THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF PHILOSOPHY OF HUMILITY
Edited by Mark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch and
Alessandra Tanesini
CONTENTS
List of contributors
Acknowledgements
ix
xii
Introduction
Mark Alfano, Michael P. Lynch and Alessandra Tanesini
1
PART 1
Theories of humility
7
1 Theories of humility:An overview
Nancy E. Snow
9
2 “I am so humble!”: On the paradoxes of humility
Brian Robinson
26
3 Humility is not a virtue
Paul Bloomfield
36
PART 2
The ethics of humility
47
4 Humility and human flourishing
Robert Roberts
49
5 Humility and self-respect: Kantian and feminist perspectives
Robin S. Dillon
59
v
Contents
6 The puzzle of humility and disparity
Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr and Daniel Howard-Snyder
72
7 Humility and truth in Nietzsche: The humblebrag of the lambs
Nickolas Pappas
84
8 The comparative concern in humility and romantic love
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev
97
9 Pride and humility
Michael S. Brady
106
10 Ashamed of our selves: Disabling shame and humility
E.M. Dadlez and Sarah H.Woolwine
117
PART 3
The politics of humility
127
11 A humble form of government: Democracy as the politics of collective
experience
Michael A. Neblo and Emily Ann Israelson
129
12 Conviction and humility
Michael P. Lynch
139
13 Humility and the toleration of diverse ideas
Casey Rebecca Johnson
148
14 Humility, forgiveness, and restorative justice: From the personal to the political
Carl Stauffer
157
15 Can humility be a liberatory virtue?
Heather Battaly
170
PART 4
Humility in religious thought
185
16 Humility among the ancient Greeks
Sophie Grace Chappell
187
17 Aquinas on humility and relational greatness
Andrew Charles Pinsent
202
vi
Contents
18 Faith and humility: Conflict or concord?
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel J. McKaughan
212
19 Humility in the Islamic tradition
Sophia Vasalou
225
20 Buddhist humility
Nicolas Bommarito
236
21 Humility in early Confucianism
Alexus McLeod
245
22 Humility and the African philosophy of ubuntu
Thaddeus Metz
257
PART 5
The epistemology of humility
269
23 Intellectual humility and contemporary epistemology:A critique of
epistemic individualism, evidentialism and internalism
John Greco
271
24 Humility and self-knowledge
Alessandra Tanesini
283
25 Intellectual humility and epistemic trust
Katherine Dormandy
292
26 Intellectual humility, testimony, and epistemic injustice
Ian M. Church
303
27 False intellectual humility
Allan Hazlett
313
28 Intellectual humility and argumentation
Andrew Aberdein
325
29 Intellectual humility and assertion
J.Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon
335
30 Humility, contingency, and pluralism in the sciences
Ian James Kidd
346
vii
Contents
31 Humean Humility and its contemporary echoes
James Van Cleve
359
PART 6
The psychology of humility
373
32 Humility in personality and positive psychology
Peter L. Samuelson and Ian M. Church
375
33 Psychological measurement of humility
Rick H. Hoyle and Elizabeth Krumrei Mancuso
387
34 The moral psychology of humility: Epistemic and ethical alignment as
foundational to moral exemplarity
Jennifer Cole Wright
35 The role of knowledge calibration in intellectual humility
Nicholas Light and Philip Fernbach
401
411
PART 7
Humility: Applications to the social world
425
36 Humility and terrorism studies
Quassim Cassam
427
37 ‘Knowledge is power’: Barriers to intellectual humility in the classroom
Lani Watson
439
38 Humility in law
Amalia Amaya
451
39 Extended cognition and humility
Duncan Pritchard
464
40 Arrogance and servility online: Humility is not the solution
Neil Levy
472
41 Humility in social networks
Mark Alfano and Emily Sullivan
484
Index
495
viii
22
HUMILITY AND THE AFRICAN
PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU
Thaddeus Metz
22.1 Introduction
The word ‘ubuntu’ comes from the Nguni language group mainly in South Africa, and it literally means humanness, where humanness is something for a person to realize through certain
positive relationships with other persons. Although the word is local, the relational approach to
ethics that it signifies is much broader, being salient in many philosophies produced from the
sub-Saharan African region.This chapter explores prominent respects in which humility figures
into not just the relational ethic of ubuntu, but also the epistemic perspectives that are usually
associated with it in regard to moral knowledge.
