Europe and America: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship?

International and Security Studies, 2017

The purpose of this article is to analyze Europe’s Place in U.S. Security Policy at the beginning of the 21st century. The chronological timeframe of the article are the years 2001–2009, i.e. the years of George W. Bush’s presidency, which encompass a number of important events in both U.S. and European security policy. The analysis is designed to answer the following research questions: What place did Europe occupy in U.S. security policy during the reign of President George W. Bush? What was cooperation like between the U.S. and allies in Europe between the years 2001 and 2009? Was Europe an important ally of the Americans? Did Europe influence the White House’s decisions on international security? What impact did the Bush administration have on U.S.-Europe relations?

European Foreign Affairs Review

The events that led to the recent US-UK campaign in Iraq created severe strains in the USA's relations with some of its European allies. These strains, in turn, have impacted on both NATO and the EU. Even before the military campaign turned into occupation, a start was made on repairing the damage to transatlantic relations; time will tell to what extent these efforts will have succeeded. The purpose of this paper-written from an American's perspective-is not so much to predict the outcome of diplomatic initiatives, as it is to examine the main trends and factors that caused the strains: the 'Messianic' aspects of US foreign policy, the changes in US-European power relations since World War II, post-cold war events and experiences, and the key diplomatic events that preceded the Iraqi Campaign. Once these are seen and understood in their proper perspective, the First World will have a better chance to face united the tasks and challenges of the post-Iraq world. I America's Slow and Unintended Rise to Power Historically, US foreign policy has been split between isolationism and an idealism that often led to intervention, often in the pursuit of objectives of doubtful relevance to any conventional definition of national interest. The roots of both concepts may be found in America's colonial experience. The 13 colonies that became the United States of America were founded in the seventeenth century by people fleeing religious persecution, or seeking more freedom, or at the least, a better life. Having arrived in America after a long and arduous voyage, they were free to fail or succeed, as indeed, were the colonies themselves. England was indifferent: it allowed them almost

Europe v. America: The Transatlantic Divide over International Security Paper delivered to the Conference on New Security Agendas in Europe, organized by the Menzies Centre, London, and the Department of War Studies, King's College London, June 2004 Remy Davison School of Government University of Tasmania In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch wrote of a transatlantic ‘security community’ More recently, Barry Buzan (1983) emphasized the profound structural implications for the international system of a ‘fully-developed’ European Union. In the post-Cold War era, both intra-European and transatlantic divisions have emerged over key issues in international security, such as fighting terrorism, and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many players in the new Europe of the post-Cold War era find themselves at significant variance with many of the security doctrines with which traditionally. These include a North Atlantic alliance; the development of Europe as a ‘third force’ in international politics; and a commitment to a wider, deeper process of European integration which sought to implement not only a single European market, but also common foreign, security and defence policies. A multi-track Europe has emerged, comprising proponents of American power; opponents of US unilateralism; and uncommitted neutrals. The newly-expanded EU from 2004 will include east European members of NATO, many of which supported US intervention in Iraq, cohabiting with ‘old Europe’ opponents of the American ‘hyperpower’, such as France and Germany. Russia, together with Germany, has also demonstrated a new willingness to act in opposition to American foreign policy. As Jean Dufourcq of the EU Military Committee argues, the transatlantic divide is ‘no longer a debatable issue; it is a reality that has resulted from a variety of convergent circumstances.’ (Dufourcq, 2004). In a global imbalance of power, three European states - Russia, Germany and France (together with China) - have developed a distinct preference for multilateral initiatives, with a view to ‘diluting’ American power via the development of a multipolar global order. Conversely, a number of the major ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers - the UK and Australia - have supported the US’s anti-terrorist initiatives and pre-emption doctrines strongly. As a consequence of these divisions, the chasm between European and American security policy has rarely been as deep as it is at present. Has this chasm developed as a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s policies, such as NMD/TMD, the ‘war on terror’ and the American-led intervention in Iraq? Asman (2003) argues that ‘One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance - the current rift has been unprecedented in its scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.’ How profound is this rift between the transatlantic allies? What is the likely impact this division will have upon the international security architecture? This paper argues that the division over security policy in Europe represents a profound shift in the dynamics of the international system, as some of the major powers seek to redress the imbalance of a unipolar system dominated by American military power. The paper conjectures that this renewed struggle over the balance of power has not been in evidence since the Cold War.

