JTMTD

MULTI-SERVICE
PROCEDURES FOR JOINT
THEATER MISSILE
TARGET DEVELOPMENT

FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43)

NTTP 3-01.13
AFTTP(I) 3-2.24

NOVEMBER 2003
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD
and DOD contractors only to prevent technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International
Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made
on 23 January 2003. Other requests for this document will be referred
to HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATDO-A, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651-5000;
NWDC, ATTN: Code N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC,
ATTN: DJ, Langley AFB VA 23665-2788.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any means that will prevent

disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
 *FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43)
*NTTP 3-01.13
*AFTTP(I) 3-2.24

FM 3-01.51 US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

NTTP 3-01.13 Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.24 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

11 November 2003

JTMTD
MULTI-SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... V
CHAPTER I OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ I-1
Background......................................................................................... I-1
Pre-Launch Attack Operations Against Theater Missiles ................... I-1
Joint Theater Missile Target Development ......................................... I-3
JFC Role............................................................................................. I-5
Peacetime Imperatives ....................................................................... I-6
Conclusion .......................................................................................... I-7
CHAPTER II THEATER MISSILE SYSTEMS ........................................................ II-1
Background........................................................................................ II-1
Generic Architecture .......................................................................... II-2

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to prevent technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was
made on 23 January 2003. Other requests for this document will be referred to HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATDO-A, Ft. Monroe, VA
23651-5000; NWDC, ATTN: Code N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ, Langley AFB VA 23665-2788.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any means that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
*This publication supersedes FM 90-43, NWP 3-01.13, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.24, 15 October 1999.

ii
 Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)....................................................... II-3
Cruise Missile .................................................................................. II-11
Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM).......................................................... II-14
Conclusion ....................................................................................... II-15
CHAPTER III STRATEGIES AND PROCEDURES................................................ III-1
Theater Missile Strategy Development............................................. III-1
JTMTD Process ................................................................................ III-4
TM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ................................ III-5
Collection Management Strategies................................................... III-7
Target Development ....................................................................... III-15
Conclusion ...................................................................................... III-20
CHAPTER IV JTMTD INTEGRATION OPTIONS................................................... IV-1
Background....................................................................................... IV-1
Integration Options ........................................................................... IV-2
JTMTD Integration Through Collaboration ....................................... IV-2
JTMTD Integration Through Liaison ................................................. IV-3
JTMTD Integration Through Consolidation....................................... IV-4
JTMTD Integration Through Collocation........................................... IV-6
Conclusion ........................................................................................ IV-6
APPENDIX A SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS................................A-1
HUMINT.............................................................................................A-1
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) .............................................................A-1
SIGINT...............................................................................................A-2
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) .........................A-3
Open Source Intelligence ..................................................................A-3
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) .....................................................A-3
APPENDIX B SPECIAL OPERATIONS ..................................................................B-1
Command of Special Operations Forces...........................................B-1
SOF Roles and Missions ...................................................................B-1
APPENDIX C QUESTIONS FOR TM IPB DEVELOPMENT ...................................C-1
Background........................................................................................C-1
Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment ....................................C-1
Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects .........................................C-3
Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary ........................................................C-4
Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action Options.................C-7
APPENDIX D THEATER TARGET DEVELOPMENT MODELS .............................D-1
Consolidated Model: US Pacific Command (USPACOM) (7th
Air Force Executive Agent).........................................................D-1
Collaborative Model: US Central Command (USCENTCOM) ..........D-2
Deployable TMD Operations Centers: USEUCOM, JAOC, and
AAMDC ......................................................................................D-2
REFERENCES .......................................................................................... References-1

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 GLOSSARY .............................................................................................. Glossary-1
INDEX .................................................................................................... Index-1

FIGURES
Figure I-1. Joint Targeting Cycle........................................................ I-4
Figure II-1. Theater Employment Operations. .................................. II-5
Figure II-2. Vehicles Required to Generate a SCUD Launch. .......... II-7
Figure II-3. Typical TM National to Tactical “Flow”. .......................... II-8
Figure II-4. National Theater Level TM Material Feeder
System. ...................................................................................... II-9
Figure II-5. Typical Deployed TM Organization. ............................. II-10
Figure II-6. Launch/Support System Interface. ............................... II-11
Figure III-1. Joint Theater Missile Target Development
Construct ................................................................................... III-1
Figure III-2. Attack Operations Activities.......................................... III-4
Figure III-3. JIPB Iterative Steps...................................................... III-6
Figure III-4. Collection Management Functions and Process .......... III-9
Figure III-5. Cognitive Hierarchy Associated with ISR Tasks ........ III-13
Figure III-6. Collection Managment Relationships ......................... III-14
Figure III-7. Collection Management Decisionmaking Process ..... III-15
Figure III-8. Countermobility Concept ............................................ III-17

TABLES
Table III-1. Example Objective to Task............................................ III-3
Table III-2. PIR Information Requirements .................................... III-10

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JTMTD
Multi-Service Procedures for
Joint Theater Missile Target Development

On the whole, offensive counter-measures to the flying bomb [V-1] brought no direct
return commensurate with the great effort devoted to them. A bolder investment in that
class of operation might have achieved much. But the Western Allies, hampered by their
failure to make a clear-cut choice between the various courses of action open to them, never
achieved the singleness of purpose, which might have helped them to stake successfully on
information that fell short of certainty.
Basil Collier, The Defense of the United Kingdom
The quote from Basil Collier reminds us that conducting offensive operations against
theater missiles has never been an easy task. The troubles in finding Saddam Hussein’s
SCUDS during DESERT STORM are reminiscent of the difficulties faced by the Allies in
locating Nazi V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II. Today, our
Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, states “the preferred
method of countering enemy theater missile (TM) operations is to attack and destroy or
disrupt TMs prior to their launch.” Recognition of the importance of this threat, the
doctrinal preference for attack operations, and the historical difficulty in achieving
successful attacks against TMs are the impetus for producing this publication.
In the past, difficulties in obtaining timely information and organizing and filtering
intelligence operations led to many of the problems in locating mobile missiles. This
publication establishes a common framework for those individuals responsible for
intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), collection management, target
development, sensor employment, current and future operations, and force application.
This common framework will enable them to establish a comprehensive and coordinated
approach for countering TMs through pre-launch attack operations against the entire TM
target system.
The focus of this publication is Joint Theater Missile Target Development (JTMTD).
JTMTD is the synergistic outcome of allocating, integrating, and synchronizing resources in
order to identify and nominate selected targets in the TM target system for timely attack.
Achieving an effective JTMTD process is a challenge for operational forces. Applying the
concepts discussed in this publication will facilitate the process.

v
 Overview
Chapter I provides the reader an understanding of the difficulties associated in trying to
find, track, and interdict TM forces. It discusses the joint force commander’s (JFC’s)
influence in achieving a cohesive JTMTD effort (principally through training and dedication
of resources). It highlights peacetime actions that are imperative to making the JTMTD
process effective during crisis or conflict.

Threat Missile Systems

Chapter II provides the reader a basic understanding of the TM target system, generic
operating phases, and some specific operating characteristics common to similar systems. It
establishes the basic common framework necessary for the TM IPB development.

Strategies and Procedures

Chapter III explains how to achieve a coherent attack strategy against TMs. It provides
a detailed description of how to conduct TM-specific IPB, collection management, and target
development processes to achieve the defined objectives.

JTMTD Integration Options

Chapter IV describes options available to the JFC for integrating and synchronizing TM
intelligence, collection, and targeting efforts. The four methods discussed in detail are
collaboration, exchange of liaisons, consolidation, and collocation.
KEY JTMTD POINTS TO REMEMBER
• Preventing TM launches requires the entire TM target system to be attacked
simultaneously and continuously.
• TM IPB must begin in peacetime to succeed in conflict.
• Successful TM IPB comes from knowing the enemy; therefore, it is imperative that
analysts who will take it to war help in its creation.
• Collection managers (CMs) must understand the threat equally as well as analysts;
otherwise, the collection effort will be unfocused.
• Every TM event provides a clue--apply knowledge learned from each event to develop
the IPB.
• Cross-cueing of sensors is imperative to timely target development.
• Avoid the temptation of fixating on killing transporter erector launchers (TELs). Stay
focused on neutralizing the enemy's launch capability.
• Transload operations are excellent targets, but forward operating locations/bases
(FOLs)/FOBs) are outstanding targets.
• Operational decision makers must understand the JTMTD process!

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 PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this
publication:
Joint
Joint Warfighting Center, Ft Monroe, VA
Joint Theater Missile Defense-Attack Operations Joint Test Force, Kirkland AFB,
NM
Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), Suffolk, VA
Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, VA
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization, JTAMDO/J-8, Washington,
D.C.
Unified/Combined
USCENTCOM, CCJ5-O (Policy), MacDill AFB, FL
USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL
Army
Third Army Deep Operations Coordination Cell, Fort McPherson, GA
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCSDCS (ATDO-A), Fort Monroe, VA
US Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX
US Army Deep and Simultaneous Attack Battlelab, Fort Sill, OK
US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK
US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC
US Army Military Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ
US Army XVIII Airborne Corps, Collection Management, Fort Bragg, NC
Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island
Second Fleet, CJ-354; TLAM/Naval Fires, Norfolk, VA
Air Force
HQ AFDC, Joint Integration Directorate (DJ), Langley Air Force Base, VA
ACC Airborne Battle Management Operations Division (DOYA), Langley AFB, VA
ACC Policy, Plans and Doctrine Division (INX), Langley AFB, VA
ACC ISR Support Branch (SCWI), Langley AFB, VA
AFC2ISR Center, Operations Division (A34), Langely AFB, VA
32d Air Operations Squadron, Ramstein AB, GE
OTHER
Coleman Research Corporation, Defense Command Force Development &
Integration
Center, Arlington, VA,
Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA
SPARTA Corporation, Huntsville, AL
Zel Tech Corporation, Hampton, VA

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 Chapter I
OVERVIEW

From the beginning to the end of the war, SCUDs introduced a serious friction into the
conduct of the air campaign—one that did not affect the final outcome, but only due to the
absence of any other Iraqi successes. There is, moreover, a larger issue: the question of
might-have-beens. Except for the hit at the war’s end that killed a large number of US
Army reservists, the SCUDs achieved little damage and few deaths. Nevertheless, a SCUD
nearly hit the USS Tarawa, while that ship was tied up at the main dock at Dhahran—a
dock piled high with ammunition. It does not take much imagination to visualize what an
actual hit might have achieved in political and psychological terms.
Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993

1. Background
a. Ballistic, cruise, and designated air-to-surface missiles have been a threat to the
United States (US) and its military operations for more than 50 years. During the Cold
War, the strategic balance and deterrence created by the theory of mutually assured
destruction between Soviet and US forces held this threat in check. The value of retaliation
as a deterrent to rogue states has waned in the post-Cold War era, as the theater missile
(TM) has proliferated.
b. The military arsenals of nations worldwide are becoming stocked with an expanding
number of varied missile systems. Most are imported, some are developed domestically,
and a few are indigenously modified. Missile threats emanate primarily from countries
armed with missiles that can range from 30 to greater than 3,000 kilometers (km). Some
countries possess hundreds of fixed and mobile missile launchers. Although they currently
pose only a regional threat, the trend is clearly towards systems with greater range,
lethality, accuracy, and sophistication.
c. TMs appeal to developing nations for a variety of reasons and are often considered
symbols of national stature. TMs enable rogue states to strike deep into neighboring
nations, placing the populace, as well as that government’s military forces, at risk.
Compared to other weapon systems, the TMs’ relatively long range, short time-of-flight, low
cost, and flexibility to carry a variety of warheads, provide numerous political and military
advantages. TMs also appeal to developing nations because defenses against TMs are not
as mature as defenses against other weapon systems. Our national security strategy
recognizes that “our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and evidence indicates that they are doing so with great determination.
The US will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic
missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny,
contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.”

