We imagine a minimal context where a programmer A serves as the provider of a program X for a use... more We imagine a minimal context where a programmer A serves as the provider of a program X for a user B. A survey is given of plausible promises and accusations in connection with the delivery and deployment of X. When X is used, various problems may arise. The focus of the paper is on the role of accusations which may plausibly arise in various scenarios. We discuss different accusation patterns that may occur outside informatics and see whether such patterns may appear in the context of programming as well.
Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affai... more Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affairs. However, there is a lack of a philosophical conceptualisation that is necessary for appropriate descriptions of accusations and further philosophical scrutiny. Accusation Theory is proposed as such a theoretical framework. This paper (1) aims to present some general tools for the description of accusations as speech acts, (2) tries to understand fundamental features of accusations, (3) analyses some elements of the practice of accusing, (4) presents a short overview of relevant literature and (5) outlines some possible avenues of further research. Now cars are ubiquitous too and we do not wonder about the absence of a substantial philosophy of cars. Accusations, however, seem to play a constitutive role in human communication and for that reason are definitely worth academic and, specifically, philosophical attention. Claim 1.2. The concept and practice of accusation has received remarkably little attention in philosophy and relatively little attention in various social sciences as well.
Proceeding on the work in [6] we proceed with an investigation of the fine structure of the class... more Proceeding on the work in [6] we proceed with an investigation of the fine structure of the class of straight accusations with focus on what we will call extreme accusations. Besides "extreme accusation" we find the need for additional terminology such as underaccusing and overaccusing. Accusing comes with risks, and we investigate such risks in some detail. Extreme accusation may arise from the intent to avoid a risk of underaccusation, but it comes with a risk of overaccusation the gravity of which which may be underestimated with unfortunate consequences.
Following up on the work in [6, 7] we proceed with a detailed investigation of a particular class... more Following up on the work in [6, 7] we proceed with a detailed investigation of a particular class of extreme accusations viz. so-called genocide accusations. We focus on real time accusations of episodal genocide, meant to bring the target behaviour of the accusee to an end, or to contribute to its termination, and we derive conditions under which issuing such accusations may be justified.
Discussions in bioethics were perhaps the main reason why human dignity was so intensely debated ... more Discussions in bioethics were perhaps the main reason why human dignity was so intensely debated over the last years. However, the role of human dignity in bioethics is unclear. But the reason is not that the concept is “useless”—as some have claimed—but rather that the dominant methodologies in bioethics (such as principlism) are not sufficiently prepared to deal with this concept. Moreover, bioethical debates are often overshadowed by ideological and religious attempts to monopolize the notion. The result is that most bioethical methodologies are not well suited to appreciate the specific function of human dignity as a foundation of the entire human rights framework.
Do future generations have (human) rights? A lot of philosophers have doubted that one can meanin... more Do future generations have (human) rights? A lot of philosophers have doubted that one can meaningfully ascribe “rights” to people who do not exist (yet) and whose existence depends on decisions current generations have to make. The human rights regime is, however, based on the assumption that all human beings have dignity. This entails the duty of human beings to ensure the necessary condition of future people to live an autonomous life. The chapter will deal with those questions in three steps. First, it will sketch what an ethics of human rights in an intergenerational perspective would look like. Second, it will discuss under which philosophical assumptions such an ethics is legitimate. Third, the chapter will briefly outline some implications of such an ethics of human rights.
The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distincti... more The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distinctions and questions that discussions about human dignity are confronted with. I will mainly focus on questions about ‘human dignity’ that are relevant within the context of the human rights framework. First, I will explain why we are in need of a philosophical account of human dignity at all. Second, I will distinguish different ideal typical models of (human) dignity. Third, I will distinguish different conceptual questions related to different approaches to human dignity and their philosophical articulations. Fourth, I will investigate some relevant questions on the way towards an ethics of human dignity. Finally, I will propose some topics that I consider to be important questions for future philosophical debates about this concept. Why develop a philosophical account of human dignity? When in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was signed, human dignity was introduced as a kind of moral reference point for an agreement that could provide normative guidance for the interpretation of the human rights framework in general. Most people believed that they knew what human dignity was about: a consensus within the humanistic tradition, a secularized version of the Judeo-Christian concept of Imago Dei, an overlap between the ethical doctrines of important thinkers like Kant and Confucius, the normative core of the natural law tradition, a moral–political statement against the atrocities of the Nazi regime etc. Although obviously not everyone endorsed the notion, it was generally assumed that its meaning and status were clear – and thus it appeared superfluous to strive for a theoretical explanation and justification of the concept.