Two opposing conceptual approaches have weighed in on the analysis of the recent relationship between the European Union (EU) -and its member states -and the United States (US). From a perspective articulated around the notion of a North Atlantic security community, all these actors are partners and tend to unite their power when dealing with their peers. In another, however, the current inconsistency of EU external action is the only element that prevents already partially competitive relations with the US from becoming essentially a strategic rivalry. While the community perspective is more relevant, the partners follow different directions to adapt to the changing international balance of power. While seeking to diversify partnerships with international actors outside of the North Atlantic community, the EU -and even more so its member states -still treat the latter as most relevant element for their outlook on world politics. For the US, however, it is doubtful that the European partners will continue to hold a similar rating as essential diplomatic and security allies.

The transatlantic relationship continues to evolve. However, even as US administrations change, the security and economic dimensions of the transatlantic relationship are not very susceptible to radical policy shifts, thanks to history, institutions and mutual interests. Individual US presidents are, in theory, able to make sweeping changes to US participation and activity levels within NATO, for example, but in practice there are a number of constraints, which have led to the historical fact that US presidents have supported appropriate US security engagement in Europe and NATO. While the US presidential election created the illusion that the next US president would seek to withdraw from agreements aimed at furthering trade liberalization, and that this would be supported by the population, actual opinion polls show strong support for continued US efforts to negotiate trade deals and actively engage in global trade.

EUROPE’S STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURIES, 2021

With the Cold War over, many political scientists and politicians proclaimed the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This alliance in nearly forty years played a crucial role in opposing the military strength of the Soviet Union. There were also opinions expressing the importance of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a platform for cooperation in the field of transatlantic security, demanding NATO’s adaptation to new tasks beyond the traditional role of defending the territory of the member states. The end of the 20th century is a period of rapid changes in the international environment and the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance to new challenges. In the 1990s, it has happened some types of ‘vacuum’ and tensions in Western Europe - the United States of America relations. It arose from structural changes in the international system, and in turn, it had a significant impact on transatlantic security relations. The 21st century began with the largest terrorist attack in history, of which the only superpower became a victim. September 11, 2001, affected U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union. The main goal of the United States of America was to shape an international situation in which no force would oppose or threaten its priority interests. Thus, they implemented a security strategy, the main elements of which were to guarantee the behavior and actions of key actors in the international scene, following the long-term interests of the United States of America. The United States of America’s power and its decisions still have a significant impact on the world. In turn, the successes, problems, and challenges of integrating Europe also have global implications. The right relations between the United States of America and its European allies have become a crucial task. However, the United States of America strives for its allies to support their activities in the international environment, not only. But also to legitimize their actions. Both within and outside of U.S. forces area responsibility stationed in Europe are invaluable ‘assets’ shaping behavior and expectations in the region and responding to challenges in Europe and beyond. The transatlantic community should cover the whole of Europe, its various institutions, and spheres of activity necessary to deepen cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are the main pillars of this community. Americans and Europeans must cooperate in strengthening cooperative security and economic and political relations with countries that for many reasons cannot become NATO or European Union members in the coming years. The additional efforts of Americans and Europeans will be particularly important for achieving stability and relations with the Russian Federation and ending the war in Ukraine. Access to these Euro-Atlantic structures is in the common interest of Europe and the United States of America. In this book, the problem of European strategic autonomy is presented in a broad international context as part of a wider transatlantic project. The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance member states at the Brussels Summit in January 1994 stressed that the European Security and Defense Identity would strengthen transatlantic ties. Thus, European strategic autonomy concerns not only purely military problems but also broader transatlantic relations. It can be a solid binder of the whole structure of relations between the USA and its European allies. When writing this book, the original materials were primarily used. The documents come mainly from the collections and archives of the United States of America administration and the United States Congress. These were primarily reports, analyses, and statements from the White House, the State Department, the United States Representation to NATO, the United States Representation to the EU, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States European Command (EUCOM). In turn, the documents of the U.S. Congress mainly include resolutions, speeches, hearings, and opinions of individual congressmen, especially statements in the forum of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on European Affairs. The work was also based on analyses, studies, and articles of both American and European scientists, including Russian researchers. Important sources of documentation acquisition were: RAND Corporation, The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), International Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Institute for European Policy, Centre d’Etudes Europeennes de Waterloo, The George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Harvard Center for European Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Austrian Diplomatic Academy, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, National Defense University in Washington (NDU), Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The American Enterprise Institute, Institute of USA and Canada.The author’s observations, and thoughts were obtained thanks to participation in many international meetings and conferences on transatlantic security, including NATO Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The author had the opportunity to participate in the discussion on Euro Atlantic strategic cooperation. In Paris, the author, in turn, talked with representatives of the United States of America at NATO Headquarters, the Ministry of Defense of France, the EU Security Research Institute, and the chairman of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). A valuable experience that the author used to write this book, were meetings with the American administration officials, representatives of European institutions, and individual countries at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London at the conference on September 12-14, 2001. It had special attention on global security. Consequently, the researcher used activities in other international discussions, among others, in Lisbon, St. Petersburg, Tallinn, Berlin, Paris, Toulouse. This book consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The research layout reflects the nodal thematic complexes. The first chapter presents the efforts of the United States of America to secure leadership in the world and the attempts of some European countries to reduce American dominance on the European continent. The second chapter is devoted to the issue of the formation of new approaches by the American administration to NATO to safeguard its interests in Europe. The next, third chapter analyses the methods and means by which the United States of America has attempted to build its concept of ESDI, aiming to keep European allies under its protectorate. The subject of the fourth chapter is transatlantic relations after September 11, 2001. It showed the clear will of the United States of America to build a wider international anti-terrorist coalition and the impact of the events of September 11 on the process of building European strategic autonomy. The period 2001 - 2015 deserves separate, in-depth analysis, i.e., from New York to Paris, from art. Art V of the Washington Treaty to art. 42 points 7 of the Treaty on European Union, as well as its further sequences. The discussion, actions, and adoption of the European Global Strategy in 2016 will demonstrate the limited will of the EU Member States and the directions for strengthening the role and position of the European Union on the international stage. In terms of the global security architecture changes, transatlantic challenges, and European strategic autonomy, this will be demonstrated in the next book by the author.

Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal) : Humanities and Social Sciences, 2021

The EU Member States share various perceptions and preferences on lots of Union’s issues, particularly in the areas of foreign and security policies. Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, focus on the establishment of the European autonomous defence. Others, especially most of the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the UK, supported the transatlantic burden sharing. The neutral states also concur with the concept of transatlantic burden sharing. However, the transatlantic relations between the EU and the US are problematic. This study argues that the EU would increase its importance to the role of international politics to effectively implement its goals if the transatlantic relations are stable. The EU requires the military capability and leadership of the US; on the other hand, the US also relies on the EU’s peacemaking and peacekeeping capacity. When both blocs closely cooperate with each other as an important partnership to counter international terrorism, regional disputes, climate change, failed states, mass movements of migration, epidemic diseases, and so on, they would respond to these problems and resolve them within a shorter time.

2007

2 The role of hegemony in security communities 4 European views on American announced and operational foreign and military policies 6 George W Bush and ‘Winds of Change’ in Transatlantic Relations 7 The Iraq War and a Deepening Transatlantic Crisis 9 Changes in European Foreign and Military Policies 13 Policy responses in the EU 13 Policy responses in NATO 15 European Responses to American Hegemony – Serious Crisis or Trivial ‘Tiff’? 18 References 20

Demokritos Scientific Journal, 2024

Being America’s friend as a European nation-state no longer pays as it once did. While the post-World War II transatlantic alliance was built on mutual interests and shared values, today’s world is far more complex. European nations are increasingly bearing the economic, political, and social costs of this alliance, often with little to show in return. As the global order shifts towards multipolarity, Europe must carefully consider its place in the world. The time has come for European nations to reassess their reliance on the U.S. and explore alternative partnerships that align more closely with their own values and interests. Whether through greater engagement with China, Russia, or other emerging powers or by strengthening their own strategic autonomy, Europe must navigate its future with a clear-eyed understanding that being America’s friend no longer guarantees prosperity or security in an increasingly fragmented world.

Društvena istražživanja-Časopis za opća društvena …, 2009