Atlantic Alliance

La guerra d'Etiopia ha rappresentato una crisi globale, modificando la politica di tutti i paesi. Per alcuni, tuttavia, le questioni sono state ancora più profonde di quelle relative alla politica estera. In mancanza di studi specifici sulla questione, sono stati discussi gli elementi per una ricerca comprendere l'impatto della vertenza sul processo di nation-building di Australia, Nuova Zelanda, Canada, Unione del Sud Africa e Stato Libero d'Irlanda

Proširenje NATO-a nakon hladnog rata, izvedeno u dva kruga s ukupno deset novih država primljenih u članstvo NATO-a, predstavlja ključan dobitak u izgradnji sigurnosne arhitekture post-hladnoratovske Europe, te je najznačajniji sigurnosni dobitak za Europu nakon raspada Varšavskog ugovora i SSSR-a. Dva kruga proširenja NATO-a bila su vrlo različita po svojem teritorijalnom opsegu, regionalnoj pripadnosti, trenutnim okolnostima unutar NATO-a, te utjecaju na geopolitičke odnose u Europi i geostrateške odnose SAD-a i Rusije. Prethodili su proširenju Europske unije na deset postkomunističkih država Europe. Nakon 11. rujna 2001., uspješna izvedba drugog kruga proširenja NATO-a postala je jedan od strateških ciljeva u borbi protiv terorizma SAD-a i njegovih saveznika. Proširenje je značajno promijenilo odnose u NATO-u i geopolitičku ravnotežu u Europi, šireći zonu sigurnosti i stabilnosti na istok i jugoistok Europe. Utjecaj NATO-a se širi na granične regije Europe, te prelazi i njihove granice. Treći krug proširenja najavljen je na summitu u Bukureštu, tijekom kojeg su Hrvatska i Albanija pozvane da se priključe NATO-u. Treći krug proširenja vjerojatno će uključivati i Makedoniju, ako ta država s Grčkom riješi spor oko imena. Ako bi NATO u članstvo uključio države iz regije Zapadnog Balkana, imao bi još značajniju ulogu u stabilizaciji ovog nestabilnog prostora, posebno u rješavanju problema koji neovisnost Kosova predstavlja za stabilnost regije. Budući strateški izazovi europskoj sigurnosti bit će vezani uz odnose NATO-a i Rusije, posebno uz ambicije NATO-a u istočnoj Europi i u regiji Kavkaza. Ako NATO odluči u članstvo pozvati Gruziju i Ukrajinu, možemo očekivati rusku reakciju, koja bi mogla dovesti do sveprisutne i dugotrajnije nestabilnosti velikog dijela Europe, ali i dijela Euroazije.

Tra le 150.000 e le 246.000 furono le vittime delle due bombe atomiche statunitensi sul Giappone sganciate il 6 agosto su Hiroshima e il 9 agosto 1945 su Nagasaki. Una mattanza di civili inermi fu l’esito finale del progetto Manhattan. Gli Stati Uniti hanno il duplice triste primato di essere stati i primi a sviluppare la bomba atomica e gli unici ad averla utilizzata per ben due volte nel giro di pochi giorni contro le città di un altro stato. L’Unione sovietica giunse all’atomica pochi anni dopo nel 1949, Stalin vivente. Iniziò da quel momento la politica di deterrenza nucleare ed una irrazionale corsa agli armamenti atomici delle maggiori potenze internazionali e di qualche piccolo stato.
La situazione attuale, a seconda dei dati pubblici è: Federazione Russa, tra 6.850 e 5.580, Stati Uniti tra 5.550 e 5.044, Cina tra 500 e 350, Francia 290, Regno Unito 225, India tra 172 e 164, Pakistan, 170, Israele 90, Nord Corea tra 50 e 30.

Turcia, la fel ca majoritatea țărilor din întreaga lume, folosește din ce în ce mai mult metodele diplomației publice pentru a-și promova interesele și a câștiga favoarea publicului străin, cu scopul de a crea soft power. Pentru a înțelege practicile și ideologia neo-otomană utilizate de instituțiile turce de diplomație publică în încercarea de a influența publicul străin și de a crea soft power, în această lucrare analizăm modul în care ideile și tezele neo-otomanismului au fost inserate în diverse activități și acțiuni desfășurate sub umbrela diplomației publice și identificăm regiunile din diferite zone ale lumii în care opinia publică a devenit un grup țintă. Partidul Justiției și Dezvoltării (AKP) și-a făcut publice obiectivele de politică externă, inclusiv pe acela al creșterii influenței sale în societățile musulmane din Balcani, Caucaz, Asia Centrală, Africa și Orientul Mijlociu. Pe această bază, acest articol explorează modul în care AKP folosește instrumentele și instituțiile specifice diplomației publice pentru a promova o ideologie neo-otomană și a organiza o politică externă ce reflectă timpurile imperiale otomane.

The main onus of responsibility for the current global economic predicament is on the financial system, not on a lack of fiscal discipline. Nonetheless, the crisis is having an extremely severe impact on the real economy, which is felt most acutely in the southern Eurozone member states. Since the end of the deepest phase of the crisis in 2009, European governments have committed themselves to fiscal consolidation. The results of these policies have been perverse: the impact of fiscal tightening during a depression may result in depressed output and high unemployment, without lowering the debt-Gross Domestic Product ratio. In light of this, we make a case for restoring growth in Europe without further delay, and discuss the role of the EU budget as an instrument for setting and implementing a real EU growth strategy.

An article I wrote and published at the Portuguese Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Ministry of National Defense, in 2004, and that was republished at the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005. In it, I argue that the European Union and NATO share, beyond their obvious differences, a large amount of commonalities. Their sources, aims and expansion have worked as if in tandem, as a result of the three ‘chapters’ of a largely hidden European ‘civil war’: the Great War of 1914-1918, the Second World War of 1939-1945, and the Cold War that spanned from 1945 up to 1991.

