fm3 01

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 3-01.94
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

COMMAND OPERATIONS
APRIL 2005
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination
was made on 21 May 2004. Other requests must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense
Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction
of the document.
*This publication supersedes FM 44-94, dated 31 March 2000.
FM 3-01.94
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (http://www.train.army.mil)
FM 3-01.94
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-09.94 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 8 April 2005
Army Air and Missile Defense Command

Operations
Contents
Page
Preface.............................................................................................................. iv
Chapter 1 ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND .......................................... 1-1

Mission............................................................................................................... 1-1
Roles.................................................................................................................. 1-1
Organization ...................................................................................................... 1-2
Operations ......................................................................................................... 1-5
Support .............................................................................................................. 1-7
Communications................................................................................................ 1-9
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL............................................................................ 2-1

Roles of AAMDC Commander .......................................................................... 2-1
Theater Command and Support Relationships ................................................. 2-4
Coordination and Liaison................................................................................... 2-7
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination
was made on 21 May 2004. Other requests must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense
Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction
of the document.
*This publication supersedes FM 44-94, dated 31 March 2000.

i
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Chapter 3 OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... 3-1

TOC Operations ................................................................................................. 3-1
Operational Element Integration…………………………………………………… 3-4
Active Air Defense.............................................................................................. 3-6
Attack Operations............................................................................................... 3-10
Passive Air Defense........................................................................................... 3-17
Operational Force Protection Operations .......................................................... 3-19
Liaison Officer Operations ................................................................................. 3-21
Force Projection Operations .............................................................................. 3-21
Homeland Defense Operations.......................................................................... 3-24
Chapter 4 SUPPORT.......................................................................................................... 4-1

Overview ............................................................................................................ 4-1
Personnel Section .............................................................................................. 4-1
Logistics Section ................................................................................................ 4-2
Special Staff Sections ........................................................................................ 4-4
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery ........................................................... 4-6
Chapter 5 COMMUNICATIONS ......................................................................................... 5-1

Overview ............................................................................................................ 5-1
Mission ............................................................................................................... 5-1
Responsibilities .................................................................................................. 5-1
Functions and Organizational Structure............................................................. 5-2
Theater Communications Equipment and Support............................................ 5-4
Summary............................................................................................................ 5-13
Appendix A EQUIPMENT...................................................................................................... A-1

Tactical Operations Center Layout .................................................................... A-1
Active/Passive Defense Cell .............................................................................. A-2
G2/Attack Operations Cell ................................................................................. A-2
G1 Personnel and G4 Logistics Cell .................................................................. A-3
Battle Captain/Current Operations/Command Group CELL .............................. A-3
G3 Plans Cell ..................................................................................................... A-4
G6 Communications Cell ................................................................................... A-4
Communications Equipment .............................................................................. A-4
Ancillary Equipment ........................................................................................... A-7
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Contents
Appendix B AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ANNEX (SAMPLE) .......................................... B-1
Appendix C CRITICAL AND DEFENDED ASSET METHODOLOGY ................................. C-1

Overview............................................................................................................ C-1
Background ....................................................................................................... C-2
Scope................................................................................................................. C-4
Worksheets........................................................................................................ C-4
Rated Criteria .................................................................................................... C-5
Glossary .........………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………….. Bibliography-1
Index …………………………………………………………………………………….. Index-1
8 April 2005 iii
FM 3-01.94
Preface
This field manual (FM) is a doctrinal guide to Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) operations.
It is intended for use by the AAMDC commander and staff, as well as the commander and staff of Army, joint,
and multinational elements that interact with the AAMDC in the conduct of theater air and missile defense
(TAMD) operations.
The manual includes chapters on the AAMDC mission, roles and organization; command and control (C2)
relationships; operations; support; and communications. Also included are appendices that describe the
AAMDC equipment, provide a formatted sample air and missile defense (AMD) annex, and provide a
methodology for critical asset list (CAL)/defended asset list (DAL) development. The sample AMD annex is
included to assist AAMDC planners in developing the AMD annex to the operations plan. The equipment
appendix shows the physical layout of the AAMDC tactical operations center (TOC) and describes the air and
missile defense planning and control system (AMDPCS), the integrated system of hardware and software within
the TOC used to plan and execute the AAMDC mission. The CAL/DAL-CVT methodology annex describes
the use of criticality, vulnerability (recuperability), and threat (CVT) to assess potential assets to be defended.
This publication implements the following international standardization agreement:
ISA TITLE EDITION
STANAG 3880 Counter Air Operations—ATP-42 3
The proponent for this manual is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028
directly to Commandant, US Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, Texas
79916-3802.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
iv 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Chapter 1
This chapter provides a concise overview of the AAMDC including its mission, roles,
and organization. It includes an operational overview that describes the AAMDC’s
2 2
C structure, theater C relationships and concept of operations; a support overview
that describes how the AAMDC supports TAMD operations; and a communications
overview that summarizes the AAMDC’s communications requirements and
4
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C I) architecture.
MISSION
1-1. The AMD forces with other elements of the joint, interagency, multinational (JIM)
team at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, will provide AMD and contribute to
situational awareness (SA)/understanding, airspace management, and operational force
protection to deter or defeat enemy aerial threat, protect the force and high value assets,
enable freedom to operate, and contribute to victory. This mission is normally executed
within a combined theater and requires integration and close coordination of Army AMD
with other counterair forces. Mission sets for AMD forces are:
• Provide air and missile defense.
• Contribute to SA/understanding.
• Contribute to airspace management.
• Contribute to operational force protection.
1-2. The AAMDC mission is to strategically deploy combat ready AMD and perform
TAMD planning, coordination, integration, and execution in support of the combatant
commanders’ priorities. In performing this mission, the AAMDC ensures that the
Army’s contribution to the joint TAMD fight is seamlessly integrated, coordinated, and
synchronized with other Army, joint, and multinational units, and supports the joint force
commander’s intent.
ROLES
1-3. The AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for Army TAMD. In wartime, the
AAMDC deploys into the theater of operations in support of the Army forces (ARFOR)
commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC), and
the joint force air component commander (JFACC) ensuring that Army TAMD
operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational
forces. Also, based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC) and augmentation with Army and JIM personnel, the
AAMDC has the capability to serve as an operational force protection integrator for the
ARFOR or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army echelons above
corps (EAC) air defense forces are properly trained and ready to support TAMD
operations. The AAMDC plans and executes a variety of training activities, exercises,
and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with joint and multinational
partners to develop procedures for combined TAMD operations, interoperability, and
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training. The AAMDC may also support homeland defense operations. See Figure 1-1 for
a functional comparison with the air defense artillery (ADA) brigade headquarters.
AAMDC EAC ADA BDE

• C2 headquarters tailored for joint operations • C2 headquarters tailored for Army operations
• Performs theater level AMD planning, • Executes tactical level engagement and force
coordination, and synchronization operations
• Conducts all operational elements of TAMD • Conducts active, passive and C2I elements
• Commands and controls EAC ADA brigades • Commands and controls ADA battalions and
and serves as TAAMDCOORD and DAADC task forces
• Provides liaison teams for TAMD force • Limited liaison team capability; but deploys
operations to key theater C2 nodes ADAFCOs for AMD engagement operations
• No organic signal capability • May have organic signal capability
• Logistics readiness center capability • Logistics readiness center capability
• Operational force protection integrator

capability
Figure 1-1. Functional Comparison.
ORGANIZATION
1-4. The AAMDC is an organization of either wholly active or reserve component
intelligence, fire support, aviation, chemical, air defense, special forces, signal, and
logistic personnel melded into an effective TAMD team. Although not part of the
AAMDC table of organization and equipment, civilian contractor personnel may be
required to augment the AAMDC for operational and technical support. The
organizational structure of the AAMDC is shown in Figure 1-2. It consists of a command
section and twelve subordinate sections: the Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel), G2
(Intelligence), G3 (Operations), G4 (Logistics), G6 (Communications/Electronics),
Headquarters Commandant, Inspector General (IG), Public Affairs, Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA), Battery Headquarters, and Motor Maintenance sections.
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AAMD
INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

COMMAND CHIEF OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION SECTION STAFF SECTION
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION
G1 G2 G3 G4 G6
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION
ACTIVE HQ
DEFENSE COMMANDANT
BATTERY
SECTION
HQS
PASSIVE
DEFENSE
MOTOR
MAINTENANCE
SECTION
ATTACK
OPERATIONS
LIAISON
TEAMS
Figure 1-2. AAMDC Organizational Structure.
AAMDC FUNCTIONS
1-5. The major functions of the command section and its subordinate staff are
summarized below:
2
1-6. The Command Section exercises C of the AAMDC and subordinate units and
ensures that functions pertaining to the overall operation of the AAMDC are planned,
coordinated, and executed. The command section also performs battle management
functions and oversees the planning, initial entry, and combat operations for air and
missile defense and operational force protection functions. The commander will provide
specific guidance to the personal staff [IG, public affairs officer (PAO), SJA], and
chaplain on who they should inform or coordinate with --- the chief of staff or other
members of the staff on issues.
1-7. The Chief of Staff Section directs and coordinates the activities of the subordinate
staff (to include the special staff) and ensures assigned tasks are promptly and efficiently
completed.
1-8. The Personnel Section is responsible for personnel administration and manpower
management and is the focal point for all personnel-related matters and services. It
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advises and assists the commander in management of personnel records and reports,
personnel replacements, discipline, morale, and welfare.
1-9. The Intelligence Section is the focal point for all military intelligence and
counterintelligence, assists the G3 in operations security, and provides TAMD
intelligence support to Army component forces and other joint/multinational forces as
required. It is responsible for intelligence production, dissemination, and support
activities; development, refinement, and validation of the intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (IPB); assistance to the commander in identifying priority intelligence
requirements; development and refinement of the theater missile (TM) intelligence
estimate and request for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection;
processing of requests for information; analysis of intelligence reports and messages;
development of target recommendations; and keeping the commander informed of
intelligence capabilities and limitations and their potential impact on operations. The
section also acquires, maintains, and monitors intelligence systems; determines
intelligence communication requirements; assists in the development of physical security
plans, operational plans, and operational security measures; and coordinates intelligence
and security drills.
1-10. The Operations Section coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes all current and
future AAMDC operations. It directs the emplacement of the TOC and monitors the
operational status, location and engagement capabilities of land-based active air defense
units. The section plans and coordinates tactical movements and maintains SA of the
2
TAMD battle. Although normally the AAMDC does not have C of any [attack
operations (AO) (field artillery or aviation)] or passive defense (PD) forces (chemical),
the operations section monitors aspects of their operations/capabilities that may impact
AAMDC operations. For instance, the operations section monitors the location and status
of all decontamination units/sites available to support AAMDC forces. It also establishes
2
and maintains liaison officers at major theater and ARFOR or JFLCC C nodes to
facilitate the conduct of AMD operations. For example, in the event a missile is
launched, the operations section receives missile launch and impact points, disseminates
early warning, and after intelligence analysis, may nominate targeting of the enemy’s
associated TM infrastructure to include suspected hide sites, countermobility, and support
facilities, to the joint air operations center (JAOC). The operations section prepares the
AMD annex to the ARFOR or JFLCC’s operations plan/operations order
(OPLAN/OPORD). It also develops plans to support future operations, assists
integration of theater missile defense (TMD) time sensitive and planned air tasking order
(ATO) target missions, and assists in the development of the joint theater area air defense
plan (AADP). The section also ensures that all forces assigned to the AAMDC are
trained and oversees force modernization initiatives.
1-11. The Logistics Section is responsible for coordinating the supply, maintenance,
facilities, transportation and services for the command. It determines current and future
ADA supply needs, recommends logistical allocations and priorities, and assists the
operations section in preparing plans for service support. The section also monitors
equipment readiness and unique ADA classes of supply (Class V, VII and IX). It also
prepares the movement annex to the OPLANs/OPORDs, coordinates and schedules
transportation operations, and advises units on current transport requirements and
movement restrictions.
1-12. The Communications/Electronics Section provides data and voice
communications, information systems planning, coordination and support to the AAMDC
as well as joint, multinational and external organizations as required.
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1-13. The Headquarters Battery [Battery headquarters Section] provides the full
range of personnel management and administrative support for the battery. It provides
the administrative link when requesting replacements, reporting casualties, and
conducting personnel actions.
1-14. The Motor Maintenance Section provides maintenance support and expertise on
all assigned equipment and ensures required services are performed. It requests repair
and replacement items and monitors the automated inventory management system for
status and availability of projected repair parts.
1-15. The Headquarters Commandant Section exercises operational control over
Soldiers assigned to the headquarters. It provides for headquarters security, food service,
quartering, medical support, field-sanitation, and supply for headquarters personnel. It
also arranges for the reception and integration of augmentees to support the AAMDC
mission.
1-16. The IG Section advises the commander on the overall welfare and state of
discipline of the command. It integrates the commander’s organizational inspection
program, conducts inspections and investigations, and assists the commander in
determining the state of the discipline, efficiency, morale, training, and readiness within
the command.
1-17. The Public Affairs Section plans and supervises the command’s public affairs
program. It advises and informs the commander of the public affairs impacts and
implications of planned or implemented operations. It serves as the command’s
spokesperson for all communication with the external media, monitors media and public
opinion, and evaluates the effectiveness of public affairs plans and operations.
1-18. The Staff Judge Advocate Section provides legal advice to the commander on
military, domestic, and foreign laws as well as those relating to armed conflict and theater
rules of engagement (ROE) issues. It also provides legal services for the command,
supervises the administration of military justice, and ensures that the rights of individuals
are protected and the interests of justice are served.
OPERATIONS
1-19. The AAMDC contributes to the JFACC’s theater counterair effort through the
framework of joint theater air and missile defense (JTAMD) operations. JTAMD is the
integration of joint force capabilities to destroy air or theater missile threats in flight or
prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy’s air and theater missile operations
through an appropriate mix of offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair
(DCA) operations consisting of mutually supportive passive air defense; active air
defense; AO; and supporting C4I measures. A TM is a missile, which may be a ballistic
missile, cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-
nuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire guided missiles),
whose target is within a given theater of operation.
1-20. JTAMD operations encompass all activities focused on the identification,
integration, and employment of forces supported by theater and national capabilities to
detect, identify, classify, locate, track, discriminate, minimize the effects of and destroy
air and theater missile threats (to include large-caliber rockets). The preferred method to
counter the air and theater missile threat is to destroy or disrupt operations prior to
launch. The next most desired option is to intercept and destroy the threat in flight.
JTAMD must also apply measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize damage in the
event AO and active defense (AD) measures are ineffective.
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COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-21. The AAMDC commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating
TAMD operations for the ARFOR commander or, if designated, the JFLCC, and
ensuring these operations are properly executed within the overall joint counterair effort.
He accomplishes these functions through the following activities:
• Commands EAC ADA forces and oversees operational level planning
to support brigade operations, ensuring that the brigades are
postured to protect theater forces and assets. He also facilitates the
force projection of the brigades and resolves brigade support issues.
• Serves as the theater Army air and missile defense coordinator
(TAAMDCOORD) and acts as a special staff officer to the
ARFOR/JFLCC commander. The TAAMDCOORD ensures Army
TAMD is integrated with counterair operations at the theater level.
• Supports the JFACC, area air defense commander (AADC), and
airspace control authority (ACA) by serving as a deputy area air
defense commander (DAADC) and ensuring that the Army’s
contribution to the joint TAMD fight is planned, coordinated, and
synchronized with the JFACC, AADC, and ACA concept of
operations. This is accomplished in part by contributing to the
development of the joint theater AADP.
• Shares, through the G2 and AO elements, IPB information with the
JAOC, deep operations coordination cell (DOCC), analysis and control
element (ACE), and other C2 nodes as necessary.
• Provides TAMD target nominations to the JAOC for immediate
targeting, time-sensitive targets, and the ATO process.
• Exercises either operational control or tactical control [or as
determined by the joint force commander (JFC)] of assigned
multinational forces.
• Coordinates with the corps ADA brigades to ensure that their
respective operations are integrated and synchronized with the
theater AADP.
• Disseminates, through his PD element, early warning to affected
ARFOR units and, when requested, to joint and multinational units
or the populace in the ARFOR area of operations (AO).
• Deploys liaison officers (LNOs) to critical theater and ARFOR C2
nodes. The LNOs provide the essential coordination needed to
prosecute the TAMD fight efficiently. They keep TAMD commanders
and staffs apprised of the status of TAMD operations and recommend
appropriate courses of action (COAs) relative to air and missile
events. They also serve as subject matter experts on the capabilities
of the AAMDC and its subordinate ADA forces.
• Integrates additional Army and JIM assets to plan, coordinate, and
synchronize operational force protection for the ARFOR or joint force.
• Supports the homeland defense mission by providing TAMD planning
capabilities, recommending AMD priorities and task organization for
AMD forces, and advising on Army AMD C2 and weapons capabilities.
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OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
1-22. An AAMDC can operate throughout the full range of military operations and is a
highly flexible and agile organization. Normally, during peacetime, the AAMDCs are
based in the continental United States (CONUS) and are organized for rapid deployment
during force projection operations to plan and conduct theater air and missile defense in
direct support of the JFACC and or for the ARFOR commander. Based on METT-TC an
AAMDC may be forward deployed prior to hostilities. During contingency missions the
AAMDC will plan, recommend, and task organize force requirements again also based
on METT-TC. For example, during periods of increased tensions in an area of
responsibility (AOR) the AAMDC may only need to send an initial coordination element
of TAMD planners and specialists to assist the JFACC and AADC and or the
ARFOR/JFLCC. Also, the AMD force requirements may be resourced from both active
and reserve components.
1-23. The AAMDC must train to meet JTAMD operational and or homeland defense
requirements. This training includes developing and practicing tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) with joint, interagency, and or multinational forces. The AAMDC
provides unity of command and commonality of purpose for all EAC ADA brigades by
establishing the EAC ADA brigade training guidance and enforcing applicable standards.
The AAMDC also coordinates with other services and multinational forces on TAMD
matters.
1-24. The AAMDC plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes Army TAMD
operations by horizontally and vertically receiving, analyzing, integrating, and
disseminating TAMD information. The AAMDC integrates the four operational
4
elements of Army TAMD (passive air defense, active air defense, AO, and C I) to protect
contingency, forward-deployed, and reinforcing forces as well as designated assets from
the JFC’s CAL. The AAMDC executes its mission using an integrated system of
hardware and software located in the TOC. This system, known as the AMDPCS,
includes the computers, communications, and other equipment necessary to plan,
coordinate, and monitor the execution of TAMD in direct support of the JFACC, and for
the ARFOR or, if designated, the JFLCC. Also, dedicated liaison teams deploy to
selected major theater and ARFOR/JFLCC elements to assist in execution of the mission.
1-25. The commanding general (CG) of the AAMDC performs three critical roles during
TAMD operations. The CG commands the AAMDC and its subordinate EAC ADA
brigades, performs the functions of the TAAMDCOORD for the ARFOR commander (or
JFLCC), and performs the functions of the DAADC for the AADC. The AAMDC
normally conducts split-based operations in support of the JFACC and AADC and the
ARFOR commander or JFLCC if designated. The AAMDC normally collocates the
“AAMDC Main” TOC (operations and intelligence sections) with the JAOC and the
“AAMDC Tactical” (administration and logistics sections with operations/intelligence
SA) with the ARFOR/JFLCC headquarters. However, dependent on METT-TC the
AAMDC has the flexibility to organize itself in a variety of ways to successfully support
and execute higher headquarters’ TAMD guidance, intent, and concept of operations.
The location of the commander and their role is also dependent on METT-TC.
SUPPORT
1-26. Support operations ensure that adequate resources are available to support the
AAMDC mission throughout all operational phases. Support includes sustainment,
prioritization, and reconstitution.
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SUSTAINMENT
1-27. AAMDC sustainment operations involve both planning and oversight activities that
are performed primarily by the G1 and G4 staffs. These activities focus on how, when,
and where to accomplish the sustainment functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing,
moving, and sustaining Soldiers and their systems:
• Manning ensures the AAMDC and its subordinate units are staffed
with the right number and types of personnel to perform the mission.
• Arming ensures the right mix and quantity of AMD missiles (Patriot,
Theater High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], etc.) are available at
the time and place needed.
• Fueling ensures sufficient quantities of petroleum, oils and lubricants
(POL) are available to support current and planned AMD operations.
• Fixing ensures critical AMD materiel and equipment are operational
and failed systems are quickly restored to operational status.
• Moving ensures adequate transportation resources (vehicles, control
procedures, plans) are available to support operations. With AMD
units normally dispersed at great distances throughout the depth of
the AO, “moving” missiles (cross-leveling) and delivering repair parts
become critical sustainment functions.
• Sustaining Soldiers ensures personnel services, health services, field
services, quality of life, and general supply support are adequate.
PRIORITIZATION
1-28. The AAMDC commander may establish support priorities by phase of the
operation or change priorities during operations to ensure that combat support (CS) or
combat service support (CSS) are provided in accordance with their relative importance
to accomplishing the mission. Changes by phase to the DAL or reprioritization of critical
assets on the DAL will normally affect support priorities and require continual
assessment by the staff. The G1 and G4 staffs will ensure these priorities are
implemented in accordance with the commander’s intent.
RECONSTITUTION
1-29. Reconstitution operations are conducted to restore the AAMDC and or its
supporting forces to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission
requirements and available resources. They are implemented when combat effectiveness
has been degraded as a result of enemy activity or other battlefield environmental factors.
Because of the limited AMD assets available for the critical force protection mission, the
AAMDC will normally provide guidance and direction to theater-wide AMD
reconstitution efforts to ensure forces are available to provide active air defense of
priority assets on the JFC’s CAL. Reconstitution operations include regeneration and
reorganization. Regeneration involves rebuilding the unit through large-scale
replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, including the reestablishment or
2
replacement of essential C personnel and equipment and the conduct of mission-
essential training. Reorganization involves the shifting of internal resources within the
unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. The AAMDC will assist the EAC ADA
brigades in regeneration and reorganization decisions and provide support and assistance
in executing either mission. Given the severely limited amount of AMD-specific
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equipment worldwide, the likelihood of complete regeneration of units is small. Most

reconstitution operations will be a combination of regeneration and reorganization.
COMMUNICATIONS
1-30. The AAMDC must establish and maintain communications at the theater level with
the ARFOR, joint forces, and multinational elements. It must also establish and maintain
a robust internal communications system. These communication linkages are required to
support a variety of critical activities including:
• Command and control
• Operational and tactical planning
• Liaison (coordination)
• Alerting/early warning
• Intelligence
• SA/surveillance
• Administration and logistics
REQUIREMENTS
4
1-31. The AAMDC C I system for TAMD must be sufficiently interoperable to respond
to the needs of the ARFOR, joint, and multinational commands and also link passive air
defense, active air defense, and AO elements in order to plan, coordinate, and integrate
4
forces to accomplish the TAMD mission. C I resources detect, identify, and track threats
to warn and cue defensive assets as well as provide accurate launch and impact points.
These resources should be capable of rapidly exchanging information, interfacing with
components, displaying a common operational picture, and allowing
distributive/collaborative planning. The information flow should support the chain of
command and be as complete, secure, and as near real time as possible.
4
1-32. New C I functions, equipment, and procedures may be required to accommodate
the changing characteristics and signatures associated with the rapidly evolving air and
4
missile threat. These C I capabilities and procedures should be integrated with existing
4
and planned C I systems as requirements are developed. At a minimum, capabilities
should match the following JTAMD requirements:
• Passive air defense measures require providing threat identification
and discrimination (conventional or nuclear, biological, and
chemical), detecting launches, predicting the impact points, providing
timely warning to units at risk, alerting chemical and medical units
and civil defense forces, and reducing target effectiveness.
• Active air defense requires early detection of airborne launch
platforms and missiles in flight to permit cueing, acquisition,
tracking, classification, discrimination, identification and destruction
in flight.
• AO require accurate location of launch platforms and support
systems, timely transmission of targeting data to attack systems, and
accurate combat assessment.
1-33. Intelligence plays a critical role in planning, deploying, employing, and sustaining
TAMD operations. The effectiveness of TAMD operations requires the timely
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of reliable and accurate intelligence
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on enemy capabilities and activities. The intelligence system is vital to the decision
making cycle and must support the status, assessment, planning, warning, and IPB
functions as well as target prioritization recommendations. The AAMDC intelligence
system must accommodate a variety of component, joint, and multinational systems.
ARCHITECTURE
4
1-34. The AAMDC C I infrastructure needs interoperable systems that facilitate the
conduct of TAMD operations against a diverse threat array. These systems should be
connected to commanders at appropriate decision and execution levels to integrate forces
2
and missions. The systems expedite C functions through rapid, reliable, flexible, and
secure exchange of information throughout the chain of command and across the joint
4
warfighting community. The C I architecture provides the timely intelligence and
operational information needed to plan, employ, coordinate, integrate, execute, and
sustain AAMDC participation in joint air and missile defense operations.
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Chapter 2
Command and Control
The focus of this chapter is the AAMDC’s command and support relationships with
all components and subordinate units. The roles of the CG of the AAMDC as senior
Army ADA commander, TAAMDCOORD, and DAADC reflect the theater command
and control structure. Coordination and liaison are essential to effective air and
missile defense.
ROLES OF AAMDC COMMANDER

2-1. The commanding general of the AAMDC has the two roles common to every ADA
commander. He is both the commander of the ADA forces assigned to him, and the air
and missile defense coordinator for the Army commander he supports. In addition he
may be appointed the DAADC. These three roles reflect the total theater involvement of
the AAMDC. Figure 2-1 shows these relationships.
DAADC TAAMDCOORD
JFACC, FUNCTIONS FUNCTIONS COMARFOR +
AADC, JFLCC, IF
ACA DESIGNATED
Recommends OCA and DCA priorities, Recommends OCA and DCA priorities,
participates in active air defense planning, plans Army/ land force active air defense,
and coordinates Army active air defense. and participates in AMD functional
integration.
CG, AAMDC
Task organizes, assigns missions, Coordinates active air defense planning

and coordinates effort. and monitors execution. XXX
X SENIOR ADA
X X
COMMANDER
FUNCTIONS
ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS CORPS
Figure 2-1. Command Relationships.