The African philosophical tradition, although long-standing, is only in its third generation
when it comes to literate contributors and interpreters. Until the 1960s, sub-Saharan philosophers by and large lived in oral cultures. Whereas those in the Judeo-Christian tradition can
invoke passages about humility that are at least 2000 years old (e.g., Proverbs 11.1–3, 16.5, 16.18–
19, 18.12), as can those in the Confucian tradition (e.g., Analects 1.14, 14.20), there are no aged,
venerable written texts to consult by those working in African philosophy.
To deal with this lack, one strategy would be to interview sages for accepted views of humility and to look for commonalities amongst indigenous African peoples (cf. Oruka 1991), or to
consult proverbs about humility that can be shown to have had widespread appeal (one could
consider Ibekwe 1998: 14–15, 150–151, 197; Kuzwayo 1998: 32, 34, 45, 49, 52). However, the
approach of this chapter is to draw on philosophical ideas that have been published in academic
fora over the past 50 years or so.They were substantially informed by the cultures of the philosophers who advanced them, and, even setting that point aside, these philosophies in themselves
provide rich approaches to morality and epistemology that differ from what is salient in many
other intellectual traditions and merit engagement.
Although the concept of humility has not often been explicitly invoked to make sense of
African morality and epistemology in academic works, this chapter shows that it is a useful lens
through which to consider key facets of these literate philosophies. In many ways, by ubuntu we
are to be humble in respect of what an individual should claim from others and what an individual may claim to know, although no claim is made here that it is some kind of ‘master virtue’
for the tradition (a view often ascribed to St.Augustine in respect of Christianity).
257
Thaddeus Metz
The chapter begins by spelling out what is arguably characteristic of humility as such,whether
it is a feature of how we treat others or how we come to know about the world (Section 22.2).
Next, it articulates some ethical ideas associated with ubuntu and considers humility in the light
of them (Section 22.3), after which it does so in the context of moral epistemology (Section
22.4). The chapter concludes by sketching some prominent African philosophies other than
what has been advanced as ubuntu, and by suggesting ways in which the analyses offered here
could be plausibly extended to them (Section 22.5).
22.2 An analysis of humility
In order to consider how ubuntu morality and epistemology may be understood to prescribe
humility, one first needs some sense of what humility is.This section does not presume that there
is an essence to humility, although it also does not reject that possibility (unlike Kellenberger
2010: 323–324). Instead, it advances features that are typical of a humble orientation, whether in
the domains of ethics or epistemics. In emphasizing similarities between ethical and intellectual
humility, the following does not strive to mark out the finer points of either one considered in
isolation from the other.
The introduction spoke of making a ‘claim’, where one might make a claim on others’
resources such as their time, or make a claim to know something about the world. Humility may
be understood in these contexts to prescribe tempering claims (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2003:
258, 265–267; Kellenberger 2010). A humble person neither makes unreasonable demands to
possess what others have, nor unreasonably maintains that she is in possession of certain kinds of
truth.A humble person does not grasp for what is not hers to receive.
Talk of ‘assumption’ and cognate terms, and specifically the lack of it, is a second recurrent
feature of humility. In the ethical realm, a humble agent is unassuming, relatively unconcerned that her status be greater than others (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2003: 259–261) and
not wanting to impose on others without giving their interests at least due consideration (if
not greater consideration than what is owed, on which see Kellenberger 2010).With regard
to epistemology, a humble enquirer questions her assumptions, perhaps even when she is
entitled not to doubt. She does not suppose that she knows with certainty or with too much
confidence, or she accepts that there are certain topics about which she cannot know (e.g.,
Whitcomb et al. 2017). She judges herself to need evidence, perhaps seeking more than is
sufficient. Whereas the humble agent does not take things for free from others, the humble
enquirer does not take things for granted about the world. Neither is presumptuous; both
accept limits.
A third term frequently associated with humility is ‘extravagance’, specifically the avoidance
of it. An agent who is not humble might make excessive demands on others, or spend lots of
resources on herself in respect of a party or an abode, perhaps ascribing to herself a value that
is disproportionately great (e.g., Garcia 2006). An enquirer who lacks humility might extravagantly posit entities for which there is insufficient evidence, such as a multiverse or angels.
Putting these ideas together, a person is humble insofar as she tempers her claims, avoids
being presumptuous, and eschews extravagance. It is natural to think of humility as a virtue,
whether practical or intellectual (for just one instance, see Battaly 2019).1 It is a disposition not
to think too much of oneself, whether that is in relation to what goods one takes from the world
or what one takes oneself to believe about it.
