiner to the Arctic Council China has made its presence felt since 2013, especially through its inclusion as an observer and through multilateral cooperation. China also has since included the Arctic in its overall Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), opening a new front through the “Ice Silk Road”. That said, considering China’s largely poor international reputation, especially in light of recent events (e.g. poor management of the COVID19 crisis and subsequent “wolf warrior” diplomacy displaying hostility towards Western countries, etc.), it is oftentimes difficult for China to coax Arctic states to negotiate for access and potential resources. As such, the Party-State sometimes benefits from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities, which are more inclined to take part in such negotiations. To this effect, this chapter supports the idea that Beijing – despite not supporting the idea for itself – does benefit from the paradiplomatic efforts of subnational entities in its quest to access the Arctic region. Consequently, the Party-State lays the foundation of relationships based on linkages and leverages that have the potential to cause domestic issues in other states. In doing so, the Party is trying to create structures of opportunity that could lead to favorable bilateral relations with numerous subnational entities, thus letting them deal with potential barriers to entry.

China claims that it&#39;s rise is different from other great powers: a benign and responsible power striving for just order and peaceful development. This paper raises question that why has China resorted to soft power mechanisms? What are the strategies that it employs to project soft image? And finally, how is soft power helpful in portraying China as a power distinct from the status quo powers? While utilising qualitative content analysis, this study focuses upon the origins of soft power conception, characteristics of Chinese soft power discourse and strategies that it has adopted to attain its objectives. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has paid a profound attention to soft power as a means to realise the &#39;China Dream&#39;. China&#39;s efforts to enhance regional and trans-regional connectivity, infrastructure investment and formula for poverty alleviation have contributed to brilliance of China.

In the wake of the 9/11 ‗war against terrorism&#39;, Bush&#39;s vision of ‗Pax Americana&#39; and ‗Axis of evil&#39; played a crucial role in shaping the global interactions among states. It resulted in the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition forces, against transnational terrorism. However, almost two decades later, they neither could eradicate terrorism from the global map nor are anywhere close to achieving the Pax Americana. An analytical study in this paper shows that their exit from Afghanistan, even if it is not a complete exit, will not be an easy task without losing a strong geostrategic foothold in this sensitive region where Russia, China, and India are already looking for opportunities to develop their dominance for regional power aspirations. The theoretical model-comprising the theory of complex interdependence and the regional security complex theory-aptly explains the complexity of Afghanistan&#39;s situa...

The article presents an analysis of Poland's potential role as a European hub supporting the transportation of goods on the route between China and the EU. The authors point out a number of factors that can favour the development of a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) hub in Poland. At the same time, they emphasise that higher demand for shipments through the New Eurasian Land Bridge within the SREB does not automatically mean that Poland will become the main hub on its European end. The study highlights several important aspects of competition as a result of which Poland is likely to adopt the role of a regional hub in Central and Eastern Europe.

Em outubro de 2014, a China lançou o documento intitulado Opiniões para a aceleração do desenvolvimento da indústria desportiva e promover o consumo do desporto (国务院关于加快发 展体育产业促进体育消费的若干意见). Desde então, outros documentos de política pública foram publicados com o intuito de alavancar o crescimento da indústria desportiva do país, promovendo o desenvolvimento de setores estratégios para o cumprimento de uma meta audaciosa de, em 2025, a indústria do desporto gere US$ 813 mil milhões para a economia do país. Duas destas políticas públicas são o Plano de desenvolvimento do futebol a médio e longo prazo (2016-2050) (中国足球中长期发 展规划[20162050年]) e o Plano de ação para o desenvolvimento do turismo desportivo do &#39;Cinturão e Rota&#39; (2017-2020) (一带一路体育旅游发展行动方案2017-2020年). O presente trabalho, a partir da revisão de literatura e da análise dos referidos documentos de política pública, procura identicar os pontos em comum nas duas iniciativas, constatando de que forma contribuem para o dese...

The information and communications technology (ICT) sector has attracted growing interest among stakeholders in countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese investors. A Digital Silk Road initiative within the BRI is growing, as countries are encouraged to work together on production and trade enabled by digital technologies. Digital connectivity and the emerging digital economy can have positive impacts on development, as has been demonstrated in some Chinese cities. However, it is difficult to tell whether the Chinese experience will be transferable. This article reviews what China has done in relation to the Digital Silk Road and the possible contributions made towards delivering the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in investee countries. We conclude that while ICT investment has the transformative power to benefit the world's poorest, its benefits should not be overestimated. Enhancing activities in the virtual world need to be matched with those in the real world to deliver sustainable outcomes.