2-2. METT-TC determines the commander’s location and role during each phase of a
contingency operation. Table 2-1 depicts a snapshot in time and provides further
definition of the AAMDC commander’s roles and tasks. These roles are interrelated and
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span across all the operational elements of JTAMD. Many of the tasks under each role
may also fall under other roles based on the dynamic nature and requirements of JTAMD
operations.
Table 2-1. Theater Roles/Tasks of the AAMDC Commander.
TAMD Senior ADA Commander TAAMDCOORD DAADC
• Single POC for Army AMD • Synchronizes missile defense • Integrates Army AMD in theater
in theater operations • Integrates two levels of
• Develops and maintains TAMD modernized Patriot force
C4I IPB/situation template • Provides LNOs to
• Provides LNOs to higher and JTAMD CRC/TAOC/Aegis
2
C nodes and accepts LNOs from • Integrates AMD
lower elements and components communications (data/voice)
• Conducts AMD operational- • Develops AMD Annex for • Chairs coordination
level planning ARFOR/JFLCC (reprioritization) board
• Conducts defense design/ • Recommends CAL/DAL with
operational-level planning CVT methodology
AD • Recommends DAL • Assists with AADP
• Commands all EAC Patriot development
units • Issues SAM Tactical Order
• Advises on coalition AMD
integration
• Plans for recovery and • POC for operational protection • Assists in theater early warning
reconstitution • Plans and synchronizes all
operational protection tasks
Passive • Disseminates early warning
Defense • Provides vulnerability analysis/
nuclear, biological and chemical
(NBC) reporting
• Assists in target definition • Assists in target definition
• ISR recommendations • ISR recommendations
AO
• Input to target nomination process • Input to target nomination
process
SENIOR ADA COMMANDER

2-3. The commanding general of the AAMDC is the Army proponent for the AMD
combat function. He has total responsibility for active air and missile defense planning
within the Army forces and when assigned for the entire land force. The CG, AAMDC
develops the AMD annex to the ARFOR OPLAN for protection of the priorities of the
Army forces commander, the JFLCC, if appointed, and the joint force commander. The
commander ensures that organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish air and
missile defense objectives in support of the Army force commander’s, JFLCC’s, if
appointed, and joint force commander’s concept of operations. These responsibilities
include recommending air and missile defense missions for the other members of the
combined arms team and integrating these missions with those of the other components
and the AADC.
2-4. The Army commander’s requirement to provide air and missile defense to the force
is no different than the requirement to provide maneuver, fire support, or logistics. The
ARFOR commander must ensure that forces at all levels have adequate air and missile
defense and must reinforce those defenses when necessary. Additionally, the Army
forces commander is required to provide air and missile defense to selected geopolitical
assets. The AAMDC is the Army forces commander’s primary air and missile defense
resource and means to accomplish the above missions. The AAMDC performs the
majority of operational level air and missile defense missions, while corps and divisional
ADA units accomplish the majority of the tactical level air and missile defense missions.
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Command and Control
THEATER ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COORDINATOR

2-5. The AAMDC commander is the TAAMDCOORD for the ARFOR commander. As
such, he is an integral member of the ARFOR or JFLCC’s staff planning team. The CG,
AAMDC and his representatives in the ARFOR command post plan AMD operations to
support the ARFOR commander’s, JFLCC’s, if appointed, and joint force commander’s
concept of the operation.
2-6. The TAAMDCOORD, with input from the G2, assesses the air and missile threat.
He recommends air and missile threats to the fire support coordinator for incorporation
into the deep attack plan. The TAAMDCOORD recommends active, passive, and other
combined arms measures in the AMD estimate. The TAAMDCOORD recommends air
and missile threats as OCA and DCA priorities to the commander of Army forces
(COMARFOR)/JFLCC, who in turn reviews and forwards these recommendations to the
JFACC and AADC. After staff coordination and approval of the air and missile defense
estimate, the TAAMDCOORD develops the AMD annex to the Army operations plan.
Appendix B provides a more detailed description of the AMD annex.
2-7. The TAAMDCOORD also coordinates with higher and lower air and missile defense
elements as well as with adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal
integration of air and missile defense operations throughout the battlefield. The
TAAMDCOORD coordinates with the joint force commander, component commanders,
and AADC at the theater and joint level. He also coordinates with the lower echelons
such as corps or equivalent units. The TAAMDCOORD also coordinates air and missile
defense with multinational forces.
2-8. The complementary relationship between the roles of the CG, AAMDC as senior
ADA commander and TAAMDCOORD is evident. Coordination with the AADC and
others is further explained in the following paragraphs.
DEPUTY AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

2-9. After considering the factors of METT-TC, the JFC and AADC will determine
whether a DAADC should be designated. Normally, the commander of the AAMDC
assumes the role of the DAADC because the AADC needs a strong advocate for land-
based air and missile defense and because the AAMDC has the necessary personnel and
equipment to support the DAADC mission. This designation formalizes the relationship
between the land-based AMD assets dedicated to theater level missions and the AADC,
and helps to ensure fully integrated and synchronized AMD operations.
2-10. The DAADC, and the deployed portion of the AAMDC that supports the
AADC/DAADC relationship, provide the following support to the AADC:
• Integrate land-based AMD into theater DCA operations.
• Advise the AADC regarding ROE [weapon control status, weapon
control procedures, states of readiness/emission, fire control orders
(FCOs), etc.], airspace control measures (ACMs), weapon control
measures, and air defense warnings (ADWs).
• Assist the AADC with the air defense plan development.
• Advise the AADC on matters regarding land-based AMD operations
and capabilities.
2-11. Although the AAMDC commander may serve as a "deputy" AADC, the DAADC
normally would not assume the role of the AADC if the AADC were incapacitated. The
DAADC is not a true deputy commander in that sense. The DAADC's primary
responsibilities are to assist the AADC in planning, coordinating, integrating, and
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synchronizing land-based AMD operations. Neither the AAMDC commander nor his
staff has the tactical, technical, or procedural expertise and capability to perform all of the
functions of an AADC in a joint environment.
THEATER COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-12. This section is based on Joint Publication 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air
and Missile Threats. It illustrates that the AAMDC not only will have a command
relationship with the ARFOR commander, but also will have a command relationship
with the JFACC and may even have a command relationship with the JFACC and
JFLCC, if designated. Theater C2 relationships are shown in Figure 2-2.
JOINT
FORCE
COMMANDER
ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATIONS

COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT
(ARFOR) (AFFOR) (NAVFOR) (MARFOR) (SOC)
JOINT FORCE JOINT FORCE AIR JOINT FORCE

LAND COMPONENT (DESIG- MARITIME
COMPONENT NATED AADC, ACA) COMPONENT
CORPS
ARMY AIR AND REGIONAL/
MISSILE DEFENSE SECTOR AIR
CORPS ADA COMMAND DEFENSE CDR
BRIGADE
Legend:
Command
MULTINATIONAL EAC ADA OPCON
LAND-BASED BRIGADES CMD / SPT Relationship
TAMD FORCES determined by JFC or MFC
Direct Support
Figure 2-2. Example of Theater C2 Relationships.
JOINT FORCES
2-13. Joint doctrine provides a great deal of flexibility in establishing command and
support relationships. The JFC in one theater may establish entirely different command
and support relationships in his theater than another JFC based on the factors of METT-
TC.
Joint Force Commander

2-14. The JFC provides authoritative direction to subordinate commanders on objectives,
priorities, missions, and apportionment of joint capabilities and forces. This includes
establishing priorities for countering air and missile threats for the theater or joint
operations area (JOA). The JFC normally exercises control of joint counterair through
the JFACC. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the supported commander for
theater/JOA-wide counterair operations. The JFC establishes and the AADC implements
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Command and Control
theater/JOA-wide defense priorities through promulgation of a joint air defense plan.

The JFC normally designates an ACA, who has overall responsibility for establishing and
operating the airspace control system. The JFC may apportion component capabilities to
the JFACC or AADC for counterair missions. The JFC also determines the most
appropriate command authority over forces made available. Typically for OCA, land
forces are in direct support. Normally for DCA, surface-based forces are provided in
direct support also.
Joint Force Air Component Commander

2-15. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC to integrate the capabilities and assign
C2 of joint air assets. Normally, the JFACC is the service component commander having
the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air
operations. The need for a JFACC is based on the JFC’s overall mission, concept of
operations, missions and tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available,
duration and nature of joint air operations desired, and degree of unity of C2 of joint air
operations required. The responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are
interrelated and normally should be assigned to one individual.
2-16. Since the attainment of air superiority is normally an AOR/JOA-wide priority, the
JFC normally designates the JFACC as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide
counterair operations. If an AADC is not appointed, the AAMDC would be in direct
support of the JFACC.
2-17. The JFC assigns the JFACC’s authority and responsibilities. They normally
include, but are not limited to, joint counterair planning, coordinating, allocating, and
tasking based on the JFC’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. Other
responsibilities of the JFACC relating to joint counterair operations include the
following:
• Develop, coordinate, and integrate the joint counterair plan with the
operations of the other components for JFC approval.
• Make an air apportionment recommendation to the JFC, after
consulting with the other component commanders.
• Provide centralized direction for allocating and tasking joint
counterair capabilities and forces made available by the JFC.
• Perform the duties of the AADC when directed by the JFC.
• Perform duties of the ACA when directed by the JFC.
• Provide information operations warfare strategies to neutralize
enemy air and missile threats and protect friendly air and missile
capabilities.
Area Air Defense Commander

2-18. The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for DCA operations to a single
commander designated as the AADC. Normally, the AADC is the component
4
commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and C I capability to plan,
coordinate, and execute integrated air defense operations. The JFC will also define the
support relationship between the AADC and supporting commanders; however, the
AADC is normally the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide DCA operations.
The AAMDC is normally in direct support of the AADC. Components will provide
representatives, as appropriate, to the AADC’s headquarters to provide specific weapon
systems expertise as well as broader mission expertise. The AADC, with the support of
the service or functional component commanders, develops, integrates, and distributes a
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JFC-approved joint AADP. As the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide DCA,

the AADC establishes weapon control procedures and measures for all DCA weapons
systems and forces. However, this does not restrict commander authority to take those
immediate actions required to defend their forces from a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent. Primary responsibilities of the AADC include the following:
• Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint air defense
plan.
• Develop and execute, in coordination with the joint force J2, J3, and
J6, a detailed plan to disseminate timely air and missile warning and
cueing information to components, forces, allies, coalition partners,
and civil authorities, as appropriate.
• Develop and implement identification and engagement procedures
that are appropriate to air and missile threats.
• Ensure timely and accurate track reporting among participating
units to provide a consistent common operational picture.
• Perform duties of the ACA when directed by the JFC.
• Establish sectors or regions, as appropriate, to enhance decentralized
execution of DCA operations.
Airspace Control Authority

2-19. The JFC normally designates an ACA who has overall responsibility for
establishing and operating the airspace control system. The ACA also develops policies
and procedures for airspace control that are incorporated into an airspace control plan
(ACP) and promulgated throughout the theater. A key responsibility of the ACA is to
provide the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to meet contingency
situations that necessitate rapid employment of forces. The ACA coordinates through the
ACP the use of airspace, including integration with the host nation and deconfliction of
user requirements. The ACA must be able to rapidly implement ACMs in the dynamic
counterair environment to enhance freedom of action of components while preventing
fratricide. The ACP is implemented through the airspace control order (ACO). All
forces affecting joint air operations are subject to the ACO. However, this centralized
direction by the ACA does not imply operational control (OPCON) or tactical control
(TACON) over any asset.
Component Commanders
2-20. The JFC may apportion component capabilities and forces to the JFACC or AADC
to support theater/JOA-wide counterair missions. The JFC determines the most
appropriate command authority over forces made available to conduct defensive and
offensive counterair. Typically for OCA, land forces are in direct support but still under
command of their component commanders. Based on a command relationship of direct
support to the JFACC (see JP 0-2 for joint command relationship definitions), the
AAMDC normally supports OCA operations through the JAOC. Normally, for forces
made available to the AADC for DCA, surface-based forces are in direct support also.
Regardless of the command or support relationship, all AD forces are subject to the ROE,
airspace, weapon control measures, and fire control orders established by the JFACC,
AADC and or ACA and approved by the JFC. As the supported commander for
theater/JOA-wide DCA, the AADC will be granted the necessary command authority to
deconflict and control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management.
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Command and Control
2-21. The AAMDC is normally under the command of the ARFOR commander who will
retain administrative control if the AAMDC is made available and placed in direct
support of the JFACC. The operational requirements of the AAMDC in this relationship
will normally be prioritized and represented to the JFC by the JFACC in accordance with
JP 0-2. An establishing directive may be issued to specify the purpose of the support
relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. If a JFLCC is
designated, AAMDC may be under OPCON or TACON.
2-22. The CG, AAMDC commands all echelon above corps ADA forces. These are
normally brigade-size units. The AAMDC may also have other forces assigned or
attached under its command. Corps and divisional ADA units are under the command of
the echelon maneuver force commander and do not fall under the command of the
AAMDC. However, since the CG, AAMDC is also the TAAMDCOORD, there is a
strong coordination relationship.
MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-23. Most joint operations are conducted within the context of an alliance or coalition.
However, each multinational operation is unique. The international situation, along with
the perspectives, motives, and values of each ally or coalition member, may vary. The
JFC should evaluate key considerations and differences involved in planning,
coordinating, and conducting counterair operations in a multinational environment.
2
Agreement on threats and a clearly defined, responsive, and interoperable C structure are
crucial to effective multinational operations. The JFC must be prepared to negotiate with
multinational partners when planning and developing ROE, ACMs, weapon control
measures, and other appropriate areas. All critical forces and geopolitical areas should
receive adequate protection from air and missile threats. Sharing intelligence and
warning information is also vital to ensuring unity of effort.
2-24. The AAMDC is the largest and most capable organization of its kind for land-based
AMD. It is the ideal choice to conduct coordination with multinational land-based
partners. It is also the logical choice for C2 of such forces if made available. Therefore,
multinational EAC air defense forces may be under OPCON or TACON (or as
determined by the Multinational Force Commander) of the AAMDC.
COORDINATION AND LIAISON

2-25. The AAMDC conducts extensive force operations coordination and liaison with
external Army and joint agencies. Figure 2-3 shows the key roles of the
TAAMDCOORD, DAADC, and liaison teams (sometimes referred to as coordination
teams) in this robust effort.
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2
ARFOR/JFLCC JFACC/AADC/ KEY C NODES
ACA (JFMCC,
JFSOCC, etc.)
ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE TAAMDCOORD DAADC LIAISON TEAMS
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE TAAMDCOORD DAADC LIAISON TEAMS
ATTACK OPERATIONS LIAISON TEAMS LIAISON TEAMS LIAISON TEAMS
4
CI COMM NETWORK - SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
MULTI - SERVICE, CONTINUOUS COORDINATION THROUGHOUT

THE THEATER
Figure 2-3. Coordinating the Air and Missile Fight.
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

2-26. The AAMDC provides SA to the JFC primarily on the missile threat, but also
includes the total air threat against land forces. The AAMDC may be required, based on
METT-TC, to have a liaison team integrate at the JFC with the JFACC liaison team and
other components to form a JTAMD cell in order to assist in providing the JFC with the
complete counterair picture. At the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), the
AAMDC brings a TMD focus to the process. The AAMDC recommends priority
adjustments based on METT-TC. Usually the CG, AAMDC is the personal
representative of the Army forces commander at the JTCB concerning TMD issues.
ARMY FORCES COMMANDER/JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER

2-27. The TAAMDCOORD integrates ARFOR/JFLCC AMD operations and at a
minimum the AAMDC will have a liaison team at the ARFOR/JFLCC location if the
AAMDC or a portion of the AAMDC (split-based operations) is not deployed there. The
AAMDC is the key force protection provider. The AAMDC also coordinates and
integrates with the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), which is the ARFOR
liaison to the service component commander designated as the JFACC, in order to
synchronize operations.
2-28. AAMDC liaison teams may deploy to the DOCC and the ACE, when necessary
based on METT-TC, to assist with the IPB and bring an air and missile focus to deep
operations. However, normally the AAMDC submits TM target nominations directly to
the JAOC for inclusion as JFACC nominated targets. The AAMDC nominates TM
targets for prosecution either within the ATO cycle or as a time sensitive target. If a
relationship with JFACC/AADC does not exist precluding submission directly to the
JAOC, the AAMDC DOCC LNOs assist in the target nomination process within the
Army targeting cycle, provide the AAMDC with non-TMD deep targets of interest,
2-8 8 April 2005
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Command and Control
inform the AAMDC of the availability of Army attack assets, and monitor the status of
the target nomination request.
JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER/AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

2-29. The DAADC function is the coordination mechanism for the JFACC/AADC. The
DAADC performs integration and parallel planning to ensure efficient coordination and
rapid response to the JFACC’s and AADC’s air and missile defense needs. The DAADC
ensures the Army’s/land forces’ contribution to the joint air and missile defense fight is
properly planned, synchronized, and executed. At a minimum, the AAMDC sends a
robust LNO team (AD, intelligence, and AO personnel) to support the JFACC, AADC
and DAADC requirements and may even; based on METT-TC, deploy the AAMDC
TOC (Main) to the JFACC/AADC (JAOC) location. The AAMDC and JAOC
intelligence personnel build a collaborative TAMD IPB, which serves as the basis for
JTAMD strategies and plans. The AAMDC (AO section in coordination with the
intelligence section) submits TM target nominations directly to the JAOC for inclusion as
JFACC nominated targets. As the senior Army air defense element at the AADC’s
location, the AAMDC LNO team is the primary interface at the JAOC for all land-based
active air defense force operations.
JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

2-30. A liaison team from AAMDC deploys to the joint force maritime component
commander (JFMCC) to coordinate ACMs, logistical requirements, and DCA missions,
and contribute to SA. If a JFMCC is not appointed, the AAMDC will send the LNOs to
the commander naval forces and or marine forces.
JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER

2-31. The AAMDC provides the joint force special operations component commander
(JFSOCC) with the TAMD IPB, intelligence reports, air defense locations, rules of
engagement, and TM target nominations. The team also shares special operations forces
(SOF) restricted fire areas, non-AMD related intelligence products, and enemy air
defense locations.
SUBORDINATE ADA BRIGADES

2-32. EAC ADA brigades send a liaison team to the AAMDC to coordinate future
operations and planning. The brigade team may also participate in the coordination
(reprioritization) board. This facilitates force protection throughout all phases of the
operation. The brigades are able to monitor theater requirements as well as resolve
support issues. This liaison provides the bridge to the operational level of AMD warfare.
CORPS AND DIVISIONAL ADA UNITS

2-33. Although the AAMDC does not send an LNO team to corps ADA brigades, the
corps ADA brigade may send LNOs to the AAMDC. If there are no corps ADA LNOs at
the AAMDC, the AD section of the AAMDC and the corps air defense element (CADE)
ensure TAMD coordination.
MULTINATIONAL UNITS
2-34. Multinational units may send LNOs to the AAMDC in order to integrate in the joint
integrated air defense system. Based on releasability and disclosure requirements,
multinational LNOs may be located in a separate area away from daily TOC operations.
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AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL OFFICER

2-35. While the AAMDC liaison teams focus on force operations, the air defense artillery
fire control officer (ADAFCO) deployed from the ADA brigade focuses on engagement
operations, see Figure 2-4. The ADAFCO executes the AMD plans prepared by the
AAMDC and the respective ADA brigade. Although ADAFCOs are part of the ADA
brigades, the AAMDC has a planning and coordination responsibility to ensure
ADAFCOs are integrated into JTAMD operations.
2-36. The mission of the ADAFCO is to deploy to the appropriate controlling authority
[AADC; region air defense commander (RADC); sector air defense commander (SADC)]
in order to coordinate Army AMD fires and to provide the ADA brigade with an
additional means to plan, direct, and execute JTAMD operations. The ADAFCO is the
single Army point of contact between land based AMD fire direction centers and the
AADC/RADC/SADC, responsible for deconflicting and controlling ADA engagements.
Figure 2-4. ADAFCO and LNO Comparison.
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Chapter 3
Operations
This chapter describes AAMDC TAMD operations and how these operations are
planned and executed by the AAMDC staff sections and cells within the TOC. It also
describes the responsibilities of the LNOs that the AAMDC deploys to critical joint
2
and Army C nodes to facilitate coordination of TAMD operations.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

2
3-1. The AAMDC not only performs a traditional C mission for Army theater air
defense forces but also integrates the operational elements of TMD for the Army forces.
When the AAMDC deploys into a theater, the TOC plans, integrates, coordinates, and
synchronizes Army TAMD operations to support the ARFOR commander’s concept of
operations and the JFACC’s concept of counterair operations. The TOC consists of six
functional areas or “cells” that operate under the direction of a battle captain. These cells
are derived from the AAMDC staff sections as shown in Figure 3-1. Three of these cells,
the AD, PD, and AO cells, perform current TAMD operations.
G2 G3
ATTACK
OPERATIONS
ACTIVE PASSIVE
DEFENSE DEFENSE
CURRENT OPS
BATTLE
CAPTAIN
SUPPORT
ADMINISTRATION
PLANS LOGISTICS
COMMUNICATIONS
G1
G6
G2 G3 G4
Figure 3-1. TOC Functional Cells and Composition.
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3-2. The other three cells—the plans, communications and administrative/ logistics cells—are
support cells formed from the AAMDC staff. The plans and communications cells perform
operations and communications planning to support the three current operations cells. When
directed by the chief of staff and or G3, all cells provide personnel to support the plans cell in
order to plan future operations and recommend COAs to the commander. The
administrative/logistics cell provides support for all current and future operations.
3-3. The TOC, shown in Figure 3-2, is 100 percent mobile with its own organic C4I systems,
shelters, and vehicles. The TOC contains the AMDPCS, which is used to conduct TAMD
operations and execute the AAMDC mission. The TOC, in Figure 3-2, is depicted as one
entity for illustrative purposes. However, the configuration of the TOC is normally changed
and adapted to satisfy the requirements of METT-TC. For example, the TOC may be
organized to conduct split-based operations at two different locations in support of the JFACC
and AADC and the ARFOR commander or JFLCC if designated.
Active
Defense
Van
Passive
Communications Defense
Van Van
G3
Active/Passive
Defense
Battle CPT/
G6
Current OPS
G2/Attack
Operations
G2/
Van
Attack OPS
G1/G4 G3 Plans
Se
cu
rit
y
ENTRANCE G1/G4
Van
Figure 3-2. TOC Configuration.