Of particular salience when it comes to ethics is the idea that others matter and must be
given their due (and perhaps more). A proverbial Robinson Crusoe alone on a deserted island
without humans or animals probably could not exhibit the moral virtue of humility, surely not
258
Humility and ubuntu
to its full extent. Relatedly, the ‘anti-humble’ vices of arrogance, vanity, attention-seeking, selfishness, and the like could not be manifest in the absence of others.
As this volume illustrates, there is of course much more one could discuss about the nature
of humility. For example, the above description has roughly focused on avoiding ‘too much’, but
presumably humility, insofar as it is a virtue, also involves avoiding ‘too little’.And any ‘too’ talk,
as well as mention of what is ‘unreasonable’ and the like, beg for specifics. However, the analysis
given here will be enough to make sense of certain important features of ubuntu as a widely
shared African philosophy.
22.3 African ethics and humility
As is becoming increasingly well known around the world, the key phrase used to sum up the
moral aspects of ubuntu is ‘A person is a person through other persons’.This maxim is an overly
literal translation of sayings prominent in South Africa and mirrored in much of at least southern
and central Africa. This section first provides a philosophical interpretation of the maxim and
then brings out how it entails humility in a variety of respects.
22.3.1 An ethical interpretation of ubuntu
To begin to understand what it means to say that a person is a person through other persons
or has ubuntu, consider some remarks from Desmond Tutu, the influential Nobel Peace Prize
winner from South Africa and former Chairperson of that country’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission:
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, he or she
has ubuntu’.This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate.
They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound
up, in theirs.We belong in a bundle of life.We say, ‘a person is a person through other
people’. It is not ’I think therefore I am’. It says rather:‘I am human because I belong’.
(1999: 34–35)
By ‘we’Tutu means indigenous African peoples, and the view he is ascribing to them is that one
ought to develop one’s humanity or personhood, which is constituted by the way one treats
other people. One realizes humanness or lives a genuinely human way of life insofar as one
exemplifies a variety of other-regarding virtues, some of which Tutu mentions.
Similar remarks appear from Yvonne Mokgoro, a former justice of South Africa’s
Constitutional Court who is known for having appealed to ubuntu in some of her judgements:
[T]hus the notion umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe [a
person is a person through other persons––ed.] which also implies that during one’s
life-time, one is constantly challenged by others, practically, to achieve self-fulfilment
through a set of collective social ideals … . Group solidarity, conformity, compassion,
respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation and collective unity have, among others
been defined as key social values of ubuntu.
(1998: 17)
Here, too, the eudaemonist approach to morality is patent: one is to realize oneself by relating to
others in certain supportive ways.
259
Thaddeus Metz
Philosophers are characteristically curious as to whether all the relevant ubuntu-constitutive
virtues can be reduced to a single one. What might generosity, hospitality, friendliness, care,
compassion, solidarity, respect, and unity all have in common, beyond being relational? The suggestion from Tutu, Mokgoro, and several others based in South Africa who have theoretically
addressed ubuntu (e.g., Mkhize 2008; Metz 2014; Murove 2016)2 is a harmonious relationship.A
certain conception of harmony is plausibly foundational when it comes to the other-regarding
moral virtues of ubuntu.
To begin to spell out what harmony involves, let us return to Tutu and Mokgoro:
I participate, I share …. Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social
harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good. Anything that subverts or
undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague.Anger, resentment,
lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this
good.
(Tutu 1999: 35)
(H)armony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group.
(Mokgoro 1998: 17)
Tutu and Mokgoro both mention two distinct ways of relating as constitutive of harmony, as
do others in the literature (on which see Metz 2013 for a fuller reconstruction). One is participating or being close, which is usefully understood not merely as refraining from isolation, but
also something like sustaining a common sense of self with others. So, for example, it means
liking being together, taking pride in others’ accomplishments, avoiding coercive, deceptive, or
exploitive interaction, and realizing others’ ends.Another phrase to capture this first element of
harmony is ‘sharing a way of life’.
The second element of harmony could be summed up as ‘caring for others’ quality of life’.
It centrally includes doing what is at least likely to make others’ lives go objectively better,
i.e., in terms of their needs, and not so much their feelings or wants. These needs include the
socio-moral imperative to develop one’s humanness, meaning that one way to realize oneself
by relating harmoniously with others is to help them realize themselves––by in turn relating
harmoniously. In addition to giving to others in ways expected to improve their lives, caring
for them means characteristically doing so consequent to certain positive attitudes, such out of
sympathy and for their own sake.