Der Zusammenhang zwischen Anthropologie und Ethik wird in aktuellen Diskursen verortet. Ausgangsp... more Der Zusammenhang zwischen Anthropologie und Ethik wird in aktuellen Diskursen verortet. Ausgangspunkt sind bioethische Diskussionen, in denen der Begriff „Menschenbild“ virulent ist. Zuerst wird das suggestive Potential dieses Begriffs analysiert und kritisch beleuchtet. Danach wird exemplarisch analysiert, wie in der Enhancement-Debatte anthropologische Argumente gebraucht werden. Abschliesend wird die These vertreten, dass es in der Ethik nicht moglich ist, direkt durch Berufung auf Konzepte des Menschen konkrete moralische Forderungen zu begrunden, dass wir aber dennoch allgemeine Annahmen uber den Menschen bei der Konkretisierung oder Realisierung moralischer Forderungen benotigen. Diese Uberlegungen haben insbesondere fur die Padagogik weitreichende Konsequenzen.
This chapter discusses some philosophical assumptions in the use of transcendental arguments in A... more This chapter discusses some philosophical assumptions in the use of transcendental arguments in Alan Gewirth'sm ethod of dialecticaln ecessity. With this method Gewirth aims to show that agents must hold some beliefs in order to understand themselvesconsistently. Firstly,itisargued that this method is not in the first place used to convince the sceptic, but rather that the aim is gain areflective understandingofourselves. Since the methodologyinvestigates 'judgments' and their role for the subject, we should seei ta sp art of ah ermeneutical enterprise to gain af orm of reflected practical self-understanding. Secondly,the paper questions the distinction between 'dialogical' and 'monological' forms of transcendental justification in ethics. It is argued thatthe investigation of dialecticallyn ecessary judgmentso ft he subject has the aim of showing in which ways the subjectm ustr espect the other in order to understand himself consistently. Those normatively committed subjects must be presupposed by discourse ethicists as well, otherwise the dialogue will not reach its goal of generating normatively acceptable outcomes. Finally,the chapter sketches some consequenceso fs eeing the role of transcendental arguments in gainingareflected form of practical self-understanding.I fm oral commitments are basedi n' judgment',t he power of judgment is of crucial importance and we must consider how the institutional and individual conditions needed to protect and develop this basic capacity can be protected and increased. 0I ntroduction What could the goal of using at ranscendental argument be?T he most widespread answer would probablyb e: to convince the sceptic. Thisw ould mean that the place of at ranscendental argument is in as pecific agonistic situation wherei mportant (theoretical or practical) convictions are contested. It evokes the objection thati ti sp erhapsn either necessary nor possiblet or espond to these contestations. Can human beingss eriously contest (if they are compos mentis)t hat there is an outside world, that there are other human beings, or that the killing of babies for fun is morallyw rong? Perhaps it is impossible to raise serious doubts regardingt he outside world from ap ractical perspective,
Preface ix 1 What is bioethics? An introduction 1 1.1 An introduction to bioethics? 1 1.1.1 Insti... more Preface ix 1 What is bioethics? An introduction 1 1.1 An introduction to bioethics? 1 1.1.1 Institutionalisation of bioethics 2 1.1.2 Interdisciplinarity: judgments in bioethics are mixed judgments 5 1.2 Biosciences-biomedicine-bioethics 11 1.3 Bioethics-history and concept 19 1.3.1 Bioethics as an academic discipline 21 1.3.2 The concept of ethics 22 1.3.3 The domain of application 24 2 Bioethics and moral philosophy 27 2.1 The tension between moral philosophy and bioethics 27 2.1.1 Morality and ethics-conceptual differences 34 2.1.2 Normative ethics and the good life: criticisms of normative ethics 40 2.1.3 Metaethical presuppositions 45 2.1.4 Case studies-experience-narrativity 51 2.1.5 Empirical research and ethics 59 2.2 Bioethics and normative ethics 65 2.2.1 Classifi cations of normative ethical theories 66 2.2.2 Utilitarianism and balancing interests 70 2.2.3 Dignity and rights 79 2.2.4 Prima facie principles, principlism 96 2.2.5 Contractualism and political liberalism 103 2.2.6 Methodological refl ection 106 Contents viii Contents 3 A cross section of bioethical questions 3.1 Moral status 109 3.1.1 The justifi cation of moral status 112 3.1.2 The scope of moral status 116 3.1.3 'Dignity of the creature' 121 3.2 Nature and life 125 3.2.1 'Naturalness' 125 3.2.2 Control over nature and life 128 3.2.3 A teleological understanding of nature? 