3-4. TOC operations are summarized below by functional cell and described in more detail
later in the chapter under each TAMD operational element:
• The Battle Captain is the focal point of TOC operations. The battle
captain ensures that the TOC is properly configured and that all
systems are operable. The battle captain synchronizes the planning
and execution of operations and ensures that intelligence, active
defense, passive defense, attack operations, logistics and
administrative support operations are fully coordinated. During
operations, assesses enemy TM launch information, verifies alerts,
characterizes missile launches, determines launch and impact points,
maintains air SA, and confirms that warnings are passed to affected
3-2 8 April 2005
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Operations
friendly units. Throughout the battle, maintains contact with

external AAMDC liaison officers to exchange information on the
status of operations and TM events.
• The Active Defense cell coordinates Army AD operations
throughout the JOA. The cell displays air and missile track
information from ADA and joint sensors, and the locations and
coverages of AMD units. During operations, it monitors the friendly
and enemy air and missile situations and processes tactical orders,
reports, and information from higher headquarters, adjacent and
subordinate units, and LNOs. Reports received (normally
electronically) include SAMSTAT reports, situation reports,
engagement reports, LNO reports, and the commander’s narrative
summary. The active defense cell also receives the ATO, ACO, and
SPINS through the air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS) or
other digital means. When enemy missiles are launched, the cell
passes the TM launch information to the AO and PD cells.
Participates in the OPG as required by the G3 and plans cell.
• The Passive Defense cell develops and provides an early warning
architecture and disseminates early warning to affected ARFOR units
and, if required, multinational units and or the local populace.
Through the use of IPB, imagery and displays, it determines which
friendly areas are fully protected, partially protected and
unprotected, and provides this information to battle planners. The
cell also displays and monitors the friendly ground situation, warns
friendly forces of enemy activity, and conducts TM vulnerability
assessments for the ARFOR or JFLCC and the JFACC and or AADC
as necessary. Participates in the OPG as required by the G3 and
plans cell.
• The Attack Operations cell supports joint force OCA attack
operations and ARFOR deep operations through analysis and
targeting focused specifically against the TM threat. Analysis
includes such actions as developing TM information requirements,
building operational patterns and profiles, identifying trigger events,
analyzing launch events, conducting countermobility analysis, and
identifying information operations warfare vulnerabilities. Targeting
actions include nominating attack strategies and submitting target
nominations and mission requests directly to the JAOC. These
validated TM nominations are normally developed in conjunction
with the JAOC for immediate or preplanned execution. The BCD is
responsible for coordinating with the DOCC for any TM targets
nominations in the ARFOR AO. Participates in the OPG as required
by the G3 and plans cell.
• The G3 Plans cell with support from other staff sections will
prepare, coordinate, publish, and distribute plans, orders, (including
fragmentary orders and warning orders), and other products as
directed by the G3. The plans cell is responsible for the
synchronization and completeness of all AAMDC plans and orders.
The cell will also review higher headquarters and subordinate plans
and orders. The cell recommends task organization, missions for
8 April 2005 3-3
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subordinate units, and COAs to meet the AAMDC commander’s

intent and guidance. The cell also is responsible for establishing,
coordinating, and conducting the TAMD coordination board (formerly
known as reprioritization board).
• The Communications cell performs a variety of planning and
communications support activities. These activities include preparing
C4 estimates, assisting the plans cell in developing OPLANs and
OPORDs, determining communications and data link requirements
with Army, joint, and multinational forces, and maintaining the
communications and computer equipment, including the TOC local
area network (LAN). The cell is also responsible for information
management within the TOC. The cell will also deploy as necessary
an interface control officer (ICO) to the joint interface control officer
(JICO) location to integrate Army AMD assets into the tactical digital
data link (TADIL) architecture.
• The Administration/Logistics (Admin/Log) cell monitors and
advises the commander on the status of administration and logistics
functions, prepares admin/log estimates, and assists the plans cell in
developing OPLANS and OPORDs. Participates in the OPG as
required by the chief of staff, G3 and or plans cell.
OPERATIONAL ELEMENT INTEGRATION

3-5. The operational elements of TAMD are AD, AO, PD, and C4I. AAMDC planning
and operations focus on coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing these operational
elements in order to effectively counter the TM and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
threat. AAMDC TTPs to successfully destroy and nullify the threat capability require:
• Pre-hostility IPB.
• Analysis of firing patterns.
• Observation of developed named areas of interest (NAIs) by
influencing the ISR collection plan.
• Nomination of targets that deny the threat’s ability to weaponize
WMD, disrupt C2, destroy TM infrastructure, and deny the threat
underground facilities and other hide sites.
• Establishment of ISR and attack operations kill boxes once pattern
analysis confirms threat tactics.
• Deployment of AD forces (for example, Patriot and THAAD) early to
the most critical assets to protect the sortie generation rate and time
phased force deployment data flow of forces.
• Conducting vulnerability analyses and maximizing PD measures at
undefended assets.
3-4 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Operations
OIF Operational Element Integration
“The 32d AAMDC had three cells of intelligence, attack operations, and active defense personnel
integrated within the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base. The Iraqis had launched six missiles at us
from the vicinity of Highway 6 north of Basra. Using launch data provided by Aegis through the 32d
AAMDC current operations cell (passive defense) at Camp Doha, the intelligence cell developed a
detailed analysis of the enemy’s launch pattern. Potential future launch sites were determined along
with sites suitable for the enemy to hide his equipment between missions. In addition, the
intelligence cell reviewed the times the missiles were launched and assessed that there were two 4-
hours periods of the day between 0900Z and 1300Z and 2000Z and 0000Z for missile launches.
So now we had two windows of vulnerability and we knew where he was firing from. We went to the
CFACC and briefed him on that. After the briefing, LtGen Mosely took us into a room where the
UAVs were controlled and directed that during the windows of vulnerability the 32d AAMDC attack
operations cell would have priority on an armed Predator. The Predator during those periods flew
up and down Highway 6 looking for enemy missiles. A Predator doesn’t see everything and it flies
relatively slow, but it was flying where we needed it.
We had another launch. AEGIS picked it up and passed it to the passive defense folks at Camp
Doha who initiated early warnng to the force. The missile was successfully engaged by Kuwaiti
Patriot. The next day the Predator flying the assigned route found a TEL in the general vicinity of
the previous day’s launch. This time we found the TEL before the enemy could fire his missiles.
The Predator engaged with a Hellfire missile and took it out.
We know it was ready to fire because it was manned and we saw the people on the video. We saw
a secondary explosion, which means the rocket was fueled. That was the last time we saw a
manned TEL being engaged. The rest of the time they were abandoned. So basically, we
destroyed his will to fight. So there it is, that’s all the operational elements of TMD coming together
to defeat the enemy.”
– Interview with the G3 Operations, 32d AAMDC, Operation Iraqi Freedom
3-6. Execution of the above TTP provides the greatest chance of success in defeating the
TM and WMD threat and contributes to the JFC’s freedom to maneuver and retention of
the initiative. As stated previously, this threat can only be countered by the synergistic
performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements. The
AAMDC is organized to fully leverage and employ the TAMD operational elements at
the theater level for ARFOR and joint operations. Figure 3-3 depicts an example of the
coordination and integration necessary to defeat the threat.
8 April 2005 3-5
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FM 3-01.94
Operational Element Integration
ATTACK ACTIVE DEFENSE /

C4I SENSORS
SYSTEMS PASSIVE DEFENSE
SITUATION TEMPLATE SENSORS ATTACK OPS ACTIVE/PASSIVE
Sensor
Sensor TEMPLATE DEFENSE
Cross TEMPLATE
Cross
U2 SOF Cueing
FACILITIES
Cueing
3 ADITS
OBJ 1 OBJ 2 OBJ 3 TSTs
M DESTROY TBM CAPABILITIES DESTROY 1st OEF DELAY 2d OEF 4 DAYS
IG
UNIT ALL 10th AD, 7th ID
E RGFC TLE: 150 m
PL
TUNNELS TIME D-DAY - D+0 - D+3 D+0 - D+3 SIZE: SCUD TEL
AXN: STATIONARY
PRIORITY CAT HPTs CAT HPTs CAT HPTs TIME/ACQ: 20 min
BRIDGES
23 Bn Unit
PRI: ATACMS, AI
AM
NODONG - D
C2 T-55/62 - D T-72 - DEL 19
A FS SCUD - D MAN BTR - D MAN BMP - DEL
17
20
RSTA - D 12 13
LAUNCH AREAS Deming
9
15
EX
TL - D 2 14 16
MRL - D MRL - A 7 11
FOB/FOL - D
CHOKE POINTS B CSS GARRISON - D FS FROG - D FS FROG - A
Paseo del Norte H 18 8
RSTA - D RSTA - D HH
10
STORAGE - D
BN LOCATION AMMO - D AMMO - D
C CSS CSS
JSTARS UAV
MAINT - D MAINT - D
STORAGE - D STORAGE - D
FIRING UNITS D - DESTROY
N - NEUTRALIZE 3
D A - ATTRIT 1
4
DEL - DELAY
“FIDELITY OF SENSORS”
• IPB • MULTI-SENSOR PLATFORM • BRILLIANT • REFINE DEFENSE

• INFO OPS / SHARING • SENSOR MANAGEMENT SUBMUNITIONS DESIGN
• DECISION AIDS TOOLS • IMPROVED ON- • INCREASES FORCE
• INCREASED SENSOR BOARD SENSORS PROTECTION
CAPABILITIES / BDA – DISPERSION
• PATRIOT LAUNCH POINT – CONCEALMENT
PREDICTION – COLLECTIVE
PROTECTION
The TBM/WMD threat can only be countered by ---

coordinating and integrating the TAMD operational elements
--- of attack operations, active air defense, passive air defense, and C4I
Figure 3-3. Example of Operational Element Integration.
ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE
C A M P D O H A , K u w a it (C N N ) -- T h e Ira q i m ilita ry c a m e w ith in

s e c o n d s o f p o s s ib ly w ip in g o u t th e h e a d q u a rte rs o f th e c o a litio n
g ro u n d fo rc e s w ith a m is s ile o n M a rc h 2 7 , U .S . m ilita ry o ffic ia ls
s a id . T h e m is s ile w a s in te rc e p te d a n d d e s tro y e d b y a U .S . P a trio t
m is s ile s h o rtly b e fo re it c o u ld h a v e h it its ta rg e t.
3-7. AD functions are performed primarily in the AD and G3 plans cells, with support
from the G2 staff. These functions include:
• Developing the TAMD IPB.
• Planning AMD operations.
• Monitoring and coordinating AMD operations.
These functions focus on force operations—the AAMDC does not directly execute
engagement operations, which are the responsibility of the ADA brigades, battalions,
batteries, and ADAFCOs.
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FM 3-01.94
Operations
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

3-8. IPB is accomplished by the G2 staff. It is a systematic and continuous process of
analyzing enemy air and missile forces as well as the battlefield environment to
determine the most probable enemy COAs. IPB allows the AAMDC commander and
intelligence staff to assess enemy capabilities and intentions and predict when and where
the enemy will strike and what assets they will use.
3-9. The IPB process is comprised of four steps: (1) defining the battlefield environment,
(2) describing the battlefield’s effects, (3) evaluating the threat, and (4) determining
threat COAs, as described below.
Battlefield Environment
3-10. To focus the command’s initial intelligence collection efforts and determine
intelligence deficiencies, the staff must define the battlefield environment. This involves
identifying characteristics of the battlefield that will influence enemy and friendly
operations. The staff must develop a broad understanding of battlefield terrain and
climatology, the geopolitical environment, and a basic understanding of the enemy’s air
and missile capabilities. Of particular interest to active air defense planners are:
• The location and type of assets to be defended.
• The location, size, and capabilities of enemy air and missile forces.
• The disposition and capabilities of friendly AMD forces.
• Geopolitical/other constraints that affect AD operations.
The staff obtains this and other pertinent information from intelligence reports (for
example, the theater intelligence estimate, intelligence summaries, and spot intelligence
reports) available via digital sources.
Battlefield Effects
3-11. The staff conducts terrain and weather analyses to understand how these factors
will affect friendly and enemy operations:
• By analyzing terrain characteristics (for example, elevation, ground
slope, road accessibility, vegetation, overhead cover, and soil
trafficability), the staff can determine the most likely locations of
enemy TM activity and the avenues of approach for enemy air and
cruise missile (CM) threats. Automated workstations within the TOC
contain terrain databases that can be used in these analyses.
• By analyzing regional climatological factors and current weather
reports, the staff gains insights into how the region’s weather will
affect operations and how seasonal variations in weather patterns
may change potential launch areas and tactics. Of particular interest
to AD cell planners are the effects of weather on the enemy’s
employment of TMs and aircraft and the impacts on AD sensors and
systems.
Threat Evaluation
3-12. In evaluating the threat, the staff examines the enemy’s air and missile capabilities,
doctrinal organization, and TTPs likely to be employed in combat operations. Using
threat models and doctrinal templates, the staff systematically analyzes the threat,
8 April 2005 3-7
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including the enemy’s order of battle, and develops a set of general COAs that the enemy
is likely to pursue.
Threat Courses of Action

3-13. Each COA is then evaluated and prioritized based on the staff’s understanding of
enemy doctrine, the battlefield environment, and the enemy’s likely objectives. The
intent is to replicate the set of specific COAs the enemy is considering and determine
which COA he is most likely to pursue.
PLANNING
3-14. Planning for AD operations involves analyzing the mission, performing a defense
laydown, assigning missions to subordinate brigades, and performing follow up
coordination to ensure that forces and selected critical assets remain adequately protected.
3-15. Normally, AAMDC planners will utilize the military decision making process
(MDMP) within the context of effects-based operations. Effects-based operations are a
process for obtaining a desired outcome through the creation of effects by the synergistic
application of military (for example, TAMD operational elements) and nonmilitary
capabilities at the operational level.
3-16. Effects-based TAMD operations do not necessarily focus on the number of enemy
missiles destroyed (attrition warfare), but whether JFC designated centers of gravity (for
example, sortie generation and force generation) are successfully protected from enemy
action. Targeting C2 nodes, fiber optic switches, and counter mobility targets and placing
AD units only on the most critical assets while utilizing only PD measures for other
assets may have a greater effect than attempting to try and attrit all enemy missiles
through AD operations and AO. Tracking the enemy order of battle is still important, but
only within the context of effects-based operations.
3-17. The JFC establishes guidance and objectives for JTAMD in appropriate OPLANs
and annexes. The JFC’s concept of operations should include prioritization of US and
multinational forces; critical assets; and areas of vital interest or political importance that
should be protected from TM attack. Components and multinational forces (MNF)
submit prioritized CAL nominations to the JFC, including detailed requirements and
justifications for the defense of each asset. The JFC, in coordination with the
components, and as necessary, MNF, develops the prioritized CAL and issues guidance
for protecting assets by phase of the operation.
3-18. AAMDC planners in support of the AADC and or ARFOR commander first review
the assigned mission and identify the critical assets to be protected from the JFC’s CAL.
The enemy situation is appraised by reviewing the IPB and recent intelligence
information to confirm COAs and determine the types and numbers of missiles and
aircraft the enemy is likely to employ, the locations of launch sites, and the ranges of
these sites from the assets to be defended. Planners must also review the composition
and disposition of the AMD resources available to protect critical assets.
3-19. After analyzing the mission, a defense laydown is performed to determine if
available AMD resources can adequately protect critical assets. This is accomplished
through the use of automated planning tools. The locations of enemy launch sites,
protected assets, and AMD unit locations are plotted and the automated tools used to
determine if the required surveillance and engagement coverages and levels of protection
can be achieved. If required coverages or levels of protection cannot be achieved with
available AMD resources, additional resources must be requested from the AADC and or
ARFOR commander or they must be advised of the risk to forces or assets.
3-8 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Operations
3-20. By utilizing the CVT methodology (see Appendix C), in conjunction with defense
planning and design, available AMD resources, and an assessment of risk the planners
construct the DAL. The DAL is a prioritized listing of assets by phase from the JFC’s
CAL and is included in the OPLAN and area air defense plan.
3-21. Planners task-organize the EAC ADA brigades and then assign specific assets to
the brigades for protection. The brigades then perform more detailed planning to
determine which subordinate battalions and task forces will cover the assets. Throughout
operations, AD planners coordinate with the brigades to ensure AMD resources are
sufficient to accomplish the mission and coverages are weighted in accordance with the
JFC’s priorities.
3-22. METT-TC dependant, the AAMDC may establish or participate in TAMD
coordination boards (formerly reprioritization boards) to recommend changes to AMD
priorities on the DAL, adjustments to the defense design during the course of operations,
and actions across all the operational elements based on enemy activities and or friendly
operations. The board uses an objective process that quantifies the level of importance of
each asset based on selected criteria. Criteria are weighted based on consideration of the
JFC’s guidance, intent, desired effects, and center-of-gravity concerns. Board
recommendations are forwarded to the respective component commanders and the
AADC, and are ultimately approved by the JFC. The AADC normally designates the
AAMDC commander (in his capacity as the DAADC) to chair the joint TAMD
coordination board.
MONITORING
3-23. The monitoring effort involves several functions:
Monitoring enemy air and missile activities.
Monitoring friendly air and missile operations including the status and
defensive posture of AMD units.
Providing critical active air defense information to the battle captain,
LNOs, subordinate units, and other cells within the AAMDC.
3-24. AD cell personnel monitor enemy air and missile activity by observing situation
displays and processing reports of air and missile events. The AMD displays provide a
comprehensive, near-real-time picture of the air situation, displaying tracks from a
variety of joint and Army sources. The reports provide information on track locations,
identification, classification, the number of missiles launched, launch and predicted
impact areas, and estimated impact times.
3-25. AD cell personnel monitor friendly air and missile operations by observing
situation displays and processing tactical orders, reports, and information from higher
headquarters, adjacent and subordinate units, and LNOs. The AD cell AMD displays
show the operational control measures currently in effect, unit positions, coverages, and
primary target lines. The reports from subordinate units (normally received digitally)
include the commander’s narrative summary, situation reports, and engagement reports.
Collectively, these reports provide an updated, comprehensive picture of TAMD
operations that includes:
• Unit locations.
• Unit alert state (state of readiness).
• Number and type of missiles available.
• Summary of recent activities/operations.
8 April 2005 3-9
FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
• Summary of anticipated activities/plans.

• Number of air and missile threats engaged, destroyed, and types.
• Number and type of missiles fired.
• Number of targets unsuccessfully engaged.
• Number of targets not engaged (impact out).
3-26. All of this information is continuously reviewed and assessed by AD cell personnel.
TM launch events and significant red air movements are immediately reported digitally to
the battle captain and other cells in the AAMDC. AD cell personnel also coordinate with
subordinate unit LNOs as required to adjust AMD coverages in accordance with the
AMD plan or guidance from the battle captain.
3-27. The AAMDC may have AD LNOs deployed at various locations (JFLCC, JFMCC,
COMARFOR, and MNF) to facilitate TAMD AD operations and keep the AD cell
informed of the status of AMD engagements and assets. See Figure 3-4 for active and
passive defense connectivity between the AAMDC TOC (Main and Tactical), JAOC, and
ARFOR TOC. (The subordinate AMD units are not depicted, but they also contribute to
information exchange.
JFLCC/ARFOR JFACC/AADC/ACA
G2/ACE Strategy Division
T BCD
O G3/Plans/TAMD Cell
Combat Ops Division
J
AAMDC LNOs
C A
Other Sections per METT-TC
Combat Plans Division O
C
ISR Division
TAAMDCOORD/DAADC
Active Defense Section
As Required
AAMDC MAIN
G2/Intelligence Section Collocated w/JAOC
Passive Defense Section Other Sections per METT-TC
LEGEND:
Coordination
AAMDC TAC Synchronization
Collocated w/ARFOR Collaboration
Figure 3-4. Active and Passive Air Defense Connectivity.
3-10 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Operations
ATTACK OPERATIONS
3-28. The AAMDC supports AO with its G2 analysis section and AO cell by performing
critical planning, analysis, tracking, and TM target development and by nominating
attack strategies and submitting TM attack mission requests in conjunction with the
JAOC. Normally, the AAMDC intelligence and AO sections are collocated with the
JAOC. LNOs at key TAMD nodes (DOCC and JFSOCC) also provide and leverage
additional TAMD AO expertise. TM AO functions are performed primarily in the AO
and G2/G3 Plans cells. These functions are:
• Conducting IPB.
• Planning TM AO.
• Nominating TM targets and requesting TM attack missions for
immediate or preplanned execution.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

3-29. The IPB process described in the previous section applies also to attack operations;
however, the focus is on the TM threat and infrastructure. This process must support
early detection and tracking of air and missile elements including infrastructure. Early
tracking supports preemptive attack operations and facilitates locating hide and logistical
support sites.
Battlefield Environment
3-30. In evaluating the battle area, the staff must consider:
• The disposition, composition, and capabilities of the enemy’s air and
TM force.
• The areas the enemy may use to support launch-, hide-, and
transload-site operations and forward operating base (FOB)
operations.
• The locations of fixed air and theater ballistic missile (TBM) sites,
and possible mobile TBM sites.
• The types of missiles and warheads used by the enemy.
• The disposition and capabilities of joint and Army AO forces.
Battlefield Effects
3-31. In assessing effects of the battlefield, the staff considers how terrain factors and
existing road networks might affect the movement of launcher and support vehicles or
impact resupply and transload activities. They assess how changes in the weather may
change potential operating areas or otherwise affect the conduct of enemy air and TM
operations. They also assess the impact of terrain and weather on joint and Army AO
and capabilities.
Threat Evaluation
3-32. In evaluating the threat, the staff analyzes the enemy order of battle (EOB),
performs mobility and temporal analyses, and examines TM doctrine and tactics with the
goal of developing doctrinal templates and identifying high value targets.
• In analyzing the EOB, the staff looks at the organizational structure
of air and missile units including such data as the number of
transporter-erector launchers or mobile erector launchers;
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transloading assets and capabilities; transportation assets and

capabilities; the types (and numbers) of missiles and warheads; and
the accuracy of the missiles. They also examine the command
structure, equipment condition and status, and the level of experience
and training of enemy troops.
• In assessing mobility, the staff looks at terrain and other mobility
limitations that affect deployment and launch of aircraft and TMs.
They also examine the operational ranges of launch units and support
vehicles and the doctrinal distances between firing sites, hide sites,
transload sites, FOBs, battalion-size support bases, and missile
support bases.
• With respect to temporal analyses, the staff examines how the
battlefield environment and other factors affect the tempo and
sustainability of air and TM operations. They also determine typical
transload times, missile checkout times, launch countdown timelines,
and rates of fire.
• With respect to doctrine and tactics, the staff assesses how the enemy
is likely to conduct air and TM launch operations, how the C4I and
logistic infrastructures are used to support these operations, and how
they may be exploited to disrupt air and TM operations.
Threat COAs
3-33. In this phase, the staff compiles and integrates the information gathered in the
previous phases to determine the most likely enemy COA, identify high priority targets,
and lay the groundwork for intelligence collection requirements. After considering the
previous analyses of weather, terrain, enemy capabilities, doctrine, tactics and
infrastructure, the staff identifies the most likely COAs. They also examine air and TM
vulnerabilities and decisive points and determine which high value targets are likely to
become high payoff targets. Using doctrinal templates, they assess where the various
elements of the air and TM infrastructure (airbases, FOBs, transload sites, hide sites, and
launch sites) are likely to be located. These become NAIs and drive intelligence
collection requirements.
PLANNING
3-34. The AAMDC has a key role in joint TAMD IPB attack strategy development, and
the target development process. See Figure 3-5 for a depiction of the theater AO process
flow. The AAMDC AO cell and intelligence personnel in coordination and collaboration
with the JAOC ISR division, strategy division, combat operations division, and combat
plans division provide detailed target intelligence to the JFACC and AAMDC
commander and recommend TM attack strategy and plans. AAMDC intelligence
personnel assist the JAOC in the TM portion of the IPB effort by integrating dedicated
analysts and subject matter experts.
3-12 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Operations
JFC
Guidance
JFACC JFLCC
Guidance Guidance
J5 Plans
Strategy
JAOC
Strategy Intel BCD DOCC
Air Strategy JFACC Target List JFLCC Target List JFLCC Target List
AAMDC Coordinated
TM Target List Effort
GAT/MAAP ATO Production

Draft JIPTL ATO
JTCB
Review JIPTL
Figure 3-5. Attack Operations Process Flow.