The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2021", financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia,

L a p t a i n Clark "Corky" Graham, throughout his naval career, has been a major force in the pursuit of a technology-based vision of the Navy of the future and the development of an engineering bridge to turn the vision into a reality. After an already distinguished naval career, he was assigned to NavSea as Ship Design Manager and Technical Director for the Navy's newest destroyer, the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51). He was a major contributor to the many technical innovations that made this ship one of the most effective combatants in the Fleet. Upon return to MIT as a teacher and head of the Navy Program, he continued to espouse the virtues of systems engineering, instilling in his students the need to continually question old paradigms and to examine and assess the merits of new and innovative approaches to ship design. During his tour as Commander of the David Taylor Research Center, he established a broad-based strategic planning process for exploring technology options and issues for the fleet of the future. He stimulated the Center's technologists and managers to challenge current paradigms and to make ships and ship systems more affordable without sacrifice in mission capabilities. He provided a collaborative systems oriented culture that addressed long range fleet operational and affordability goals. This led to the development of a battleforce design incorporating a multipurpose modular ship concept called Carrier of Large Objects (CLO), double-hull structural concepts, and an emphasis on technologies and processes to enhance the affordability of future ships. He also waged a successful campaign to convince higher authority of the merits of an integrated electric drive for ships. This ultimately led to his present assignment as Manager of NavSea's Advanced Surface Ship Machinery Program. Capt. Graham has laid a technological foundation for the Navy to meet the challenges of the future in a world of profound geopolitical change. Perhaps of even greater importance, he articulated his ideas and philosophy to a wide audience, giving inspiration and stimulation to the Naval Engineering Community. He has taught, both formally and by example, the importance of a spirit of innovation. His many contributions to Naval Engineering and the Navy make him most worthy to receive the Gold Medal Award of the American Society of Naval Engineers for 199 1.

Les élections présidentielles du 6 mai 2007 ont marqué une date décisive pour la France et a décidé de son destin pour le prochain quinquennat. Les deux candidats qualifiés dans le second tour de scrutin, Nicolas Sarkozy de l'UMP et Ségolène Royale du PS se présentent tous deux avec des programmes électoraux qu'ils ont conçu et soutenu de façon extrêmement différente, le premier conformément à la doctrine de droite démocrate, la seconde sous le prisme des valeurs socialistes. Au chapitre image, les deux enregistrent des points forts et des points faibles. Chacun a choisi de construire son image publique et son discours en fonction tant de ses électeurs traditionnels, que de ceux déroutés par les autres partis politiques ou des hésitants. La candidate de gauche perd le débat télévisé à cause de sa nervosité et de l'agressivité verbale, ce qui prouve que la stratégie de sont rival a porté fruit. Leurs discours électoraux sont structurés en fonction de stratégies argumentatives astucieuses. Preambul Alegerile prezidenţiale din 6 mai 2007 au marcat o dată decisivă în istoria Franţei şi i-au hotărât destinul pentru următorii cinci ani. Se anunţă o nouă generaţie de conducători. Mize importante referitoare în special de modernizarea ţării, de reforma sistemului politic se împletesc în jurul ei. Momentele de criză naţională, de clivaje sociale precum "embolia" din 1995, crahul civil din 2002 şi răzmeriţele urbane din 2005 nu sunt uşor de uitat şi se doresc irepetabile. Celor doi candidaţi la preşedinţia Franţei, Nicolas Sarkozy [NS], reprezentantul dreptei democratice şi liberale, şi Ségolène Royal [SR], reprezentanta stângii socialiste, le revenea misiunea de a propune electoratului soluţii viabile împotriva celor cinci "flageluri" care îi copleşeau pe concetăţenii lor : blocajul creşterii economice, rezistenţa şomajului, sărăcirea accentuată a populaţiei şi dinamica descreşterii sociale, problema datoriei publice şi, finalmente, cea a constrângerilor externe 126. Prin urmare, cei doi candidaţi vor propune strategii coerente, sub forma unor programe electorale sau proiecte reformatoare, care să se înscrie în logica etatistă, a protecţionismului naţional şi social, dar şi în cea a mondializării, liberalizării pieţei muncii şi a altor deziderate europene. Franţa trebuia să-şi aleagă un viitor pe baza acestor două propuneri foarte diferite ideologic. Din bloc-notesul politic de dinainte de al doilea tur de scrutin din 6 mai, mai amintim că NS, candidatul UMP-ului a ajuns să lupte împotriva lui SR, candidata PS-ului prin eliminarea lui François Bayrou, devenit vedeta interimară a alegerilor, candidat votat în primul tur de 6,8 milioane de francezi. Analiştii politici îi reproşează acestuia că a căzut timpuriu în capcana populismului şi că a dus negocieri secrete ipocrite. NS este votat de mai bine de 11 milioane de francezi în primul tur şi îl câştigă pe al doilea cu peste 53%, devenind astfel cel deal şaselea preşedinte al celei de-a V-a Republici franceze. Scurt parcurs politic Copil rebel şi bătăuş, NS iubea fotbalul şi ciclismul. La 20 de ani, era vânzător de flori şi de îngheţată. Face studii de drept şi de ştiinţe politice. Pledează ca avocat de la 26 de ani, meserie pe care continuă să o practice în plus faţă de activitatea politică. Student militant, este ales consilier municipal în 1977 şi devine, în 1983, la numai 28 de ani primar la Neuilly-sur-Seine. Este consilier regional al Île-de-France, deputat în Adunarea naţională şi în Parlamentul european, vice-preşedinte, apoi preşedinte, din 2004, al Consiliului general al Hauts-de-Seine. În 1993 este ministrul al bugetului şi purtătorul de cuvânt al primului ministru, Edouard Balladur. În 2002 este numit ministru de Interne, apoi ministru al Finanţelor. Demisionează din guvern în 2004 când este ales şeful UMP-ului, dar revine în mai 2005 ca ministru de Stat, de Interne şi al amenajării teritoriului. Gestionează exemplar violenţele din periferiile Parisului. Căsătorit de două ori, are trei fii 127 .