2. Pre-Launch Attack Operations Against Theater Missiles

a. No nation in any war has ever effectively countered TMs by reactively attacking
missile launchers. There are many parallels between the Allied efforts during World War
II to counter Hitler’s V-1/V-2 rockets, and the coalition’s efforts during the Gulf War to
counter Saddam Hussein’s SCUDs. The vignettes cited throughout this publication

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reinforce one key point: mobile long-range missiles provide an adversary an asymmetric
means of leveraging military operations. The “owner” of TMs can choose to use them
against strategic, operational, or tactical targets of military, political, or economic
importance; can make that decision at the last minute; and can change, on a daily basis,
how they intend to use them. Although the less sophisticated variety of TMs may not be
very effective tactically, the capability to use them to deliver WMD makes them significant
threats.
b. Reliance on defensive measures to protect friendly forces is a gamble and
relinquishes the initiative to the enemy. Pre-launch attack operations against TMs
are vital to protecting friendly forces and their freedom of action. Enemy missiles can
quickly disrupt deployment operations and consume operational forces in counter TM
efforts. While defensive measures are essential, so are pre-launch attack operations that
reduce the volume of incoming missiles and put the adversary’s TM forces at risk.
c. Because adversary TM forces use dispersed operating patterns and employ
deception efforts to hide their operations, finding and destroying launchers has been a
daunting task. Not only are adversary TM operations easy to hide, but they also do not
confine themselves to one segment of the battlespace. Unlike most threats, TMs can cut
across all boundaries to threaten any aspect of military force or political objective in a
matter of minutes. Also, missile launches tend to cause considerable anxiety up and down
the national chain of command and will often prompt an urge to respond.
d. Countering TMs has proven difficult for a variety of reasons including insufficient
sensors capable of detecting missiles in pre-launch operations, inability to unequivocally
identify TMs other than through actual launch indicators, and an inability to task assets in
time to strike targets when found. Because of these shortcomings, attack operations have
gravitated toward reactive responses; however, reactive attack operations are not the
desired method. Operations are most effective when conducted against theater missiles
before launch.
e. Preventing enemy launch operations requires a comprehensive strategy that targets
the enemy’s entire TM infrastructure, from launch platforms and ground support
equipment (GSE) to command and control (C2) nodes, missile stocks, and TM
manufacturing facilities. Implementing an effective TM attack strategy depends on many
things, but none more important than timely and predictive intelligence. US forces have
proven much more capable of attacking TM targets than they have of locating them; if US
forces can find it, they can destroy it. While destruction of the missile transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) can be a significant piece of an overall TM attack strategy, it must not be
the sole focus. TM mobility, while being a key strength, is also one of the key
vulnerabilities of TMs. They must move to bring elements together in order to achieve
launch. Finding ways to prevent the various elements of the target system from
coming together and operating as a whole, is the key to developing a successful
attack strategy. This MTTP will use “TEL” as an all-encompassing generic term that
includes the TEL, erector launcher (EL) and the mobile erector launcher (MEL) systems.
f. As previously noted, successful prosecution of TMs cuts across many boundaries and
levels of command—national to tactical. Because TM intelligence information is extremely
perishable in nature, the window of opportunity to collect and exploit information is usually
very short. Unless the intelligence and collection architectures are focused and responsive,
vital information can be lost.

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 g. TM intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) requires an extensive
intelligence effort and must be well coordinated long before hostilities commence. A
piecemeal, under-resourced, or ad hoc TM intelligence effort can and does lead to missed
cues, missed information, and missed attack opportunities, or at the very least, delayed
responses to TM activity indicators. TM intelligence centers at each echelon must
coordinate to avoid creating conflicting intelligence requirements (IRs).

3. Joint Theater Missile Target Development

Target development is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems, individual
targets, and elements of each target for military, economic, and political importance and is
a critical part of the six-phase joint targeting cycle (figure I-1). Target development is
driven by the joint force commander’s (JFC) objectives, guidance, and intent, and is
continually adjusted by combat assessments.

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 Figure I-1. Joint Targeting Cycle

a. This publication focuses on a single target system: theater missiles. JTMTD is not
a separate targeting process; it works through established targeting and intelligence
structures, such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and the joint intelligence
center (JIC), to achieve effective TM target nominations that satisfy the JFC’s objectives.
For more information on the targeting process see JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting,
and JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to
Targeting.

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 b. Current doctrine recognizes that we fight as Service components within the
framework of a joint force. However, doctrine provides only broad guidance and does not
provide the required details to deal with elusive TM threats.
c. This publication focuses specifically on integrating TM IPB, collection/sensor
management, and targeting processes to achieve effective TM target nominations. JTMTD
is a process derived from the synergistic outcomes of allocating, integrating, and
synchronizing resources in order to identify and attack selected targets within the TM
target system. Only with a commonly shared perspective of the TM force and aggressive
collection management effort will the joint task force (JTF) be able to achieve a coherent
and effective TM attack strategy.

4. JFC Role
“Within their designated AOs, land and naval force commanders synchronize maneuver,
fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders have the
authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs…the
JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA,
including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs. The JFC normally designates
the joint force air component commander (JFACC) as the supported commander for theater
or JOA-wide counterair.”
JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats
As noted in joint doctrine, the role of the JFC in organizing forces is the first step
towards successful JTMTD efforts. Besides structuring the JTF, the JFC establishes
theater-specific guidance and objectives and disseminates them to subordinate commanders
through mission-type orders. These orders help define command relationships and
facilitate mission accomplishment. The guidance and objectives are the “guideposts”
subordinate commanders and staffs use to prepare, coordinate, and execute their assigned
responsibilities.
a. Peacetime JFC Considerations.
(1) JFCs take many actions to prepare their components for war. Among the most
critical actions for JTMTD is joint training. Exercising TM attack operations and inherent
JTMTD processes is essential. Only by training as we intend to fight, can we find and
correct deficiencies in interoperability of equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP). Every training opportunity should seek to improve the working relationship among
elements tasked with countering TMs and refining theater JTMTD TTPs.
(2) The second action the JFC can take during peacetime, affecting JTMTD, is to
dedicate resources (e.g., time, personnel, and collection resources) to TM IPB development.
The JFC must use every means available, to include national intelligence and combat
support agencies (e.g., National Security Agency [NSA], Central Intelligence Agency [CIA],
National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA], Missile and Space Intelligence Center
[MSIC], Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]), to ensure friendly forces have the best
information available regarding the adversary’s missile forces, capabilities, and intentions.
The depth of peacetime TM IPB development will greatly influence whether
attack operations during conflict are pre-launch focused or reactive in nature.
b. JFC Considerations in Crisis and Conflict. As tensions rise, the joint force must be
prepared to quickly leverage available assets to develop a complete and accurate TM

I-5
intelligence picture. When indications and warning point towards the use of TMs and/or
WMD, the JFC may have to accept risk by making tradeoffs in other areas (such as shifts in
resources away from major operations, changes in special operations forces [SOF] locations,
diversion of sensors, changes in time-phased force and deployment data [TPFDD] flow, etc).
As a crisis escalates, prioritization of IRs and corresponding management of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will become critical. The focus of JTMTD
efforts throughout must be on providing the JFC the best TM intelligence picture
and most viable attack strategy possible.

5. Peacetime Imperatives
a. TM IPB. Commanders use the IPB process to clearly understand the capabilities,
intentions, and possible actions of the adversary. IPB also helps leaders understand the
effects of geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) on enemy and friendly
operations. Key requirements for TM IPB that must occur during peacetime are:
(1) Collecting data and supporting material on terrain, equipment, doctrine,
communications, lines of communication (LOC), etc.
(2) Conducting TM IPB using available information in coordination with DIA, CIA,
NSA, MSIC, and other appropriate agencies.
(3) Collecting imagery to validate and refine database information.
(4) Identifying intelligence gaps and preparing information requirements and
requests for information (RFIs) (if necessary).
(5) Conducting in-depth analysis of potential TM operating areas.
(6) Identifying possible adversary objectives and analyzing the associated locations
and activities required to prosecute the intended mission.
b. Collection Management. Peacetime development of TM IPB is dependent upon
collection efforts and the collection management process. TM collection priorities must be
integrated into the joint force’s overall collection strategy. It is important to plan for the
employment of additional ISR assets during crisis and conflict. This requires identifying
assets needed to support JTMTD efforts and developing “on-the-shelf” collection plans that
can quickly expand when tensions rise. Plans should specify the roles and responsibilities
of supporting components and organizations and include the procedures for dynamically re-
tasking sensors to meet priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Plans should also assign
and delineate clearly the responsibilities of the Collection Management Authority (CMA),
Collection Requirements Management (CRM), and Collection Operations Management
(COM). Key requirements for on-the-shelf collection plans are:
(1) Incorporating TM IPB-related IRs for each phase into the JTF’s overall PIRs for
JFC approval.
(2) Identifying, within each intelligence discipline, available collection assets to
support TM intelligence and target development during crisis and conflict stages.
(3) Assessing anticipated available assets for correct sensor mix and ensure they are
capable of providing the kind of information required at the right time and place.
(4) Identifying potential cross-cueing requirements to support TM collection and
engagement efforts.

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 (5) Basing collection priorities for sensors on the JFC-approved priorities, projected
availability of ISR assets, and probable combat and intelligence operations. If TM IRs are
not a top priority, examine planned sensor flight tracks for residual collection opportunities.
c. Target Development. Activly involve targeteers in developing targeting data against
known TM targets. These will be primarily infrastructure-related targets such as TM
manufacturing facilities, TM import facilities, missile storage facilities, chemical and
biological weapon production sites, liquid and solid fuel production facilities, LOCs (roads,
railways, waterways, etc.), and garrison locations of TM forces. Involve targeteers in
developing targeting data against projected forward operating locations, suspected hide
sites, etc. Key requirements for target development are:
(1) Determining the enemy TM target system’s vulnerabilities and decisive points.
Explore these weaknesses to develop a TM attack strategy, including non-traditional ISR
assets, against the entire target system.
(2) Assisting in conducting countermobility analysis to determine potential targets
that will prevent or disrupt TM components from coming together (e.g., interdiction of
choke points).
(3) Examining anticipated available assets for correct sensor mix and ensuring they
are capable of providing the kind of information required at the right time and place.
(4) Identifying potential cross-cueing requirements to support TM collection and
engagement efforts.
(5) Considering using non-lethal means to disrupt launch operations (e.g., electronic
warfare to disrupt communications).
(6) Considering using psychological operations to deter possible adversaries from
using TMs.

6. Conclusion
Preventing an adversary from launching TMs requires a cohesive and well-coordinated
joint effort. Disrupting the enemy force’s ability to generate and sustain missile launch
operations requires the refinement and integration of JTMTD TTPs during peacetime. The
processes of JTMTD are the foundation for developing a comprehensive TM attack strategy
and for conducting deliberate and time-sensitive attack operations against the entire TM
target system. The goal of this publication is to establish a common perspective on this
process.