3-35. Although the TM target set and NAIs normally fall outside the ARFOR AO, the
AAMDC G2 may assist the ARFOR ACE with the TAMD IPB and, dependent on
METT-TC, may even deploy a LNO team equipped with the necessary equipment to
establish connectivity to intelligence resources. If deployed, the LNO team collects
information for the AAMDC and may pass information requirements to the ACE
collection manager. However, most AAMDC recommendations for collection support
for TAMD IPB are made to the JAOC ISR division for incorporation in the joint force
collection strategy.
3-36. The G2 analysis section supports the AO cell by analyzing launch events,
conducting countermobility analyses, refining and validating the IPB, nominating
deliberate targets 72-96 hours out, analyzing post-launch events, building tracking
profiles, and disseminating intelligence products and reports for the JFACC and when
appropriate the ARFOR commander or JFLCC. To achieve preemptive attacks the
AAMDC G2 section and the JAOC ISR division must continuously share targeting
intelligence. Although both organizations perform many of the same IPB functions,
differences in analysis, methodologies, sensors, and perspectives create synergies and
better overall SA of enemy TM activity. Exchange of target intelligence early in the
planning and execution process is essential to achieve effective joint AO.
3-37. The AAMDC G2 leverages all intelligence sources to develop a comprehensive TM
intelligence picture. AAMDC G2 personnel normally establish intelligence collaboration
efforts with their intelligence counterparts at the JAOC through collocation and
integration within the JAOC ISR division and or through digital and voice means. At a
minimum, the AAMDC will deploy an LNO team to the JAOC that will include AO and
intelligence personnel to influence joint ISR and AO assets in the TM fight. TM analysts
in the AAMDC G2 section and the JAOC normally collaborate in TAMD IPB
development and share near-real-time target intelligence. Intelligence collaboration
between component TAMD nodes ensures that all available TM information is fused,
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limited collection resources are efficiently used, and operational level decision-makers
have the best analysis available.
3-38. At the Joint Task Force level, the JFC issues targeting guidance and priorities to
establish how air- and surface-delivered fires will be used to accomplish his objectives.
When established, the JTCB assists the JFC in providing targeting guidance and priorities
for the campaign. The AAMDC commander should be a member of the JTCB to provide
a TM focus to the process. The JFACC staff at the JAOC is heavily involved in the
JFC’s campaign through the production and execution of the ATO. The ATO ultimately
assigns aircraft and weapons against targets and runs for a theater-specific time period,
usually 24 hours. The length of the ATO development cycle is also theater-specific, but
usually ranges between 48 and 96 hours. TM targets identified for attack by the AAMDC
G2 and AO section are nominated to the JAOC for prosecution as JFACC nominated
targets, either as preplanned targets or immediate targets. The BCD and AAMDC DOCC
LNO team will normally receive visibility of these nominations digitally.
3-39. The ARFOR DOCC is responsible for coordinating ARFOR deep operations and
targeting outside the ARFOR AO with the ATO planners at the JAOC. The BCD is
responsible for deconflicting any JAOC target nominations within the ARFOR AO with
the DOCC.
3-40. Preplanned targets are targets with lengthy dwell times that can be engaged via
assets on the ATO. Preplanned targets include TBM production and storage facilities,
surface-to-surface missile garrisons, stationary FOBs, communications nodes, and
countermobility targets such as bridges and mining chokepoints. These verified
nominations are submitted to the JAOC for inclusion in the draft joint integrated
prioritized target list (JIPTL) and discussion during the guidance, apportionment, and
targeting meeting. The JIPTL represents targets recommended for attack, which support
the JFC’s overall campaign plan. The draft JIPTL is passed to the JTCB for coordination
and deconfliction and then submitted to the JFC for approval. The master air attack
planning team in the combat plans division of the JAOC takes the approved JIPTL and
adds it to the ATO. The JIPTL is the basis for the ATO.
3-41. Early and continuous IPB collaboration may expedite the JIPTL process by
establishing a common TM intelligence picture to support and justify target nominations.
Collaborating before actual target nominations are submitted improves the quality of
analysis, prevents unnecessary target duplication, provides the opportunity to discuss
priorities in support of strategy, coordinates surveillance area requests, minimizes
redundancies, and creates a synergy in TM target development.
3-42. Potential time sensitive targets (TSTs) should be determined during the planning
process. This enables target nomination and early selection of primary attack means,
which will significantly reduce the time from detection to attack. Ideally attack means
are given ROE for attack of targets in their area, which allows them to engage
immediately on detection and identification of the TST.
EXECUTION
3-43. While preplanned targets are an integral part of an overall TM attack strategy,
immediate targeting is also essential to the successful conduct of TM AO. See Figure 3-
6.
3-14 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Operations
A T O T a rg e tin g C yc le Im m e d ia te a n d T im e S e n s itive
T arg etin g T a rg e tin g C y c le
G u id a n ce
T a rg e tin g
• D e ve lo p s A A M D C G u id a n c e
T M D g u id a n c e
• P ro vid e s T B M • D e v e lo p s A A M D C
O b tain B D A e x p e rtis e to J F A C C T M D g u id a n c e
D evelo p • P ro vid e s T B M N o m in ate
T arg ets O b ta in B D A e x p e rtis e to J F A C C
T arg e ts
• R e c o m m e n d s re- • P ro v id e s T M D fo c u s e d
a tta c k ta rg e ts a n a lytic a l e ffo rt • R e c o m m e n d s re- • O ve rs e e s in te l c o u n te r T B M fig h t
• R e c o m m e n d s IS R • D e ve lo p s T M D ta rg e t lis t a tta c k ta rg e ts • C o o rd in a te s d yn a m ic IS R re q u e s t
p rio ritie s • C o o rd in a te s c o lle c tio n • R e c o m m e n d s IS R • R e c o m m e n d s T S T / im m e d ia te ta rg e ts
m anagem ent d yn a m ic re ta s k in g • F u s e s A ll S o u rc e In te l
• F u s e s A ll S o u rc e In te l
M o n ito r N o m in ate M o n ito r

M is sio n s T a rg e ts M iss io n s
• M o n ito rs IS R c o lle c tio n s ta tu s • N o m in a te s p re p la n n e d T M D • M o n ito rs a tta c k
• M o n ito rs S C U D S A T C O M n e t ta rg e ts • M o n ito rs / tra c k s a ll T B M re po rte d
• M o n ito rs s trik e o p e ra tio n s • S u p p o rts d e ve lo p m e n t o f d ra ft ta rg e ts
J IP T L
• N o m in a te s IS R c o lle c tio n a s s e ts
F U L L Y IN T E G R A T E D IN J A O C T O
A A M D C T B M P R IO R IT Y 1 T A R G E T S IN T H E C U R R E N T A T O
E X E C U T E N O N A T O S T R IK E S
A A M D C p ro vid e s T A M D fo c u s e d in te llig e n c e to s u p p o rt th e T a rg e tin g C y c le
Figure 3-6. AAMDC Support of AO.

3-44. TM IPB does not stop after planning. It is a systematic, continuous process of
analyzing the threat and environment. Through this analysis, target areas are refined and
collections are focused so that ultimately, short dwell or immediate targets become
identifiable and engageable. Immediate targets—those that must be attacked inside the
normal ATO planning cycle—are also submitted to the JAOC via a request and
nominations process similar to that used for preplanned targets. Examples of immediate
targets are mobile FOBs, missile transload sites, transporter-erector launcher hide sites,
and launch sites. When identified by the AAMDC working with the ISR targeting team,
these targets are forwarded through JAOC channels, which processes the request. If the
request is approved and the target could be serviced with Army assets, it is forwarded to
the BCD for airspace clearance and to the executing unit for attack. If not serviceable by
Army assets, the request is then passed to the execution cell in the combat operations
division of the JAOC for tasking to available aircraft. See Figure 3-7 for an illustration
of the process.
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ET
S JAO C PL
AN
RG AAMDC NE
TA DT
IV E A tta c k AR
S IT GE
S EN TS
O p e ra tio n s
T IM E
C e ll
JAO C Com bat JA O C
O p e ra tio n s De C o m b a t P la n s
D iv is io n co D iv is io n
nf
li c ti
on Situa tion a l A w a re ne s s
G RO U ND A TTA C K
A IR A TTA C K BCD
AT O N OM IN A TIO N
AIR R E Q UE S T
• A ircr aft a vailab le ?

• A ircr aft in ra nge ?
• P r ope rly we ap one ere d? • FS s yst em s ava ila ble ?
DACC A AM D C
• Ta rge t in ra nge ? LNO
• P rop er m un itions ? FSE
D e co n fli ct ion
N o m in at io n Flo w
In for m at io n O nly A2C2
D e co n fli ct ion /Fir e M is s io n Fl ow
Figure 3-7. Target Nomination Process: AAMDC Collocated with the JAOC.
3-45. AAMDC AO LNOs may deploy to the DOCC and the JFSOCC to facilitate AO
and keep the AO cell informed of the status of target nominations and all available attack
assets. See Figure 3-8 for TM AO connectivity.
JFLCC/ARFO R JFACC/AADC/ACA
G2/ACE Strategy Division
T BCD
O G3/DO CC
Com bat O ps Division
J
AAMDC LNO s
C A
Com bat Plans Division O
C
ISR Division
TAAM DCO O RD/DAADC
Attack O perations Section
As Required
G2/Intelligence Section AAMDC Main
Collocated w /JAO C
LEGEND:
Coordination
Synchronization
Collaboration
Figure 3-8. Attack Operations Connectivity.
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Operations
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

3-46. Passive air defense functions are performed primarily in the PD cell. These
functions are planning and executing passive air defense operations.
OIF – Passive Defense
“The Passive Defense cell also played a critical role in Attack Operations. We also had ‘CHAT’ and ‘CHAT’
worked exceptionally well in Attack Operations. I was personally involved in three kills on TELs. The Higgins
would send voice early warning, and over ‘CHAT’ they would provide warning, and on ‘CHAT’ they would
provide the launch points for the Iraqi Ababils and Al Samouds.
We would turn that around and in a matter of seconds provide that information to our Attack Operations cell
within the CFACC. The CFACC in turn would coordinate that as a TST, and we would be listening to the AC-1
and AC-10 nets, and we would know that the information that was provided by Higgins and relayed by us killed
three TELs…at least by pilot reports.
As a matter of fact, when you look at this in a Joint aspect it is really outstanding. I mean, the Navy AEGIS
detected the missile, provided that information to the Army, which in turn warned Army forces; the Army in turn
relayed that information to the CAOC in PSAB, which in turn coordinated that air strike to get steel on target,
which, for the most part, ended up being Marine Air out of the III MAW because most of the launches occurred
north of Basrah, which was in the Marine sector.
So, within a matter of minutes, we had information flow for Attack Operations going from the Navy, to the
Army, to the Air Force, to the Marines, and putting steel on target and killing things, which was outstanding!”
– Interview with the Passive Defense OIC, 32d AAMDC, Operation Iraqi Freedom
PLANNING
3-47. The PD cell plans, coordinates, and executes passive air defense warning operations
for the ARFOR to minimize the effectiveness of attacking aircraft, missiles, and threat
surveillance. The PD cell normally plans and coordinates operations 72 hours in
advance. PD cell plans are created with a firm understanding of the TAMD IPB, while
PD cell planners assist the AAMDC G2 with developing NBC intelligence. The PD cell
contributes to the development of the AMD plan and plans for a warning architecture that
can disseminate both general and specific warnings to the force. General warnings
indicate that attacks are imminent or have occurred, while specific warnings signify that
only certain units or areas are in danger of attack.
3-48. The PD cell must develop and maintain an accurate, coherent, tactical picture of
friendly land forces to ensure that these forces can be quickly warned if a TM or air threat
is launched or an NBC event occurs. Information technology displays and supporting
databases provide the exact locations and the identity of friendly forces. These databases
are updated at frequent intervals from various joint sources. Using these databases, the
PD cell can maintain an accurate friendly picture that includes virtually all of the Army,
joint, and multinational forces that the AAMDC must warn.
3-49. Concurrently with developing the friendly picture, PD cell planners must decide
how air, missile, and NBC warnings will be disseminated. Communications means and
procedures will vary with the theater of operations. Warning will normally be
transmitted by data and voice for redundancy. Planners may elect to use existing
communications capabilities in the theater to facilitate warning of attack—specifically,
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the air defense early warning architecture—or use an alternative means such as a pager
alert warning system (PAWS).
3-50. A PAWS may expand the existing data warning architecture, distribute warning
directly to the lowest levels of the force, and allow flexibility in warning only affected
units. If PAWS is used, the PD cell, after a thorough analysis based on METT-TC,
recommends which units will receive the pagers in a pager distribution plan. If the
number of available pagers is insufficient to equip all units, the PD cell planners will
recommend alternate methods of warning the units without pagers.
3-51. The PD cell must also conduct vulnerability analyses within the ARFOR/JFLCC
AOR and when directed analyses of critical assets within the JOA to ensure personnel,
equipment, and facilities will survive an air, missile or NBC attack with minimum
casualties and damage. Analyses will focus on WMD and the effects the enemy might
possibly achieve against JFC critical assets and or centers of gravity. In conducting
vulnerability analyses, planners must consider a number of factors including hardening,
redundancy, dispersal, civil authority training, and NBC defense. PD planners will
ensure that AMD forces are aware of the locations of engineer support units, chemical
decontamination units, medical facilities, and host nation and other support facilities to
assist recovery and reconstitution efforts. In order to advise the commander in a timely
manner, PD cell planners will have information systems to quickly produce vulnerability
analyses against various threat COAs or scenarios.
3-52. PD cell planners will ensure their passive air defense procedures and plans are
current and relevant to the theater in which the AAMDC is deployed. They will also
assist in developing theater procedures and plans and share information and expertise
with other component PD cells. Planners may also be called upon to assist in
development of theater deception plans.
EXECUTION
3-53. The PD cell tracks friendly forces and monitors ARFOR or JFLCC ground and
TAMD operations to assist it in performing its primary function of disseminating
warnings to the force. The cell also monitors the DAL and active air defense operations
conducted to protect priority assets. Reports of enemy air activity and TM launches are
provided digitally by several joint sources in near real time to information workstations
within the cell. The workstations display the air and missile activity including the
number of missiles launched, launch locations and azimuths, and predicted impact areas
and times.
3-54. Other workstations receive reports of NBC events and display the type of event,
type of burst or agent, area of contamination, downwind hazard, and the units affected.
The cell has the ability to predict ground effects of WMD from identified incoming TMs
and pass that information immediately to affected units. PD cell personnel also can
receive joint force information, intelligence information, and weather data to aid in
current operational decisions. See Figure 3-4 for PD connectivity.
3-55. The PD cell disseminates general and specific warnings based on receipt of the
above information. This is shown in Figure 3-9.
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Operations
SENSORS NBC REPORTS INTELLIGENCE

Air Threat Time Detonation/Attack TAMD Situational Awareness
Missile Threat Type of Burst/Agent Joint Blue Force Data
Area of Contamination
Impact Ellipse Intel Information
Impact Time Downwind Hazard
Weather Information
Units Affected
PD CELL
WARNING TO FORCES
Air Warning
TM/NBC Warning
TM/NBC Event Number
Areas at Risk
Time of Impact/Event
Figure 3-9. Warning Process.
OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION OPERATIONS

3-56. An operational level commander may designate a single general officer as the
deputy commander for operational force protection to synchronize efforts between
different organizations. The AAMDC may be assigned the mission to perform
operational protection for the ARFOR or JFLCC or possibly even for the JFC. FM 3-0,
Operations, states that, “Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force
so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place.”
3-57. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and
fratricide avoidance. Force protection, the primary component, minimizes the effects of
enemy firepower (including WMD), maneuver, and information. Field discipline
precludes losses from hostile environments (occupational and environmental hazards)
and disease. Safety reduces the inherent risk of nonbattle deaths and injuries. Fratricide
avoidance minimizes the inadvertent killing or maiming of Soldiers by friendly fire.
3-58. Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile
actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources,
facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential
so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated
offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force
while degrading opportunities for the enemy.
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3-59. Army force protection consists of the following components:

• Air, space, and missile defense.
• Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive defense.
• Antiterrorism.
• Defensive information operations.
• Security to operational-level forces and means.
Operational Protection During Operation Iraqi Freedom
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the combined forces land component commander
(CFLCC) appointed the 32d AAMDC commander as the deputy commander for operational
protection. The CFLCC’s intent for operational force protection during OIF was “the
uninterrupted flow of combat power into the region.” This was a crucial center of gravity for
the CFLCC.
In order to accomplish this mission the 32d AAMDC was augmented from the CFLCC
provost marshal and chemical staff sections and also received additional augmentation from
the Marines, Navy, and Air Force. The 32d AAMDC conducted vulnerability assessments of
high value assets using the criticality, vulnerability (recuperability), and threat (CVT)
methodology. The 32d AAMDC also established a coalition operational protection
coordination center (COPCC) that met with host nation agencies and coalition partners with
units in the joint rear area.
The 32d AAMDC also established and conducted an operational protection board that met
twice a week consisting of air defense artillery, military police, chemical, engineer, surgeon,
and signal representatives. The board assessed HVAs to determine what assets should be
protected and how they would be protected or how the threat could be mitigated. The board
tracked each HVA as being protected or vulnerable. The board also monitored force flow
and made recommendations to the CFLCC on mitigation measures or the diversion of
assets to perform protection tasks.
3-60. When assigned the responsibility and properly augmented with Army and JIM
assets the AAMDC will recommend operational force protection priorities, lead theater
operational protection boards, and will oversee vulnerability assessments of critical assets
and other ARFOR, JFLCC, and or JFC priorities in the AO. The AAMDC will
recommend protection measures required to meet the effects desired (for example,
uninterrupted flow of combat power into theater; maintain F-117 and F-15E sortie
generation, protect component C2 nodes, etc.) by the higher headquarters commander.
The functional tasks associated with operational force protection include:
• Offensive and defensive theater air and missile operations.
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance and defense.
• High value asset protection.
• Joint rear area security.
• Physical security.
• Operations security.
• Defensive information operations.
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Operations
• Antiterrorism operations.
• Host nation integration.
• Post attack impact mitigation.
LIAISON OFFICER OPERATIONS

3-61. Liaison teams, commonly referred to as coordination teams, are essential in joint
and multinational TAMD operations. They facilitate understanding, coordination,
synchronization, and mission accomplishment. Liaison personnel must be familiar with
the staff and operational organizations, doctrine, and procedures of the headquarters or
element with which they will work as well as being subject matter experts on ARFOR
and AAMDC air and missile defense capabilities. AAMDC liaison requirements are
fulfilled through dedicated liaison personnel and information technology systems.
2
3-62. Based on METT-TC, AAMDC liaison teams may deploy to all major theater C
headquarters including the JFLCC, JFACC and or AADC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC, and to
the ARFOR elements of the DOCC, BCD, and ACE. Although normally the AAMDC
collocates with the JAOC, the AAMDC may choose instead to deploy a robust liaison
team to the AADC location to support the DAADC and the JFACC and or AADC and to
integrate with the JAOC and BCD. When the DAADC is not present a senior ADA
officer leads the liaison team, which will consist of active air defense, AO, and IPB
experienced personnel to execute 24-hour TAMD operations.
FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS

3-63. Force projection is the military component of power projection. Force projection
operations usually begin as a rapid response to a crisis somewhere in the world.
Deployed forces, communication facilities, and geopolitical assets will need protection
from air surveillance and from air and missile attack. AMD forces must be lethal,
modular, versatile, and tactically and strategically mobile to accomplish the mission.
Force projection encompasses a range of processes: mobilization, deployment,
employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous,
overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Decisions made early in
the process may determine the success of the campaign.
MOBILIZATION AND PREDEPLOYMENT

3-64. Military forces are mobilized in response to a situation requiring military
intervention. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the reserve component, and
assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. During mobilization and
predeployment, the ARFOR (or JFLCC) uses the AAMDC to plan, coordinate,
deconflict, and execute TAMD within the assigned AO. The AAMDC establishes
communications with and sends liaisons to the JFACC and or AADC, ARFOR or JFLCC
staff and other units, organizations, and agencies as required. Normally, the AAMDC
sends an initial coordination element of planners and logistics personnel into theater to
start planning and coordination. The initial coordination element is followed by a larger
advance party to continue planning and lay the groundwork for the deployment and
reception of the main body and the TOC equipment.
3-65. Although planning is an ongoing process, the AAMDC works in coordination with
the ARFOR or JFLCC commander and his staff to convert the command’s contingency
plan (CONPLAN) to an OPLAN. The AAMDC conducts analysis and assessment
activities, participates in the decision-making process, and assists in the development of
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the operations order. The AAMDC uses automated planning capabilities to develop the
AMD annex to the ARFOR’s/JFLCC’s plan and synchronizes it with the joint force and
other component OPLAN(s) to include the AADC. Planning cells within the AAMDC
will conduct detailed planning and assessment activities for entry and follow-on
operations.
3-66. During the mobilization and predeployment stage, numerous concurrent activities
for planning and execution will continue. The ARFOR or JFLCC and JFACC and or
AADC use the AAMDC to validate possible air and missile threat scenarios and COAs.
The TAMD IPB serves as the basis for determining the most effective deployment
strategy, development of the ARFOR’s/JFLCC’s intelligence plan, and the appropriate
mix of weapons, sensors, and capabilities to counter the anticipated TM and air threat for
each phase of the operation. During this stage, the AAMDC:
• Coordinates with the designated JFACC and or AADC (participates
in JFACC crisis action planning as required.
• Conducts air and missile IPB in conjunction with theater and
national agencies.
• Participates in and synchronizes TAMD planning.
• Plans and integrates ARFOR/JFLCC contributions into joint TAMD
operations.
• Assesses AMD architecture and recommends changes as needed.
• Develops force packages for subsequent force projection stages.
• Assesses unit readiness status.
• Plans deployment of LNO teams as required.
• Plans communications and multi-TADIL network architecture.
• Assesses passive defense capabilities.
• Plans for follow-on TAMD operations.
• Plans for logistic support operations (sustainment requirements).
• Plans for movement.
DEPLOYMENT AND ENTRY OPERATIONS