134 3.2.4 The aesthetics of nature and contingency 137 3.3 Human nature and culture 141 3.3.1 Concepts and images of human nature 141 3.3.2 Gender 154 3.3.3 Disability 161 3.3.4 Intercultural bioethics 168 3.3.5 Bioethics, religion, theology 174 3.4 New technologies and the scope of responsibility 181 3.4.1 Concepts of responsibility 181 3.4.2 The scope of responsibility: space, time, uncertainty 185 4 Domains and debates in bioethics 4.1 Bioethics and biomedicine 193 4.1.1 Informed consent, patient autonomy and medical research 193 4.1.2 Euthanasia and the termination of medical treatment 199 4.1.3 Organ transplantation and organ procurement 212 4.1.4 Reproductive medicine, cloning and stem cell research 222 4.1.5 Genetic diagnosis and gene therapy 233 4.1.6 Disease, enhancement and the aims of medicine 239 4.2 'Green' bioethics 247 4.2.1 Animal ethics 248 4.2.2 Agriculture, food, environment 256 5 Conclusion 5.1 Bioethical perspectives 267 Bibliography Index Preface xi but to clarify in what ways bioethical assertions, theories and positions are dependent on moral-philosophical premises. Refl ection upon these premises is, I believe, the essential 'ethical' element of bioethics. In this way, bioethics can make a fundamental contribution to the transparency of the way moral judgments are formed in a situation of moral pluralism, and thus, moreover, be exceptionally conducive to understanding and constructive communication in public debate. This book refl ects, in multifarious ways, my bioethical work over the last 20-odd years. As an academic coordinator of the Interdepartmental Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities in Tübingen I have collaborated on a number of academic projects. Particularly exciting were the many doctoral projects of the research training group 'Ethics in the Sciences', the broad interdisciplinary team as well as the European research projects. I have learned much, in particular, from liaisons with Dietmar Mieth and Klaus Steigleder. For over 10 years now, my working context has been the Department of Philosophy at Utrecht University, where I am director of the Ethics Institute, and from where I directed for the last 7 years the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy. The move to a new country and the encounter with a different academic culture has certainly disclosed a number of new perspectives. The intensive contact with students of philosophy and the students on our international MA programme in Applied Ethics, and the collaboration with the doctoral students of the institute and the research school has been the most enriching challenge. I thank Sigrid Graumann and Micha H. Werner for their numerous comments on the concept and individual sections of the manuscript. My gratitude also concerns the comments and corrections I gained from a discussion in the colloquium of the Ethics Institute at Utrecht University, in par ticular from Marcel Verweij and Jan Vorstenbosch. Robert Heeger's detailed enquiries have-as always-taught me a great deal. This book is the English version of an introduction into bioethics that was fi rst published in German in 2008. I thank Metzler publishing house, especially Ute Hechtfi scher, for the support when writing the German manuscript and for the permission to translate it into English. I thank Routledge, especially Katherine Carpenter and Stephen Gutierrez, for their support and patience in the publishing process, and Sheila McLean for the willingness to consider the manuscript for publication in the Biomedical Law and Ethics Library. I thank Candice Cornelis for various suggestions concerning the English text, Gerhard Bos and Andre Krom for literature suggestions. But fi rst and foremost I have to thank Naomi van Steenbergen. Naomi has translated the whole manuscript from German into English. She did a really wonderful job and I am very grateful for her scrupulous and reliable edition of the text. Sabine Antony, to conclude, has critically read the entire manuscript and has supported its development. For this I am grateful and for much more.
We imagine a minimal context where a programmer A serves as the provider of a program X for a use... more We imagine a minimal context where a programmer A serves as the provider of a program X for a user B. A survey is given of plausible promises and accusations in connection with the delivery and deployment of X. When X is used, various problems may arise. The focus of the paper is on the role of accusations which may plausibly arise in various scenarios. We discuss different accusation patterns that may occur outside informatics and see whether such patterns may appear in the context of programming as well.
Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affai... more Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affairs. However, there is a lack of a philosophical conceptualisation that is necessary for appropriate descriptions of accusations and further philosophical scrutiny. Accusation Theory is proposed as such a theoretical framework. This paper (1) aims to present some general tools for the description of accusations as speech acts, (2) tries to understand fundamental features of accusations, (3) analyses some elements of the practice of accusing, (4) presents a short overview of relevant literature and (5) outlines some possible avenues of further research. Now cars are ubiquitous too and we do not wonder about the absence of a substantial philosophy of cars. Accusations, however, seem to play a constitutive role in human communication and for that reason are definitely worth academic and, specifically, philosophical attention. Claim 1.2. The concept and practice of accusation has received remarkably little attention in philosophy and relatively little attention in various social sciences as well.
Proceeding on the work in [6] we proceed with an investigation of the fine structure of the class... more Proceeding on the work in [6] we proceed with an investigation of the fine structure of the class of straight accusations with focus on what we will call extreme accusations. Besides "extreme accusation" we find the need for additional terminology such as underaccusing and overaccusing. Accusing comes with risks, and we investigate such risks in some detail. Extreme accusation may arise from the intent to avoid a risk of underaccusation, but it comes with a risk of overaccusation the gravity of which which may be underestimated with unfortunate consequences.
Following up on the work in [6, 7] we proceed with a detailed investigation of a particular class... more Following up on the work in [6, 7] we proceed with a detailed investigation of a particular class of extreme accusations viz. so-called genocide accusations. We focus on real time accusations of episodal genocide, meant to bring the target behaviour of the accusee to an end, or to contribute to its termination, and we derive conditions under which issuing such accusations may be justified.
Discussions in bioethics were perhaps the main reason why human dignity was so intensely debated ... more Discussions in bioethics were perhaps the main reason why human dignity was so intensely debated over the last years. However, the role of human dignity in bioethics is unclear. But the reason is not that the concept is “useless”—as some have claimed—but rather that the dominant methodologies in bioethics (such as principlism) are not sufficiently prepared to deal with this concept. Moreover, bioethical debates are often overshadowed by ideological and religious attempts to monopolize the notion. The result is that most bioethical methodologies are not well suited to appreciate the specific function of human dignity as a foundation of the entire human rights framework.
Do future generations have (human) rights? A lot of philosophers have doubted that one can meanin... more Do future generations have (human) rights? A lot of philosophers have doubted that one can meaningfully ascribe “rights” to people who do not exist (yet) and whose existence depends on decisions current generations have to make. The human rights regime is, however, based on the assumption that all human beings have dignity. This entails the duty of human beings to ensure the necessary condition of future people to live an autonomous life. The chapter will deal with those questions in three steps. First, it will sketch what an ethics of human rights in an intergenerational perspective would look like. Second, it will discuss under which philosophical assumptions such an ethics is legitimate. Third, the chapter will briefly outline some implications of such an ethics of human rights.
The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distincti... more The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distinctions and questions that discussions about human dignity are confronted with. I will mainly focus on questions about ‘human dignity’ that are relevant within the context of the human rights framework. First, I will explain why we are in need of a philosophical account of human dignity at all. Second, I will distinguish different ideal typical models of (human) dignity. Third, I will distinguish different conceptual questions related to different approaches to human dignity and their philosophical articulations. Fourth, I will investigate some relevant questions on the way towards an ethics of human dignity. Finally, I will propose some topics that I consider to be important questions for future philosophical debates about this concept. Why develop a philosophical account of human dignity? When in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was signed, human dignity was introduced as a kind of moral reference point for an agreement that could provide normative guidance for the interpretation of the human rights framework in general. Most people believed that they knew what human dignity was about: a consensus within the humanistic tradition, a secularized version of the Judeo-Christian concept of Imago Dei, an overlap between the ethical doctrines of important thinkers like Kant and Confucius, the normative core of the natural law tradition, a moral–political statement against the atrocities of the Nazi regime etc. Although obviously not everyone endorsed the notion, it was generally assumed that its meaning and status were clear – and thus it appeared superfluous to strive for a theoretical explanation and justification of the concept.