A series or articles, most in English, albeit some in Portuguese, written by me. I expect to, in the next couple of years, publish two or three more compilations on International Relations articles I wrote — and a possibly larger series of books with some of my articles on Geopolitics.

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Given the current geopolitical situations in Europe and the United States, Europe and America: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship? is both timely and insightful. Both the United States and the European Union are on foreign policy trajectories that were, until 2016, unexpected. This is true as regards their general foreign policy as well as their foreign policy vis-à-vis one another. Throw into the mix the (at present, unconcluded) departure from the European Union of one of the US' staunchest allies, a revanchist Russia, a rising China, continued instability in the Middle East and Africa and the fact that the US and the EU do not always see eye-toeye on these issues, and the future of the relationship becomes increasingly difficult to predict. And yet, attempting to predict the future of the US/European relationship is one of the two stated purposes of this book. The first purpose is to help the reader "better understand which variables determine the foreign policies of" Europe and America through a 10-case study comparison. Through this case-study comparison, the authors hope to accomplish the second purpose, "to try to foresee the future of transatlantic relations" (p. 2). To accomplish these purposes, the editor, Federiga Bindi, rightly diversifies the case study countries to include four "big" European countries (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom), two "midsize" European countries (Poland, Spain), two "small" European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark), and finish up with two of Europe's primary influencers/partners: the United States as the primary focus of this work, and its primary rival on the continent, Russia. The editor not only diversifies the cases, but also allows the authors considerable flexibility in their approach and structure with four important results. First, the reader is able to identify common trends across the countries and regions. For example, France, Italy and Spain are all lukewarm toward NATO, while the UK, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic all strongly favour NATO involvement on the continent. Germany is somewhere in between (more on this later). Some of this is historical (de Gaulle's uneasy relationship with the US and the UK, and Denmark being one of the stalwarts within NATO), and some of it is much more political (domestic opposition to NATO campaigns in Spain is equally rivalled by domestic support for NATO in the Czech Republic). Regardless of the cause, the book highlights key generalisations such as regional geopolitical preferences vis-à-vis the US. Second, and following on from the first, the diversity in content and structure allows the reader to get a sense of the complexity facing the US if they are to maintain a strong relationship with Europe. The diversity of interests across Europe means that the US, in maintaining a strong relationship with Europe, will also be more closely tied with troubles in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the rising influence of Russia and China within Europe. Where the US may be involved with some of these issues anyway (specifically the Middle East, Russia and China), the book really highlights the potential magnification and diversification of such tensions that, were the US to draw down their relationship with Europe, do not necessarily need be. That's a tempting proposition to a US that, under current President Donald Trump, is unabashedly "America first". Third, the diversity does allow for some predictability as regards the US/European relationship going forward. This is because most relations between the US and the individual case EUROPEAN SECURITY

uniting rather than dividing its littoral states. The Baltic can now serve to mediate rather than obstruct contacts, and to open up routes of transport and communication previously closed 2. The unification of Germany and the disintegration of the USSR have also transformed the geopolitics of the region. As a Royal Danish Naval Commander noted, with German unification, one littoral state disappeared from the Baltic and a former Baltic great power reemerged 3. With the disintegration of the USSR, the three Baltic Republics have regained their independence and sovereignty, and Russian territory has been reduced to two enclaves, St. Petersberg and Kaliningrad. This Russian presence on the Baltic is particularly significant because this region is now the only place where Russia is really in direct contact with the West. It is in the Baltic Sea region, therefore, that Russia's role as a major European is truly in evidence. Russia's behaviour in the region will therefore be of great significance for its wider role and acceptance in Europe. In this respect, Russian policy towards the three Baltic republics will be especially important. As Carl Bildt has argued, 'Russia's policies towards the Baltic countries will the litmus test of its new direction', and 'Russia's conduct towards these states will show the true nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and principles' 4. With the end of the cold war and the peeling back of superpower 'overlay' 5 , therefore, traditional patterns of cooperation and conflict have resurfaced in the Baltic Sea region. Historical, cultural and linguistic relationships are being re-established between states on the southeastern and northwestern rims of the Baltic. Yet this does not signify simply that the region is returning 'back to the future'. Rather, traditional cultural links and historical relationships are re-emerging in a very different context than before the onset of the cold war. Europe itself-including much of northern Europe-has been transformed by multilateral institutional integration, economic interdependence and informal networks of societal communication and exchange. Whilst international relations in the Baltic Sea region are strongly coloured by historical patterns of cooperation and conflict, they are also being 2 'Die Nachricht vom Untergang der Fähre "Estonia" bringt uns schlagartig zum Bewußtsein, daß der Wochenentrip von Stockholm über die Ostsee nach Tallinn für Tausende inzwischen zur Routine geworden istdas mare balticum als o wieder als Verkehrs-und Kommunikationsraum'.

Introducere În relaţiile internaţionale, pentru a se înţelege pe deplin anumite evenimente (legături şi acor-duri politice între două sau mai multe state, con-flicte, decizii s.a.) este, în opinia noastră, superficial să tratăm un fenomen doar din punct de vedere politic sau economic, fără a se ţine cont şi de aspectele culturale şi identitare. De pildă, în vederea problematicii privind Uniunea Europeană şi scenariul formării unui singur stat european (Statele Unite ale Europei) la care să contribuie cu efective militare şi cu finanţare fiecare stat în parte, este necesar să analizăm istoria şi evoluţia Europei nu doar la nivel politic, limitându-ne nu-mai la tratate, parteneriate încheiate de-a lungul timpului, la conflicte militare începute şi terminate, ci trebuie să ţinem cont şi de faptul că fiecare naţiune are o limbă proprie, o identitate proprie, o cultură diferită de a alteia, lucru ce face ca dife-renţele dintre ele să fie mult mai mari. Un alt exemplu ar fi mult-discutata...