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 Similarities between WWII and the Gulf War
Reports and prisoner of war debriefings obtained at the end of World War II indicate
that the Allies’ strenuous efforts to attack the small, dispersed V-1 flying bomb launch sites
and mobile V-2 ballistic missile launching units did not have any significant influence on
the rate or volume of V-weapon fire. The principle limiting factor on Nazi missile
operations was the level of production that could be sustained at the weapon manufacturing
facilities in the Third Reich.
There is a direct comparison between the effect of the SCUDs in the Gulf War and the
effect of the Nazi V-1/V-2 campaign in the last years of World War II. The Nazi missiles
possessed no great accuracy, but were nevertheless able to draw off considerable resources
from the Allied strategic bombing campaign, tactical air efforts, and aerial
photoreconnaissance operations. The British government feared—quite rightly—that the
explosion of large numbers of V-1s in southern England might have a serious impact on the
morale of the population and its willingness to see the war through to a successful
conclusion. In the end, Allied air and ground forces mastered the threat but only after the
expenditure of resources far in excess of what the Germans devoted to their program.
Many of the following tactics used by the Nazis to defeat Allied attack operations efforts
ring familiar to those employed by Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Gulf War:
(V-1) The presence of large numbers of decoy launchers;
(V-1/V-2) Extensive use of camouflage, concealment, and natural cover;
(V-1/V-2) Dispersal of the launch forces into small elements;
(V-1) Preparation of excess launch capacity to buffer launcher losses;
(V-2) Mobile launch unit operations, including:
• Redeployment to entirely new operating areas;
• Day-to-day switching between multiple, randomly-situated launch sites;
• “Shoot and scoot” launch tactics;
(V-2) Low-volume, low-rate missile firing which minimizes launch unit exposure;
(V-2) Sheltering launch operations in areas populated by civilians; and
(V-1/V-2) Launch operations conducted during bad weather or at night.
Both Nazis and the Iraqis proved that a country can preserve its theater missile
launchers through the use of simple and well-chosen tactics, despite the fact that country’s
opponents may have won air supremacy over the missile unit operating areas.
Dr. Rob Allen, Sandia National Labs
Based on US Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

I-8
 Chapter II
THEATER MISSILE SYSTEMS

“The Fuhrer and I have squared off the most rewarding targets on the map of London.
Twice as many inhabitants are crammed into London as Berlin. For three and a half years
they have had no sirens. Imagine the terrific awakening that’s coming! Our weapons
[V-1/V-2] are absolutely unprecedented. There is no defense, no warning at all. Wham! It
hurtles down into the city, all unaware! I cannot picture a more devastating attack on their
morale….”
- Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Minister of Propaganda,
quoted by David Irving in The Mare’s Nest

1. Background
A TM is defined as a missile that may be ballistic, cruise, or air-to-surface (not including
short-range, non-nuclear, direct-fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-
guided missiles). Their target is within a given theater of operation. Consider the unique
capabilities of TMs when planning countermeasures . For example, no other target system
can put a warhead into the theater rear area or threaten neutral countries in a matter of
minutes. Other target systems do not create public panic and a political situation each
time a launch is broadcast on television worldwide by reporters wearing gas masks. These
unique traits, coupled with the elusive nature of the TM target system, require the
dedicated attention of determined, knowledgeable professionals to effectively counter the
threat.
a. Modern TMs have extended range capabilities and can launch a variety of warheads
including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives. They are
also currently difficult to counter. These lethal weapons are increasingly available on the
world market. Because they are relatively cost-effective weapons, ballistic missiles are
weapons of choice for many developing nations. Such weapons provide an offensive
capability, and when mated with a warhead of mass destruction, give a nation the ability to
deter a potential adversary by holding population centers and/or military forces at risk.
Rogue nations believe TMs provide them with a counter to sophisticated land, air, and
naval forces. As a result, nations around the world are actively pursuing TM capability.
b. TMs may be used alone or in conjunction with other weapon systems. Their targets
can be military targets such as deployed US and multinational forces, headquarters, air
defense sites, C2 facilities, communications nodes, and logistic centers; they can also be
civilian targets such as population centers, power and water stations, petroleum pumping
and storage sites, and industrial complexes. Ballistic and cruise missiles also present a
serious threat to merchant shipping, critical sea lanes and maritime operations in joint
littoral warfare, and key offensive and defensive forces/complexes and support
organizations. Air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) are also effective weapons against point
targets and are difficult to defend against.
c. This chapter discusses the essential framework for each TM system in a generic
fashion and serves as a foundation for an initial understanding of how TMs operate.

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2. Generic Architecture
a. Although there are many variables between the different types of TMs, they
generally share a common architecture. Countries possessing TMs may import them,
reverse-engineer them, and/or develop their own technology. Common aspects of all TM
programs are:
(1) Research and Development (R&D). If a country is developing its own missile
system(s), or adapting a system purchased from another country, there will be a center,
institution, and personnel responsible for the R&D effort. However, if a country purchases
the complete TM system there may be no R&D effort.
(2) Manufacturing. Countries that develop their own systems or adapt those
produced by other nations require dedicated manufacturing and testing facilities. They
may also have to develop or refine the fuel for the missile systems. Although the fuels are
of a specific type, they are commonly available on the international market from several
sources.
(3) Import. Countries that purchase systems from other nations will have prepared
sites for receipt of missile system components and fuels. These ports of entry may be air,
land (road or rail), or sea-based. These locations must have receipt, inspection, and storage
capabilities. If the equipment requires assembly, nearby facilities may support these
activities.
(4) Transportation. TM components must move from their manufacturing or import
site by rail, road, air, or sea to garrison or permanent storage sites.
(5) Missile Storage. Missile storage locations are required at the point of
manufacture, point of receipt, in TM unit garrison locations, and at training installations.
Check projected operational areas for construction and development of missile storage sites.
(6) Warhead Storage. Warhead storage sites are usually located in ammunition
areas and may not be easily discernible from bunkers holding other munitions. WMD
warheads will require specialized storage, handling, and, most importantly, higher security.
(7) Garrison. TM units are usually garrisoned at army, air, or naval bases. Most
training and equipment maintenance occurs at these locations. Land-based units will likely
move from garrison to a forward operating base (FOB) to conduct combat operations. Air
and naval TM units may conduct wartime operations directly from their home air base or
port facility.
(8) Dispersal. During peacetime training or conflict, TMs move from garrison or
permanent storage sites to operating areas. These areas may include training areas, FOBs,
staging bases, hide locations, or air bases. TMs are normally transported via dedicated or
modified missile transporters or TELs; they can also move by railcar or covered truck. For
cruise missiles and ASMs, aircraft may move to designated dispersal or staging bases,
while ships may move out of port to a designated operating area.
(9) Assembly Areas. In most cases, missiles and warheads are shipped and stored
separately. One of the final stages of preparing the weapon for launch is mating the
warhead to the missile body. This applies to training and combat operations.
(10) Launch Areas. TM attacks normally take place from pre-selected launch areas.
The characteristics of the launch areas are dependent on missile type. Ballistic missile

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launchers usually start from a hide position, and then move to the launch area. Aircraft
and naval vessels usually proceed directly to a pre-selected launch area from their bases.
(11) Launch Preparation. After arrival at a launch area, most ballistic missiles
require some pre-launch preparation. These activities may involve fueling and testing the
missile and warhead components along with some assembly operations. Launch
preparations for liquid-fueled TMs generally require longer setup and checkout time than
solid-fuel missiles. For cruise missiles and ASMs, these activities will most likely occur at
an airfield or port and may involve simply moving the missile from a storage area to a
delivery platform (aircraft or ship).
(12) Command, Control, and Communications (C3). Planning TM operations is
normally a highly centralized process with tight control over the employment and selection
of targets. Execution of TM operations may be either centralized or decentralized. The
degree of centralization is generally determined by the amount of control desired by civilian
or senior military leaders, the capability for secure radio or hardwire communications, the
ability of the opposing force to detect or locate transmitters, and the tactics employed.
WMD-armed missiles are tightly controlled because of their political sensitivity and the
possibility of retaliation. Thus, WMD-associated TM units will normally require robust
communication links or constant communication with national leadership for launch
authorization.
(13) Support Units. Most TM systems require an extensive support system.
Support units provide a variety of functions to include maintenance, rearming, refueling,
personnel replacement, etc. They also deliver replacement warheads and missiles and
conduct all electronic testing and repair. During peacetime, these units will probably
collocate with the TM firing units in garrison. In wartime, they may disperse to FOBs or
forward operating locations (FOLs), dispersal/staging airfields, or naval operating areas.

3. Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)

a. Description. TBMs are surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched with ballistic
trajectories. They include short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges of 30 to 1,000
km, and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 km. TBMs
are often launched from highly mobile, difficult to detect TEL having the capability to carry
nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. Ballistic missiles are guided to their pre-selected
targets using gyroscopic assemblies. Embedded global positioning system (GPS) receivers
provide some missiles with very accurate navigational updates from orbiting GPS satellites
during flight. These updates improve missile in-flight and terminal accuracy, regardless of
the range of the target from the TBM launch point.
b. Threat Employment Concepts.
(1) Prime strategic targets for ballistic missiles are large, soft, heavily defended, and
deep rear area facilities that are critical to a nation’s warfighting ability. Examples include
airfields, air defense sites, transportation centers (ports and airfields), logistical hubs, and
national command and control nodes. Additionally, key population centers are prime
targets to create panic among the populace and foster a political crisis. Enemy forces may
use TBMs in a tactical sense to affect battlefield logistics and operations, although this is
less likely given the strategic importance of such weapons to developing nations.

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 (2) Mobility enhances TBM survivability and complicates targeting efforts. Their
long range affords the enemy increased options in selecting operating areas and
determining potential targets. TBMs have been exported by many nations; the SCUD SSM
and its derivatives are the most common. The SCUD, as well as a number of former Soviet
Union (FSU) and indigenously produced TBMs can be set up and fired in less than 45
minutes and relocated within minutes.
(3) Countries such as China and South Korea have modified surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems into SSMs. This trend will likely spread to other nations.
(4) As missile systems and missile technology proliferate, nations will acquire or be
able to produce missile systems using solid fuels, which will significantly reduce the dwell
time required for system checks and fueling during launch preparation. This will
additionally reduce the TM signature and the reaction time available for attack operations.
c. Threat Employment Operations.
(1) TBM operations are generally broken down into five major phases. These
include readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution. Although
this model follows FSU doctrine, it is important to note that many rogue nations and
terrorist organizations employing TMs may modify this doctrine within each phase to
increase TM survivability and surprise. Figure II-1 depicts the phases.
(a) Readiness Phase. The readiness phase encompasses normal day-to-day
peacetime operations. During this phase TBM forces train on wartime tasks and practice
doctrinal employment in the local training areas or in garrison. This normally entails site
preparation, simulated launch procedures, TEL operations, and missile maintenance.
(b) Deployment Phase. The deployment phase may include initial movement
from the garrison location(s) to the initial warfighting positions to support established
objectives. TBM force deployment will depend on the range to the target, missile capability,
terrain, and survivability considerations. Firing units will move to either hide positions or
directly into firing positions. Support units will likely move to a FOB or FOL, and from
there, conduct support to transload operations. (Fueled, ready missiles are loaded onto
TELs at the transload site.)
Note: Deployment may or may not convey hostile intent, depending upon the
circumstances.

(c) Employment Phase. The employment phase encompasses initial combat

operations. During this phase, TELs move missiles to their initial firing positions from a
hide site, and move them to another hide site or directly to transload operations after
launch. The support unit will establish the transload location based on doctrine, terrain,
the TBM force commander’s firing operations, and the threat.
(d) Sustainment Phase. During the sustainment phase, support units will
likely use a FOB or FOL to conduct the necessary repair/replacement operations to sustain
the TBM force. Sustainment operations require the support units to use LOCs from the
FOB to garrison locations, field storage areas, and/or the manufacturing
infrastructure/import facilities.

