Meaning of Life by Thaddeus Metz
Religious Studies, 2022
Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presum... more Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presumed a conception of God that is Abrahamic. In contrast, in this article I critically discuss some of the desirable and undesirable facets of Traditional African Religion’s salient conceptions of God as they bear on meaning in life. Given an interest in a maximally meaningful life, and supposing mean- ing would come from fulfilling God’s purpose for us, would it be reasonable to prefer God as char- acteristically conceived by African philosophers of religion to exist instead of the Abrahamic conception of God? At this stage of enquiry, I answer that, in respect of the range of people to whom God’s purpose would apply, a more African view of God would plausibly offer a greater mean- ing, but that, concerning what the content of God’s purpose would be, the Abrahamic view appears to offer a greater one. I conclude by reflecting on this mixed verdict and by suggesting respects in which non-purposive facets of the African and Abrahamic conceptions of God could also have impli- cations for life’s meaning.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2022
In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, So... more In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, Soul and the Meaning of Life in a special issue of the International Journal of Philosophy and Theology. I view them mainly as addressing the ‘meaning’ of God in three distinct senses, namely, in terms of how best to understand the word ‘God’ and related terms such as ‘the spiritual’, whether God is central to what gives our lives a particular sort of final value, and how beliefs about God might be central to interpreting what on the face of it are non-religious beliefs and practices in contem- porary Western society. My remarks are intended to continue the dialogue about these definitional, axiological, and hermeneutic meanings of God.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2022
This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are place... more This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are places in his oeuvre where he contends that, while our lives might be able to exhibit some terrestrial or human meaning, that is not enough to make them worth creating, which would require a cosmic meaning that is unavailable to us. There are those who maintain, in reply to Benatar, that some of our lives do have a cosmic meaning, but I grant Benatar here that none of our lives does. I instead argue that a lack of cosmic meaning is insufficient to infer that our lives are all bad or, more carefully, bad enough to make procreation impermissible. In particular, I advance a new principle by which to judge the absence of a good to be bad, roughly according to which the more unavailable a good is, the less reason there is to exhibit negative reactive attitudes toward its absence. It follows that there is no reason to regret or be sad about the lack of cosmic meaning, given that it is impossible for us
Journal of Jewish Ethics, 2021
In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious an... more In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious and secular theorists about what would make life meaningful, with a large majority of the religious philosophers having drawn on Christianity. In this article, in contrast, I draw on Judaism, with the aims of articulating characteristically Jewish approaches to life's meaning, which is a kind of intellectual history, and of providing some support for them relative to familiar Christian and Islamic approaches (salient in the Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur’an), which is a more philosophical enterprise. Sometimes I point out that dominant views in contemporary philosophy favor a Jewish approach to meaning relative to rivals, e.g., insofar as Judaism contends that a merely earthly life can be meaningful. Other times I suggest that Judaism provides reason to doubt dominant views in recent analytic philosophy, e.g., to the extent that the former posits a people, not merely a person, as a bearer of meaning.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2021
On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a mea... more On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.
Ethik in der Medizin, 2021
Definition of the problem
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been domin... more Definition of the problem
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments
I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion
My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the ... more What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the meaning of life? World-renowned experts, David Benatar and Thaddeus Metz, give you their answers to life’s biggest question. Spoiler alert: it isn’t 42. We’ve all felt a unique sense of isolation over the past year. Is there a way to find meaning in this brave new world? Benatar argues that from the cosmic perspective, life on this pale blue dot has almost no significance. But Metz holds a more optimistic view. Discover his rules for how anyone can enrich their lives through truth, beauty, and goodness. Conversations about the Meaning of Life is a discussion with two of the most important thinkers on the topic, and includes an exclusive debate between them. If you strive to lead a more meaningful existence, and want an accessible, intelligent guide to the ultimate question, you’ll love this book. "This is, in my opinion, the best dialogue about the meaning of life in the literature. The interlocutors are two of the most important philosophers in the field and it is enlightening to hear these two titans engaging each other directly. Anyone interested in the meaning of life should read this brief and accessible work." - John G Messerly, author of The Meaning of Life.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 2021
A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focu... more A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focus on books and more recent works.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2020
I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan Afric... more I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a “modern” Western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore, and consider some ways they might respond to the objections.