Usporedbom dviju geopolitičkih i geostrateških vizija o strateškim izazovima i ulozi NATO-a u suvremenom svijetu i bliskoj budućnosti pokušava se ukazati na različitost izazova koji stoje pred NATO-om. Dvije vizije koje se obrađuju identificiraju izazove i predlažu odgovore na izazove. Različitost identificiranih izazova i predloženih odgovora na izazove pokazatelj je različitosti vizija. Identifikacija izazova i opasnosti razlikuje se ovisno o autorima vizija i ciljevima koje su isti željeli postići. Ključnim geopolitičkim i geostrateškim izazovima za NATO u budućnosti označuju se: sigurnosni izazovi iz šire regije Bliskog istoka, sve veće značenje kontrole nad izvorima energije, tj. nalazištima nafte i plina, ekonomsko, političko i vojno jačanje NR Kine, odnosi NATO-a u cjelini i pojedinih članica s Rusijom te unutarnji odnosi u NATO-u. Obrađuje se i problematika identificiranja strateških ciljeva kao rezultata trendova na koje NATO mora pronalaziti odgovore te definiranja buduće uloge NATO-a s obzirom na geografski prostor i djelovanje, tj. hoće li NATO ostati regionalna sigurnosna organizacija ili će postati de facto globalni sigurnosni čimbenik koji zastupa i štiti interese članica na globalnoj razini. Ključne riječi: NATO, geopolitički i geostrateški izazovi, geopolitičke vizije, strateški ciljevi, ekonomska kriza. Uvod U razdoblju koje se proteže otprilike od polovine 2008. godine najvažniji trenutak koji obilježuje Sjevernu Ameriku (kad je NATO u pitanju, ovaj pojam poistovjećuje se s Angloamerikom, tj. SAD-om i Kanadom) i Europu jest ekonomska kriza koja je 2009., pa i 2010. godine, za mnoge države s ova dva kontinenta značila i recesiju. Članice NA-TO-a našle su se suočene s velikim problemima kad je u pitanju održavanje postignute Pregledni znanstveni članak UDK: 355.356(100-622 NATO) Primljeno: 19. svibnja 2014.

In this research work we analyzed some traditional media, such as newspa- pers and a digital social media such as Twitter, to verify the hypothesis that the emerging narrative about the Ukraine war can be a contrast between a “good” part, which lives in the contemporary digital world, and a “bad” part, which comes from the Soviet analogue era. The research is structured in two phases: the first is closer to the classical analysis of traditional media discourse (7 national newspapers), while the second uses the social network analysis (SNA) techniques on Twitter. The time span is from February 24, 2022 to June 15, 2022. In general, the contrast between “good web” vs “bad web” emerges much more than that one between obsolete vs digital technologies. The double analysis reveals a different representation of the relationship between war and technology, where traditional media (paper newspapers) presents a more polarized approach and social media (tweets) a more segmented representation.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the detente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became somethi...

Con la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el nacimiento de una Europa geopolítica, la Unión Europea (UE) se ha encontrado frente a una encrucijada histórica. Le ha exigido un rápido fortalecimiento de sus capacidades, y ha sometido a una difícil prueba su actuación en favor de una mayor autonomía estratégica, y de la transición energética prevista en el Pacto Verde Europeo. Ambas políticas han presidido el actual ciclo político de la UE, y, lejos de haberse abandonado o retrasado, se han acelerado. Algo más de un año después de iniciarse la invasión, la UE, como tal, ha prestado un significativo apoyo militar a Ucrania en el ejercicio de su derecho a defenderse de la agresión rusa, en el marco de una relación reforzada con Estados Unidos y la OTAN. También ha hecho frente a la crisis energética en el invierno de 2022-23 acelerando la transición hacia las renovables, y diversificando sus fuentes externas de suministro. Este trabajo analiza esas transformaciones y sus implicaciones para el proceso de construcción europea, y su papel e inserción en un sistema internacional en crisis, que atraviesa una etapa de interregno caracterizada por una radical incertidumbre. La autonomía estratégica, la descarbonización y la transición energética siguen siendo, en ese contexto, opciones posibles y a la vez necesarias para la UE y la redefinición de su proyecto socioeconómico y sus relaciones con el mundo.

Given the current geopolitical situations in Europe and the United States, Europe and America: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship? is both timely and insightful. Both the United States and the European Union are on foreign policy trajectories that were, until 2016, unexpected. This is true as regards their general foreign policy as well as their foreign policy vis-à-vis one another. Throw into the mix the (at present, unconcluded) departure from the European Union of one of the US' staunchest allies, a revanchist Russia, a rising China, continued instability in the Middle East and Africa and the fact that the US and the EU do not always see eye-toeye on these issues, and the future of the relationship becomes increasingly difficult to predict. And yet, attempting to predict the future of the US/European relationship is one of the two stated purposes of this book. The first purpose is to help the reader "better understand which variables determine the foreign policies of" Europe and America through a 10-case study comparison. Through this case-study comparison, the authors hope to accomplish the second purpose, "to try to foresee the future of transatlantic relations" (p. 2). To accomplish these purposes, the editor, Federiga Bindi, rightly diversifies the case study countries to include four "big" European countries (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom), two "midsize" European countries (Poland, Spain), two "small" European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark), and finish up with two of Europe's primary influencers/partners: the United States as the primary focus of this work, and its primary rival on the continent, Russia. The editor not only diversifies the cases, but also allows the authors considerable flexibility in their approach and structure with four important results. First, the reader is able to identify common trends across the countries and regions. For example, France, Italy and Spain are all lukewarm toward NATO, while the UK, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic all strongly favour NATO involvement on the continent. Germany is somewhere in between (more on this later). Some of this is historical (de Gaulle's uneasy relationship with the US and the UK, and Denmark being one of the stalwarts within NATO), and some of it is much more political (domestic opposition to NATO campaigns in Spain is equally rivalled by domestic support for NATO in the Czech Republic). Regardless of the cause, the book highlights key generalisations such as regional geopolitical preferences vis-à-vis the US. Second, and following on from the first, the diversity in content and structure allows the reader to get a sense of the complexity facing the US if they are to maintain a strong relationship with Europe. The diversity of interests across Europe means that the US, in maintaining a strong relationship with Europe, will also be more closely tied with troubles in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the rising influence of Russia and China within Europe. Where the US may be involved with some of these issues anyway (specifically the Middle East, Russia and China), the book really highlights the potential magnification and diversification of such tensions that, were the US to draw down their relationship with Europe, do not necessarily need be. That's a tempting proposition to a US that, under current President Donald Trump, is unabashedly "America first". Third, the diversity does allow for some predictability as regards the US/European relationship going forward. This is because most relations between the US and the individual case EUROPEAN SECURITY