Der Zusammenhang zwischen Anthropologie und Ethik wird in aktuellen Diskursen verortet. Ausgangsp... more Der Zusammenhang zwischen Anthropologie und Ethik wird in aktuellen Diskursen verortet. Ausgangspunkt sind bioethische Diskussionen, in denen der Begriff „Menschenbild“ virulent ist. Zuerst wird das suggestive Potential dieses Begriffs analysiert und kritisch beleuchtet. Danach wird exemplarisch analysiert, wie in der Enhancement-Debatte anthropologische Argumente gebraucht werden. Abschliesend wird die These vertreten, dass es in der Ethik nicht moglich ist, direkt durch Berufung auf Konzepte des Menschen konkrete moralische Forderungen zu begrunden, dass wir aber dennoch allgemeine Annahmen uber den Menschen bei der Konkretisierung oder Realisierung moralischer Forderungen benotigen. Diese Uberlegungen haben insbesondere fur die Padagogik weitreichende Konsequenzen.
This chapter discusses some philosophical assumptions in the use of transcendental arguments in A... more This chapter discusses some philosophical assumptions in the use of transcendental arguments in Alan Gewirth'sm ethod of dialecticaln ecessity. With this method Gewirth aims to show that agents must hold some beliefs in order to understand themselvesconsistently. Firstly,itisargued that this method is not in the first place used to convince the sceptic, but rather that the aim is gain areflective understandingofourselves. Since the methodologyinvestigates 'judgments' and their role for the subject, we should seei ta sp art of ah ermeneutical enterprise to gain af orm of reflected practical self-understanding. Secondly,the paper questions the distinction between 'dialogical' and 'monological' forms of transcendental justification in ethics. It is argued thatthe investigation of dialecticallyn ecessary judgmentso ft he subject has the aim of showing in which ways the subjectm ustr espect the other in order to understand himself consistently. Those normatively committed subjects must be presupposed by discourse ethicists as well, otherwise the dialogue will not reach its goal of generating normatively acceptable outcomes. Finally,the chapter sketches some consequenceso fs eeing the role of transcendental arguments in gainingareflected form of practical self-understanding.I fm oral commitments are basedi n' judgment',t he power of judgment is of crucial importance and we must consider how the institutional and individual conditions needed to protect and develop this basic capacity can be protected and increased. 0I ntroduction What could the goal of using at ranscendental argument be?T he most widespread answer would probablyb e: to convince the sceptic. Thisw ould mean that the place of at ranscendental argument is in as pecific agonistic situation wherei mportant (theoretical or practical) convictions are contested. It evokes the objection thati ti sp erhapsn either necessary nor possiblet or espond to these contestations. Can human beingss eriously contest (if they are compos mentis)t hat there is an outside world, that there are other human beings, or that the killing of babies for fun is morallyw rong? Perhaps it is impossible to raise serious doubts regardingt he outside world from ap ractical perspective,
Preface ix 1 What is bioethics? An introduction 1 1.1 An introduction to bioethics? 1 1.1.1 Insti... more Preface ix 1 What is bioethics? An introduction 1 1.1 An introduction to bioethics? 1 1.1.1 Institutionalisation of bioethics 2 1.1.2 Interdisciplinarity: judgments in bioethics are mixed judgments 5 1.2 Biosciences-biomedicine-bioethics 11 1.3 Bioethics-history and concept 19 1.3.1 Bioethics as an academic discipline 21 1.3.2 The concept of ethics 22 1.3.3 The domain of application 24 2 Bioethics and moral philosophy 27 2.1 The tension between moral philosophy and bioethics 27 2.1.1 Morality and ethics-conceptual differences 34 2.1.2 Normative ethics and the good life: criticisms of normative ethics 40 2.1.3 Metaethical presuppositions 45 2.1.4 Case studies-experience-narrativity 51 2.1.5 Empirical research and ethics 59 2.2 Bioethics and normative ethics 65 2.2.1 Classifi cations of normative ethical theories 66 2.2.2 Utilitarianism and balancing interests 70 2.2.3 Dignity and rights 79 2.2.4 Prima facie principles, principlism 96 2.2.5 Contractualism and political liberalism 103 2.2.6 Methodological refl ection 106 Contents viii Contents 3 A cross section of bioethical questions 3.1 Moral status 109 3.1.1 The justifi cation of moral status 112 3.1.2 The scope of moral status 116 3.1.3 'Dignity of the creature' 121 3.2 Nature and life 125 3.2.1 'Naturalness' 125 3.2.2 Control over nature and life 128 3.2.3 A teleological understanding of nature? 