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 (e) Reconstitution Phase. The reconstitution phase encompasses continuous
operations between firing units, support units, and higher echelon logistics locations to
regenerate TBM forces.

Figure II-1. Theater Employment Operations.

d. Threat Employment TTPs.

(1) TEL Operations (moving or stationary). TELs serve as the transporter and
launch platform for missiles. The most common TELs are variants of the FSU MAZ-543
8x8 truck. TELs present a small, extremely mobile target with very short dwell time. Most
TELs have off-road mobility and can be easily hidden. TELs generally travel only short

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distances between hide sites, launch sites, and transload sites, unless they are required to
return to the FOB/FOL for additional maintenance. A TEL will be in launch configuration
for a very short period of time and can displace to a new hide site in a matter of minutes.
(2) FOB. The FOB is the main TM unit supply and storage activity and will be
spread out over a large geographic area for survivability. The number of FOBs will depend
on the size of the missile force, targets selected, and acceptable travel distances for support
units. In situations where a country’s geographic area of responsibility (AOR) is small, it is
possible that enemy forces could conduct from garrison operations typically associated with
the FOB.
(a) A typical FOB contains warhead, missile, and propellant storage sites;
transporters and cranes; checkout vehicles; fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel); resupply
vehicles; and other support vehicles. Enemy forces can establish an FOB in an urban
environment by hiding them in large buildings, underground facilities, or in the field. The
FOB will normally deploy GSE to FOLs and/or transload sites as needed to sustain launch
operations. FOBs require robust lines of communications (primarily roads and rails) to
support continuous operations.
(b) The FOB cannot be easily hidden however it also may not be easy to
discriminate between the FOB and other logistics facilities. Once established, enemy forces
will probably not move the the FOB in total, but may move certain components to
complicate detection or create a deception.
(3) FOL. An FOL is typically where warheads and missiles are mated, missiles are
fueled, and missiles are loaded onto the resupply vehicle. A FOL may remain in one place
from one-half to 3 days. The FOL usually consists of warheads and missile airframes,
transporters, cranes, checkout vehicles, fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel), resupply
vehicles, and other support vehicles. Enemy forces can locate FOLs in rural or urban
settings, and may hide them in a building complex or underground facility. The FOL has a
larger footprint than TEL or transload operations, but is still difficult to locate. Some
countries may not employ FOLs, preferring to conduct these operations out of the FOB.
(4) Transload Site. Fueled, ready missiles are loaded onto TELs at the transload
site. Support unit personnel, vehicles, and equipment from the FOB or FOL rendezvous at
this site with firing unit TELs. There are generally a number of vehicles at this site,
including: missile resupply vehicles (with one to three missiles), a crane (possibly attached
to the resupply vehicle), and other GSE as required by the missile type. The transload site
is usually an open area large enough to allow the crane to lift and pivot the missile onto the
TEL (approximately 50 by 50 meters). This operation can occur in large buildings or
underground facilities with sufficient height (approximately 20 meters). When detected,
this site will remain vulnerable throughout its established dwell time. Figure II-2 details
an example of the GSE required to support a SCUD launch. GSE will not likely have great
off-road mobility; therefore, transload sites will likely be within a short distance from
improved roads.

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 Figure II-2. Vehicles Required to Generate a SCUD Launch.

The following figures (II-3 through II-6) depict the general flow of TM (both TBM and
ground-launched cruise missile) elements into a national-level TM infrastructure.

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 Figure II-3. Typical TM National to Tactical “Flow”.

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Figure II-4. National Theater Level TM Materiel Feeder System.

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 Figure II-5. Typical Deployed TM Organization.

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 Figure II-6. Launch/Support System Interface.

4. Cruise Missiles
a. Definition. Cruise missiles are defined as guided missiles, the majority of which fly
at approximately constant velocity along their flight path to the target, and depend on the
dynamic reaction of air for lift and upon propulsion forces to balance drag. Cruise missiles
navigate autonomously to the targets and, depending on their sophistication, position
themselves through a number of update methods along extended flight routes. Cruise
missiles are capable of delivering the full complement of warheads, from conventional to
WMD.

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 b. Threat Cruise Missiles.
(1) Very few nations currently possess sophisticated cruise missiles, such as the US
Navy Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) or US Air Force conventional air-launched
cruise missile (CALCM). Employment by developed nations has been limited. The majority
of cruise missiles in potential threat nations are anti-ship cruise missiles with ranges up to
100 nautical miles, such as China’s Silkworm. Some countries are developing unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) applications for battlefield surveillance or modifying anti-ship cruise
missiles for land attack roles.
(2) Future cruise missile technology will build on existing low observable, sensor
defeating designs using radar absorbing materials and composite materials such as Kevlar
or carbon fiber to further reduce their radar cross section (RCS) and render them more
difficult to detect. Cruise missiles are characterized as having the following features:
(a) RCS of 0.1 square meters or less (-10 decibel and lower)
(b) Low IR signature (varies by type of cruise missile)
(c) Acoustic signature (varies by type of cruise missile)
(d) Cruise altitude of 100 feet to 2,000 feet above ground level or 50,000 feet
above mean sea level
(e) Range of 100 to 1,000 nautical miles
(f) Payload of 200 to 1,000 pounds
(g) Speeds of high subsonic (at low altitude) or supersonic (at high altitude)
(h) Launch from air, land, or sea platforms.
c. Threat Cruise Missile Employment Concepts.
(1) Cruise missiles stress air defense systems because they are difficult for theater
sensors and weapon systems to detect, identify, track, acquire, and destroy. Cruise missiles
are normally more difficult to detect than the larger TBMs because they do not give off as
large a heat signature at launch and normally have a smaller RCS. Ground based
surveillance radars may have a difficult time detecting cruise missiles when in low level
flight because of line of sight restrictions created by terrain masking, earth curvature, and
ground clutter. Similarly, airborne radar systems may have a difficult time isolating cruise
missiles from ambient noise caused by ground clutter. These traits, when combined with
radar evasion techniques and low observable (LO) construction methods, cause delays in
detection and engagement decision by battle managers. Recent improvements in
equipment and techniques have increased detection and tracking capabilities. Once cruise
missiles are detected in flight, fighters and air and missile defense forces can engage them.
(2) The low altitude, subsonic flight profile is the typical profile for cruise missiles.
Although a low altitude cruise missile flight profile presents a higher RCS view to airborne
radar, it also requires the airborne radar to search in ground clutter. Ground radars may
be able to detect the release of an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), but will have
increased difficulty in tracking the cruise missile at low altitudes.
(3) Sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and ground launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs) present opportunities for detection as well as challenges for surveillance systems.
Normally, surface launch systems must use a booster to get the missile to cruise altitude.

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The booster portion often uses a rocket motor that will produce an infrared signature that
space-based or properly positioned theater assets may exploit. ALCM do not have a boost
plume since aircraft or UAV deliver them above the cruise altitude. Although the cruise
missile has a small RCS, it is vulnerable to radar detection during descent to its low-level
altitude. Once near the surface, and in a terrain-following mode, sensors have to filter
radar ground clutter to extract a radar signature from these low altitude profile missiles.
(4) High altitude, high mach profiles rely on altitude and speed to overcome
defenses. Because the cruise missile is high, the curvature of the earth will not obstruct
ground-based radars, and airborne radars can discriminate them from ground clutter. As a
result, when using the high altitude flight profile, radar is more likely to detect cruise
missiles when not using a low-level profile.
(5) Cruise missiles provide a significant standoff range for the aircraft or launch
platform and remove the manned component of the weapons system from the intermediate
target area. The release range of cruise missile from aircraft and other platforms is easily
beyond most defender’s radar and sensor range. The long-distance release or launch of
cruise missiles and their smaller radar signature increase the possibility that surveillance
assets will not detect missiles. Battle managers require automated cues to narrow their
focus in detecting cruise missiles in any surveillance area. Combining hostile aircraft
attacks with cruise missile and ASM attacks may allow leakers to get through. Indeed,
because cruise missiles may resemble manned aircraft, battle mangers may misidentify
them.
(6) Combat identification is critical for cruise missile defense. It is less important
for TBMs because battle managers can readily identify them as hostile based on point of
origin and identifiable flight profiles. Cruise missile defense is further complicated by the
use of LO technology. Cruise missiles make surveillance and detection difficult because
their profiles are specifically designed to defeat or confuse radar tracking. As with ballistic
missiles, the objective is to eliminate as many cruise missiles as possible before launch.
The challenge for defending against cruise missiles is to find them early, before launch if
possible, and engage them before they can navigate to their targets.
(7) Attacking a cruise missile TEL requires the earliest possible detection of the
target and the ability of sensors to discriminate between TELs and other targets.
Targeting cruise missiles will therefore depend on pre-hostility IPB efforts. Targeteers will
require information on infrastructure, logistic support patterns, movement discipline, and
signatures of typical storage and assembly facilities. Identification by signature is key to
finding cruise missiles before launch, because detecting the launch itself or tracing the
flight path back to the launch site is extremely difficult when launched from maximum
range.
d. Cruise Missile Target TTPs.
(1) Procedures for finding and targeting cruise missiles on the ground are no
different fromprocedures for finding other targets using a variety of theater and national
sensors. Space-based and theater ISR assets will normally collect intelligence data on these
targets prior to armed conflict as part of IPB. Sensors on the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS), UAVs, Rivet Joint (RJ), and SOF pass mobile and
stationary cruise missile target information to analysts and battle managers by datalink or
voice. Data collected and fused from multiple sensors will provide the necessary
confirmation of the target. Characterization of a surface target as a WMD will depend on

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data from high-resolution sensors such as enhanced and inverse synthetic aperture radars.
Immediate threat data will be broadcast over intelligence processing and transmission
systems such as tactical related applications (TRAP) and tactical data dissemination
systems (TDDS).
(2) When conflict begins, sensors must be used to validate known target
information. Aircraft and naval launch platforms for ALCM and SLCM provide identifiable
signatures against relatively uncluttered backgrounds (sky and sea) and will yield
opportunities to detect, track, acquire, and attack these platforms. GLCMs will present a
more difficult target set. The following is a discussion of targeting methods against each
category.
(a) ALCM. Destroying ALCM-capable aircraft on the ground or neutralizing
their supporting airstrips/bases is the best means to prevent ALCM employment. In this
context, missions against this target system do not differ from other offensive counterair
(OCA) missions in terms of tactics or weapons. The IPB process must focus on providing
the intelligence targeteers need to determine which aircraft and air bases support ALCM
activity, and task missions against those bases accordingly.
(b) SLCM. Destroying the launch platform in port is the best means to prevent
SLCM launch. The IPB process will provide the naval order of battle (OB) information to
identify specific SLCM carriers and support bases, allowing targeteers and battle managers
to task missions against them. Missions in this category will not drive revolutionary
developments in weapons, ordnance, or tactics. Signatures of naval vessels and their
substantial support base infrastructure will facilitate finding SLCM targets by satellite,
UAV, and other surveillance platforms.
(c) GLCM. GLCM platforms will probably evolve as an adaptation of available
vehicle chassis capable of supporting one to two tons. Enemy forces can modify any
medium- to large-size truck or tracked vehicle into a cruise missile TEL. These TELs will
likely be considerably smaller and travel less distance than heavier TBM TELs; however, a
robust IPB effort can catalog such known and suspected vehicles for exploitation by
surveillance sensors. Collect and study cues that suggest a suspect nation may be training
for GLCM deployment. Long-range GLCM permit the enemy to establish a large number of
well dispersed, fixed launch locations (both actual and decoy), deep within their own
territory. Expect the enemy to employ camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD)
against fixed and mobile TELs to reduce probability of detection. New sensor capabilities
must provide the resolution of real target features to yield unambiguous detection and
characterization. Targeting mobile GLCM platforms or newly discovered fixed sites as time
sensitive targets (TSTs) will depend on a robust IPB; dynamic management of ISR assets;
dedicated and trained analysts, aided by technological improvements such as automatic
target recognition systems; and a responsive command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I) architecture.

5. Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM)

Expect ASM employment on all battlefields. Like TBMs and cruise missiles, ASMs are
capable of delivering a complete range of warheads and can be carried by a variety of rotary
and fixed-wing platforms. Flight profiles, short flight times, and reduced RCS make these
missiles difficult to track, acquire, and target. ASMs increase the survivability of the
delivery platform through standoff capability beyond the range of point defenses. Most of

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the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and former Warsaw Pact nations are
equipped with US and Russian manufactured systems and have exported them throughout
the world. The best method for countering ASMs is to target the delivery platforms and
related bases and facilities.

6. Conclusion
While each TM system is unique, each category (TBMs, cruise missiles, ASMs) exhibits
similar characteristics and functional operations. Specific analysis is required to apply this
information to a particular missile system and country. The vignette below is included as a
reminder that facts must be proven, not simply accepted.

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 The Lure of the Expected
Deception is a key part of any combat operations. The examples below illustrate what
happens when analysts stop analyzing events and begin to believe what they think they are
seeing.
World War II
Prior to the beginning of the V-1 attacks against London on June 12, 1944, the Allied
attack operations concentrated on an elaborate system of “sites” which were believed to be
Nazi V-1 launch locations. The locations were dubbed “ski sites” because of the shape of
several long, curved buildings, which were characteristic in the aerial photographs of each
location. These sites were targeted and heavily bombed from December 1943 through May
1944. Although the “ski sites” were largely destroyed, not one of the real V-1 sites was
attacked during this period. Once Hitler unleashed his missile force on England in June,
the volume of V-1 launches provided incontrovertible evidence that a second set of launch
sites was actually being used. Not until then did the weight of the Allied bombing effort
finally begin to shift to the correct targets. Even so, the real sites were so hard to find due
to Nazi camouflage and concealment measures that attacks were still being made on nearby
decoy “ski sites” until the end of June.
Based on Operation CROSSBOW Volume of the US Strategic Bombing Survey
Gulf War
The initial hope of the planners in Riyadh that heavy attacks on the fixed SCUD sites
during the opening hours of the air campaign would largely eliminate Iraq’s capability to
launch ballistic missiles against Israel or regional members of the US-led Coalition proved
to be illusory. The fixed SCUD launchers in western Iraq functioned, on the night of 16-17
January 1991, as “decoys” that diverted attention away from the mobile launchers that had
already deployed to their wartime “hide” sites, and the first of Iraq’s extended-range
SCUDs were fired at Israel the following night.
Once SCUDs started falling first on Israel and then on Saudi Arabia two days later, the
next best military option would have been to locate and attack mobile launchers before they
had time to fire. Soviet exercise patterns in central Europe with SCUD-Bs and Iraqi
practice during the Iran-Iraq War, indicated that if the Iraqis followed prior practices, there
might be enough pre-launch signature and time to give patrolling aircraft some chance of
attacking mobile launchers before they fired. However, the Iraqis dramatically cut their
pre-launch set-up times, avoided any pre-launch electromagnetic emissions that might give
away their locations before launch, and seeded the launch areas with decoys (some of which
were very high in fidelity…most (and possible all) of the roughly 100 mobile launchers
reported destroyed by Coalition aircraft and special operation forces now appear to have
been either decoys, other vehicles such as tanker trucks, or other objects unfortunate
enough to provide “SCUD-like” signatures.
Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993

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 Chapter III
STRATEGIES AND PROCEDURES

“It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new
weapons [V-1/V-2] six months earlier than he [Hitler] did, our invasion of Europe would
have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. I feel sure that if he had succeeded
in using these weapons over a six-month period, and particularly if he had made the
Portsmouth-Southampton area one of his principal targets, Overlord might have been
written off.”
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe

1. Theater Missile Strategy Development

TM strategy development requires a joint effort between operations, communication,
and intelligence personnel at the JTF and component levels and must be an integral part of
the JFC’s overall campaign strategy (figure III-1). Joint theater missile defense is one
portion of the overarching targeting concept of operations (CONOPS). Planners develop a
TM targeting strategy based on the JFC’s objectives and guidance, and known intelligence.
In turn, the approved strategy drives IPB, collection management, and target development.

Figure III-1. Joint Theater Missile Target Development Construct

a. TM Attack Strategy. Continuous engagement of TMs is necessary to deprive the

adversary of the initiative. Attacking the entire target system simultaneously prevents
enemy TM forces from conducting unimpeded operations and forces them to change their

III-1
operating patterns to regain the initiative. This potentially creates further opportunities
for exploitation by exposing TM vulnerabilities.
(1) TM attack strategy should--
(a) Plan for continuous engagement of TM targets.
(b) Orient on the TM vulnerabilities and decisive points.
(c) Be supported by predictive and developed intelligence.
(d) Be synchronized with the overall phases of the campaign.
(e) Maximize use of all available resources.
(f) Be continuously assessed and adjusted.
b. TM Vulnerabilities and Decisive Points. Doctrinal templates and enemy courses of
action (COA) developed during initial IPB serve as the basis for identifying TM
vulnerabilities and decisive points. A decisive point is a point, usually geographical in
nature, that, when retained, provides the commander with an advantage over his opponent.
Decisive points may also be physical elements such as critical equipment, command posts,
communications nodes, etc. Determining TM vulnerabilities and decisive points requires a
thorough understanding of the adversary’s operational capabilities, CONOPS, and
intentions. Once identified, these elements or specific aspects of the target system become
high payoff targets (HPTs) for immediate nomination and attack when acquired.
c. TM Friendly COA. TM friendly COAs are fully dependent on predictive and
developed intelligence derived from the IPB process. Predictive intelligence implies that
the friendly level of understanding of the enemy’s plan is sufficient to predict what will
occur next. In the case of TMs, this means developing a near-real time picture of TM
activity and detailed analysis of potential TM operating areas. Because TM information is
highly perishable, tailor the collection strategy and sensor distribution plan to support
these requirements.
(1) The TM friendly COAs also define the phasing, timing, and desired effects of
attacks. For example, the initial phase may focus on immediately reducing TM launches,
while later phases may focus on destroying the enemy’s ability to reconstitute TMs in the
future. The friendly COA must also define what “success” means for each phase based on
combat assessment results (for example, TM launches reduced 70 percent by D+7). An
example of theater level guidance regarding TMs might be written as follows:
(a) Locate and target enemy missile order-of-battle (i.e., WMD storage sites,
manufacture and assembly facilities), forward operating bases, and LOCs supporting the
missile OB.
(b) Reduce the enemy’s ability to reconstitute, store, and transport TMs with
WMD.
(c) Destroy missile manufacture/assembly facilities, known storage facilities,
and FOBs.
(d) Degrade enemy LOC capabilities between storage facilities and FOBs by 50
percent.

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 (2) Once theater level guidance has been defined, write objectives and tasks to
amplify specifics and aid implementation. Table III-1 illustrates possible friendly COA
objectives and tasks.
Table III-1. Example Objective to Task

Objective 1 Disrupt enemy TM launch operations.

Task 1A: Destroy FOBs and ground support equipment necessary to conduct
launch operations.
Task 1B: Interdict key LOCs between FOBs, transload sites and firing
locations.
Task 1C: Destroy/disrupt enemy TM C2 capabilities; force enemy to use more
exploitable communications.
Objective 2 Destroy enemy long-term TM capability.
Task 2A: Destroy key TM production/test facilities.
Task 2B: Destroy TM garrison and depot facilities.
Objective 3 Destroy TELs at firing locations and hide sites.
d. Collection and Attack Assets. As stated in Chapter II, TM threats cut across many
operational/component lines. This makes countering TMs a joint task. Employ all
collection and attack assets in a manner that maximizes the strategy. Relying on one
particular asset over another is counterproductive. Evaluate each available asset on how it
contributes to the strategy given the circumstances. The JFC guidance must define how
time-sensitive TM targets will be prosecuted or tracked for intelligence, and discuss optimal
use of all assets.
e. Assessments. Assess and adjust the TM strategy, just like the overall campaign.
Reassess collection and attack strategies based on feedback from combat assessment of
friendly operations, weapon system availability, and the enemy’s response to current
operations. These assessments help determine when a particular phase has been
completed, whether the next phase should be implemented, and how to adjust plans to
better meet the JFC’s overall objectives regarding TMs. Keeping continuous pressure on
the entire TM target system during transition between and throughout each phase of the
operation is essential.
f. Who conducts JTMTD and how it is integrated between echelons is the subject of
Chapter IV. In the end, however, it is less important where these functions occur than that
they are done in a dedicated, cohesive, and timely manner to achieve the desired end state.
Figure III-2 depicts the activities and steps involved in conducting attack operations. This
publication’s principal focus is on implementation of sensor activities necessary to achieve
TM target nominations and conduct reattack recommendations.

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 Figure III-2. Attack Operations Activities

2. JTMTD Process
There are multiple paths to countering TMs, some offensive, others defensive. Offensive
measures to prevent launch are significantly complicated by the target system’s mobility,
dispersed operating patterns, and CCD measures. Achieving preemptive success against
TMs requires a melding of three processes: IPB, collection management, and target
development (refer back to figure III-1). While each process is distinct, they cannot achieve
their collective purpose if they are not properly harmonized.
a. Joint Theater Missile Target Development. JTMTD is the synergistic outcome of
allocating, integrating, and synchronizing resources in order to identify and nominate
selected targets in the TM target system for timely attack. It is how we--
(1) Apply the IPB process in a logical manner to TMs.
(2) Establish a common perspective of the enemy TM intelligence picture among all
analysts, planners, and execution forces.
(3) Use this common understanding and the JFC’s objectives and guidance to devise
a joint attack strategy against the entire TM target system to disrupt, neutralize, or destroy
the adversary’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO – the ability to conduct and sustain launch
operations).
(4) Submit TM IRs into the collection management process for application of
national and theater assets.

III-4
 (5) Employ joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems to monitor, detect, and report TM
activities, and responsively cue ISR assets to confirm TM activity.
(6) Integrate all-source intelligence information to refine the TM picture and
confirm which COA the adversary has chosen.
(7) Develop and maintain situational awareness (SA) to rapidly generate target
nominations. Enforce timely and accurate track reporting to enhance the integrated air
picture.
(8) Task, exploit, and report post attack collection management results to targeting
battle damage assessment (BDA) analysts for reattack recommendation.
(9) Integrate post-strike combat assessment to adjust the attack strategy.
“A good IPB is essential if the operators are to understand how the threat is likely to
operate, to get the sensors in the most effective configuration and to react to subtle TM
activity indicators. The IPB information helps sort out real TM information from the
distracting background traffic”.
Joint Theater Missile Defense-Attack Operations Joint Test Force, 1997

3. TM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

a. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB). JIPB is the analytical
process used to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence support
products that enable the JFC and JTF staff to visualize the full spectrum of adversary
capabilities and COA across all dimensions of the battlespace. JIPB for TMs is the
integration of national, theater, and component intelligence operations to develop a single
TM intelligence picture. The guiding principles for conducting JIPB are delineated in the
Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace and US Army Field Manual (FM) 2-01.3 Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) National Air
Intelligence Center (NAIC)-061-0789-97 (S) Theater Missile Defense Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace Methodology (S) provides in-depth information on conducting
TM-specific IPB.
(1) JIPB Process. JIPB is the process of building an extensive database for each
potential joint operations area (JOA) and then analyzing it in detail to determine the
impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on friendly operations. JIPB is a continuous
and iterative process (figure III-3) with input from many levels, and is usually presented in
graphic form. Components conduct IPB to meet their respective needs, which contributes
to the overall JIPB process for the JTF.