3-67. Deployment and entry operations are characterized by rapid deployment of forces
into the theater of operations. As part of the Army's initial force projection capability, the
AAMDC is normally deployed to the theater under the command of the ARFOR or the
operational control of the JFLCC and is in direct support of the JFACC. This force will
include the TOC, command group, LNO teams, and essential staff sections. Upon arrival
in theater, the AAMDC establishes connectivity through the Army’s C4I architecture and
4
joint interfaces as required and establish linkages to joint, multinational, and national C I
systems.
3-68. The AAMDC represents the ARFOR or JFLCC during joint planning on TAMD
issues. The AAMDC monitors enemy activities using intelligence provided by available
national and theater intelligence sources. The AAMDC continuously processes and
reviews intelligence information, collects battle damage assessment, and assesses the
enemy situation. LNO teams continue to deploy as required. During this stage, the
AAMDC:
• Establishes liaison.
• Coordinates with the JFACC, AADC, and or the ACA as required.
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Operations
• Participates in the JFLCC J3/J5 or ARFOR G3 planning cell by

providing TAMD input to plans.
• Integrates intelligence from deployed sensors to provide the ARFOR
or JFLCC SA.
• Refines the air and missile IPB picture and requirements.
• Analyzes CVT.
• Recommends changes to improve passive defense.
• Monitors operations security.
• Monitors friendly and enemy air operations.
• Recommends AMD architecture designs.
• Recommends AMD priorities in coordination with operational
maneuver plans.
• Executes logistic support functions.
• Coordinates with other components as required.
• Coordinates and implements AMD early warning procedures.
• Assists in coordination of TM targets and targeting priorities.
• Provides theater AMD expertise.
• Monitors ADA unit locations and status.
• Task organizes and assigns missions to EAC ADA brigades as
required.
EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

3-69. The AAMDC supports the JFACC and or AADC and ARFOR or JFLCC by
providing effective land-based active air defense to protect maneuver forces and the
JFC’s priority assets. The AAMDC assists in implementing passive air defense measures
throughout the AO and provides attack strategy recommendations to the JFACC and
ARFOR staffs for planning and coordinating of preplanned and immediate missions. The
AAMDC plans, coordinates, monitors, integrates, and sustains Army TAMD operations
and recommends adjustments to the DAL. During this stage, the AAMDC:
• Provides the TAAMDCOORD to the ARFOR or JFLCC.
• Provides the Deputy AADC when designated by the JFC or AADC.
• Conducts split-based operations based on METT-TC in support of the
JFACC and the ARFOR or JFLCC if designated.
• Integrates Army TAMD operations within joint operations.
• Continues to update the air and missile IPB.
• Recommends ISR collection for TM NAIs.
• Nominates TM targets directly to the JAOC.
• Provides early warning according to warning release criteria.
• Provides LNO teams to support theater C2 nodes and ARFOR
elements as required.
• Monitors theater-wide CSS for ADA units including allocation of
missile and repair parts to EAC and corps ADA brigades according to
the ARFOR or JFLCC, and JFC priorities.
• Supports the ARFOR or JFLCC by processing and disseminating
TAMD information to EAC, corps, and division C2 nodes.
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• Establishes or assists in establishing a TAMD coordination board to

recommend changes to the DAL and the defense design to the
COMARFOR and or the AADC.
REDEPLOYMENT
3-70. Postconflict and redeployment operations generally take place after cessation of
hostilities and accomplishment of the primary mission by the deployed force. Recovery
and reconstitution activities support the redeployment. The AAMDC task organizes
active air defense forces based on reassessed JFC, AADC, and ARFOR priorities and the
DAL. AMD forces may maintain an alert or ready status during this stage to protect the
force. Additionally, AAMDC may make recommendations on AMD elements to remain
behind for stability and support operations. During this stage, the AAMDC:
• Consolidates forces for redeployment and reconstitutes remaining air
and missile defense forces to a full readiness capability.
• Requests theater sensors and intelligence resources in sufficient
quantities to provide continuous (though possibly reduced) early
warning and intelligence coverage during postconflict operations.
• Recommends the size, composition, and mission guidelines for stay
behind forces to the AADC and or the ARFOR or JFLCC commander.
HOMELAND DEFENSE OPERATIONS

3-71. As the Army’s operational lead for TAMD, the AAMDC may be assigned a
homeland defense (HLD) mission in support of homeland security. Although HLD is a
non-standard AMD mission for the AAMDC and will most likely entail multiple and
simultaneous operations against the full spectrum threat, the AAMDC has the personnel,
equipment, and expertise to effectively integrate, coordinate, and synchronize the Army’s
AMD contribution to HLD.
3-72. The three roles of the CG, AAMDC (TAAMDCOORD), and DAADC, as discussed
in chapter 3, are all applicable to HLD. For HLD the AAMDC provides TAMD planning
capabilities at the operational level, recommendations on theater AMD C2 relationships,
priorities, and task organization, and advice on AMD unit C2 and weapons capabilities.
Many of the tasks on the AAMDC mission essential task list are applicable to HLD and
the AAMDC has the flexibility and agility to adapt to new requirements in HLD. For
example, the AAMDC ability to apply the CVT methodology to critical assets and
recommend prioritization of those assets and conduct a TAMD coordination board to
reassess priorities when necessary may be utilized in an HLD mission.
3-73. Based on METT-TC in HLD some aspects of AAMDC operations or tasks standard
to wartime and or contingency operations may need to be modified due to the unique
nature of the HLD theater. For HLD AAMDC planners will conduct a detailed MDMP
and present the commander with COAs to execute operations. Examples of
modifications to operations or tasks may include:
• Role of attack operations in HLD.
• Multiple, simultaneous, and high visibility HLD operations across
CONUS (DAADC may have numerous subordinate command
posts and deputies).
• JIM considerations.
• IPB and threat order of battle.
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Operations
• Restrictions on emplacement and employment AMD weapon

systems (public, private, and Federal land).
• Identification of hostile air threat in HLD (civilian aircraft).
• Rules of engagement in HLD. (Highly centralized control –
engagement authority at highest levels).
• Weapons effectiveness against threat target (warhead versus
aircraft size, etc.)
• Emerging cruise missile threat.
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Chapter 4
Support
This chapter describes the roles and functions of the AAMDC’s key support staff.
This staff includes the G1 and G4 sections, and other support elements such as the
special staff and the headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB).
OVERVIEW
4-1. In order for the AAMDC to efficiently perform its mission, a number of critical
support functions must be performed. These support functions include personnel
management, logistic management, special staff functions, and battery headquarters
administration.
PERSONNEL SECTION
4-2. The G1 is responsible for personnel administration and manpower management and
is the focal point for all personnel-related matters. It ensures that the AAMDC and
subordinate elements are manned at levels sufficient to accomplish their mission,
provides health and personnel service support, and performs headquarters management
functions. The section uses automated systems and personnel databases to support
operations. The organizational structure is shown in Figure 4-1.
G1
PERSONNEL &
PLANS TREATMENT
ADMINISTRATION
SERVICES
SERVICES
Figure 4-1. G1 Organization.
OPERATIONS
4-3. To ensure the AAMDC and subordinate units are adequately manned, the G1
monitors, collects, and assesses information affecting Soldier readiness and continually
monitors and analyzes personnel strength using information technology systems. It also
projects future requirements and develops plans to maintain strength.
4-4. To maintain personnel strength, the G1 actively manages personnel replacement.
This involves:
• Receiving, accounting, processing, and delivering personnel.
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• Advising the commander and staff on matters concerning individual

replacements and the operation of the replacement system.
• Preparing estimates for personnel replacement requirements based
on estimated casualties, nonbattle losses, and foreseeable
administrative losses.
• Requesting and allocating individual replacements according to G3
priorities.
• Integrating the personnel replacement plan with the equipment
replacement plan from the G4 and with the operations plan from the
G3.
• Coordinating and monitoring readiness processing and movement
support.
• Planning and coordinating policies for personnel determined unfit for
combat duty.
4-5. The G1 also manages casualty operations. This involves casualty reporting,
notification, and assistance; line-of-duty determination; reporting of status of remains;
and casualty mail coordination.
Health and Personnel Service Support

4-6. The G1 provides a variety of health and personnel support services. These include:
• Staff planning and supervision of morale support activities,
community and family support activities, quality of life programs,
medical treatment support, and awards programs.
• Personnel service support, including finance, record-keeping, postal
services, religious support, legal services, and command information.
• Assessment of the status of morale and recommendation of programs
to enhance morale.
Headquarters Management
4-7. The G1 performs several headquarters management tasks including managing the
organization and administration of the headquarters, recommending manpower allocation
and coordinating and supervising movement and administrative support.
Other Tasks
4-8. The G1 plans and supervises:
• Administrative support for military and civilian personnel that
includes leaves, passes, counseling, and personal affairs.
• Administrative support for augmentees (multinational forces, foreign
nationals, civilian contractors, civilian internees).
• Administration of discipline and law and order, that includes absence
without leave, desertion, courts martial offenses, requests for
transfers, awards and punishments, and disposition of stragglers.
LOGISTICS SECTION
4-9. The logistics section (G4) is responsible for coordinating the logistic integration of
supply, maintenance, transportation, and services for the command. The section uses
4-2 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Support
automated systems and logistic databases to support operations. The organizational

structure is shown in Figure 4-2.
G4
LOGISTIC READINESS &

COMPTROLLER SUPPORT OPERATIONS
MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, PLANS PROPERTY BOOK

TRANSPORTATION PLANS & & OPERATIONS SECTION
READINESS
OPERATIONS
4-10. The G4 develops the logistic plan to support operations and coordinates with the
G3 and G1 to equip replacement personnel and units. The G4 provides the overall input
on logistic requirements (less medical) to the theater support command.
4-11. The G4 section keeps track of the locations and numbers of ADA missiles (by type
in coordination with Army Missile Command personnel at Redstone Arsenal IMMC) and
coordinates directly with the AD cell to monitor current numbers. It also coordinates
with supporting unit commanders on current and future support capability of those units
and performs other tasks including:
• Performing logistic preparation of the battlespace (in coordination
with the support command).
• Recommending information requirements to the G2.
• Recommending command policy for collection and disposal of excess
property and salvage.
• Providing assessment of the threat’s logistic capability based on G4
analysis of information provided the G2.
Supply
4-12. The G4 performs a variety of supply-related activities including:
• Determining, in conjunction with the support units and G3, the
supply requirements (less medical).
• Coordinating all classes of supply, except class VIII (medical), with
the theater support command.
• Coordinating the requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and
equipment and the maintenance of materiel records.
• Ensuring that accountability and security of supplies and equipment
are adequate.
• Calculating and recommending to the G3 basic and prescribed loads
and assisting the G3 in determining the required supply rates.
• Coordinating and monitoring the collection and distribution of excess,
surplus, and salvage supplies and equipment.
8 April 2005 4-3
FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
• Tracking of high priority missile parts on a case by case basis.
Maintenance
4-13. The G4 section monitors and analyzes the equipment readiness status and
determines maintenance workload requirements with the theater support command and
subordinate units. The section also coordinates maintenance, equipment recovery, and
evacuation timelines.
Transportation
4-14. The G4 section coordinates with the G3 to support strategic movements and
conducts operational planning to support movement control and mode and terminal
operations. The G4 section also provides movement support to unit movement officers of
subordinate units. It also coordinates with the G1 and G3 on transporting replacement
personnel and enemy prisoners of war.
Services
4-15. The G4 coordinates a variety of services including:
• Construction of facilities and installations.
• Field sanitation, food preparation, water purification, mortuary
affairs, aerial delivery, laundry, shower, and clothing repair.
• Transportation, storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous
materials and waste.
Logistic Readiness and Support Operations

4-16. Current G4 structure does not support a logistic readiness center or logistic support
operation functions and must be augmented to execute this mission. When augmented
for this mission, the G4 section monitors material readiness data, supply performance
data, equipment usage data, the use of purchase cards and travel card status.
Other Tasks
4-17. The G4 section performs the property book function for the AAMDC. It also has
staff planning and supervision responsibilities over:
• Coordination with the resource management officer and finance
officer in financial matters.
• Identification of requirements and restrictions for using local
civilians, EPWs, and civilian internees and detainees in logistic
support operations.
• Battlefield procurement and contracting.
SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

4-18. The special staff sections include the headquarters commandant, IG, public affairs,
and SJA. These sections are described below.
HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT
4-19. The headquarters commandant section has operational control over Soldiers
assigned to the AAMDC who are not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.
This includes responsibility for the following areas and activities:
4-4 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Support
• Local headquarters security, to include construction of defensive

positions.
• Arrangement and movement of the headquarters.
• Training and morale activity for headquarters personnel.
• Food service, quartering, medical support, field sanitation, and
supply for headquarters personnel.
• Reception and accommodation of visitors.
• Motor transportation organic to or allocated for use by the
headquarters.
• Maintenance of equipment organic to or allocated for use by the
headquarters.
INSPECTOR GENERAL
4-20. The IG section is responsible for advising the commander on the overall welfare
and state of discipline of the command. Specific responsibilities include:
• Integrating the commander’s organizational inspection program.
• Conducting inspections, surveys, and studies as the commander
requires and monitoring corrective actions.
• Receiving allegations and conducting investigations and inquiries.
• Monitoring and informing the commander of trends, both positive and
negative, in all activities.
• Determining the command’s discipline, efficiency, economy, morale,
training, and readiness.
• Assisting Soldiers, family members, and others who seek help with
Army-related problems.
• Providing the commander with a continuous, objective, and impartial
assessment of the command’s operational and administrative
effectiveness.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
4-21. The public affairs section is responsible for understanding and fulfilling the
information needs of Soldiers and the public. Specific responsibilities include:
• Planning and supervising a command public affairs program.
• Advising and informing the commander of the public affairs impact
and implications of planned or implemented operations.
• Serving as the command’s spokesman for all communication with the
external media.
• Assessing the information requirements and expectation of the Army
and public, monitoring media and public opinion, and evaluating the
effectiveness of public affair plans and operations.
• Facilitating media efforts to cover operations by expediting the flow of
complete, accurate, and timely information.
• Developing, disseminating, educating, and training the command on
policies and procedures for protecting against release of information
detrimental to the mission, national security, or personal privacy.
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FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

4-22. The SJA section is responsible for advising the command on all matters affecting
the morale, good order, and discipline of the command. Specific responsibilities include:
• Providing legal advice to the commander on military law, foreign and
international law, the law of armed conflict (Geneva and Hague
Conventions), ROE and warfare, and other treaties.
• Supervising the administration of military justice.
• Ensuring that criminal law matters are handled in a manner that
ensures the rights of individuals are protected and the interests of
justice are served.
• Coordinating with representatives of the Army trial defense service to
provide trial defense counsel to represent Soldiers and with
representatives of the Army trial judiciary to provide military judges
for general and special courts martial.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

4-23. The battery headquarters provides administrative, supply, food service, and
maintenance support to the headquarters. This includes but is not limited to processing
leaves and personnel actions; equipping Soldiers with appropriate uniforms and supplies;
feeding Soldiers in both garrison and in the field; and maintaining assigned vehicles,
weapons, communications items, and other required equipment. The organizational
structure of the HHB is shown in Figure 4-3.
HHB
FOOD OPERATIONS SUPPLY PERSONNEL/

ADMINISTRATION
MOTOR MAINTENANCE
Figure 4-3. HHB Organization.

4-24. The commander and the first sergeant are responsible for the health, welfare, and
training of Soldiers assigned or attached to the battery. The commander exercises
nonjudicial punishment over personnel assigned or attached unless reserved by the
AAMDC commander. The battery commander works for the chief of staff and the CG
and maintains close ties to each staff section to deconflict training requirements and
mission support activities. The first sergeant works for the battery commander, but
coordinates closely with the command sergeant major and other staff sergeants major. All
other members of the battery headquarters work for the battery commander and the first
sergeant.
4-6 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Chapter 5
Communications
This chapter focuses on the various communications systems and media resources
that enable the AAMDC to accomplish its TAMD mission. It prescribes the mission,
responsibilities, functions and organizational structure of the G6 section, as well as
the dependency on non-organic theater communication resources.
OVERVIEW
5-1. The AAMDC requires communications connectivity and equipment to conduct
TAMD operations and execute its mission. These systems, which include both internal
and external communications resources, enable the AAMDC to effectively plan, conduct,
coordinate, and synchronize TAMD operations with Army, joint and multinational
forces. These systems enable the real-time and near-real time exchange of C4I
information allowing the execution of TAMD operations.
MISSION
5-2. The mission of the AAMDC G6 section is to plan, organize, develop, coordinate,
and maintain all mission-essential communications, facilitating interoperability with the
JFC, JFLCC/ARFOR, joint and multinational elements that collectively comprise a
coherent TAMD.
RESPONSIBILITIES
5-3. The G6 has numerous responsibilities in order to execute AAMDC C4I requirements.
These include basic G6 responsibilities described in the FM 6-02-series, FM 3-0, FM 3-
13, and FM 6-0. The following are AAMDC specific responsibilities:
• Determines requirements and recommends methods to provide both
internal and external communications resources to support AAMDC
operational requirements.
• Coordinates as required with the supporting communications
infrastructure to provide voice and data communications support to
the AAMDC.
• Monitors the allocation and resourcing of theater-specific
communications requirements for an integrated air and missile
defense system.
• Supervises the allocation, distribution, and use of communications
security (COMSEC) equipment devices and the promulgation of
signal operating instructions and standing signal instructions within
the AAMDC.
8 April 2005 5-1
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FM 3-01.94
• Coordinates frequency requirements, as well as the subsequent

allocations and assignments for the AAMDC and subordinate AMD
forces.
• Consolidates, plans and coordinates theater ADA unit participation
in the joint data network (JDN) [for example, the Link-16 network
and operational tasking data link (OPTASKLINK) requirements].
• Plans and coordinates communications operations to include
preparation of the signal annex to standing operating procedures,
OPORDs, and plans.
• Oversees implementation of automated information systems in
support of the AAMDC information systems security program.
• Coordinates (with the theater signal command/brigade) a reachback
capability to the sustaining base, in theater tactical voice and data
communications, and access to commercial circuits.
• Coordinates with the senior Army G6/J6 theater service component
and the joint command control communications (JCCC) cell for C4I
network support for any joint exercise or operation.
FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

5-4. Functions of the G6 section are communications planning, communications
operations, and automation management and information systems security. The
organizational structure of the G6 is shown in Figure 5-1.
G6
COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS AUTOMATION MGT

OPERATIONS PLANNING & INFO SYSTEMS
SECURITY
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING
5-5. G6 planning begins with the commander’s estimate of the situation, objectives, and
overall concept of operations. It also takes into consideration METT-TC, habitual
operational patterns and methods, and any existing in-theater communications
architectures. The G6 plans and coordinates with the Army G6/J6 theater service
components, the JCCC, and the designated JICO for user or dedicated voice and data
requirements and information exchange requirement.
5-6. The G6 section reviews the mission and operations order, ensures current internal
communications will allow execution of TAMD operations within the TOC, and plans
external communications to meet the METT-TC aspects of the overall TAMD mission.
The force projection operations cycle (see Chapter 3), may allow time to make
adjustments to internal communications requirements such as software upgrades, power
conversion, and terrain database uploads, and thus allow the AAMDC TOC to be fully
mission capable upon arrival in theater. The G6 ensures AAMDC field standing
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FM 3-01.94
Communications
operating procedures provide basic information on TOC emplacement, internal

communications connectivity procedures, and external communications requirements.
5-7. Overall planning responsibilities of the G6 are to:
• Plan C4I integration of US ADA forces and any assigned or attached
joint and multinational forces as part of the integrated air and
missile defense system.
• Oversee planning of the Army requirements within the JDN.
Coordinate the integration of Army tactical data systems into the
JDN.
• Review and update Army TAMD communications support plans for
appropriate supported combatant commander exercises and
contingencies at the component and joint level.
• Coordinate integration of new/emerging technologies within the
AMDPCS-based AAMDC TOC.
• Advise the AAMDC commander on related signal doctrine and
initiatives pertaining to EAC and joint and multinational level TAMD
connectivity.
• Coordinates with the supporting communications force operatives to
ensure that external AAMDC communications requirements are
known and understood, both in the sense of technical requirements
and speed of service criticality.
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS
5-8. To support AAMDC operations, communications are established and maintained
using all available means, including the tactical service component, sustaining base,
strategic, commercially-leased, multinational, and host nation communications. The
required communications must support high-speed data systems with massive data
storage, retrieval, and dissemination capabilities. The following types of information are
exchanged:
• SA—consisting of an air picture, ground picture, and alerting and
early warning.
• C2—consisting of command, operational control, and tactical control.
Although a part of C2, engagement operations are not executed by the
AAMDC. The AAMDC focuses on TAMD force operations.
• Operations and intelligence—consisting of coordination, orders,
reports, static intelligence, dynamic intelligence, and targeting
information.
• Administrative/logistics—consisting of sustaining information,
personnel and unit information, medical, supply, and status reports.
5-9. Overall operational responsibilities of the G6 are to:
• Coordinate access to the sustaining base; to operational and strategic
information networks; and to baseline distributed information
services required to support AAMDC and subordinate units within
the theater area common user system (ACUS) architecture.
• Manage ADA information network support interfaces with joint and
multinational forces, and host nation support interfaces to provide
seamless telecommunications support for sharing releasable common
information within the battlespace.
8 April 2005 5-3
FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
• Provide assistance and guidance to subordinate units and supporting

signal elements on ADA-supported communications systems and
network priorities of effort for installation and restoration, frequency
coordination, deconfliction, and reporting. In the absence of an Army
component representative or when required, provide representation
to the JCCC cell.
• Make available personnel to serve as Army ICOs to assist in a theater
JICO support cell that would activate and collocate under authority
of the AADC. At least three personnel should be trained and
available to support 24-hour JICO cell operations.
• Manage the AAMDC COMSEC account. This includes acting as the
distribution authority for COMSEC material received from Army,
joint and multinational activities required by subordinate ADA
activities.
• Coordinate distribution of theater signal operating instructions and
standing signal instructions for use by EAC ADA forces.
AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY

5-10. Automation management and information systems security functions require proper
planning, established procedural safeguards, and continual oversight from the G6 section.
The G6:
• Oversees baseline configuration management of required automation
systems for AAMDC headquarters and EAC ADA units. AAMDC's
promulgation of C4I standards for equipment and software
requirements and equipment configurations must be consistent with
that of the theater's, in order to support a seamless architecture and
facilitate a rapid transition should unit task reorganization be
required.
• Supervises the AAMDC automated information systems security
program. The focus is on protection of the AAMDC’s portion of the
defense information infrastructure and includes unclassified and
classified local area networks as well as protection of standalone
workstations.
• Supervises the AAMDC information modernization management
plan. The information modernization management plan’s framework
entails identifying automation technical requirements; identifying
current capabilities, including interoperability and shortfalls;
identifying and analyzing evolving information system technologies
for near-, mid-, and far-term applications; and recommending
automation solutions to resolve shortfalls and enhance
interoperability.
THEATER COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT

5-11. The AAMDC maintains organic subscriber equipment for common and dedicated
("dial-and-hold") voice and data support, acquires evolving technology and systems, and
requests non-organic mission enabling resources consistent with its contingency
missions. The AAMDC requires external signal support connectivity to a network-
4
centric C I joint theater communications system to provide vertical and horizontal
5-4 8 April 2005