Roughly speaking, sharing a way of life with others captures the virtues of respect, solidarity, and unity, while caring for them is what generosity, hospitality, care, and compassion have in
common. And although there are still two distinct properties here, of sharing and caring, they
are naturally viewed as a pair, for together they constitute what many English-speakers would
call ‘friendliness’ or even a broad sense of ‘love’.To relate in a friendly manner is more or less to
enjoy a sense of togetherness, to engage in cooperative projects, to help one another, and to do
so for reasons beyond self-interest.
In sum, a powerful way to understand one major strain of African thought about morality
is in terms of a prescription to live in a way that prizes harmony or friendliness, or, more carefully, treats individuals with respect insofar as they are, in principle, capable of being party to
such ways of relating. By this latter phrasing, a person who can by her nature be friendly and be
befriended has a dignity that demands honoring, with one key way to do so being to cultivate
or sustain friendly relationships with her. Although neither Tutu nor Mokgoro mentions dignity
in the above quotations, a number of African philosophers have maintained that sub-Saharan
260
Humility and ubuntu
peoples typically ascribe dignity to human beings (e.g.,Wiredu 1996: 158; Bujo 2001: 2, 138–
139, 142; Deng 2004: 501; Gyekye 2010: section 6). Often the thought has been that everyone
has dignity because she is a child of God, but here the link with harmony is tightened up, so
that it is roughly the capacity to love and be loved in which our dignity inheres. As Tutu suggests at one point,‘The completely self-sufficient person would be subhuman’ (1999: 214). Such
a relational approach to morality differs from a focus on not merely autonomy or pleasure but
also care, which standardly neglects both the sharing a way of life element and the relevance of
dignity.
As with the nature of humility, there is more one could say about an ubuntu ethic, construed
as prescribing one to realize oneself by prizing harmonious or friendly ways of relating. On the
one hand, many will want to know why the ‘African’ label is apt for this principle, beyond the
fact that it is grounded on the remarks of two African intellectuals from South Africa.The brief
answer, and the only one space allows for here, is that something counts as ‘African’ if it has been
characteristic of––not necessarily unique or essential to––much of that place and for a long time
in a way that differentiates it from many other locales (Metz 2015), and that harmony indeed
captures a wide array of beliefs and practices salient below the Sahara desert (Paris 1995; Metz
2017a; Ejizu n.d.).
On the other hand, readers will hanker for more specifics about the nature of the ethic.
Is one to relate that way only with human persons, or do some other parts of nature, such as
animals, count? Does an ethic prescribing harmony categorically forbid the use of force, and, if
not, under what conditions does it permit force? How is one to balance actual harmonious relationships of which one is a part with merely potential ones with strangers? These are important
questions, but we do not need answers in order to make headway on the ethic’s implications
for humility.
22.3.2 Ubuntu and humility
There are a number of ways in which an ethic instructing agents to respect others in virtue
of their capacity for harmonious relationships, and hence characteristically to relate harmoniously, plausibly includes some form of humility, whether that means tempering claims, avoiding
presumptuousness, or eschewing extravagance. This section highlights some major respects in
which this is so.
The relationship between harmony and humility that is probably the most tempting to note
is a causal one.That is, one naturally judges that a lack of humility, say, in the form of arrogance
or self-centeredness, would likely discourage people from entering into or sustaining ties with
those who manifest these traits. Instead, such attitudes can be expected to prompt discord,
roughly understood as division and ill-will between people. Conversely, as Nelson Mandela
(2000) has pointed out in an interview, if one is humble and so not a threat to others, then one
will be in a good position not merely to avoid, but also to resolve, discord between others.
These claims are true, but they are also weak, in the sense that they ground no necessary
relation between harmony and humility. Often haughtiness or selfishness will lead to alienation between people down the road, and is to be discouraged for that reason, but not invariably. Whether a certain attitude, or even its expression, brings about particular results or not
depends on contexts that vary, for instance, on whether others have noticed it or not. If you
did not hear another person gratuitously disparage you, his attitude will not on that occasion lead you to put more distance between yourself and him. Similarly, even if one is in fact
humble, if people perceive one otherwise, then one’s ability to resolve conflict amongst them
will be hindered.
261
Thaddeus Metz
Here are some connections between harmony and humility that are stronger for being constitutive and not merely causal.To begin, consider that an ethic that ascribes a dignity to at least
human persons straightforwardly forbids treating others as worth less than oneself.To have dignity is to possess superlative final value, and, by most interpretations of it these days, everyone has
equal dignity if they have enough of the requisite property, in this case, the capacity to be party
to harmonious relationships. Such an approach to morality rules out not only discrimination
on grounds such as race or gender, but also arrogance. Having an equal worth when it comes to
moral treatment easily entails a kind of humility in which one tempers one’s claims on others
and does not presume to impose on them (at least when it comes to non-intimates).