III-5
 Figure III-3. JIPB Iterative Steps

(a) As depicted in figure III-3, JIPB is a continuous and iterative process,

incorporating continuous reassessment to ensure that the IPB analysis remains valid and
complete. IPB provides intelligence and operational decision–maker’s direction in adjusting
collection efforts and conducting operations. For TM IPB efforts to be effective, all
commanders and supporting staffs must understand and apply the methodology in the
same manner.
(b) The four-step JIPB process provides analysts and operators a
comprehensive methodology for developing any intelligence picture, for TMs or any other

III-6
target system. IPB is the foundation on which collection strategies and operational plans
are built. Crisis does not change the IPB process, only the pace at which it is conducted.
b. TM IPB. The key word in IPB is preparation. Establishing an adequate TM
knowledge base requires dedicated resources, personnel, and a considerable amount of time
for the operational forces as well as the theater and national intelligence centers and
agencies. Operational forces that will fight in the theater must be involved in the process
so that they will have “first-hand” knowledge of the enemy’s TM operating procedures.
(1) TM IPB Process. TM IPB is the continuous application of the JIPB methodology
against each specific missile threat in a specific geographical area. A well-developed TM
IPB provides the intelligence necessary to determine likely adversary TM COA, associated
COA branches and sequels, and describes the environment in which friendly operations and
planning must occur.
(a) TM IPB supports offensive and defensive counter missile efforts. TM IPB
differs from other air-, land-, or sea-focused IPB. For example, while a ground-focused IPB
concentrates on maneuver forces in defensive positions or moving forward, TM IPB focuses
on dispersed ground activities in the enemy’s rear area, most likely moving away from the
front. Likewise, an air-focused IPB would center on intelligence required to achieve air
superiority, conduct air interdiction and strategic attack, vice the more narrow focus TM
threat.
(b) Developing TM IPB requires dedicated analysts who have developed a keen
understanding of the enemy’s TM forces through repetitive analysis – it is a full-time
function. From an analytical perspective, TM IPB breaks down and correlates the who
(units), what (equipment), when (timing), where (infrastructure), why (objectives), and how
(operations) of an enemy TM force to derive likely enemy COA.
(c) While all missile systems have similar characteristics, each country’s TM
force will differ depending on how it is equipped, organized, trained, and employed.
Appendix C provides a list of questions that can help analysts start the TM IPB process.
(d) If TM IPB related production is not done in considerable detail before
hostilities commence, it is unlikely that it can be done well enough once hostilities begin to
be effective in a short conflict. While TM IPB may not provide an abundance of targets on
D-Day (unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence), it is
the key to having the right sensors, in the right place, at the right time to detect pre-launch
TM activity so that we may quickly interrupt it.
(e) The four iterative and parallel steps of the IPB methodology are further
discussed in Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Missile Defense
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (FM 3-01.16/MCWP 2-12.1A/NTTP 2-
01.2/AFTTP (I) 3-2.36), March 2002.

4. Collection Management Strategies

a. Collection Management.
(1) The primary purpose of collection management is to answer the commander’s
IRs by making the best use of scarce ISR assets. This includes non-traditional sensors,
such as strike aircraft with on-board sensors that may be available to augment traditional
assets and bolster counter-TM capabilities. TM IPB and target development cannot

III-7
succeed without the effective employment of all sensors. While available sensor systems
can readily support the JTMTD process, it can also create a dilemma for the JFC. Finding
(and disrupting) TM activity can quickly become a resource-intensive operation. The
challenge for the JFC is in balancing the IRs for countering TMs with the intelligence needs
of the overall JTF.
(2) Collection management’s secondary purpose is to answer IRs from other
intelligence users. IRs orient on intelligence required to: prevent surprise; support
planning, and support decisionmaking during execution operations, and engagement of
HPTs. To be useful, the gathered information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed,
properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user.
b. Information Requirements.
(1) The link between IR originators and the sensor/collectors themselves is the
collection manager (CM). The CM is responsible for translating IRs into effective collection
strategies; therefore, it is paramount that CMs clearly understand what the operator needs.
(2) In-theater, IRs originate from intelligence analysts, targeteers, combat
assessment, and combat operations planning at the JTF and component levels. They may
also originate from external intelligence organizations, such as CIA, NSA, DIA, etc. In-
theater IRs are products of decisionmaking and target development planning processes.
These processes determine the IR priority, relative to the JTF’s mission success. CMs
participate in these processes and develop a list of PIRs for the JFC’s approval. In joint
operations, these collection management priorities are normally established at a daily
meeting of CMs chaired by the J2 or the J2 CM and approved by the JFC.
(3) While TM related IRs are important, they do not have “control” over ISR assets
and must compete for these resources with other JTF IRs. It is the CM’s responsibility to
ensure that the collection strategy developed fulfills the most important IRs first, and most
completely, using all available ISR assets. If countering TMs is one of the highest
priorities, the IRs developed during the TM IPB process become part of the JFC’s PIRs. If
TMs are not a high priority, it is still possible to gather some requested information by
integrating the requirements into existing collection efforts (commonly referred to as
“piggybacking”).
c. The Collection Management Process. CMs use PIRs to begin the collection
management process.
(1) There are six collection management functions that are managed under two
headings: CRM and COM. The six steps outlined in figure III-4 depict how CMs
participate in formulating collection requirements, submit those requirements through
appropriate channels to the collectors, and monitor/manage/track all activities required to
satisfy those requirements.
(a) CRM prioritizes competing RFI based on the JFC’s guidance and objectives
and keeps the collection strategy synchronized with the overall campaign (figure III-4,
Steps 1 and 6).
(b) COM develops the collection plan, tasks collectors, disseminates results,
evaluates ongoing operations (figure III-4, Steps 2 through 5) and assists CRM in keeping
the strategy up-to-date (Step 6).

III-8
 Figure III-4. Collection Management Functions and Process

d. Collection Management Functions and Process. Steps 1 & 2 (figure III-4) are most
critical because they determine how PIRs are translated into specific information
requirements (SIRs) and then into specific orders and request (SORs) for transmission to
collectors. Poorly written PIRs do not produce well-defined and focused SORs. If PIRs are
poorly written, the collection effort will not likely produce the information needed to fill the
intelligence gap. Good PIRs have several things in common: they ask only one question;
they focus on a specific fact, event, or activity; and they provide intelligence required to
support a single decision. Table III-2 indicates the information necessary to make PIRs
complete and precise.

III-9
 Table III-2. PIR Information Requirements

WHAT Activity or indicator. Also, include accuracy required for target data.
WHERE Named area of interest (NAI) or target area of interest (TAI) location.
WHEN Time the indicator is expected to occur.
WHY Justification for requesting the information.
WHO Who needs the results?
BY WHEN How quickly is the information needed?
MEDIA What is the desired format for the information; that is, report, briefing,
multi-media, verbal, direct feed, etc.
Note: In completing the “why” portion of the TM IR request, it is important to include
in the justification that it supports force protection operations.
e. Collection Strategy Development. Four key characteristics of a good collection
strategy are: redundancy, mix, cross-cueing, and integration.
(1) Redundancy. Redundancy implies the use of several same-discipline assets to
cover the same target. Redundancy is used against high priority collections when the
probability of success by any one system is low and to improve the chance of obtaining a
more accurate position location of the target.
(2) Mix. Mix means providing complementary coverage by combining assets from
multiple disciplines. Sensor mix increases the probability of collection, reduces the risk of
successful enemy deception, facilitates cross-cueing, and provides more complete reporting.
(3) Cross-cueing. Cross-cueing involves using one or more sensor systems to “cue” or
direct other sensors on “where to search.” Cross-cueing requires that the platform hosting
the sensor be in view of the new collection location or able to move within collection range
within available time windows. Cross-cueing can be intra-platform (multiple sensors on
single platform), inter-platform (between two sensor platforms), or some combination
thereof from ground-based, airborne, and/or overhead systems.
(a) Sensor cross-cueing. Sensor cross-cueing refers to automatic or semi-
automatic redirection of a sensor’s specific search area. Automatic redirection is cross-
cueing based on pre-established criteria that conform to collection priorities. Semi-
automatic redirection means an operator is “in-the-loop” to redirect the sensor to the new
collection location manually. This decision is based on an indicator from another source
and whether the cross-cue satisfies pre-established conditions (such as higher priority
tasking, etc.). Air and missile defense sensors support cross-cueing operations by providing
threat TM estimated launch points (ELPs) digitally over the joint data net to friendly
forces. This data automatically supports attack and passive defense operations by
providing friendly forces with timely information on enemy activities, locations, possible
TM ELPs, and predicted ground impact points.
(b) Sensor cross-cueing is highly dependent on dissemination architectures,
sensor system design, and operator training. Although cross-cueing may only change the
sensor’s search area temporarily, the value of any lost intelligence during this period must
by weighed against the expected value of the new intelligence gained. For example, if a
sensor is in the process of monitoring an event as it occurs, cross-cueing the sensor at that
particular moment might result in a complete loss of information about that event.

III-10
Because an “informed” operator in-the-loop is needed to make these types of decisions, the
amount and type of automatic cross-cueing is normally limited.
(c) Cross-cueing is very important to TM IPB and target development; this can
be especially true for locating FOLs and FOBs. For example, a TM launch location
provided by Defense Support Program (DSP) warning or “hit” can be cross-cued to a
platform employing a ground movement target indicator or other applicable sensor system.
This sensor would then monitor the TEL’s movement and track it back to the transload site
and then, in turn, track the ground support vehicles back to the FOL or FOB.
(4) Integration. Integration means bringing new higher priority or existing lower
priority requirements into planned or ongoing missions. Integration helps avoid
undertasking very capable assets and reduces disruption of the overall collection strategy
caused by dynamic re-tasking.
(a) Dynamic re-tasking refers to changing a sensor’s collection focus while it is
actively engaged in supporting collection requirements established prior to its current
mission. Like cross-cueing, the value of the collections lost as a result of dynamic re-
tasking, must be compared with the value of the new intelligence gained. Sensors are not
normally dynamically re-tasked unless the new requirement meets a higher JFC priority
and the particular system is capable of being re-tasked in time to fulfill the new
requirement. For overhead collection systems, dynamic re-tasking is normally limited to
changing the sensor’s “boresight”.
(b) Dynamic re-tasking may also require the movement of the platform hosting
the sensor to within viewing range of the new collection area. For airborne assets, this
means changing the track the platform is flying in order to support the new collection
requirement. Current UAVs are generally the most flexible asset, but have longer transit
times because of low airspeeds. Overhead asset “orbits” or U2 aircraft’s “track” cannot be
altered quickly, and therefore are usually not considered for dynamic re-tasking when the
“orbit/track” requires alteration. The flexibility of other airborne assets may also be
constrained by self-protection and airspace deconfliction issues. UAVs are vulnerable to the
same air defense threats as manned aircraft and, therefore, require the same IPB
considerations when determining safe flight routes. Carefully consider these issues when
deciding to dynamically re-task a collection asset.
Note: The U2’s on board sensors are capable of being cross-cued or dynamically re-
tasked when a flight path change is not required.