134 3.2.4 The aesthetics of nature and contingency 137 3.3 Human nature and culture 141 3.3.1 Concepts and images of human nature 141 3.3.2 Gender 154 3.3.3 Disability 161 3.3.4 Intercultural bioethics 168 3.3.5 Bioethics, religion, theology 174 3.4 New technologies and the scope of responsibility 181 3.4.1 Concepts of responsibility 181 3.4.2 The scope of responsibility: space, time, uncertainty 185 4 Domains and debates in bioethics 4.1 Bioethics and biomedicine 193 4.1.1 Informed consent, patient autonomy and medical research 193 4.1.2 Euthanasia and the termination of medical treatment 199 4.1.3 Organ transplantation and organ procurement 212 4.1.4 Reproductive medicine, cloning and stem cell research 222 4.1.5 Genetic diagnosis and gene therapy 233 4.1.6 Disease, enhancement and the aims of medicine 239 4.2 'Green' bioethics 247 4.2.1 Animal ethics 248 4.2.2 Agriculture, food, environment 256 5 Conclusion 5.1 Bioethical perspectives 267 Bibliography Index Preface xi but to clarify in what ways bioethical assertions, theories and positions are dependent on moral-philosophical premises. Refl ection upon these premises is, I believe, the essential 'ethical' element of bioethics. In this way, bioethics can make a fundamental contribution to the transparency of the way moral judgments are formed in a situation of moral pluralism, and thus, moreover, be exceptionally conducive to understanding and constructive communication in public debate. This book refl ects, in multifarious ways, my bioethical work over the last 20-odd years. As an academic coordinator of the Interdepartmental Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities in Tübingen I have collaborated on a number of academic projects. Particularly exciting were the many doctoral projects of the research training group 'Ethics in the Sciences', the broad interdisciplinary team as well as the European research projects. I have learned much, in particular, from liaisons with Dietmar Mieth and Klaus Steigleder. For over 10 years now, my working context has been the Department of Philosophy at Utrecht University, where I am director of the Ethics Institute, and from where I directed for the last 7 years the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy. The move to a new country and the encounter with a different academic culture has certainly disclosed a number of new perspectives. The intensive contact with students of philosophy and the students on our international MA programme in Applied Ethics, and the collaboration with the doctoral students of the institute and the research school has been the most enriching challenge. I thank Sigrid Graumann and Micha H. Werner for their numerous comments on the concept and individual sections of the manuscript. My gratitude also concerns the comments and corrections I gained from a discussion in the colloquium of the Ethics Institute at Utrecht University, in par ticular from Marcel Verweij and Jan Vorstenbosch. Robert Heeger's detailed enquiries have-as always-taught me a great deal. This book is the English version of an introduction into bioethics that was fi rst published in German in 2008. I thank Metzler publishing house, especially Ute Hechtfi scher, for the support when writing the German manuscript and for the permission to translate it into English. I thank Routledge, especially Katherine Carpenter and Stephen Gutierrez, for their support and patience in the publishing process, and Sheila McLean for the willingness to consider the manuscript for publication in the Biomedical Law and Ethics Library. I thank Candice Cornelis for various suggestions concerning the English text, Gerhard Bos and Andre Krom for literature suggestions. But fi rst and foremost I have to thank Naomi van Steenbergen. Naomi has translated the whole manuscript from German into English. She did a really wonderful job and I am very grateful for her scrupulous and reliable edition of the text. Sabine Antony, to conclude, has critically read the entire manuscript and has supported its development. For this I am grateful and for much more.
Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affai... more Accusations play a pivotal role in human communication, including in contemporary political affairs. However, there is a lack of a philosophical conceptualisation that is necessary for appropriate descriptions of accusations and further philosophical scrutiny. Accusation Theory is proposed as such a theoretical framework. This paper (1) aims to present some general tools for the description of accusations as speech acts, (2) tries to understand fundamental features of accusations, (3) analyses some elements of the practice of accusing, (4) presents a short overview of relevant literature and (5) outlines some possible avenues of further research.
Uploads
Papers by Marcus Düwell