One way to avoid discrimination and arrogance would be to remove oneself from society.
However, an ethic of harmony also forbids doing so. This ethic implies that the value of others
is such as to require one to come closer to them, typically interpreted to require reconciliation
between victims and those who have committed crimes against them, for instance (e.g., Tutu
1999; Krog 2008). If one were to isolate oneself, one would be failing to recognize other people’s
worth adequately and so failing to be humble before them. Paying attention to only oneself would
amount to ascribing a certain kind of importance to oneself that one does not in fact have. It
would mean that others do not matter enough for one to go out of one’s way for them, but their
dignity calls for more than that. If we have dignity by virtue of our ability to relate harmoniously,
then the default mode of engagement (viz., with innocent parties) should be to relate in that way.
More specifically, by the present ethic, one is obligated to acknowledge the importance of
others in two major ways. First, one must come closer to them by participating with them
cooperatively. One must rein in one’s ends so that they are at least substantially consistent with
those of others, if not shared with them. One may not spend so much time, labor, money, and
the like on oneself that one is left unable to advance other people’s projects. Second, one should
advance certain kinds of ends, ones that are at least unlikely to make people’s lives objectively
worse, and ideally those likely to make them better. Indeed, according to what is probably the
dominant strain of thought about African morality, there is no category of supererogation, a
view that is sometimes explicit (e.g., Gyekye 1997: 70–75) and other times implicit in the principles advanced (consider, say, the Golden Rule in Wiredu 1992: 198). In the African tradition, it
is imperative to curb one’s demands on others and instead to go out of one’s way for them, especially for extended family members, to the point where, in some cultures, having slaughtered an
animal and not offered some to relatives would be considered theft (Metz and Gaie 2010: 278).
There is an additional respect in which ubuntu as an ethic prescribes humility, which concerns
not how one should treat others, a first-order virtue, but how one should regard oneself in respect
of how one has treated others, a second-order virtue. In brief, one should be humble about one’s
having been humble.3 It is one thing to be presumptuous in respect of others’ interests and thereby
lack virtue, and another to be presumptuous in respect of one’s own virtue, another type of a lack
of virtue. M. K. Gandhi accepts this point when he says,‘A humble person is not himself conscious
of his humility …. (A) man who is proud of his virtue often becomes a curse to society’ (1932: 30).4
How would failing to be humble about one’s humility, or one’s virtue more generally, show
disrespect of others’ ability to be party to relationships of harmony? One idea, suggested by
Gandhi above, is that if one were to label oneself as ‘humble’ or ‘virtuous’, then one would
rest on one’s laurels and be disinclined to reflect critically on oneself.There is always room for
growth as a moral person, or at the very least decline for one to ward off, both of which seem
to prescribe erring on the side of underestimating the extent to which one has realized virtue.
Notice, though, the ‘often’ in Gandhi’s formulation: this rationale cannot explain why it is always
a vice to some degree to fail to be humble about one’s virtue, as sometimes being proud about
it will not be expected to have bad consequences for others.
262
Humility and ubuntu
Reflecting on Nelson Mandela’s virtue occasions awareness of other, stronger reasons for
thinking that one should be humble about one’s humility and, more generally, one’s virtue.
Mandela is famous for having illustrated humility about his moral accomplishments, and it is
reasonable to think that it is a function of the ubuntu ethic to which he subscribed (Mandela
2012: 147, 155, 2013a: 227). Mandela would, for instance, often pay tribute to others beyond
himself, such as the South African people, for major positive changes to their country’s sociopolitical structure, and he also recommended doing so as an ideal form of leadership (Mandela
2013b). Here, it is plausible to think of sharing credit and praise with others as an instantiation
of ubuntu; it is another way to give to others, instead of directing good things to oneself.
For another respect in which Mandela was humble about his achievements, consider that he
avoided comparing them to those of others, instead being known for having referred to all the
greater tasks he had yet to accomplish. In the last paragraph of his autobiography, Long Walk to
Freedom, Mandela famously remarks,‘I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill,
one only finds that there are many more hills to climb’ (1994: 751). By focusing not on how
great his achievements were relative to most people’s, but instead on how many more achievements he had yet to make, Mandela respects others, in two ways. He avoids making people feel
inadequate, and prompts himself to do all the more for human beings, the sole relevant achievement by an ubuntu morality.