Human Affairs, 2019
In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the que... more In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the question of what it essentially means to speak of "life's meaning". Instead of considering what might in fact confer meaning on life, I make two claims about the more abstract, meta-ethical question of how to understand what by definition is involved in making that sort of enquiry. One of my claims is that over the past five years there has been a noticeable trend among philosophers to try to change our understanding of what talk of "life's meaning" connotes. For example, whereas most philosophers for a long while had held that such talk is about a kind of value possible in the life of human beings, recently some have argued that certain non-human parts of nature can exhibit meaningfulness, which, furthermore, is not necessarily something valuable. The second claim I advance is that there is strong reason to reject this trend, and instead for philosophers to retain the long-standing approach.
This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning a... more This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning as discussed in recent Anglo-American philosophical literature. There have been four broad views: God or a soul is necessary for meaning in our lives; neither is necessary for it; one or both would greatly enhance the meaning in our lives; one or both would substantially detract from it. The book familiarizes readers with all four positions, paying particular attention to the latter two, and also presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (As with any text listed here, email the author for a copy, if interested.)
In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on... more In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on claims he makes about what makes a life meaningful. According to Bennett-Hunter, for human life to be meaningful it must obtain its meaning from what is beyond the human and is ineffable, which constitutes an ultimate kind of meaning. I spell out Bennett-Hunter’s rationale for making this claim, raise some objections to it, and in their wake articulate an alternative conception of ultimate meaning. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6tP0)
A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and... more A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and morality, might plausibly figure into public policy. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6ycd)
The Meaning of Life and the Great Philosophers
This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koh... more This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koheleth (or Qoheleth), the presumed author of Ecclesiastes, a book from the Hebrew Bible. Koheleth famously argues that ‘life is futility’ (or ‘vanity’) for a variety of reasons, with this chapter focusing on the three that are most recurrent in the text and have been particularly influential in the Western tradition of philosophy. These are considerations about: the mortality of humankind, the undeserved allocations of benefits and burdens we receive, and the inability to control our fate.
This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions ... more This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions of what makes a person's life meaningful. It contends that no promising analysis captures all and only the theories that are intuitively about meaning in life. It concludes that conceptions of life's meaning are instead united in virtue of family resemblances. Specifically, theories of what makes a life meaningful are views that answer the following kinds of partially overlapping questions: how may a person bring purpose to her life beyond pursuing happiness? how should an individual connect with intrinsic value beyond his animal nature? how might one do something worthy of great esteem or admiration?
Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nat... more Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or 'biased'? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which issues of neutrality arise in the contexts of life's meaning. In addition to providing a taxonomy of the key points of contention, a second aim is to advance reflection about them by considering the most important arguments that have been marshalled in favour of one side or the other, particularly as they appear in recent neutral positions. I conclude that meaning in life is neutral with respect to time but not any other conditions such as agents and patients, with a third aim being to point out that this makes the value of meaning different from the kinds of non/neutrality encountered in some salient conceptions of prudence and morality.
In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things consi... more In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view.
Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad... more Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad views about how to help patients. On the one hand, some maintain that, or at least act as though, the basic point of therapy is to help patients become clear about what they want deep down and to enable them to achieve it by overcoming mental blockages. On the other hand, there are those who contend that the aim of therapy should instead be to psychologically enable patients to live objectively desirable lives, say, ones that involve developing their inherent talents or exhibiting an authentic/strong/integrated self. In this chapter, I argue that neither of these prominent approaches is complete. Contra the former, sometimes what patients want deep down is not something to promote, and, against the latter, it can sometimes be reasonable for patients to want to sacrifice their own objective interests and for therapists to assist them in this regard. I argue that the category of meaningfulness does well at accounting for these counterexamples to the two dominant approaches, while capturing the kernels of truth in them. The proper aim of therapy, I suggest, is to enable patients to live meaningfully.
The Philosophical Forum, 2012
It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philos... more It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philosophy, and merely in the last 25 or so that debate with real substance and complexity has appeared. Using systematic, critical discussion of recent Anglo-American philosophical literature
as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.
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Meaning of Life by Thaddeus Metz
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments
I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion
My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments
I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion
My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.