La guerra in Ucraina nel triangolo Washington, Mosca, Pechino di Michele Chiaruzzi Un turbinio di eventi e discorsi si addensa intorno alla giornata del 24 febbraio quando, un anno fa, il governo russo tentò la conquista dell'Ucraina con una seconda aggressione dopo quella del 2014. Essa è divenuta oggi l'apice fallimentare di una guerra decennale che rivela ormai compiutamente un significato politico ben più ampio del teatro europeo in cui si combatte. Su quel teatro gli effetti imprevisti della guerra russa contro l'Ucraina sono tanti e tali da rendere ogni bilancio parziale. Tutti però segnalano che la politica russa di divisione e ricatto in Europa è finora fallita, come pure un'offensiva bellica consumatasi in crimini di guerra, distruzione massiccia e

NATO’nun Afrika’daki askeri varlığı tıpkı Asya’da ve Akdeniz’de olduğu
gibi örgütün en güçlü üyesi olan ABD’nin ulusal çıkarlarıyla doğru orantılı
olarak kimi zaman artmakta kimi zaman azalmaktadır. Ancak, NATO Soğuk
Savaş yıllarından itibaren Akdeniz bölgesine özel politikalar geliştirmiştir
(Segell, 2011; Gyllensporre, 2010). Özellikle Afrika Birliği’nin çağrısıyla verilen
askeri eğitimleri dışarıda bıraktığımız zaman Somali ve Libya’daki askeri
müdahaleler tamamen ABD’nin ulusal çıkarlarıyla eşleşen müdahalelerdir.
Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde artan uluslararası terörizm tehdidi ve bu tehdidin
kaynaklarından birisi olan Afrika kıtasına yönelik olarak NATO’nun bir Afrika
politikasının varlığından söz etmek çok zordur (Gyllensporre, 2010). Sorulması
gereken soru ise NATO’nun bir Afrika politikası olmalı mıdır ya da böyle bir
politika terörle mücadelede nasıl sonuç verir? Afrika’nın tarihsel olarak geri
bırakılmışlığı ve uluslararası politikadaki ikincil pozisyonu bu politika ya da
strateji eksikliğinde ne denli önemlidir?

Bu çalışma NATO’nun Afrika’daki varlığı NATO’nun bir Afrika
politikasının mevcudiyetinden ziyade ABD’nin ulusal çıkarlarını korumak
amacıyla Afrika’da yer aldığını iddia etmektedir. Afrika’daki yaşanan iç savaşlar
ya da insani krizlere karşı herhangi bir politikası bulunmayan NATO uluslararası
terörizm harici konularda kıta ile olan ilişkilerini sadece birkaç askeri eğitim
aktivitesiyle sınırlı tutmaktadır. Uluslararası terörizmin kökeni olarak
köktendincilikle mücadelede Somali, Kenya, Nijerya, Mozambik, Libya gibi
Afrika’nın birçok farklı ülkesinde NATO’nun uluslararası terörizmle mücadele
alanı mevcut olmasına rağmen buralara olan ilgisi kısıtlı kalmıştır. Afrika kıtası
hem maruz kaldığı terör saldırıları açısından hem de kıtanın farklı bölgelerinde
uluslararası terörizme ev sahipliği yapmasıyla özel bir ilgiyi hak etmektedir.

Given the current geopolitical situations in Europe and the United States, Europe and America: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship? is both timely and insightful. Both the United States and the European Union are on foreign policy trajectories that were, until 2016, unexpected. This is true as regards their general foreign policy as well as their foreign policy vis-à-vis one another. Throw into the mix the (at present, unconcluded) departure from the European Union of one of the US' staunchest allies, a revanchist Russia, a rising China, continued instability in the Middle East and Africa and the fact that the US and the EU do not always see eye-toeye on these issues, and the future of the relationship becomes increasingly difficult to predict. And yet, attempting to predict the future of the US/European relationship is one of the two stated purposes of this book. The first purpose is to help the reader "better understand which variables determine the foreign policies of" Europe and America through a 10-case study comparison. Through this case-study comparison, the authors hope to accomplish the second purpose, "to try to foresee the future of transatlantic relations" (p. 2). To accomplish these purposes, the editor, Federiga Bindi, rightly diversifies the case study countries to include four "big" European countries (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom), two "midsize" European countries (Poland, Spain), two "small" European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark), and finish up with two of Europe's primary influencers/partners: the United States as the primary focus of this work, and its primary rival on the continent, Russia. The editor not only diversifies the cases, but also allows the authors considerable flexibility in their approach and structure with four important results. First, the reader is able to identify common trends across the countries and regions. For example, France, Italy and Spain are all lukewarm toward NATO, while the UK, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic all strongly favour NATO involvement on the continent. Germany is somewhere in between (more on this later). Some of this is historical (de Gaulle's uneasy relationship with the US and the UK, and Denmark being one of the stalwarts within NATO), and some of it is much more political (domestic opposition to NATO campaigns in Spain is equally rivalled by domestic support for NATO in the Czech Republic). Regardless of the cause, the book highlights key generalisations such as regional geopolitical preferences vis-à-vis the US. Second, and following on from the first, the diversity in content and structure allows the reader to get a sense of the complexity facing the US if they are to maintain a strong relationship with Europe. The diversity of interests across Europe means that the US, in maintaining a strong relationship with Europe, will also be more closely tied with troubles in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the rising influence of Russia and China within Europe. Where the US may be involved with some of these issues anyway (specifically the Middle East, Russia and China), the book really highlights the potential magnification and diversification of such tensions that, were the US to draw down their relationship with Europe, do not necessarily need be. That's a tempting proposition to a US that, under current President Donald Trump, is unabashedly "America first". Third, the diversity does allow for some predictability as regards the US/European relationship going forward. This is because most relations between the US and the individual case EUROPEAN SECURITY