FM 3-01.94
Communications
connectivity with Army, joint, multinational elements and subordinate ADA elements for
joint or combined operations.
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
5-12. Internal communications resources consist of various types of organic equipment,
which includes radios [line of sight and single channel tactical satellite (SCTACSAT)],
telephones, facsimile machines, modems, routers, switches and computers. This
equipment is an integral part of the TOC (AMDPCS) and enables the AAMDC staff to
access and exchange critical information from unclassified and classified voice and data
networks. The equipment, with few exceptions, is defense information infrastructure -
COE compliant and utilizes approved protocols. The Army common hardware/software
(telephones, headsets, radios, antennas, computer system hardware, software, databases,
applications, and local area network equipment) is organic to the AAMDC. To improve
battle command SA, newly developed equipment and information technology are
integrated into TOC operations by the G6, often on an experimental or evaluative basis.
The G6 manages emplacement and maintenance of internal TOC communications and
information systems.
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
5-13. External communications are provided by assigned, attached, or supporting
communications units/elements external to the AAMDC TOC. This includes any
assigned or attached signal battalions, tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications,
commercial communications as well as theater networks such as the ACUS, TADIL
networks and voice networks required to support the JDN.
TACTICAL SIGNAL SUPPORT

5-14. The AAMDC requires theater-level tactical signal support consisting of
multichannel voice, high-speed data, video, and imagery to assigned and attached ADA
brigades and active air defense units. Theater signal forces will provide signal support for
the AAMDC. Supporting theater signal infrastructure will provide the assured access and
4
speed of service requirements associated with AAMDC C operations. These forces must
accommodate a mix of switching and long-haul transmission-capable systems/modular
packages, and must be capable of providing a bandwidth on demand to support critical
information exchange requirements, including the common operational picture, video
teleconferencing, and automated decision support.
TACTICAL SATELLITE
5-15. The AAMDC requires an organic, beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) SCTACSAT radio
net to support C2 requirements during periods of mobility as well as static operations
because of widely separated theater critical assets that must be protected by AMD forces.
The AAMDC AMD C2 and coordination net (see Figure 5-2) are absolutely essential
during early entry and subsequent phases of an operation to transmit critical operational
4
information to AMD units, logistical support locations, and joint C I facilities.
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JOINT
AMD HEU
LNOs
CORPS
ADABDE
EAC
ADA BDE
AAMDC PATRIOT
NCS BN
X
AMD X
TF
X
PATRIOT
BTRY
PATRIOT
BN Legend:
Command & Control
THAAD
BTRY Coordination
PATRIOT If next HEU not deployed
BTRY or as necessary for non-
doctrinal employments
2
Figure 5-2. AAMDC C and Coordination Net.
The TACSAT will provide the required communications connectivity to units and
facilities deployed throughout the geographical AO. Past battlefield experience has
demonstrated that the early deployment of AMD forces into a theater results in AMD
communications requirements that exceed the capability of the supporting signal forces
and results in degraded mission defense posture. The deployments in these theaters
exceed the normal doctrinal distances for current organic communication relay
capabilities and are in areas that have limited ACUS or austere commercial backbone
support, thereby preventing line-of-sight communications and data systems from assured
connectivity. In addition to ADA TACSAT being a critical link during early phases of a
deployment, single channel TACSAT is required to support sustainment operations in
theaters where a reduced US and multinational force presence has resulted in severely
2
reduced communications support and degraded ADA C . TACSAT radios will be
required as an organic resource to the ADA brigades, battalions, and batteries. Each
Patriot battery requires TACSAT communications capabilities for use in force projection
operations or for designated master battery operations as part of a mission-tailored AMD
Task Force. The AAMDC must also monitor several SCTACSAT channels to include
the air defense command and control net (ADCCN), track supervision net (TSN), and
data coordination net (DCN).
TACTICAL FM
5-16. Combat radio nets serve to provide communications during periods of mobility,
initial TOC setup, and during failures of the supporting area communications networks.
Because the AAMDC is a theater echelon unit, only a minimum number of radios are
5-6 8 April 2005
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Communications
required. Because the individual operational cells may be required to move separately,
separate radios will be needed where indicated. Participants in the net are shown in
Figure 5-3.
CDR
AAMDC
PASSIVE DCDR
DEFENSE AAMDC
CELL
ATTACK COMM VAN ACTIVE

OPERATIONS (NCS) DEFENSE
CELL CELL
CDR DCDR CURRENT

EAC BDE EAC BDE OPERATIONS
EAC BDE
Figure 5-3. AAMDC Command Operations Radio Net.

5-17. The AAMDC admin-log net’s purpose is to facilitate logistical support for the
AAMDC, subordinate AD brigade (and battalions), and to meet the needs of the HHB
AAMDC. Participants in the net are shown in Figure 5-4.
CDR
HHB
AAMDC
G1/4 VAN
(NCS)
HHB MOTOR S1/4

MAINTENANCE EAC AD BDE
Figure 5-4. AAMDC Admin-Log Radio Net.
COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS
5-18. To support operational requirements for external intertheater and intratheater
communications sustaining base support, the AAMDC requires voice and data (wide and
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narrow band) access to commercial long-distance service as well as a tie-in to a host

nation's communications infrastructure.
5-19. The AAMDC operates with specialized leased communications and emerging
technologies such as use of the net trunking radio system, cellular phones, and or
international maritime satellite terminal.
5-20. Normally, a T-1 connection (1.544 megahertz bandwidth telecommunications
channel) or larger is required for secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET)
connectivity into a theater of operations. The senior Army G6/J6 component in theater
validates AAMDC technical requirements, while the JCCC coordinates with the theater
signal command for signal support and availability. Pre-positioned and non-organic on-
site signal units/modular packages are OPCON to the theater signal command’s joint
systems control for technical direction and reporting, as the AAMDC does not have the
resources nor the management functions to plan or engineer these additional assets into
the external networks.
THEATER NETWORKS
5-21. Theater networks are characterized by a broad-based set of joint users who access
database information from multiple sources via an information network grid (for
example, an interconnected set of networks and systems for information services). The
network-centric grid system consists of sensor grids (for example, grids from space-, air-,
sea-, and ground-based sensors generating battlespace awareness); engagement grids (for
example, grids of air-, sea-, and ground-based shooters exploiting battlespace awareness);
and an information grid currently comprised of multiple-force ACUS communication
systems. In the future, it will also consist of WIN-T component system threads
supporting computational and or control nodes that synchronize live combat power and
simulations for battlespace awareness. The AAMDC must be able to access the network-
centric grid system through a variety of “push” or “pull” operations by its four
operational elements. There may also be an operational benefit to using the emerging
broadcast systems such as the global broadcast system, which might be used as a large
throughput communications system to either “pull” large databases or facilitate wide-area
dissemination of critical, time-sensitive information such as TBM early warnings.
5-22. Guiding principles for AAMDC connectivity to the theater are that its
communications and automated information systems be:
• Sufficiently flexible to accommodate expansion of TAMD-phased
operations.
• Joint and multinational capable.
• Robust, redundant, and real-time.
• Supported with data integrity and security.
• Accessible and sustainable for increased velocity of information or
high data infrastructure capacity.
• Supported with a comprehensive and wide-ranging backplane
(backbone network).
5-23. An example of an existing "smart-push" information feed is the intelligence
broadcast service (IBS). The IBS [IBS-interactive (I) and TBS-simplex (S)] will
subsume the tactical information broadcast service (TIBS), the tactical receive equipment
and related applications TRAP data dissemination system (TDDS), the tactical
reconnaissance intelligence exchange system and several other legacy systems with the
fielding of the joint tactical terminal radio. The joint tactical terminal radio is presently
used in the AO cell for IPB, and in the current operations cell for SA, launch data, and
5-8 8 April 2005

FM 3-01.94
Communications
predictive analysis. An example of an existing "intelligent- pull" feed is the logistic and
sustainment data requested from a database by various units and users. Both “push” and
“pull” information feeds are representative of the spectrum of available information
exchange/automated decision sources that support theater operations.
AAMDC AREA COMMON USER SYSTEM SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

5-24. Figure 5-5 on the following page shows AAMDC ACUS service requirements
within a theater. Information entries correlate with the previously discussed general
categories of information such as SA, C2, operations and intelligence, and
administrative/logistics. The AAMDC C2 and support systems include both
communications and automation systems for access to intertheater and or intratheater
common-user services. The AAMDC's connectivity into the theater communications
system relies on the ACUS. The ACUS, primary provider for the Army EAC ADA
community, assures AAMDC users access to theater level network switching, gateway
access, and redundancy to robustly support TAMD operations. AAMDC users own and
operate the requisite subscriber terminals that connect to external information systems.
Automated data systems and terminals use the various means of connectivity to support
all facets of planning and operations. Appendix A describes the automated systems that
rely on connectivity to other external and internal systems or terminals.
COMPONENT ELEMENTS INFORMATION
CJTF Staff SA, C2, O&I, A/L

JFC LNOs
JFLCC Staff
DOCC
ACE
JFLCC/ARFOR BCD SA, C2, O&I, A/L
EAC ADA Brigades
Corps ADA Bde/CADE
LNOs
JAOC, C2 Ships, TACC

JFACC/AADC/ACA/AFFOR RADC/SADC SA, C2, O&I
JICO
LNOs
JFMCC Staff
JFMCC/NAVFOR/MARFOR RADC/SADC SA, C2, O&I
LNOs
JFSOCC/JSOTF JFSOCC Staff SA, C2, O&I

LNOs
Figure 5-5. ACUS Service Requirements for AAMDC.
JOINT DATA NETWORK

5-25. Operationally, the single most important network to the AAMDC is the multi-
TADIL network, which exists within the JDN. It is used almost exclusively for
2
distributing air picture data and C data such as real-time tracks, unit status information,
engagement status, and engagement operations orders among joint service TAMD
2
systems and C level nodes. While the net has a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff mandate
to migrate to a total TADIL-J network, several participants continue to utilize TADIL-
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A/Link 11A and TADIL-B/Link 11B. Until all AMD participants have TADIL-J
capability, non TADIL-J units may enter the network using TADIL-A and or TADIL-B.
When all joint TAMD systems are connected via TADIL-J, coalition forces may continue
to use legacy systems. For this reason, and for continuity of operations, the legacy
capabilities of the TADIL A and TADIL B will be retained.
5-26. Figure 5-6 illustrates a typical JDN architecture, with primary and alternative
links/paths. TADIL-A and TADIL-B links are generally for systems not yet TADIL-J
[joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS)] capable and for backup or
secondary network contingencies. The serial TADIL-J is used to exchange data in
TADIL-J format over long-haul media such as ACUS, cable, or satellite. Currently,
serial TADIL-J provides a limited capability for theater data exchange until a joint range
extension capability becomes available. Joint range extension will provide extended
range connectivity between Army, joint, and multinational units within a theater of
operations. It will enable TADIL-J information to be exchanged over distances greater
than 30 km or over lesser distances in areas where the line-of-sight is restricted by
mountains, vegetation, buildings, or other terrain features (natural or manmade).
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Communications
ALTERNATIVE Data Link Architecture

TADIL-A
TADIL-B
PADIL Other Services/
SERIAL-J
Coalition Forces
Note 6
Note 6
UHFHF
MSE/
Tactical FiberTRITAC
Satellite Optic
Cable
Joint Tactical Air
Note 5
TADIL-J
Ground Station
Note1
Note 1 Army Air & Missile
Defense Command
ADA BRIGADE
PATRIOT
BATTALION Note 2
UHF PADIL
PATRIOT BATTERY Note 3
ADAM CELL
MANEUVER DIVISION
A2C2
MANEUVER
BATTALION ABMOC
Notes:
1. Requires special interface and SINCGARS
coordination
MANEUVER
2. When Battery command post
present SENSORS
3. Only one SHORAD C2 element
transmits track data SINCGARS EPLRS
4. 1CD, 3ID, and 4ID only MANEUVER FDL Note 4
5. Army Class 2M terminal is IJMS WEAPONS
and TADIL-J capable
6. Service Coalition force
dependent
Figure 5-6. Typical Multi-TADIL Architecture/Joint Data Network.

5-27. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6120.01X, joint multi-TADIL
operating procedures, mandates an operational requirement for several supporting,
servicing, and overhead voice networks for TADIL participants in the JDN. These nets
are used to oversee JDN operations, manage and control the net, and ensure air picture
quality. Two of these nets—the ADCCN and the TSN—are often single channel
TACSAT based because of the requirement to communicate BLOS. A third—the
DCN—is a voice network that operates via SCTACSAT (preferred method), but if not
available dial-and-hold circuits can be used. The OPTASKLINK provides the voice
circuits within the theater.
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5-28. The ADCCN in Figure 5-7 is used to disseminate changes to the AADP. This
includes changes to tactical operational data defined positions, responsibilities or status.
Examples of information passed over the ADCCN are missile engagement zone
activation or deactivation, cross-boundary engagements, voice reporting of alert status or
weapon release conditions, changes to surveillance areas or track production areas, etc.
AADC AAMDC
(NCS)
TACSAT ADA BDE
OTHER SERVICES
AMD TASK FORCE THAAD BN
SHORAD BN PATRIOT BN
THAAD BTRY
PATRIOT BTRY*
* WHEN BCP PRESENT
Figure 5-7. Army AMD Participants in the ADCCN.

5-29. The TSN, in Figure 5-8, is used by the track data coordinator to ensure all data on
the interface is promptly reported, reported in the correct location, reported by only one
unit, and that the reported data is correct. All units that input track data to the joint
interface should monitor the TSN.
TDC
(NCS)
TACSAT
OTHER SERVICES PATRIOT BTRY*
SHORAD BN PATRIOT BN
AM D TASK FORCE
* W HEN BCP PRESENT
Figure 5-8. Army AMD Participants in the TSN.

5-30. The DCN is used by the ICO to manage and coordinate the multi-TADIL interface.
The DCN is established over telephone circuits and connects the ICO or his
representative with participants from the following Army AMD organizations: AAMDC
G6; ADA brigades; Patriot battalions and batteries, Maneuver AMD battalions, AMD
task forces; and THAAD battalions and batteries. The battalions require SCTACSAT
capabilities to be active participants on the TSN and DCN for rapid coordination with the
JICO cell.
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Communications
5-31. The JTIDS Class 2/MIDS radio (the Army uses the AN/GSQ-240 Class 2M model
and or the AN/USQ-140 (V)2 MIDS radio) is a computerized radio developed to provide
joint forces with a high-speed, high-volume information transfer system, with
characteristics especially suited to TAMD operations. It requires a separate computer to
initialize and monitor its operation, and a separate information processing system to drive
and interpret its outgoing and incoming information. The AAMDC uses its JTIDS radio
primarily to monitor the air picture from the JDN. The AAMDC plays a key role in the
JDN’s planning. The JDN must be coordinated, planned, and designed in advance of
implementation. The Army ICO, residing in the G6 staff, coordinates with Army AMD
units, the Army AMD network design facility, and the JICO to plan the network design
with the information exchange requirements that have been provided by subordinate units
and the command.
SUMMARY
4
5-32. C I for the AAMDC mission must be accomplished using existing joint and service
4
C I systems and resources efficiently to ensure integration with other operational
4
functions and to optimize scarce resources. The C I system enables and integrates
TAMD operations. It provides timely threat assessment, tactical warning, mission
4
assignment, targeting data, and post-strike assessment. TAMD C I capabilities must
support the principles of centralized planning, decentralized execution, and coordinated
efforts by forces assigned TAMD tasks. There is an absolute requirement for vertical and
horizontal technical and procedural interoperability, both from a joint and multinational
aspect. AAMDC relies on supporting theater signal infrastructure to provide assured
4
access and speed of service requirements associated with AAMDC C I operations. The
G6 is the focal point for properly planning, coordinating, and overseeing the integration
of requested services into the AAMDC network-centric portion in theater.
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Appendix A
Equipment
This appendix describes the equipment used in the AAMDC TOC to plan and execute
the AAMDC mission. The equipment consists of an integrated system of hardware
and software collectively known as AMDPCS. The AMDPCS includes shelters,
computers, and communication equipment, and is supported by a variety of ancillary
equipment.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER LAYOUT

A-1. The TOC is modular, comprised of six octagonal, quick erect, soft-walled shelters
and five high-mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), as shown in Figure
A-1, in a single site configuration (for illustrative purposes). The AMDPCS equipment
needed to plan and execute the AAMDC mission is distributed throughout the TOC’s
operational cells. The configuration of the TOC can be changed to satisfy the
requirements of METT-TC. Each AAMDC will have FSOP describing their most
common layouts for assigned contingency or HLD missions.
Active
Defense
Van
Passive
Communications Defense
Van Van
G3
Active/Passive
Defense
Battle CPT/
G6
Current OPS
G2/Attack
Operations
G2/
Van
Attack OPS
G1/G4 G3 Plans
Se
cu
rit
y
ENTRANCE G1/G4
Van
Figure A-1. Layout of TOC.
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ACTIVE/PASSIVE DEFENSE CELL

A-2. The AD and PD cell and vans equipment consist of two air defense systems
integrator (ADSI) remote monitor workstations and a tactical situational display, an
AMDWS, a global command and control system-Army (GCCS), the worldwide origin
and threat system (WOTS), and laptop computers. This equipment is described as
follows:
• The ADSI is a suite of automated communications equipment capable
of receiving and transmitting messages in a variety of TADIL
formats. This enables the ADSI to exchange air picture and other
tactical information with joint and Army systems. The ADSI also
receives intelligence information via the TIBS and the tactical receive
equipment and related applications TDDS. This tactical and
intelligence information is displayed on the ADSI tactical display and
passed to other processors through a serial connection within the
TOC, including the AMDWS. TIBS/TDDS data is passed to the
AMDWS through the LAN.
• The AMDWS is the primary tool for monitoring and managing AMD
operations. It receives air SA from the ADSI, and ground situation
and intelligence information from the maneuver control system, all
source analysis system (ASAS) remote workstation and other sources.
The AMDWS maintains a comprehensive database of the tactical
situation and also provides mission-planning capabilities to overlay
sensor coverage, weapons coverage, ACMs, threat locations, and
planned unit positions.
• The GCCS receives air and missile SA, joint friendly force
information, intelligence information, and weather data from a
variety of sources. The cell uses this information to keep track of the
TM situation and the locations of friendly forces so they can quickly
be warned in the event of a TM or NBC attack.
• The WOTS receives reports of TM launches from theater and national
intelligence sources. It correlates these reports and displays event
numbers, the numbers of missiles launched, the predicted impact
ellipses, and the estimated impact times.
• The laptop computers are used for both operational and
administrative purposes and provide connectivity via the SIPRNET
to AAMDC staff and LNOs and other SIPRNET users. The PD laptop
computers host software that can be used to predict the ground
effects of a TM warhead burst, and also determine which friendly
units will be affected by NBC agents.
G2/ATTACK OPERATIONS CELL

A-3. The G2/AO cell and van equipment includes the automated deep operations
coordination system (ADOCS), the ASAS (Light), the generic area limitation
environment (GALE), and laptop computers as described:
• The ADOCS is an integrated set of automated tools used for mission
planning, coordination, analysis, and data management. It displays a
variety of data including friendly and enemy unit locations, air
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Equipment
corridors, restricted fire areas, and operational graphics. It is used to

submit TM target nominations to the DOCC and provide friendly
artillery and fire support coordination measure SA to the AO cell and
LNOs.
• The ASAS Light receives and correlates data from strategic and
tactical intelligence sensors and sources. This data includes
electronic, signal, imagery, and human intelligence. The ASAS Light
displays the enemy and friendly situations and includes tools that can
be used to perform IPB, situation and event analysis, and target
planning.
• The GALE is an automated workstation that contains a
comprehensive terrain database. It is capable of analyzing terrain
and predicting the most probable locations of enemy launch areas,
forward operating bases, hide sites, and support areas. It is also
capable of modeling the movement of enemy mobile launch platforms
and predicting where they are going, what roads they will be using
and the time required to reach their destinations.
• The laptop computers are used for operational, administrative, and
intelligence information dissemination purposes and provide
connectivity via the SIPRNET to AAMDC staff, LNOs and other
SIPRNET users.
G1 PERSONNEL AND G4 LOGISTICS CELL

A-4. The equipment for the G1 personnel and G4 logistics cell and van currently includes
two AMDWS, and laptop computers. Based on METT-TC and theater, the G1/G4 cell
may use GCCS instead of AMDWS. This equipment is described as follows:
• The AMDWS is used by the G1/G4 cell to manage personnel and
logistics functions. It provides an automated rollup for submitting
personnel reports, unit reports, and daily summaries.
• The GCCS is an automated system that provides timely situational
awareness and force projection information to allow the G1/G4 staff
to support current and future operations. It is capable of rapidly
collecting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating critical personnel,
logistics, medical, and financial information, as well as used in
planning and decision-making activities.
• The laptop computers are used for operational, administrative, and
logistics purposes and provide connectivity via the SIPRNET to
AAMDC staff, LNOs, and other SIPRNET users.
BATTLE CAPTAIN/CURRENT OPERATIONS/COMMAND GROUP

CELL
A-5. The battle captain/current operations and command group contains workspace and
facilities for the AAMDC commander, the chief of staff, and the battle captain. The
battle captain’s workstation includes the central communications display, which is used
to direct and coordinate AAMDC operations. The central communications display is
linked via the LAN to other workstations within the TOC. It allows the battle captain to
selectively view other displays including the ADOCS, GALE, ADSI, AMDWS, ASAS
8 April 2005 A-3
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Light, and WOTS. It also allows him to communicate with operators of other displays to
facilitate coordination of TOC operations.
G3 PLANS CELL
A.6. The G3 plans cell equipment includes the AMDWS and laptop computers. The
AMDWS is utilized to assist the MDMP and maintains a comprehensive database of the
tactical situation and also provides mission-planning capabilities to overlay sensor
coverage, weapons coverage, ACMs, threat locations, and planned unit positions. The
laptop computers are used for both operational and administrative purposes and provide
connectivity via the SIPRNET to AAMDC staff, LNOs, and other SIPRNET users.
G6 COMMUNICATIONS CELL
A-7. The G6 communications cell and van equipment includes the ADSI, various
communications equipment, which in some instances is utilized throughout the TOC (see
communications equipment section below), and laptop computers. The ADSI is a suite
of automated communications equipment capable of receiving and transmitting messages
in a variety of TADIL formats. This enables the ADSI to exchange air picture and other
tactical information with joint and Army systems. The laptop computers are used for
both operational and administrative purposes and provide connectivity via the SIPRNET
to AAMDC staff, LNOs, and other SIPRNET users. The PAO laptop computer is also in
this cell.
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
A-8. The AMDPCS communications equipment includes many pieces. These various
items are described in the following paragraphs.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER NET

A-9. The TOC NET system consists of two different types of line replaceable units, a
micro central switching unit (MCSU) and a crew access unit (CAU). Vehicle
subsystems, or nodes, can be constructed with a building block approach. Multiple nodes
(up to 64) can be networked together to form one larger system with up to 1024 assets
(radios, phones, operators).
MICRO CENTRAL SWITCHING UNIT

A-10. The MCSU provides the central processing and interface functions for each node.
It also provides the physical interface ports for external communication assets, digitizes
audio signals, distributes the audio, and interacts with the CAU for control and audio
functions. Functional configuration can be established or modified and software
upgrades can be installed in the field through maintenance interface ports.
CREW ACCESS UNIT

A-11. The CAU allows the operator to access and control various communications
functions. The operator selects the desired functions and commands by placing a finger,
or other pointing device, on the surface of the amber electro luminescent quarter VGA
touch screen. Using the CAU menu pages, the operator may configure and use the
TOCNET system as needed. The touch panel has infrared touch control and is MOPP IV
and cold weather gear compatible. The CAU provides two headset ports compatible with
A-4 8 April 2005
FM 3-01.94
Equipment
standard headsets including Bose ANR, handset, or hand microphone. The CAU has one
8-ohm speaker output and one RS-232 maintenance port.
SOFT CREW ACCESS UNIT