22.4 African moral epistemology and humility
Whereas the previous section addressed respects in which humility is prescribed by an ethic of
respect for individuals’ capacity for harmonious relationships, the present one considers some
ways that humility figures into the African epistemology that is the common companion to
this ethic. In particular, this section notes some respects in which individuals should be humble
when it comes to knowing which acts are right and attitudes are virtuous.
Very broadly speaking, the Western tradition encourages an individual to use his own rational
powers to evaluate a given subject matter, including morality; methods such as a priori reflection
and coherentist justification in the light of one’s intuitions are common. In contrast, the African
tradition is much less sanguine about what can be known about morality by a typical human
being cogitating on his own. Roughly, although the Western tradition has recently acknowledged the importance of expert testimony as a source of knowledge, debate is ongoing about
the aptness of moral testimony, and the African tradition makes reliance on epistemic authority
and collective enquiry more central, and especially for moral matters.
Probably most indigenous African peoples believe in God, such that it is much too narrow
to think of monotheism merely in terms of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions.5 Whereas
the Abrahamic faiths are revelatory, traditional African religion is not (Gyekye 1995: 129–146;
Wiredu 1996: 61–77). That is, according to the Abrahamic faiths, God’s benevolent and just
will has been directly communicated to human beings via certain texts or prophets. If you read
a certain book, or hear what a certain person has said, then you can know what God’s moral
purpose is. In contrast, from a characteristic sub-Saharan perspective, God is ‘too big’ or ‘too
distant’ for us to be able to apprehend His mind, so that we require a mediator in order to convey God’s intentions to us. For the African tradition, we must be humble in respect of knowing
God’s mind, including His moral commands––indeed, we have no hope of becoming directly
acquainted with the thoughts of an infinite being.
As for the mediator who can become acquainted with God’s will, the standard view amongst
indigenous sub-Saharan peoples is that it must be an ancestor, a wise founder of a clan who
has survived the death of his body, continues to reside on earth in an imperceptible realm, and
263
Thaddeus Metz
instructs the clan on how to behave, which includes dishing out penalties for moral infractions.
How, then, is a human being to know the mind of an ancestor? Here, again, humility is warranted on the part of a typical human person. It is not just any individual who is deemed to have
the ability to access the ancestral world, but rather those who have undergone years of training
in how to interpret dreams, enter trances, detect reincarnated persons, and the like.
In the African tradition, there are also less ‘spiritual’ mediums through which to access judgements about who did wrong and what morally should be done now. Even these more naturalist
methods, however, tend to eschew reliance on individual reflection, intuition, etc. Particularly
common is the thought that one should defer to the judgement of elders, and especially to consensus amongst them, about moral matters, such that moral education ought to center around
apprehending, and not particularly questioning, their views (for a robust articulation and defense
of this position, see Ikuenobe 2006). A young person challenging a much older one about
morality would be viewed as lacking the requisite epistemic humility; specifically, the young
person would be viewed as being presumptuous.
Although it is possible for an aged person not to count as an ‘elder’, for evincing poor judgement, the default position is that with age comes wisdom and hence the authority to speak
about moral matters.The notion that some people in their 20s or 30s could reach the highest
stage of moral appraisal, a view advanced by the influential American psychologist Lawrence
Kohlberg (1984: 272–273), is quite out of place amongst African philosophers. Instead, as an
influential Nigerian ethicist remarks of an Igbo African proverb:
‘What an old man sees sitting down, a young man cannot see standing up’ … .
(A)lthough we would not have a great deal of difficulty talking about an 18-year-old
mathematical giant, we would have a great deal of difficulty talking about an 18-yearold moral giant.
(Menkiti 2004: 325)
This view is plausible insofar as an ethic of the sort analyzed in the previous section is accepted;
for it takes substantial experience to learn how to navigate the complexities and challenges of
interpersonal relationships (for more on the point, see Metz and Gaie 2010: 286).
Furthermore, it is common in the African tradition to maintain that moral knowledge is
most likely to emerge from consensus amongst at least a group of elders, if not all those affected
by the controversy, and not so much from the pronouncement of a single person. Although
many indigenous African societies were led by a monarch, it was routine for him to defer to the
collective judgement of a group of elders, or perhaps all those involved, about how to resolve
conflicts or otherwise proceed with contentious matters. Part of the reason for being inclusionary is practical, e.g., making people more likely to enjoy a sense of togetherness, but another
part is clearly epistemic, the rough idea being that two heads are better than one (one finds
discussion of both in Bujo 1997: 43–57, 2001: 45–71, 2005: 427–431). If kings deem themselves
unqualified to make ethical judgements on their own, so much the worse for a typical individual
member of society. Instead, from this standpoint, she must be humble in respect of her own ability to determine what the best course of action is in a relational context.