The West has lost the battle for a modern and democratic Afghanistan not on the battlefield but at the psychological, social and economic levels. The massive withdrawal of Americans and other Western troops from Afghanistan has decisively facilitated the Taliban's recapture of the country, and we know now that it was the Americans who first decided the abandonment of this weak or failing state. In the Western democratic societies of countries involved in the long nation-building process, the population found it increasingly difficult to tolerate the loss of human lives and the spending of large sums of money to modernize a state and a society that for the most part refused to abandon its tribal, conservative, and archaic character. The western states abandoned Afghanistan when It became clear that there was no clear solution, no mega-plan that would have generated a successful outcome, mainly due to the societal resistance shown by the predominant rural Afghan population and the inability of successive governments in Kabul to effectively govern, relying on inclusive institutions, on solid and effective force structures. The new government, created by Tallbans, must rule a country which lacks the necessary economic resources and administrative skills, while also facing the insurgency of another islamist group, a more radical one, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province.

Proces proširenja Europske Unije prošao je kroz sedam faza i to u različitim političkim okolnostima. Pojam "proširenje" predstavlja više od brojčanog širenja članstva i zapravo je sinonim za ujedinjenje kontinenta. Proširenje prvenstveno znači definiranje kriterija za potencijalne nove članice EU-a, kao i sam proces pristupnih pregovora za punopravno članstvo novih država članica. Usto, proširenje predstavlja najjači instrument širenja paneuropske ideje s namjerom stvaranja jedinstvene političke, gospodarske i multikulturalne geografske cjeline s konačnim ciljem da se Europu učini jednim od čimbenika novonastajućega globalnog međunarodnog poretka, uz SAD, Kinu i Rusiju. Možda se to čini (suviše) ambicioznim, ali proces proširenja (ujedinjenja) realna je pretpostavka u traženju načina stvaranja Europe kao važnoga globalnog čimbenika. Pritom Zapadni Balkan kao "(ne)sređena" europska subregija može biti sredstvo (de)stabilizacije Europe. Deklaracijom iz Soluna iz 2003. godine Europska Unija čelnicima Zapadnog Balkana jasno je izrazila "europsku budućnost" svih zemalja Zapadnoga Balkana.

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO decided to expand its membership to Central and Eastern European countries. In the 1990s, the Alliance opened its door to the former members of the Warsaw Pact as part of a strategy of uniting Europe and recasting NATO for the post-Cold War era. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, even former Soviet states like the Baltics joined the Alliance. The enlargement took place mainly because the US made it a prominent strategic priority. Washington promoted the enlargement in the face of opposition from Russia. Western European allies gave conditioned support to the Open Door policy. The dual-track approach pursued by NATO in dealing with Moscow while reassuring candidates and new member states proved to be contradictory. The essay intends to investigate the historical dynamics of the enlargement, particularly the first round in 1999, with a view on the possible prosecution of the process.

Hibridno ratovanje ne predstavlja nov i revolucionaran pristup u ostvarivanju političkih ciljeva. Navedeno je temeljna pretpostavka ove doktorske disertacije koja je potvrĎena kroz znanstveno istraţivanje i komparativnu analizu tri studije slučaja. Pokušaj stvaranja Velike Srbije, zbog činjenice da se relativno nedavno odvijao na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, najrelevantniji je slučaj kada govorimo o aktualnim vanjskopolitičkim i obrambenim izazovima Republike Hrvatske. Izraelsko-libanonski rat iz 2006. godine smatra se oglednim primjerkom hibridnog rata izmeĎu drţavnog i nedrţavnog aktera. Rat Rusije i Ukrajine i aneksija Krima najrecentniji je primjer hibridnog rata izmeĎu dva drţavna aktera, i katalizator koji je aktualizirao pojam hibridnog rata, pokrenuo meĎunarodnu zajednicu i NATO savez da preispitaju svoj pristup suvremenom ratovanju. Ova disertacija temelji na se razmatranju ratova s vojnopolitičkog stajališta, a kombiniranjem tri teorijska okvira odabrano je 16 čimbenika ...