(c) Cross-cueing and dynamic re-tasking require CMs to maintain “sensor SA,”
that is, a picture of where sensors are, their capabilities, range, etc. Sensor SA is still
mostly a manual process. This impedes flexibility and the responsiveness of the collection
management system. Several near-term systems may improve these shortcomings.
f. Collection Management Focus. The collection management processes during
peacetime, crisis or conflict (to include wartime and military operations other than war) do
not differ greatly. However, the level of hostilities will change the focus of the collection
management effort and number/types of ISR assets available for collection tasking.
(1) Peacetime Collection Management. Collection management during peacetime
has two purposes. Acquiring sufficient database information to permit analysts to develop
a credible IPB, and developing plans for employment of ISR assets during crisis and

III-11
conflict. Peacetime TM collection efforts will generally focus on facilities related to
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), production and manufacturing,
national storage sites, import operations, supporting infrastructure, doctrinal information,
training and exercises, and strategic TM operations.
(a) Overflight restrictions and worldwide commitments will likely constrain
ISR assets during peacetime. However, there is no prohibition against planning for periods
of crisis or conflict. TM analysts and CMs develop on-the-shelf collection plans that include
provisions for ISR assets needed to quickly “mature” the TM IPB and monitor TM forces in
garrison before they deploy.
(2) Crisis Collection Management. Monitoring TM activity during the early stages
of a crisis is critical. If hostilities appear imminent, the adversary will likely deploy TM
forces to dispersed locations to prepare for their employment and to protect them from
attack. Available in-theater ISR assets, as well as other national technical means, must
watch for the deployment of missile forces and, if possible, track them to their various
operating areas. Having an on-the-shelf crisis collection plan that includes TM named area
of interests (NAIs) is essential.
(3) Conflict Collection Management. Once conflict begins, the collection
management effort in support of TM target development shifts from the strategic to the
tactical. Commanders should include strategic TM targets (normally fixed), developed
during peacetime planning, in the initial attack strategy, air tasking orders, target list, and
collection assessment requirements. If the adversary has already dispersed the missile
forces, these attacks against strategic fixed-targets will have only minimal immediate effect
on launch operations, but may affect the adversary’s ability to reconstitute forces. During
crisis the key to effective TM collection efforts is establishing a near-real time intelligence
feed and responsive cross-cueing procedures for sensors.
(4) Collection Management ISR Operations. It is important to note here that ISR
operations (with exception) do not generally collect intelligence. Rather, they collect data
information that becomes intelligence after it is processed, evaluated, and integrated
(fused) with other pieces of data. When dealing with a mobile TM threat, the classic
intelligence functions of planning and direction, collection, processing, production and
dissemination must be compressed in time, level of detailed analysis, coordination, and
decisionmaking. Figure III-5 shows the cognitive hierarchy associated with these tasks.

III-12
 Figure III-5. Cognitive Hierarchy Associated with ISR Tasks

(5) Collection Management Relationships. Tactical TM activities produce perishable

intelligence information. Unless the TM analyst knows what to look for, and can see and
interpret events in near real time, it is unlikely that the analyst can develop a proactive
response before the opportunity disappears. This means that direct dissemination of data
to TM analysts and targeteers is essential to success. TM analysts and targeteers need
direct input into the cross-cueing and dynamic re-tasking processes when the JFC’s priority
is countering TMs.
(a) To be effective, the planned wartime collection architecture must be
exercised during peacetime. Unless exercised routinely, connectivity cannot be guaranteed
and data stream problems identified and resolved. Without pre-conflict testing and
effective management, communications paths can quickly become saturated by duplicative
information, hindering greatly the analysis and production efforts. Figure III-6 illustrates
the complexity of collections and intelligence information pathways that exist in support of
operations during crisis or conflict.

III-13
 Figure III-6. Collection Management Relationships

(b) The dashed line in figure III-6 indicates coordination, the solid lines with
arrows at both ends indicate interaction (requirements development, coordination,
communication, etc.), and the solid lines with a single arrowhead indicate tasking or
passing of information or requirements. Continuous coordination and cross-talk is critical
among CMs, intelligence analysts, personnel involved in combat assessment, targeteers,
and the operational decision makers to ensure that all of the information gaps are
identified and covered. During peacetime, interaction among these various sections occur
during intelligence briefings and through established daily working relationships. During
crisis and conflict, much of this interaction occurs at daily collection management or JTCB
meetings. Extra “TM-focused” meetings, which bring the theater and component TM
players together to synchronize intelligence, collection and target development operations,
are also necessary and essential.
g. Collection Management Decisionmaking Process. Near real time intelligence
collection is the key to turning predictive IPB analysis and products developed during
peacetime into a near-truth TM intelligence picture. Assumptions are replaced quickly
with facts and the analysis is fine-tuned based upon the evolving situation. Figure III-6
diagrams the collection management decisionmaking process in support of JTMTD. How
well the TM IPB and collection management processes are “harmonized” will determine the
quality of predictive intelligence and whether target nominations can be produced and
executed within the short window of opportunity presented by TMs.

III-14
 Figure III-7. Collection Management Decisionmaking Process

h. In addition to understanding the collection management process, it is equally

important to understand ISR capabilities and limitations. Appendix A contains
information on sensor considerations to aid the development of a TM collection strategy. A
critical ISR asset to TM IPB is human intelligence (HUMINT), especially SOF. Sensors
cannot replace the quality of intelligence from “eyes-on” observations. Appendix B contains
information on SOF roles and mission and support to TMD operations.

5. Target Development
Target Development is the third aspect of JTMTD. While TM IPB and collection
management are important in determining which COA the enemy has chosen, and what he
is doing where, this information is useless unless “acted on” within the required timelines.
Target development is the process of turning intelligence information into target
nominations. Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization make up the
second phase of the joint targeting cycle (refer back to figure I-1 in Chapter 1).
a. Target Identification and Nomination. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter,
after the TM attack strategy has been refined and approved, targeteers use the tasks and
subtasks to define appropriate target system components and HPTs. HPT target
nominations (supported by target folders or lists) are developed in as much detail as
possible and refined, as additional information becomes available. Preplanned target
nominations are approved according to the procedures established by the JTCB or
established target coordination forum. If TMs are designated as high priority, components
prosecute immediate TM target nominations within their area of operations (AO) and
coordinate with other components as necessary for target deconfliction, clearance, and
execution or target handoff.
(1) Peacetime Target Development. Peacetime target development should focus on
two aspects of the target system – infrastructure and potential operating areas. Provided

III-15
that TMs are accorded high priority for national and theater collection/intelligence
production, much of the TM infrastructure (such as the missile force’s garrison facilities,
weapons storage depots, LOCs, production facilities, etc.), can be identified, validated and
nominated for attack prior to hostilities. Detailed information on targets, to include
weaponeering solutions produced by appropriate service component operators, are built and
maintained on air tasking orders and target lists for immediate use at the onset of
hostilities. Based on the TM IPB, potential tactical operating areas for the missile forces
(such as potential FOBs locations; transload, launch and hide sites; countermobility targets;
etc.) are also “weaponeered” and put on the shelf. During crisis and conflict, these pre-
planned targets can be quickly validated and nominated for execution. This pre-planning
effort will require a substantial commitment of manpower and collection resources but is
critical to attaining successful pre-launch attack operations.
(2) Crisis and Conflict Target Development. Once a crisis begins, additional ISR
assets planned for during peacetime collection management analysis will become available.
These ISR assets will help confirm targets anticipated during peacetime TM IPB. On-the-
shelf target nominations are then completed quickly and nominated for execution. While
peacetime JTMTD efforts will provide an initial list of fixed-targets, the majority of the
mobile target system components will only emerge after hostilities commence. As the TM
IPB process narrows the focus of collections, fleeting targets such as TELs and GSE should
emerge. As a TM is launched, it will be tracked by air and missile defense systems, such as
Patriot, that will automatically transmit digital data containing the ELP of the TM. If the
opportunity exists, these targets can be immediately nominated for attack as TSTs. Even if
not attacked immediately, these components of the TM target system should be “tracked”
by sensor systems to help develop the TM intelligence picture. If a post-launch TEL can be
tracked to its hide site it can be attacked there; or better yet, tracked to a transload site and
attacked. GSE can be tracked back to the FOL or FOB to discover the operating network.
Once there is confirmation that the enemy is using a particular TM operating area, further
area limitation analysis may provide good countermobility targets for interdiction of the
mobility network.
(3) Countermobility. The countermobility concept capitalizes on the enemy TM’s
greatest vulnerability – the requirement to bring components together to accomplish launch
operations. Countermobility analyzes the TM mobility network in each operating area for
points of interdiction that will keep components separated. Countermobility can be
extremely effective depending on the topography of the terrain. For example, if a TEL has
difficulty moving from a hide site to its launch point, the enemy may delay the launch
beyond its approved launch window. Such a delay could be extremely important if the
adversary is trying to saturate our defenses with salvo launches. Countermobility
targeting also forces the adversary to find alternate routes to accomplish essential tasks.
When forced into changing operating patterns, TELs and GSE become exposed for greater
periods of time; thus lengthening the attack window of opportunity. Because most GSE has
limited off road capability, alternate routes may become very circuitous, further disrupting
the enemy’s OPTEMPO. Figure III-7 illustrates countermobility targeting options based on
detailed mobility analysis. The success of this type of analysis is highly dependent on
knowledge of the enemy’s operating patterns derived from the IPB process.

III-16
 Figure III-8. Countermobility Concept

(4) Combat Assessment (CA). Targets can also be nominated based on the results of
CA. These are known targets requiring restrikes or related targets not previously struck
that are identified as the overall attack strategy causes the enemy to react. As with all
operations, pre-planned and effective CA is critical and affects the entire JTMTD process.
Two key assessments that analysts must examine are: the impact of friendly operations on
the enemy’s TM capability, and the enemy’s reaction, in terms of changes to their operating
procedures.
(a) TM IPB must be continuously updated to reflect changes to the enemy’s TM
OB, operating procedures, and results of infrastructure attacks (destruction of bridges, rail
networks, etc.) that affect the enemy missile force’s ability to operate. CA directly
measures if the attack strategy is succeeding, whether a particular phase has been
completed, or when strategy changes are required. For example, if a bridge is destroyed as
part of countermobility targeting, immediately incorporate it into the area delimitation
database and use the information to analyze how the enemy will react and where new
HPTs will appear.
(b) BDA is a principle subordinate element of CA. BDA attempts to determine
the impact of operations against individual targets and target systems. There are three
phases of BDA, each of which must be done correctly to determine the overall effectiveness
of operations: physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target
system assessment.
• Physical damage assessment (Phase 1 BDA) estimates the quantitative
extent of physical damage through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage
effects to target. Phase 1 assessments are based on observed or interpreted damage
reported by the attacking force or the component-level BDA analytical cell.