22.5 Conclusion
This chapter has expounded one major strain of African thought about normative ethics, which
is relational, and brought out what it means for humility in both normative ethical and moral
epistemological matters. Broadly speaking, supposing that a good person, i.e., one with ubuntu, is
264
Humility and ubuntu
one whose attitudes and actions express respect for people’s dignified ability to relate harmoniously, one must not be discriminatory, arrogant, or selfish when it comes to the way one treats
others, and one must consult routinely with elders about how to sustain, deepen, and otherwise
honor relationships. Failing to live harmoniously would often consist of failing to manifest
humility, as would believing that one can routinely ascertain how to exemplify ubuntu without
the input of older and wiser people.
There are other accounts of African morality that contemporary philosophers have expounded
that this chapter has not addressed. Instead of taking relational features to be foundational, most
of the other views instead deem either vitality (e.g., Dzobo 1992; Magesa 1997) or the common
good (Gyekye 1997, 2010) to be what ultimately matters for ethics (but see Wiredu 1992 for
a somewhat different view). However, even by these approaches, harmonious relationships are
nearly always deemed to be particularly reliable, if not essential, means by which to promote
life or well-being.That is, sharing a way of life and caring for others’ quality of life, even if not
deemed to be relationships to pursue as ends, are thought quite likely to make other people
more lively or to improve their welfare. Insofar as that is the case, the considerations about how
humility figures into a relational ethic will, mutatis mutandis, apply with comparable force to
these other African ethics. One may therefore conclude that humility is central to African moral
philosophy, not merely the ubuntu variant on which this chapter has focused.
Notes
1 Is there an aesthetic humility that would complement the ethic and epistemic? Although the literature
does not speak of one, it would be worth pursuing the idea that there is a humility possible in the realm
of the beautiful, and not just in the good and the true. One thought is that, while aesthetic judgments
might have an objective dimension, humility counsels against typically deeming them to be universally
valid (for such a view, see Miller 1998).
2 But not only them—there are many from the rest of the continent who also place notions of harmony,
cohesion, community, and the like at the heart of self-realization, just two examples of which include
Paris (1995); and Ejizu (n.d.).
3 For this ‘self-attribution problem’, see Driver (1989); Kellenberger (2010: 328–331); and Whitcomb et
al. (2017).The point is similar to the familiar idea that a person is wise (partly) insofar as she is disinclined to think of herself as wise (or at least to proclaim herself wise to others).
4 But perhaps not so much when Gandhi had earlier said,‘I claim to be a simple individual liable to err
like any other fellow mortal. I own, however, that I have humility enough to confess my errors and to
retrace my steps’ (1926/1999: 195).
5 The rest of this paragraph borrows from Metz (2017b: 804).
References
Battaly, Heather. 2019.‘Humility’. In: LaFollette, Hugh, ed. International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1–9.
Bujo, Bénézet. 1997.The Ethical Dimension of Community, Nganda, C.N., trans. Nairobi: Paulines Publications.
Bujo, Bénézet. 2001. Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, McNeil,
Brian, trans. New York: Crossroad Publishers.
Bujo, Bénézet. 2005.‘Differentiations in African Ethics’. In: Schweiker,William, ed. The Blackwell Companion
to Religious Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 423–437.
Deng, Francis. 2004.‘Human Rights in the African Context’. In:Wiredu, Kwasi, ed. A Companion to African
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 499–508.
Driver, Julia. 1989.‘The Virtues of Ignorance’. The Journal of Philosophy 86(7): 373–384.
Dzobo, Noah. 1992. ‘Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors, and God’. In: Wiredu, Kwasi and
Gyekye, Kwame, eds. Person and Community; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, Vol. I. Washington, D.C.:
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 223–240.
265
Thaddeus Metz
Ejizu, Christopher. n.d.‘African Traditional Religions and the Promotion of Community-Living in Africa’.
www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/community.htm.
Gandhi, Mahatma. 1926. ‘From Far-Off America’. Young India, 6 May 1926. Repr. in The Collected Works
of Mahatma Gandhi,Vol. 35. New Delhi: Publications Division Government of India, 1999, 193–196,
www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/mahatma-gandhi-collected-works-volume-35.pdf.
Gandhi, M. K. 1932. From Yervada Mandir, Desai, Valji Govindji, trans. Ahmedabad: Jitendra T. Desai,
Navajivan Mudranalaya, www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/yeravda.pdf.
Garcia, J. L. A. 2006. ‘Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility’. Philosophia 34(4):
417–435.