A-12. The Soft CAU is an optional user interface, which runs on a workstation, a PC, a
laptop computer, or a PocketPC. The Soft CAU takes advantage of Windows GUI
features (for example, drop down menus, radio buttons, etc.) and provides capability
similar to a CAU for operator control or interaction and audio connection. This allows the
operator to use a mouse or other pointing device for control and interaction, while routing
MCSU audio through the headphones attached to the computing system emulating the
CAU.
SERIAL DISTRIBUTION
A-13. The distribution of serial data starts from the communications vehicle and is
distributed to all the vehicles in the AAMDC TOC through an 8-channel fiber optic
interconnecting cable. Workstations permanently installed in the vehicles requiring a
serial feed are pre-wired with the appropriated feed. In addition each vehicle in the TOC
has two 9-pin connectors in the tent interface panel from which any outside workstation
requiring a serial feed can connect.
DIGITAL NONSECURE VOICE TELEPHONE

A-14. The MCSU provides interface for eight conditioned diphase 4-wire digital
interfaces. Each interface is capable of either driving one digital phone [digital nonsecure
voice telephone (DNVT)] or connecting to one channel of an external mobile subscriber
equipment (MSE) type switch. When an external phone is connected, the MCSU can
supply power to the phone. The operating mode is software selectable for each line and
is set by entries into the configuration file.
VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL

A-15. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) channels is the transfer of voice data across
the Internet using IP protocol. The analog voice is digitized and optionally compressed
before being routed across the Internet where it is received and reconverted back to
analog by the far end. The process of establishing connections across the Internet to be
used for VoIP call is controlled by ITU video, and other data type connections. Other
specifications exist for the call setup and data exchange including session initiated
protocol and media gateway control protocol; however H.323 is currently the most
common type and most VoIP equipment can be configured to operate in H.323
compatible mode.
TSEC/KY-68 DIGITAL SECURE VOICE TERMINAL

A-16. The TSEC/KY-68 Digital Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT) is a ruggedized terminal
used for encrypting/decrypting voice traffic and provides secure digitized data traffic. It
includes a push-to-talk handset and operates as a full duplex voice/data subscriber
terminal and is switch selectable for 16 or 32 kilobytes per second.
PATCH PANELS
A-17. The communications patch panel allows routing of external and internal signals
and provides flexibility in configuring interconnections between equipment and routing
around line failures.
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LINE TERMINATION UNIT

A-18. The line termination unit can provide up to 18 channels and is utilized as a
multiplexer/demultiplexer. It functions in support of receiver/transmitter MSE
communications.
UHF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS RADIO

A-19. The UHF satellite communications (SATCOM) radios are used for satellite and
line-of-sight communications operating the 225- to 400-megahertz UHF band. It provides
data and secure/nonsecure voice capability.
AN/GRC-138 TRANSCEIVER
A-20. The AN/GRC-138 receiver/transmitter is a high frequency/very high frequency
(HF/VHF) system that operates with a frequency 1.6 to 60 megahertz. The built-in
modem allows 2400 or 300 bytes per second (data communication.
TSEC/KY-99 TRUNK ENCRYPTION DEVICE

A-21. The TSEC/KY-99 provides the secure voice for and is collocated with selected
UHF SATCOM radios.
SECURE TELEPHONE UNIT

A-22. The Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III provides a secure voice and data telephone
capability between commercial networks. It operates over most existing telephone
networks and has selectable specific modes of secure operation.
AN/GSQ-240 JTIDS 2M TERMINAL/ANTENNA

A-23. JTIDS is the primary interface means for radio frequency TADIL-J information to
be received from and transmitted into the JDN. The terminal utilizes embedded crypto to
process secure digital data information such as situational awareness, friendly force
management, and targeting information. It operates in the bandwidth from 960 to 1215
megahertz.
TACTICAL TELEPHONES
A-24. Tactical telephone users are shown in Figure A-2. These users may be physically
located in the TOC or in a fixed facility in the vicinity of the TOC.
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Equipment
USER INSTRUMENT USER INSTRUMENT
CG, 32d AAMDC DNVT MSRT Entry Control Point (TOC) DNVT
(Vehicle)
DCG, 32d AAMDC DNVT G4 DNVT
Chief of Staff DNVT G4 Log Officer DNVT
Deputy Chief of Staff DNVT G6 DNVT
SGS DNVT G6 Help Desk DNVT
Headquarters DNVT CRC1 ADI Data (TOC) ADI

Commandant
PAO DNVT CRC1 ADI (TOC Comms Van) DSVT (KY-68)
SJA/IG DNVT CRC1 ADI (TOC Comms Van) DSVT (KY-68)
G1 DNVT EAC Bde LNOs DNVT
G2 DNVT THAAD LNO (TOC) DNVT
G2 Analysis Chief DNVT Corps ADA Bde LNO (TOC) DNVT
G2 Current Ops DNVT Theater Spt Cmd LNO (TOC) DNVT
G3 DSVT (KY-68) Allied/Multinational LNO DNVT

(TOC)
G3 DNVT Allied/Multinational LNO DNVT

(TOC)
G3 Ops/Battle Cpt DNVT Allied/Multinational LNO DNVT

(TOC)
G3 Plans Officer DNVT LNO Spare DNVT
Active Defense DNVT Spare DNVT
Attack Operations DNVT Spare DNVT
Passive Defense DNVT
Figure A-2. Tactical Telephone Users.
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
A-25. Ancillary equipment, shown in Figure A-3, includes three HMMWV support
vehicles, a COMSEC van, two deployable rapid assembly shelters (DRASH or similar
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type shelters) utilities shelter transporter (UST) trailers, two 35 kilowatt power
generators, and eight equipment storage containers.
UST M1097 HMMWV UST M1097 HMMWV

(AC/20K GEN) (SUPPORT VECH.) (AC/20K GEN) (SUPPORT VECH.)
GST M1097 HMMWV GST COMSEC VAN

(35K GEN) (SUPPORT VECH.) (35K GEN)
ISU-90 QUADCON
ISU-90 MOTOR BOX NBC
BOX SYSTEMS POOL SUPPLY
SYSTEMS EQUIP.
Figure A-3. AAMDC Ancillary Equipment.
SUPPORT VEHICLES
A-26. The HMMWV support vehicles are used to transport the UST trailers, power
generators, and other support equipment. The UST trailers each contain an integrated
environmental control unit (ECU), electrical generator and power panel. When deployed,
the ECU provides air-conditioning/heating for the AMDPCS shelters. The cargo area at
the rear of each UST trailer is used to transport the DRASH shelters.
COMSEC VAN
A-27. The COMSEC van is used for secure storage and to transport one of the 35
kilowatt generators.
GENERATORS
A-28. The 35 kilowatt generators, along with the 20 kilowatt generators on the UST
trailers, provide the electrical power required to run the AMDPCS during operations.
STORAGE CONTAINERS
A-29. The storage containers are used to store a variety of equipment and supplies
required to support AAMDC operations. The containers are air lifted into the theater of
operations and transported to the operational site using nonorganic transportation
facilities.
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Appendix B
Air and Missile Defense Annex (Sample)
This appendix provides a sample outline for an Army level AMD annex with related
appendices. The sample is formatted as it will normally appear when used by AMD
planners.
ANNEX ___(AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE) TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO ___
References: Maps, charts, datum, and other relevant documents.
Time Zone Used throughout the Order:
1. SITUATION. Thoroughly describe the operational environment in which the major operation
will be conducted. Include tactical information for early phases of the operation.
2. MISSION. Describe the Army TAMD mission in terms of the objective that must be
accomplished and its aim or purpose. Provide an overview of the mission of integrated TAMD
operations in support of the JFC or JFLCC.
3. EXECUTION. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the commander's vision of TAMD

mission accomplishment.
a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Describe the commander's vision of how the TAMD

mission will be accomplished for all phases of the operation, to include the intent for the execution
of operations for each of the four TMD operational elements. Discuss defense of critical assets,
sensors, AD, AO, PD, and AOR for each phase of the operation.
b. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. Provide the tasks for each phase of the
operation in a subparagraph for units supporting TMD operations.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Provide operational support instructions that are of primary interest to
the elements being supported. Refer to the basic OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Provide information concerning CP locations, succession of

command, and liaison requirements. State, in broad terms, the primary links for synchronizing
and integrating TAMD operations.
Figure B-1. Outline of Air and Missile Defense Annex.
8 April 2005 B-1
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APPENDIX 1. INTELLIGENCE
1. SITUATION. Describe the situation in terms of enemy air and theater missile forces, and
friendly units available for TAMD operations.
2. MISSION. Describe the mission of intelligence operations.
3. EXECUTION.
a. AREAS OF OPERATION. Identify specific features of the environment or activities

within it that may influence available courses of action or the commander's decisions. Focus on
the characteristics that will influence the TAMD mission.
b. ENEMY SITUATION. Describe the enemy air and TM situation. Include disposition,
composition and strength, air and TM weapon capabilities, recent and present significant
activities, and peculiarities and weaknesses regarding enemy air and TM forces.
c. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Provide a determination of threat air and TM force

capabilities, enemy COAs, and doctrinal principles and TTPs threat forces prefer to employ.
d. DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE. The doctrinal template illustrates the deployment pattern

and disposition preferred by the threat's normal tactics when not constrained by the effects of the
battlefield environment.
e. NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST. NAIs are points or areas where enemy activity (or
lack of activity) confirm or deny enemy COAs.
f. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. PIRs are information requirements

compiled by the commander regarding enemy COAs or capabilities that could significantly impact
on the commander's decisions and or identify critical intelligence gaps.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See basic AMD Annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Provide information concerning CP locations, succession of

command, and liaison requirements.
TAB A. Doctrinal template.
TAB B. NAIs.
Figure B-1. Outline of Air and Missile Defense Annex (continued).

B-2 8 April 2005
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APPENDIX 2. ATTACK OPERATIONS
1. SITUATION. Describe the situation in terms of enemy TM and air forces and capabilities and
friendly units available for TAMD attack operations.
2. MISSION. Describe the mission of attack operations-capable forces.
3. EXECUTION.
a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Describe the operational concept for each of the

phases of the operation. Include AO guidance and targeting priorities for the AAMDC
commander, land component commander and the JFC.
b. AIR SUPPORT. Provide information on the employment and availability of air assets
for attack operations. Describe the procedures for quick reaction use of Army aviation, Air
Force, Navy and Marine assets to attack TELs and/or other short dwell-time targets of
opportunity.
c. FIELD ARTILLERY. List artillery assets capable of engaging TMD targets to include
unit designation and type and number of munitions available. Include unit location and launch
authority if available.
d. ARMY AVIATION. List available assets.
e. NAVAL SUPPORT. Provide naval TMD task organization and the coordination
procedures for employment of Naval assets.
f. ELECTRONIC WARFARE. Describe the establishment and coordination of EW

priorities. Details are provided in the information operations warfare appendix.
g. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. Provide the locations of the fire support

coordination line, coordinated fire line, engagement boxes, restricted fire areas, and no-fire
areas. Describe the targeting plan and the assignment of targeting numbers. List the high
priority targets. Provide target selection standards including range, target location errors, and
attack guidance for preemptive strikes. Provide information on ROE and on procedures for
sensor-to-shooter links and target deconfliction to allow components to rapidly engage targets.
Provide ATO cycle and targeting battle rhythm.
h. REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. Provide reporting instructions for attack operation-

capable units, SOF and coordination teams.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See basic AMD Annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Designate the authority for prioritizing, coordinating, and
deconflicting attack operations by AO. Provide locations for the AAMDC, DOCC, JFACC and
SOF units. Provide any code words used to signal TBM activities. Provide procedures for
alerting the force and transmission of launch point calculations to AO forces.
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APPENDIX 3. ACTIVE DEFENSE
1. SITUATION. Describe the situation in terms of enemy air and TM forces and capabilities and
friendly units available to conduct TAMD operations.
2. MISSION. Describe the mission of integrated AD operations in support of the maneuver

forces.
3. EXECUTION. Include a description of the concept of operations and coordinating instructions.
a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. State the plan for the early deployment of AD units to
defend the force and high priority, critical assets (from the defended asset list). Develop a time-
phased plan for disposition of AD assets as they arrive in theater, and as defended forces arrive
in theater. Describe procedures for airspace control and coordination between the joint force
staff, JFACC, AADC, ACA, ARFOR, AAMDC, and EAC and Corps ADA brigades. Describe
procedures for tactical control of fire control elements. Develop these procedures in accordance
with procedural rules developed by the AADC and joint force staff coordinator. Specify the
deployment and employment of counter-RSTA procedures.
b. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. Describe the role of the AAMDC in coordinating,

reconciling, and monitoring AD functions in accordance with the established ROE as promulgated
in the air defense plan. Provide reporting instructions for missioned AD units.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See the basic AMD annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Designate the authority for prioritizing, coordinating, and
deconflicting AD operations. Designate responsibility for coordination and execution of the TAMD
active air defense plan. Provide locations for ADA brigade TOCs, joint force staff, AADC, and
AAMDC. Provide for integration of Corps assets. Provide any code words used to signal air and
TM activities. Provide procedures for transmission of cueing information to AD forces.
Designate reporting communications circuits.
TAB A. TMD priorities.
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APPENDIX 4. PASSIVE DEFENSE
friendly vulnerability to air and TM attack.
2. MISSION. Describe the mission of PD operations.
3. EXECUTION. Describe how Army units will apply PD measures to warn the force, reduce
targeting effectiveness, enhance personnel and equipment survivability, and recover and
reconstitute if attacked. Provide a vulnerability analysis and delineate measures forces should
take to enhance survivability. Specify recovery and reconstitution measures to be taken by
Army units in theater. Describe procedures for warning the force of enemy air and TM attack.
Provide the commander’s philosophy on selective warning versus risk. Describe the procedures
for providing alert messages and early warning (refined alert) messages.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See basic AMD annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See basic AMD annex. Describe the theater warning nets.
TAB A. Warning devices.
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APPENDIX 5. COMMUNICATIONS
2. MISSION. State, in broad terms, the primary communications links used for synchronizing and
integrating AMD operations.
3. EXECUTION. Describe the communications links and nets that facilitate communications for
each phase of the operation. Communications with higher and lower echelon units are described
as well as connectivity to various nets and sensors. Describe voice and data networks and links
for early warning, communications with higher and lower echelon units, joint communications, and
communications with other service components, LNOs, and the BCD.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See basic AMD annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See the basic AMD annex.
TAB A. MSE/TRITAC network.
TAB B. FM nets.
TAB C. Antenna farm.
TAB D. Communications diagrams.
TAB E. Early warning net.
TAB F. LNO net.
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APPENDIX 6. INFORMATION OPERATIONS WARFARE
2. MISSION. Describe the IO warfare mission as it affects TAMD operations.
3. EXECUTION. Describe the employment of IO warfare measures including C2 protection and

destruction or interference with enemy air and TM C3I. Describe the plans for accomplishing C2
protection through OPSEC, signal security (SIGSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC),
deception, and camouflage and concealment.
a. OPSEC. Describe how the enemy will be denied timely information acquisition and
identification of friendly forces. Include communications security, signature reduction, and
physical security measures.
b. SIGSEC. Describe the actions that must be taken to manage communications

emissions over time in a manner that reduces the enemy’s ability to detect and locate C2 nodes.
c. COMPUSEC. Describe the measures that must be taken to protect friendly

electronic data processing systems from infiltration, viruses, etc.
d. DECEPTION. Describe actions that must be taken to mislead the enemy, such as
falsifying the indicators used by the enemy to discern friendly intentions, capabilities, or
dispositions.
e. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Describe cover and concealment measures that

must be taken to counter the enemy’s targeting effectiveness, making Soldiers, units, vehicles,
aircraft, weapons systems, positions and installations difficult to locate, strike and destroy.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See the basic AMD annex and OPLAN.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See the basic AMD annex.
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Appendix C
Critical and Defended Asset Methodology
This appendix provides a recommended methodology for CAL/DAL development.
This methodology is created with CVT assessments of the potential assets to be
defended.
OVERVIEW
C-1. The AMD commander considers METT-TC, IPB, and the supported commander's
intent, concept of operations, and develops AMD priorities. The AMD commander
submits these priorities to the maneuver commander for approval. Priorities are based on
the factors of CVT (FM 3-01.20). CVT is the methodology used to evaluate each asset on
the CAL. This methodology employs objective criteria and quantifies the level of
importance of each asset. The CVT methodology assists the commander in identifying
those assets to be protected from attack using available AMD resources and
accepting risk as necessary. The CVT is a mission, location, and command
influenced process, the numbers and weights, are changeable as required by the
commanders’ intent or as the changing mission dictates.
CRITICALITY
C-2. Criticality is the degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission
accomplishment. Determination of the criticality of an asset or force is made by assessing
the impact on the conduct of the operation that would result from damage to the asset or
force. The degree of criticality is based on whether damage to the asset or force prevents,
seriously interferes with, or causes only limited interference with the execution of the
plan.
VULNERABILITY
C-3. Vulnerability consists of two parts: susceptibility to damage if attacked and
recuperability. Susceptibility to damage is further subdivided into two parts: hardness and
dispersion. Consideration should be given to the asset or force’s hardness and its ability
to disperse or displace to another position. Recuperability is the degree to which an asset
or force can recover from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and available
manpower to continue its mission.
THREAT
C-4. Threat is the assessed probability of an asset or force being targeted for surveillance
or attack. The use of threat information to develop AMD priorities is a reverse IPB
process (what we expect enemy air to detect and attack) based on IPB. Targeting
information provided by intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack
methods, and enemy doctrine is useful in evaluating AMD priorities. To determine the
relative importance of assets and forces, the commander considers certain characteristics,
which make an asset or force a lucrative target for the enemy. In effect, this is reverse
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target “value” analysis. Intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack
methods, and enemy doctrine are useful in assessing the probability that an asset or force
will be targeted by the threat. This is, in effect, reverse target analysis.
THEATER-LEVEL CRITICAL ASSET LISTS

C-5. The CAL is a prioritized list of critical assets identified by phase of the operation.
This list is developed by the J3/J5 with input from the components of the joint forces.
They identify candidate assets to be protected from attack. The JFC or combatant
commander approves the CAL listing and it is included in the OPLAN and AADP. The
CAL development process evaluates critical assets based on CVT, AMD resources,
possible defense designs, and the elements of risk to develop the DAL.
DEFENDED ASSET LIST

C-6. The DAL is a JFC-approved prioritized listing of assets by phase that are to receive
AMD protection. This list is included in the OPLAN and the area AADP. The DAL
specifies required levels of protection for each asset. The DAL may be developed by the
AADC with component input but normally the AADC delegates the DAL process to the
DAADC. The DAADC’s DAL recommendation (with component commanders input) is
submitted through the AADC to the JFC for approval.
BACKGROUND
C-7. The JFC establishes guidance and objectives for JTMD. This guidance should be
reflected in appropriate OPLANS and their annexes. The JFC must define and
implement a methodology for JTMD activities. Assessment of a given threat and risk
analysis will provide the basis for integration of the appropriate joint theater missile
defense capability into the force package to ensure synchronization.
C-8. The JFC’s concept of operations should include prioritization of US and
multinational forces; critical assets; and areas of vital interest or political importance that
should be protected from TM attack. The J5 develops a prioritized list of assets to be
defended from TM attack during various stages of the operation and coordinates the list
with the J3 before approval by the JFC. Active air defense operations defend only what
is most important or critical due to resource limitations and accept some risk should the
enemy attack lower priority assets that are not directly defended.
C-9. The JFC, with input from the components, establishes JTMD priorities based on the
campaign plan. The JFC, or if delegated, the AADC tasks components to develop
detailed priorities. The components conduct COA analysis to prioritize their defended
assets by phase. The AAMDC is involved in this process by assisting the ARFOR and
AADC in planning and coordination of the DAL. The AAMDC commander provides
mission analysis and COAs to defend the JFC’s priorities based on CVT. Factors of
METT-TC must be considered as a part of this analysis. The JFC or AADC with the
components goes through an arbitration process to coalesce all priorities into a single list.
C-10. The DAL is the product from the process of applying the CVT methodology,
AMD resources and defense design to the CAL while identifying risk. It identifies the
prioritized assets from the CAL to be actually defended with the resources available. See
Figure C-1.
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CAL CFC C/JTMD Guidance DAL

J5 Planning Staff
Priorities
AADC/DAADC
JTMD Responsibility Concept of Ops JTMD Responsibility
• Component input • Component input
• Geopolitical input • Active defense coverage of assets
• Identified by phase • Identified by phase of operation
• Coordinated with J3
• Approved by CFC
P-CAL • Coordinated with J3/J5
• Approved by AADC and CFC
J5 Planning Staff
AADC/DAADC Responsibility AMD RESOURCES
DEFENSE DESIGN
• Prioritized list of critical assets RISK
• Identified by phase
NAVFOR • Coordinated with J3/J5
AFFOR • Approved by CFC NAVFOR
AFFOR
CRITICAL CV(R)T
DEFENDED
ASSET GUIDANCE
ASSET
MARFOR LIST ARFOR
MARFOR LIST ARFOR
JSOTF
JSOTF
Conducted during
DYNAMIC PROCESS
Conducted during
MDMP Coordination Board
Figure C-1. DAL Process.

C-11. The coordination board (formerly reprioritization board, see Figure C-2) develops
COAs for adjustments to the DAL. The DAADC normally chairs the coordination board
for the AADC. Normally, the board is comprised of component representatives who
have the authority to make decisions to the board on behalf of their component
commanders. During the coordination board, the AAMDC staff will brief to the board
the status of the enemy TM threat, friendly concept of the operation, active air defense
coverage, and units/capabilities deploying into theater. After discussion, and with
component input, the board will develop a recommendation that the DAADC will pass to
the AADC for approval and forwarding to the JFC for final approval. The board looks
120 hours into the future, finalizes the board recommended COA no later than 96 hours,
and gains a decision between 96 and 72 hours to allow sufficient time for execution of
board decisions.
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Board Evolution
Reprioritization Board Coordination Board

¾ The Reprioritization Board is ¾ Operational level, future focused
used to recommend changes to
air and missile defense priorities ¾ Coordinate and recommend
on the Defended Asset List (DAL) actions across all TMD Operational
and adjustments to the defense Elements based on enemy activities
design during the course of and/or friendly operations
operations
1996 - 2004 ¾ Combined/Joint spectrum in
support of CFC’s campaign plan
¾ Education
Patriot Moves Desired Effects
Figure C-2. Coordination Board Evolution.
SCOPE
C-12. CVT is an objective process that quantifies level of importance based on selected
criteria. When conducting a CVT assessment, one must consider intelligence, air
operations, ground combat operations, maritime operations, and support operations. Each
asset must be evaluated against defined criteria and the criteria must be weighted based
on consideration of the JFC’s intent, concept of operations, and center-of-gravity
concerns. For example, the following weights could be used to define the JFC’s center-
of-gravity or critical event: “Criticality x 3, Threat x 2, and Vulnerability x 2.” Note that
when priorities are phased, assets must be reevaluated in accordance with critical events.
WORKSHEETS
C-13. The purpose of the CVT methodology worksheets is to quantify to the best degree
possible, the relative value of the various assets. The intent is to minimize subjectivity
and maximize objectivity. There are two worksheets, the component asset data sheet and
the component CAL summary sheet. Fill out the asset data sheet for each asset being
proposed for inclusion on the CAL/DAL. The component CAL summary sheet is a rank
ordering of the component’s assets based on the established criteria for each phase.
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COMPONENT ASSET DATA WORKSHEET

C-14. Asset data worksheets (Figure C-3) are used to provide proposed defended asset
names and mission, e.g. “Biggs Army Airfield, air ports of debarkation (APOD)”.
Suggested CAL/DAL assets include, but are not limited to airbases, ports, seaports of
debarkation (SPODs), APODs, C2 nodes, communication centers, assembly and holding
areas, civilian/political sites, logistics bases, and critical component assets. This is a
combined CAL/DAL (US/coalition) worksheet that should include coalition assets.
C-15. Asset data worksheets provide an 8-digit grid coordinate and latitude/longitude
coordinates for center of mass of the asset. If possible, gives a radius size of the asset,
which will be used in planning the defense design. It also provides location name for each
asset being submitted.
C-16. The worksheet describes the assets functions/missions. Based on the component’s
view, describes the asset’s importance to the theater plan and provides the supporting
information needed such as:
• Airbase: Number of aircraft arriving or in place (type, number, C-
dates aircraft are expected to be at the airbase, mission roles, and
type of munitions the aircraft is carrying, such as precision guided
munitions).
• Navy ports: First C-date of operations, capabilities of port, short tons
being delivered through the port.
• SPODs: First C-date of operations, capabilities of port, amount of
cargo arriving/leaving, and start of peak flow.
• APODs: First C-date of operations, capabilities of port, amount of
cargo arriving/leaving, and start of peak flow.
• C2 nodes: First C-date of operations, capabilities, and occupying
headquarters.
• Communications centers: First C-date of operations, capabilities,
occupying signal unit, and type of equipment at location.
• Assembly/holding areas: First C-date of operations, and peak of flow.
• Civilian/Political sites: Political importance.
• Logistics bases: First C-date of operations, peak of flow, type and
quantity of stored supply, and Class I through Class X.
• Critical component assets: First C-date of operations, reasons of
importance, and peak of flow or critical time.
• Other assets: First C-date of operations, start of peak flow, and
reason of importance.
• All assets: Other like/similar assets, mission capabilities and roles,
and other pertinent information.
Additionally, the worksheet provides numerical values according to criteria sheets for
each C-day block/time period.
COMPONENT SUMMARY SHEET (SEE FIGURE C-4, PAGE C-9).