This article attempts to underscore the extraordinary significance of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the industrialization and economic growth of Pakistan as well as the development and consolidation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)-which is a core component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Though Pakistan has previously experimented with SEZs, its scale, outreach and impact on the country's economy and society remained very limited. Thus, the proposed SEZs under the CPEC offer new opportunities for mutual economic cooperation, investment, human resource development, sustained industrialization and, above all, the consolidation of CPEC. Nevertheless, there are several challenges ranging from structural issues to security problems that the proposed SEZs, in particular, and CPEC, in general, face. The article, thus, provides a comprehensive set of strategies to convert challenges into capabilities.

Purpose: The research aims to analyse mutual relations between Poland and China in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), assess Poland's involvement in this China-led project and identify the most significant factors affecting the cooperation between both countries. The multidimensional analysis is based on a set of criteria, which are in line with the BRI's focus areas. The article discusses the achievements so far, current challenges and prospects for further Polish-Chinese cooperation in the institutional, logistics and infrastructural, trade, investment and financial dimensions, and people-to-people contacts as well. Design/Methodology/Approach: Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to achieve the above-mentioned objectives. Findings: The authors identify and assess the main areas of Poland's activity in the BRI. They also point out potential solutions to the main problems related to Poland benefiting by this project. Practical Implications: Solutions falling within the scope of logistics and infrastructure can be quickly implemented and in a short time give an answer to the bottleneck problem within the BRI. Originality/Value: The article provides a comprehensive analysis of Poland-China relations in the context of the BRI and Poland's engagement in the BRI. In this paper, the authors describe institutional, logistics and infrastructural, trade, investment, financial and people-topeople relations between China and Poland.

The centre-of-gravity of world‘s economic power is shifting eastwards to the ‗Indo-Pacific‘, a maritime-configured macro-region that spans the maritime underbelly of Asia connecting the Indian and the western Pacific oceans. The security environment in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific are different; nonetheless, strong maritime security linkages emerging between the two oceans has led to the reincarnation of the concept of ‗Indo-Pacific‘. Since the turn of the 21st century, new maritime insecurities have taken root, including in terms of China‘s revisionist positions on the established maritime order. Notwithstanding the US response in the western Pacific and the recent articulation of its ‗Indo-Pacific‘ strategy, it is unclear how the regional countries and the major regional stakeholders willmanage to address the emerging maritime insecurities in the Indian Ocean, including in terms of China‘s expanding politico-military footprint. This paper attempts to examine the securi...

The newly conceived China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) can prove a game changer not only for the two countries but also for the region. The corridor can act as a regional institution to boost bilateral relations. Against the commonly misunderstood impression that the CPEC is a land or rail connectivity passage between the two countries, the CPEC is indeed a comprehensive concept that encompasses economic and strategic integration between the two countries in the long run. Furthermore, the CPEC is the name of regional economic integration beyond the geographical route; it represent the domestic institutional arrangements and macro-economic coordination between the two countries in the transnational flow of economic factors such as capital, technology, information and labour....Thus, economic cooperation between Pakistan and China is not only complementary in areas such as capital, technology, labour and energy but also pushes for the integration of their economies. This compleme...

This data article shows that most of the rail and road projects in which the Chinese are involved in Central Asia are implemented within the territories of individual countries and thus are still poorly linked with each other. However, these internal transport routes are expected to eventually form the basis of a new cross-regional network within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Smaller scale road construction and rehabilitation projects create linkages connecting China across Central Asia to South Asia, Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor, (CPEC) which runs from China’s northwestern Xinjiang Province to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, on the Arabian Sea, is considered to be the flagship of China’s modern Silk Road project.  Formerly called One Belt One Road (OBOR), the project is now called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and was unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2015. Not only is the BRI the brain child of President Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao, but the BRI like Xi Jinping Thought, has actually been added to the Chinese constitution, meaning it is beyond criticism. In short, both the BRI and CPEC are happening.

This data article provides an overview of fossil fuel trends in Central Asia from 2010 to 2019. Data on the production, consumption, export and import of coal, natural gas and oil are summarised for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. While promoting renewable energy, Central Asia continues to rely on and expand the use of coal, natural gas and oil with no major phase-out plans yet on the horizon.