Gyekye, Kwame. 1995. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme, rev edn.
Philadelphia, PA:Temple University Press.
Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gyekye, Kwame. 2010. ‘African Ethics’. In: Zalta, Edward, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato
.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/african-ethics/.
Ibekwe, Patrick. 1998. Wit and Wisdom of Africa: Proverbs from Africa and the Caribbean. Oxford: New
Internationalist Publications Ltd.
Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2006. Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Kellenberger, James. 2010.‘Humility’. American Philosophical Quarterly 47(4): 321–336.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1984. The Psychology of Moral Development. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
Krog, Antjie. 2008.‘“This Thing Called Reconciliation….”; Forgiveness as Part of an InterconnectednessTowards-Wholeness’. South African Journal of Philosophy 27(4): 353–366.
Kuzwayo, Ellen. 1998. African Wisdom:A Personal Collection of Setswana Proverbs. Cape Town: Kwela Books.
Magesa, Laurenti. 1997. African Religion:The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Mandela, Nelson. 1994. Long Walk to Freedom. London: Abacus.
Mandela, Nelson. 2000. ‘The Most Humble Man Oprah Has Ever Met’, www.oprah.com/world/nelso
n-mandela-shares-the-importance-of-humility-video#ixzz5bj4CiZu4.
Mandela, Nelson. 2012. Notes to the Future:Words of Wisdom, Hatang, Sello and Venter, Sahm, eds. New York:
Atria.
Mandela, Nelson. 2013a. Nelson Mandela by Himself: The Authorised Book of Quotations, Hatang, Sello and
Venter, Sahm, eds. Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan.
Mandela, Nelson. 2013b. ‘The Words of Nelson Mandela (1918 – 2013) that Forever Inspire Our World’.
https://jetsettimes.com/in-crowd/nelson-mandela/.
Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 2004.‘On the Normative Conception of a Person’. In:Wiredu, Kwasi, ed. A Companion to
African Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 324–331.
Metz,Thaddeus. 2013. ‘The Western Ethic of Care or an Afro-Communitarian Ethic?: Finding the Right
Relational Morality’. Journal of Global Ethics 9(1): 77–92.
Metz, Thaddeus. 2014. ‘Ubuntu: The Good Life’. In: Michalos, Alex, ed. Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and
Well-Being Research. Dordrecht: Springer, 6761–6765.
Metz,Thaddeus.2015.‘How the West Was One:The Western as Individualist,the African as Communitarian’.
Educational Philosophy and Theory 47(11): 1175–1184.
Metz,Thaddeus. 2017a.‘Toward an African Moral Theory’, rev. edn. In: Ukpokolo, Isaac, ed. Themes, Issues
and Problems in African Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 97–119.
Metz,Thaddeus. 2017b.‘African Philosophy as a Multidisciplinary Discourse’. In: Falola,Toyin and Afolayan,
Adeshina, eds. The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 795–812.
Metz,Thaddeus and Gaie, Joseph. 2010.‘The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on
Morality’. Journal of Moral Education 39(3): 273–290.
Miller, Richard W. 1998. ‘Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral, and Scientific’. In: Levinson,
Jerrold, ed. Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. New York: Cambridge University Press, 26–58.
Mkhize, Nhlanhla. 2008. ‘Ubuntu and Harmony’. In: Nicolson, Ronald, ed. Persons in Community: African
Ethics in a Global Culture. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 35–44.
Mokgoro, Yvonne. 1998. ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1(1):
15–26, www.nwu.ac.za/p-per/volume-1-1998-no-1-1#Articles.
Murove, Munyaradzi Felix. 2016. African Moral Consciousness. London:Austin Macauley Publishers.
Oruka, Henry Odera. 1991. Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy.
Nairobi:African Center for Technological Studies Press.
266
Humility and ubuntu
Paris, Peter. 1995. The Spirituality of African Peoples:The Search for a Common Moral Discourse. Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress Press.
Roberts, Robert C. and Wood, W. Jay. 2003. ‘Humility and Epistemic Goods’. In: DePaul, Michael and
Zagzebski, Linda, eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford
University Press, 257–279.
Tutu, Desmond. 1999. No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Random House.
Whitcomb, Dennis et al. 2017. ‘Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 94(3): 509–539.
Wiredu, Kwasi. 1992.‘Moral Foundations of an African Culture’. In:Wiredu, Kwasi and Gyekye, Kwame,
eds. Person and Community; Ghanaian Philosophical Studies,Vol. I.Washington, D.C.: Council for Research
in Values and Philosophy, 193–206.
Wiredu, Kwasi. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press.
267