What is Grand Strategy? Every State has always had a Grand Strategy, which is wider and more inclusive than military strategy even if it has seldom been formalized in strategic documents. Some strategic documents of the past are nonetheless relevant and quite close to current grand strategic thinking. An exemplary model is the making of US Grand Strategy during and after the Cold War up to the National Security Strategies of today. US Grand Strategy during the Cold War took shape from George Kennan’s containment strategy but its implementation required the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947. The introduction, towards the end of the Cold War, of a comprehensive strategic document such as the US National Security Strategy of 1987 prompted the adoption of National Security Strategy documents by other States. Britain led the way by introducing the concept of a comprehensive National Security Strategy, soon followed by France and, later, by the European Union. The UK and France updated their security policy decision making process by establishing coordinating bodies which took inspiration from the US National Security Council. Germany, in 2016 published a comprehensive security policy document but it has not yet established its own National Security Council. A step that Japan took in 2013, by creating its own National Security Council and publishing its National Security Strategy. An Italian National Security Strategy cannot, however, ignore the evolution of NATO and European Union strategic documents. Therefore, a chapter is dedicated to an overview of the evolution of NATO’s and EU’s Strategic documents up to the “NATO 2030” Report and to the “Strategic Compass 2022” of the European Union. Time has come to draft an Italian National Security Strategy, to establish a National Security Council and to appoint a National Security Adviser. Such a reform would bring back security policy where it belongs: to the centre of Government.

Ovaj završni rad donosi pregled procesa pristupanja Hrvatske najznačajnijim međunarodnim organizacijama – Ujedinjenim narodima, NATO i Europskoj uniji. Od vremena nastanka te strukture bile su jamac mira, stabilnosti, društvenog razvoja, ljudskih prava i gospodarskog rasta. Pristupanjem prvoj takvoj organizaciji - Ujedinjenim narodima, Republika Hrvatska je potvrdila svoju državnost i međunarodni legitimitet, nakon što se izborila za svoju neovisnost od Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Svojim ulaskom u NATO savez osnažila je svoj međunarodni položaj i unaprijedila sustav nacionalne sigurnosti. Dok je kao 28. članica Europske unije ostvarila primarni gospodarski i politički interes koji joj je bio cilj od njezine neovisnosti. Stoga se Hrvatska kroz postupno institucionalno uključivanje u spomenute organizacije potvrdila kao stabilna, demokratska država i značajan partner u ostvarivanju međunarodnog mira i sigurnosti

Il saggio va a indagare il mutamento della strategia britannica tra Ottocento e Novecento, momento in cui la Gran Bretagna, trovandosi sempre più in difficoltà nella gestione del suo immenso Impero, è obbligata a stringere accordi vincolanti con altre Potenze (Giappone e Russia in primis) per riportare parte delle sue forze nelle acque nazionali, in modo da concentrarsi sulle nuove emergenti minacce europee

The Three Seas (Baltic-Adriatic-Black) Initiative was originally rationalised as a geopolitical alliance of NATO/EU member states of "New Europe", from Estonia to Croatia, connecting the Baltic and Adriatic Seas. The member states, with the exception of Austria, share certain common denominators, such as communist history and NATO membership, prior to EU membership. The idea resembles the geopolitical idea of Intermarium, which was envisioned as a federation of independent Central and Eastern European states, based mostly on the ethnic principle. At present day, the Initiative is also intended to contain the influence of Russia and pull the states between EU/NATO and Russia out of the Russian sphere of influence. The post-communist NATO/EU member states are bandwagoning towards the U.S. and perceive NATO as the guarantor of their security. The Three Seas Initiative represents a geopolitical wedge between EU/Bruxelles and Moscow or, in geopolitical and historical terms, between Germany and Russia.

The article analyses the narratives of political parties and representatives, which call for Slovakia to withdraw from NATO and for the neutrality of the Slovak Republic. Criticism of the foreign policy of the United States, the claim to deepen the relationship with the Russian Federation and Pan-Slavism ideas are becoming the sources of legitimacy in defending the military neutrality of the Slovak Republic. The main objective is to identify the key actors behind these claims and reconstruct one of the perspectives of the cleavage, which takes place around the foreign and security policy’s orientation in Slovakia.