C-17. Fill in the numerical values for each C-day block and rank the order of assets.
RATED CRITERIA
C-18. Criticality (See Table C-1). Criticality is rated 1-10; higher is more critical.
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Table C-1. Criticality.

VALUE CRITERIA
Loss of asset would stop JFC OPLAN execution.
10
Loss of asset would endanger JFC OPLAN execution.
8
Loss of asset would cause a major change in JFC OPLAN.
6
Loss of asset would delay the execution of the next JFC OPLAN
4 phase.
Loss of asset would cause a shift of missions/assets to another
2 location.
ADD 0.5 if asset is JFC center-of-gravity for Phase I, II, or III.

ADD 0.5 if asset is a noncombatant evacuation operation relocation center, aerial port of embarkation, or seaport
of embarkation.
C-19. Susceptibility to damage adds up to a maximum total of 6 points. (See Tables C-2
and C-3).
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Table C-2. Asset/Force Hardness.

VALUE CRITERIA
3 < 29% of facilities hardened
2 30% - 74% of facilities hardened
1 > 75% of facilities hardened
Table C-3. Asset/Force Dispersion/Displacement.
VALUE CRITERIA
3 < 29% of facilities dispersed
2 30% - 74% of facilities dispersed
1 > 75% of facilities dispersed
C-20. Recuperability of force’s capabilities adds up to a maximum of 4 points total.

Susceptibility and recuperability add up to a total of no more than 10 points. (See Tables
C-4 and C-5).
Table C-4. Time for Assets to Recover Infrastructure After Enemy Attack.
VALUE CRITERIA
2.0 Closure > 7 days or permanent closure
1.5 Temporary closure 1 – 7 days
1.0 75% - 100% mission degraded for > 1 day
0.5 25% - 74% mission degraded for > 1 day
Table C-5. Ability to Replicate a Capability/Unit Lost from Enemy Attack.
VALUE CRITERIA
2.0 25% replication of capability/unit
1.5 26% - 75% replication of capability/unit
0.5 100% replication of capability/unit
C-21. Each part of threat has a value no greater than 5, and a combined
total no greater than 10. Higher is more probable to be attacked. (See
Tables C-6 and C-7).
Table C-6. Probability of Enemy Attack.
VALUE CRITERIA
5 High probability of attack
3 Moderate probability of attack
1 Low probability of attack
Table C-7. Probability of Enemy Surveillance.

VALUE CRITERIA
5 High probability of detection
3 Moderate probability of detection
1 Low probability of detection
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Figure C-3. Component Asset Data Sheet.
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Figure C-4. Component CAL Summary Sheet.
8 April 2005 C-9
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Glossary
AADC area air defense commander
area air defense within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force,
commander the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single
commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the
preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and
communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense
operations. Representation from the other components involved will be
provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters.
Also called AADC (JP 1-02)
AADP area air defense plan
AAMDC Army air and missile defense command
ACA airspace control authority
airspace control the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation
authority of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA
(JP 1-02)
ACE analysis and control element
ACM airspace control measure
ACO airspace control order
airspace control an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of
order the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published either as
part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. Also called ACO (JP
1-02)
ACP airspace control plan
airspace control the document approved by the joint force commander that provides specific
plan planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the joint
force area of responsibility/joint operations area. Also called ACP (JP 1-02)
ACUS area common user system
AD active defense
active defense operations that protect selected assets and forces from attack by
destroying TM airborne launch platforms and or TMs in flight.
Active defense also includes those actions that mitigate the
effectiveness of targeting and delivery systems through EW against
remote or onboard guidance systems (JP 1-02)
active air defense direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes
the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other
available weapons (JP 1-02)
ADA air defense artillery
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ADAFCO air defense artillery fire control officer

ADCCN air defense command and control net
ADOCS automated deep operations coordination system
ADSI air defense systems integrator
ADW air defense warning
AMD air and missile defense
air and missile as normally used, the term is synonymous with theater air and missile defense
defense (see entry). However, the term can also be used in a broader context to apply
to any integrated joint force operations conducted to destroy air and missile
threats in flight or prior to launch regardless of whether the operations occur
in an established theater. The term can also be used in a narrower context to
apply to ADA operations (or active defense operations) conducted to destroy
air and missile threats in flight (USAADASCH)
AMDPCS air and missile defense planning and control system
air and missile a standardized, digitized element of equipment in the AAMDC and brigade
defense planning tactical operations centers (TOCs). The AMDPCS consists of an integrated
and control system system of hardware and software required to plan and execute the AAMDC
and brigade missions. It includes vehicles, shelters, computers,
communication, and ancillary equipment (USAADASCH).
AMDWS air and missile defense workstation
AO area of operation; attack operations
area of operations an operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval forces. Areas of
operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint
force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to
accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02)
attack operations offensive actions intended to destroy and disrupt enemy TM
capabilities before, during, and after launch. The objective of these
operations is to prevent the launch of TMs by attacking each
element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying
launch platforms, RSTA platforms, C2 nodes, and missile stocks
and infrastructure (JP 3-01.5)
AOR area of responsibility
APOD air ports of debarkation
ARFOR Army forces
ASAS all source analysis system
ATO air tasking order
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Glossary
air tasking order a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and
C2 agencies those projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specific
missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs,
targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called
ATO (JP 1-02)
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BLOS beyond line-of-sight
C2 command and control
C 4I command, control, communications, computers and intelligence
C 4I the command, control, communications, computers and intelligence
(C4I) system links passive defense, active defense, and attack
operations to provide timely assessment of the threat (to include
IPB); rapid dissemination of tactical warning; and mission
assignment, targeting data, and post-strike assessment to the
appropriate JTMD element. For each operational element, the C4I
system must provide rapid communications among intelligence
assets, the fusion and decision-making facilities, warning systems,
and weapon systems, to include a capability for rapid coordination
with supporting combatant commanders (JP 3-05.1)
CADE corps air defense element
CAL critical asset list
CAU crew access unit
CG commanding general
CM cruise missile
COA course of action
COMARFOR commander of Army forces
COMSEC communications security
CONPLAN contingency plan
CONUS continental United States
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CVT criticality, vulnerability (recuperability), and threat
DAADC deputy area air defense commander
DAL defended asset list
DCA defensive counterair
defensive all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept and destroy or
counterair negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air
environment. Also called DCA (JP 1-02)
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DCN data coordination net

DNVT digital nonsecure voice terminal
DOCC deep operations coordination cell
deep operations an Army organization frequently used at division, corps and Army levels that
coordination cell serves as the center for focusing and integrating the planning, coordination,
synchronization, and execution functions for deep operations. Working with
the BCD and other coordination elements (e.g., AAMDC), the deep
operations coordination cell (DOCC) will plan and coordinate, as appropriate,
the use of fires, combined arms maneuver, SOF, and Army airspace command
2 2
and control (A C ) in support of Army deep maneuver operations (JP 3-
09)
DSVT digital secure voice terminal
EAC echelons above corps
ECU environmental control unit
EOB enemy order of battle
FCO fire control order
FOB forward operating base
GALE generic area limitation environment
GCCS global command and control system
HF high frequency
HHB headquarters and headquarters battery
HLD homeland defense
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
IBS intelligence broadcast service
ICO interface control officer
IG inspector general
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
intelligence an analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the
preparation of the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence
battlespace preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential
area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed
in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment and terrain on
operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the
battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB (JP 1-02)
ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
JAOC joint air operations center
JCCC joint command control communications
JDN joint data network
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Glossary
JFACC joint force air component commander

joint force air the joint force air component commander (JFACC) derives
component authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to
commander exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination
among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to
ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.
The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air
component commander. The joint force air component commander’s
responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander
(normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning
coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force
commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force
commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with
other service component commanders and other assigned or
supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander
will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air
sorties to various missions or geographic areas (JP 1-02)
JFC joint force commander
joint force a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified
commander commander or joint task force commander authorized to exercise
combatant command (command authority) or operational control
over a joint force. Also called JFC (JP 1-02)
JFLCC joint force land component commander
joint force land the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified
component command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander commander for making recommendations on the proper
employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land
operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be
assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the
authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by
the establishing commander. The joint force land component
commander will normally be the commander with the
preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and
control capabilities. Also called JFLCC (JP 1-02)
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
joint force maritime the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or
component joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making
commander recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets,
planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such
operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component
commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks
assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component
commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of
maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also
called JFMCC (JP 1-02)
JFSOCC joint forces special operations component commander
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joint force special the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or
operations joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making
component recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and
commander assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such
operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations
component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force
special operations component commander will normally be the commander
with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite
command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC (JP 1-02)
JICO joint interface control officer
JIM joint, interagency, multinational
JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list
joint integrated a prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by a joint force
prioritized target commander, and maintained by a joint task force. Targets and priorities are
list derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their
proposed operations supporting the joint force commander’s objectives and
guidance. Also called JIPTL (JP 1-02)
JOA joint operations area
joint operations an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant
area commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force
commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military
operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are
particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area
or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters
(JP 1-02)
JTAMD joint theater air and missile defense
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
joint targeting a group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting
coordination board oversight functions that may include, but are not limited to, coordinating
target information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing
and or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of
representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required,
component subordinate units. Also called JTCB (JP 1-02)
JTIDS joint tactical information distribution system
LAN local area network
LNO liaison officer
MCSU micro central switching unit
MDMP military decision making process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and
civil considerations
MNF multinational forces
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Glossary
MSE mobile subscriber equipment

NAI named areas of interest
NBC nuclear, biological and chemical
OCA offensive counterair
offensive counterair offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,
launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and
after launch, but as close to their source as possible. Offensive counterair
operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at
the initiative of friendly forces. These operations include attack operations,
fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses. Also called
OCA (JP 1-02)
OPCON operational control
operational control transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is
inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control
may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command
over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and
forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training
necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational
control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint
force commanders and Service and or functional component commanders.
Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands
and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational
control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational
control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics
or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.
Also called OPCON (JP 1-02)
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPTASKLINK operational tasking data link
PAO public affairs office
PAWS pager alert warning system
PD passive defense
passive defense operations that provide essential individual and collective
protection for friendly forces, population centers, and critical
assets. The principal measures used to accomplish passive defense
are tactical warning, reducing targeting effectiveness, reducing
vulnerability, and recovery and reconstitution (JP 3-01.5)
RADC regional air defense commander
ROE rules of engagement
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rules of engagement directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also
called ROE (JP 1-02)
SA situational awareness
SADC sector air defense commander
SATCOM satellite communications
SCTACSAT single channel tactical satellite
SIPRNET secret internet protocol router network
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations force
SPOD seaport of debarkation
STU secure telephone unit
TAAMDCOORD theater army air and missile defense coordinator
TACON tactical control
tactical control command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military
capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed
and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is
inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and
exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also
called TACON (JP 1-02)
TACSAT tactical satellite
TADIL tactical digital information link
TBM theater ballistic missile
TDDS TRAP data dissemination system
THAAD theater high altitude area defense
TIBS tactical information broadcast service
TM theater missile
theater missile a missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an
air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, nonnuclear, direct
fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided
missiles), whose target is within a given theater of operation. Also
called TM (JP 1-02)
TMD theater missile defense
TOC tactical operations center
FM 3-01.94
Glossary
tactical operations a subelement of a headquarters command post with staff elements (AAMDC,
center brigades, and battalions). A tactical operations center (TOC) consists of a
physical grouping of the staff elements concerned with current and future
tactical operations and tactical support. A key standardized, digitized element
of equipment in the AAMDC and brigade TOCs is the air and missile defense
planning and control system (AMDPCS) (FM 44-100)
TSN track supervision net
TST time sensitive target
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UST utilities shelter transporter
VHF very high frequency
VoIP voice over Internet protocol
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WOTS worldwide origin and threat system
FM 3-01.94
Bibliography
FM 3-0 (100-5). Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-01.7. Air Defense Artillery Brigade Operations. 31 October 2000.
FM 3-01.20. Multiservice Procedures for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Army Air and
Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination. 22 March 2004.
FM 3-05.20 (31-30). Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001.
FM 3-07.2. Force Protection (Initial Draft). June 2003
FM 3-09.31. (6-71) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms
Commander. 1 October 2002.
FM 3-11.4. Multiservice TTP (NBC) Protection. 2 June 2003.
FM 3-11.34. MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields. 29 Sep 2000.
FM 3-14. NBC Vulnerability Analysis. 12 November 1997, Change 1, 24 September 1998.
FM 3-19.1. Military Police Operations. 22 March 2001, Change 1, 31 January 2002.
FM 3-31. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Handbook. 13 December 2001.
FM 3-93. The Army in Theater Operations (Final Draft). 31 December 2003.
FM 3-100.2. Multiservice Procedures for ICAC2 – Integrated Combat Airspace Command and
Control. 30 June 2000.
FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.
FM 4-0. Combat Service Support. 29 August 2003.
FM 5-01.12. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison
Officer Integration. 27 January 2003.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: C2 of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 8 May 1996.
FM 6-24.8. TADIL J – Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference
Guide, 30 June 2000.
FM 7-0 Training the Force. 22 October 2002.
FM 7-1. Battle Focused Training. 15 September 2003.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 31 August 2003.
FM 11-45. Signal Support to Theater Operations. 30 June 1999.
FM 12-6. Personnel Doctrine. 9 September 1994.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. 15 June 2000.
FM 90-43. Multiservice Procedures for Joint Theater Missile Target Development (JTMTD). 15
October 1999.
FM 100-10-2. Contracting Support on the Battlefield. 4 August 1999.
FM 100-12. Army Theater Missile Defense Operations. 31 March 2000.
FM 100-13. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). 5 September 1996.
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. 29 October 1996.
FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
8 April 2005 Bibliography-1
FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.

Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States. 14 November 2000.
Joint Pub 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 10 July 2001.
Joint Pub 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 10September 2001.
Joint Pub 3-01. Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats. 19 October 1999.
Joint Pub 3-01.1. Aerospace Defense of North America, 4 November 1996.
Joint Pub 3-01.5. Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense. 22 February 1996.
Joint Pub 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.
Joint Pub 3-10. Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations. 28 May 1996.
Joint Pub 3-11. Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Environments. 11 July 2000.
Joint Pub 3-30. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 5 Jun 2003.
Joint Pub 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 22 July 1995.
Joint Pub 3-60. Joint Doctrine for Targeting. 17 January 2002.
Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS). 29 July 1998.
STANAG 3880. Counter Air Operations—ATP-42. 15 November 1995.
Bibliography-2
FM 3-01.94
Index
A critical asset list (CAL), C-5, Figure joint force maritime component
active air defense, 1-10, 1-19, 1-24, C-1, C-14 commander (JFMCC), 2-30
1-31, 1-32, 2-29, 3-62, 3-69 joint force special operations
active defense D component commander (JFSOCC),
cell, 3-25, 3-27 defended asset list (DAL), 3-20, C-6, 2-31
forces, 2-20, 3-5 C-10, Figure C-1 joint integrated prioritized target list
functions, 3-7 deputy area air defense commander (JIPTL), 3-40
operations, 3-4, (DAADC), Table 2-1, joint targeting coordination board
planners, 3-10, 3-11, 3-15, 3-21 2-10, 2-11, 2-29, C-11 (JTCB), 3-38
section, 2-33 digital nonsecure voice telephone joint tactical information
sensors, 3-11 (DNVT), A-14, Figure A-2 distribution system (JTIDS), 5-26, 5-
units, 3-16 digital secure voice terminal 31, A-23
air and missile defense (DSVT), A-16, Figure A-2 joint theater air and missile defense
AMDPCS, 1-24, 3-3, 5-12, A-1 E (JTAMD), 1-19, 1-20
AMDWS, A-2, A-4, A-6 echelons above corps (EAC), Figure L
annex, 1-10, Table 2-1, 2-3, 2-6, 3- 1-1, 2-32 liaison officer (LNO), 1-21, 3-28, 3-
65, Appendix B G 35
air defense artillery, 1-3, Figure 1-1, G1 (Personnel), 1-27, 1-28, 4-2, line termination unit, A-18
2-32, 2-33, 3-4 Figure 4-1, 4-3 through 4-8 logistics, see G4
air tasking order (ATO), 1-10, 3-38, G2 (Intelligence), 3-8, 3-35 through M
3-40 3-37 micro central switching unit
airspace G3 (Operations), 3-4, 3-7, 3-28, A-6 (MCSU), A-10, A-14
control order (ACO), 2-19, 3-4 G4 (Logistics), 1-27, 1-28, 4-9 mobile subscriber radio terminal
control authority (ACA), through 4-17 (MSRT), Figure A-2
2-19 G6 (Communications/Electronics), N
control plan (ACP), 5-2 through 5-7, Figure 5-1, 5-9, 5- named areas of interest (NAI), 3-33,
2-19, 10, 5-12, 5-32 3-35
area H nuclear, biological and chemical
of operations (AO), Table 2-1, headquarters and headquarters (NBC), Table 2-1, 3-47 through 3-49
of operations (AO) cell, 3-34, A-3 battery (HHB), 4-23, Figure 4-3 O
area air defense commander homeland defense (HLD), 3-71 offensive counterair (OCA), 2-6, 2-
(AADC), 2-9, 2-14, 2-18, 3-22, C-6, through 3-73 14, 2-20
C-9 I operational control (OPCON), 2-19,
B intelligence, (see G3) 2-21, 2-24
battlefield coordination detachment intelligence broadcast service, 5-23 operation order (OPORD), 1-10, 1-
(BCD), 2-27, 3-4, 3-39 intelligence preparation of the 11, 3-4, 5-3
battle captain, 3-4, A-5 battlefield (IPB), 3-8, 3-9, 3-29 operational tasking data link
C interface control officer (ICO), 5-31 (OPTASKLINK),
combat service support (CSS), 1-28 inspector general (IG), 1-16, 4-20 operations, (see G3)
command and control (C2), 1-6 J operations plan (OPLAN), 1-10, 1-
command, control, communications, joint air operations center (JAOC), 2- 11, 2-3, 3-4, 3-17, 3-20, 3-65
computers, and intelligence (C4I), 1- 29, 3-34, 3-37 operations security (OPSEC), 5-3, 5-
31, 1-32, 1-34, joint command control 27
Table 2-1, 5-32 communications (JCCC), 5-20 P
communications joint data network (JDN), 5-26, passive air defense, 1-24, 1-32,
external, 5-13 Figure 5-6, 5-31 Figure 3-4, 3-46
equipment, 5-11 through 5-31 joint force air component passive defense (PD), 1-10, 3-1,
internal, 5-12 commander (JFACC), 2-15, 2-17 Figure 3-1, 3-5
crew access unit (CAU), A-11, A-12 joint force commander (JFC), 2-9, 2- passive dense cell, 3-4, 3-46 through
13, 2-14 3-55, Figure 3-9
8 April 2005 Index-1
FM 3-01.94
Index
pager alert warning system (PAWS),

3-50
personnel, (see G1)
S
safety, 3-57
satellite communications
(SATCOM), A-19
secure telephone unit, A-22
security, 5-10
sensor, 5-21
single channel tactical satellite
(SCTACSAT), 5-12, 5-15
situational awareness (SA), 1-10, 2-
26, 5-8
staff judge advocate (SJA), 4-22
T
tactical control (TACON), 2-19, 2-
21, 2-24
tactical digital information link
(TADIL), 5-13, 5-25, 5-26, Figure 5-
6
theater army air and missile defense
coordinator (TAAMDCOORD), 1-
21,
Table 2-1, 2-6, 2-7, Figure 2-3, 2-27,
3-72
U
UHF SATCOM, A-19
V
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
A-15
Index-2
FM 3-01.94
FM 3-01.94
8 APRIL 2005
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
SANDRA R. RILEY
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0508404
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed. Electronic Media Only.
FM 3-01.94
PIN: 082387-000

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HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 3-01.94

ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

*This publication supersedes FM 44-94, dated 31 March 2000.

Army Air and Missile Defense Command

Chapter 1 ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND .......................................... 1-1

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL............................................................................ 2-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

*This publication supersedes FM 44-94, dated 31 March 2000.

Chapter 3 OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... 3-1

Chapter 4 SUPPORT.......................................................................................................... 4-1

Chapter 5 COMMUNICATIONS ......................................................................................... 5-1

Appendix A EQUIPMENT...................................................................................................... A-1

Appendix B AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ANNEX (SAMPLE) .......................................... B-1

Appendix C CRITICAL AND DEFENDED ASSET METHODOLOGY ................................. C-1

Glossary .........………………………………………………………………………………… Glossary-1

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………….. Bibliography-1

Index …………………………………………………………………………………….. Index-1

8 April 2005 iii

AAMDC EAC ADA BDE

• No organic signal capability • May have organic signal capability

• Logistics readiness center capability • Logistics readiness center capability

• Operational force protection integrator

Figure 1-1. Functional Comparison.

1-2 8 April 2005

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Figure 1-2. AAMDC Organizational Structure.

8 April 2005 1-3

1-4 8 April 2005

8 April 2005 1-5

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-6 8 April 2005

8 April 2005 1-7

1-8 8 April 2005

equipment worldwide, the likelihood of complete regeneration of units is small. Most

1-10 8 April 2005

ROLES OF AAMDC COMMANDER

Task organizes, assigns missions, Coordinates active air defense planning

ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS CORPS

Figure 2-1. Command Relationships.

SENIOR ADA COMMANDER

THEATER ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COORDINATOR

DEPUTY AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

THEATER COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATIONS

JOINT FORCE JOINT FORCE AIR JOINT FORCE

Figure 2-2. Example of Theater C2 Relationships.

Joint Force Commander

theater/JOA-wide defense priorities through promulgation of a joint air defense plan.

Joint Force Air Component Commander

Area Air Defense Commander

JFC-approved joint AADP. As the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide DCA,

Airspace Control Authority