This paper will assess the alleged relevance of the realist thinking in International Relations by answering the question whether Realism still dominates the theory and practice of International Relations. Examination of some core theoretical assumptions of Realism and assessment of the continuing significance of the realist thinking during the Cold War period and after will be undertaken with regard to both theory and practice. To answer the key research question whether Realism is still dominant, arguments against and in favour of the claim will be presented. Based on evidence, the line of argument establishes that although the realist depiction of International Relations, with its stress upon the distribution of power, provides an important departure and continuous insight, not to mention the ‘timeless wisdom’ into the understanding of the behaviour of states, it is not in itself definitive as Realism has some noticeable weaknesses. This paper begins from the premise that although Realism alone is insufficient for understanding of contemporary international relations, its insights remain necessary to that enterprise. The method adopted is Toulmin model of argument, which serves as a basis for structure and organization. The big idea is an elucidation on ‘an enlightened Realism’, which confirms the continuing validity of Realist principles throughout history. It is explained through a juxtaposition between statecraft by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite arguments questioning the relevance of the classical paradigm Realism is nowhere near becoming irrelevant in the practice of some states. Whereas the discipline has witnessed an astounding flourishing of numerous post-classical theories of International Relations. Despite emergence of such new theories, it is reasonable to suggest that Realism has not become obsolete. Undeniably, Realism produces numerous prolific critics, perhaps deservedly, because in its power political mode, it provides instrumental interpretation of the international system. Some would argue even, immoral examination of international politics, as opposed to a normative one, unlocked by the study of alternative International Relations theories, such as the English School, Constructivism, Feminism, Green theories or Global Environmentalism. It will be argued, however, that scholars of international politics cannot totally discard the Realist paradigm since security, rather than economic development, still remains the most important concern for many states in the developing world (although emancipation concerns are coming to the fore as well). Realism’s applicability and ability to explain the current international politics remains unparalleled. Although the world is changing (45% of the world is democratic), in certain fundamentals, it has not changed as much as many contemporary International Relations theorists believe. To a large extent, it remains characterised by anarchy, and its attendant logic of self-help and struggle for survival. The world is still decentralised, the key political actors are states which are competitive. This confirms Realist analyses of power politics with states compelled by their anarchic environment to act in a ‘functionally undifferentiated’ manner while using capability advantages to gain more influence over outcomes based on power accumulation, as timeless. In other words, Realism as one of not many theoretical paradigms remains relevant despite the passing of history, in other words, it aspires to explain events even beyond history as it is the longest tradition of thinking about international political reality. Thus, Realism remains essential to understanding states’ choices and actions. Consequently, despite the emergence of postpositivist approaches, it would be incorrect, some would argue even naïve, to state that Realism is not dominant. However pessimistically it may sound, based on data and evidence of states' practice Realism persists. Realism is far from being an exhaustive theory though, neither has it existed without evident limitations, nor has it remained universally applicable to all times and epochs (despite claims for it being beyond history, i.e. being relevant in all epochs), but its savage, simplistic variant is still evident in the world. Whether in brutal acts of war, acts of avenge, revanchism, competition and breaking of human rights, Realism is still unrivalled when it comes to the conduct of states in the non-democratic world. However, Realism's influence is not monolithic when it comes to theory. Realism persists in acts of states only when weak leaders sacrificing integrity and objectivity decide to allow so, for example, by not disarming an aggressor in time, or by turning a blind eye to unlawful military interventions, or by not being guided by ethics. Hard military power counts for more in the context of international politics than it does in democratic domestic politics. In international relations, conquest, or pure coercion, is not leadership, but mere dictation. In other words, 'offensive' Realism exists, as long as, weak leaders who are on top of states follow the realist precepts and its attendant logic of competition, rivalry, carnal revenge and retort to war. In so doing though dictators put whole societies as well as liberal order in danger. In contrast, strong leaders help groups create and achieve shared goals. Successful transformational leadership is about change. When strong leaders allow for the possibility of transformation of the structure towards security community, then the realist logic no longer holds true and is not accurate. Realism and neo-realism are unable to explain structural change in world order. In line with the evidence, although Realism is not definitive (i.e. even weak leaders have alternatives and societies have democracy to choose strong leaders), it is alive and well, and it looks like it is not likely to disappear anytime soon from both theory and practice of International Relations. Primitive, savage and brutal elements are unfortunately still visible in 21st century civilized world. What can IR scholars do to make Realism less dominant in both IR theory and practice of states? The relationship between theory and practice is that of mutual, dual causality. If Realism persists on top echelons of power, it persists also in the practice of states. To change this, scholars have to initiate a theoretical innovation among the top most powerful statesmen. Realism persists unless IR scholars are actively engaged in innovative refinement and eclectic creation of new theories which could then be, in turn, readily applied by strong, transformational leaders, i.e. leaders who believe in change and bring about real, multiple social change. In principle, good theories lead to good policies since policy problems inspire theoretical innovation. Theories inform policy although policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in International Relations. If this trend could be reversed, if more scholars would become more interested in doing policy-relevant work and if more policy makers started to listen to IR scholars, then this would enable more effective bridging of the gap between theory and policy. If it is accepted that the point of IR theory is to enable a convergence in which political theory meets practice. Then, such an analytic activity could be, thereby leading to a smoother and swifter transfer of new, well crafted, fine-tuned, and more innovative theories strengthening 'transmission belt' from theory to policy. This would be followed by implementation of effective, successful policies to enable peaceful change though within the system, in actual reality, leading to the innovative and technological transformation of the whole system. Perhaps, even civilizing the International Society in the way that some of the English School scholars have long time ago envisaged. Creative, original ideas exist, but they are rarely applied by policy makers and statesmen who often discard eco-movements, feminist, postmodernist, pospositivist theories. Thus, if scholars and academics produce useful knowledge, as for example with the theory of 'an enlightened Realism', such constructive ideas could be implemented into the practice of statecraft. When successful, research for policy’s sake could perform an enlightenment function of social sciences (this metaphor illustrates the role of a theory in understanding the world of IR - we can only shed light on what is known, and even then, we cannot be 100% certain about the activity of theorising, for what is unknown remains in the darkness) making the discipline more diverse and the world a better place. Reminding at the same time that each of the theories whether classical or post-classical, reveal only part of truth about contemporary international political reality, and thus, from this standpoint, none is sufficiently satisfactory.

Il saggio si basa su documentazione recentemente desecretata. Attraverso tali fonti d’archivio viene ricostruito il dibattito in seno all’Amministrazione Clinton in merito all’allargamento della NATO in Europa centro-orientale. Il lavoro prospetta come tale processo abbia avuto luogo anzitutto perchè gli Stati Uniti ne hanno fatto un’importante priorità strategica, promossa nonostante l’opposizione russa – invero talvolta contraddittoria – che avrebbe voluto dare maggior peso all’OSCE come istituzione di sicurezza paneuropea.

Prostori koji cine teritorij Republike Hrvatske kroz povijest su uglavnom bili položeni na granicama između velikih država i carstava, interesnih sfera i blokova te se položaj razlicitih hrvatskih prostora smatrao kontaktno- spojnim. To je omogucilo utjecaje razlicitih naroda i kultura, ali i stalnu izloženost ovih prostora osvajackim težnjama. U suvremenom geopolitickom okruženju, Hrvatska ponovno ima kontaktno-spojni položaj, između clanica Europske unije i država zapadnog Balkana. Ulaskom u Europsku uniju (i prije toga u clanstvo NATO saveza), Republika Hrvatska je definitivno prestala biti dijelom zapadnog Balkana. Hrvatska se od 2008. godine dolaskom globalne financijske krize pa do danas nalazi u vrlo losoj gospodarskoj i ekonomskoj situaciji. Kada se Republika Hrvatska promatra s geopolitickog gledista, tj. iz konteksta njezinog oblika granica i teritorija, vidljivo je da je Hrvatska na raskrscu putova između zapadne i sredisnje Europe s istocnom i jugoistocnom Europom. Time ...