III-17
 • Functional damage assessment (Phase 2 BDA) estimates the effect of the
attack on the target to degrade or destroy the functional or operational capability of a
target to perform its intended mission compared to the operational objective established
against the target. This assessment is inferred on the basis of all-source intelligence and
includes an estimate of the time needed to replace or recuperate the target function. When
appropriate, a re-attack recommendation is also included.
• Target system assessment (Phase 3 BDA) is a broad assessment of the
overall impact and effectiveness of attacks against the entire target system’s capability. It
is based upon the cumulative level of functional damage to the individual targets/facilities
that make up the system. It is also used to judge an enemy unit’s combat effectiveness.
When appropriate, a re-attack recommendation is also included.
(5) Operational Assessment. The following indicators and measures can be used to
assess the effect of friendly operations on the TM force:
(a) Physical Count. Subtract enemy TM assets from the OB based on CA
estimates of targets destroyed/damaged. While this is the most straightforward means of
measuring success, the complete reliability of such numbers has generally been proven
false during combat. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain an accurate count of the TM
OB in order to assess remaining TM capability.
(b) Reduction in TM Launch Rate/Volume. This indicator is easily observed
and measured and can provide insight into the TM force’s current capability. A significant
reduction in the launch rate may indicate: attrition of launchers/missiles, disruption of TM
logistics, or a deliberate reduction to reduce exposure to attack. This may also indicate a
change in enemy strategy or intent.
(c) Shift to New Operating Area. This may indicate change in operations due
to threat and/or loss of key infrastructure. It may also indicate the adoption of a new
strategy that is a shift from strategic or political targeting to focusing on tactical units.
(d) Reduction in TM Accuracy/Effectiveness. Degraded accuracy, missile in-
flight failures, and use of inert warheads may indicate a loss of preferred firing locations
and/or a disruption of the TM logistics system.
(e) Shift in Timing of Launches. A temporal change in the launch pattern (that
is, from day to night operations) may indicate a change in operations in response to attacks.
b. Deception. Deception is an integral part of all TM operations because it is the key to
survival. During TM IPB it is important to consider what options the enemy might employ
to deceive us as their intentions and physical operations. Deception operations range from
misinformation about capabilities and range of systems, to decoy launchers deployed in
likely launch areas. While it is impossible to characterize all possible CCD methods, it is
important to consider all possibilities in the context of the battlespace. Analyze all
intelligence information that appears “out-of-synch.” It is necessary to question every piece
of information and learn something from every TM event so that the deception will become
intuitively obvious.
c. Attack Platforms. Once targets are identified, confirmed, and nominated there is a
variety of weapons systems available to engage TM targets. While it is not the intent of
this publication to go beyond the target nomination process, the attack system selected does
have a direct bearing on the scope of the intelligence required (that is, imagery

III-18
requirements, target location accuracy requirements, etc.). It is important to emphasize
that each Service brings unique capabilities to the fight. The goal must be to maximize the
use of each system’s strengths according to the circumstances. The following is a brief
description of attack platform options:
(1) Fixed Wing Attack Aircraft (Fighter and Bombers). Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps aircraft provide advantages of speed, range, and flexibility in responding to both
preplanned and TST targets. Trained aircrews can extend a weapon system’s capability
against moving targets or those that can quickly relocate. Units can optimally deliver a
wide variety of munitions, with varying precision, weapon effects, penetration, and area-
denial capabilities, against specific elements of the TM target system. Risk management
considerations for crew exposure must also factor into employment, although stand-off
weapons further reduce exposure time.
(2) Surface-to-Surface Tactical Missiles. The Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS) provides all-weather, day or night, semi-ballistic, guided missile fires to 300(+)
km. The missile variants are armed with anti-personnel/anti-materiel (APAM) bomblets
designed to engage soft, stationary targets or with unitary warheads to engage point
targets as well as the APAM target sets. The unitary warhead missile minimizes the
collateral damage and bomblet duds that may be associated with the APAM warhead. The
ATACMS missile can engage TSTs or preplanned targets when precise target location data
(within 150 meter accuracy) is available. ATACMS requires little time to accomplish fire
direction calculations and has a relatively short time of flight. Consider ATACMS for use
against targets protected by sophisticated enemy air defenses when the risk to aircraft and
personnel is high. For example, a well-defended FOB is an excellent ATACMS target if
within range. Airspace deconfliction requirements are a major consideration when
employing ATACMS. Procedures for establishing airspace control measures for ATACMS
are discussed in Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and
Control (FM 3-100.2, MCRP 3-25D, NTTP 3-52.1(A), AFTTP(I) 3-2.16), June 2000.
(3) Cruise Missiles. Units can employ cruise missiles, such as TLAM and CALCM,
against high-value, fixed, or relocatable targets in highly defended areas. However, these
systems require precise coordinates and a considerable amount of lead-time for planning.
TLAM and CALCM are effective against a variety of stationary TM related vehicles and
support equipment. Stand-off delivery methods and precision against fixed/stationary
targets are a primary advantage of cruise missiles.
(4) Special Operations Forces. SOF provide a low-signature operation to fill gaps in
sensor coverage, in order to support target identification and acquisition through Special
Reconnaissance (SR), direct observation, tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection,
and precision emplacement of unattended ground sensors (UGS). Additionally, SOF can
facilitate attack operations through target acquisition/terminal guidance for airborne
platforms and, as necessary, direct action. Risk management considerations for SOF
exposure and survivability considerations for “delivering” aircrews must also factor into
employment.
(5) Attack Rotary-Wing Aircraft. The AH-64 (Apache) is a day/night adverse
weather attack helicopter that employs an array of rockets, missiles, and cannon fire. The
AH-64 has a combat range of approximately 670 km and a stand-off range of 8 km. The
AH-64 can conduct “search and attack” missions against targets when the target location
has not been sufficiently refined to permit engagement by other attack systems. Depending

III-19
on the range to the target area, an AH-64 battalion can spend approximately 1 to 2 hours
searching an area in which it is known that enemy TM forces are operating. The AH-64 is
equipped with sophisticated night vision, navigation, and target acquisition systems to
locate targets not readily visible and can team with other sensor systems to refine search
areas.
(6) Non-lethal Attack Options. A variety of non-lethal means are available to
support and enhance targeting of the TM target system. A variety of electronic and
information attacks, psychological operations, and deception operations may adversely
affect portions of the TM C2 system. Additionally, direct jamming can exploit the
vulnerability of weather data collected by TM-related radar systems. Combining both
lethal and non-lethal forces can enhance the overall TMD strategy.
(7) Multinational Operations. The JFC must take advantage of all attack platforms
to include multinational assets. Multinational operations serve to expand and enhance the
availability of lethal and non-lethal weapons systems for TM target engagement.

6. Conclusion
The JTMTD process defines the relationship that must exist between TM IPB, collection
management, and target development to achieve the desired end state for attack operations
– reducing or preventing enemy TM launches. While on the surface the harmonization of
these three processes appears simple, in reality, the operational architectures, databases,
resources, and enemy’s efforts to elude detection make it very difficult. The processes
described can help establish a common perspective of TM target development procedures
for everyone involved in countering TMs.

III-20
 Attack Operations During World War II
During the war, RAF Fighter Command, 2nd Tactical Air Force, and the US 9th Air
Force conducted a variety of missions (Codename CROSSBOW) against the Nazi V-2
threat. First, fighter planes and ground attack aircraft flew armed reconnaissance patrols
over known or suspected V-2 operating areas (a “V-2 Combat Air Patrol [CAP]”) for the
purpose of hunting for fleeting targets and maintaining a threatening presence to disrupt
and suppress V-2 operations. Fighter/bombers and light bombers were used to deliver pre-
planned strikes against specific missile-related targets. Also, ground attack aircraft
attempted to interdict rail traffic moving into and within the V-2 operating areas. Finally,
specially equipped light bombers also flew a small number of night intruder missions
against suspected CROSSBOW targets.
No missile firing units were ever attacked during launch operations, despite the fact the
V-2 CAP sometimes reached levels as high as 100 fighter sorties per day over suspected
missile unit operating areas. As was the case with the V-1 CROSSBOW effort, the attack
operations missions that had measurable impact on the volume and rate of missile fire,
involved air strikes against the forward support elements and supply lines of the V-weapon
forces.
One such mission occurred in February 1945 over a large wooded park in The Hague
called the Haagsche Bosch. Dutch underground had reported substantial V-2 activity at
this location, and Allied photo-reconnaissance flights had also occasionally spotted groups
of rockets in the area. On the recommendation of his chief intelligence officer, Air Marshal
Hill of Fighter Command decided to abandon combat air patrols for several days and use
his strike resources for a concentrated attack on the park. The Haagsche Bosch, with its
natural cover, and proximity to a rail line turned out to be the site for a Nazi missile
technical battery. According to Nazi accounts obtained after the war, the February attack
damaged a number of missile transporters, rockets, the special gantry crane used to
transfer missiles, and the missile checkout station located in a large sound stage of a Dutch
film studio adjacent to the park.
The average launch rate from The Hague during February 1945 was approximately ten
missiles per day. After the Fighter Command air strikes went in on February 21 and 22
(after a one day gap during which the missiles already at the launch units were used up),
firing essentially stopped for several days while the technical battery moved to a new
location and received replacement equipment.
Dr. Rob Allen, Sandia National Lab based on
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

III-21
 Chapter IV
JTMTD INTEGRATION OPTIONS

“Joint forces must be integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of offensive
and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats, both
before and after launch. This enables friendly use of otherwise contested airspace,
enhances freedom of action, and reduces the enemy’s air and missile threat to friendly
forces.”
Joint Publication 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats

1. Background
a. JTMTD, as described in Chapter III, is a process derived from the synergistic
outcome of melding TM IPB, collection management, and target development processes into
a cohesive strategy to achieve the JFC’s objective with regard to attack operations against
TMs. As noted in the preface, countering TMs is not a mission area itself, but rather a
problem that cuts across many operational and component lines and one that is inherently
joint.
b. In examining ways to integrate JTMTD efforts it is necessary to understand
capabilities and limitations of current technology and force structure. Historic
architectures and methods have not been effective in reducing or preventing enemy TM
launches. Some reasons for this ineffectiveness stem from the lack of fully interoperable
systems as well as deficiencies in joint training and joint personnel training programs.
(1) Integrated Approach. An integrated multi-Service approach to JTMTD is
necessary. Multiple intelligence organizations (national, theater, JTF, and component)
have a need for TM intelligence. The goal of JTMTD must be to create a mutually agreed
upon, comprehensive, and accurate TM picture. This requires integration of all JTMTD
efforts to:
(a) Provide the theater commander and staff with a coherent TM IPB,
collection management, and targeting effort.
(b) Provide visualization of TM targets, ISR, and weapons assets that can see
and engage TM targets, which enhances dynamic re-tasking.
(c) Expedite access to decision makers for dynamic re-tasking of sensors and
weapons.
(d) Reduce duplication of effort.
(e) Expedite the decisionmaking process for tactical responses (combat
identification).
(f) Ensure maximum sharing of information.

IV-1
 “Effective joint…operations require a reliable C4I capability that integrates air-,
surface-, subsurface-, and space-based assets…. These resources should be capable of
rapidly exchanging information, interfacing with components, and displaying a common
operational picture to all components of concern. The information flow should support the
chain of command and be as complete, secure, and as near real time as possible. These
systems should be flexible enough to allow redirection of available forces.”
Joint Publication 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats
c. The quotation above acknowledges the need for interoperable intelligence
operations. This chapter explores integration options that are feasible given the
constraints of current systems. Theater combatant commanders/JFCs must develop TM
options. The options discussed are in use in various theaters. Appendix D provides some
information on theater-specific and deployable models.

2. Integration Options
TMD organization and integration varies by theater depending on forces available and
threat capabilities. The goal of integration is achieved when a common picture of TM
activity is established among Service components. TM data flows smoothly between
component C2 nodes, and fewer “work-arounds” are required to overcome hardware and
software interoperability problems.
a. Integration Methods. Four methods for achieving an integrated JTMTD effort are--
(1) Collaboration.
(2) Liaison.
(3) Consolidation.
(4) Collocation.

3. JTMTD Integration Through Collaboration

The optimal method for achieving integration of the various JTMTD efforts is through a
collaborative information environment.
a. Techniques. The following techniques can improve JTMTD coordination and
synchronization using existing systems.
(1) Text chat, augmented by voice, is the preferred method for communication by
collaborative groups. It has the important benefits of providing a log of activities, as well as
allowing members to review what has gone on in previous sessions. Units can use
NetMeeting®, internet portals, and other chat room type tools to obtain and facilitate the
exchange of information. The usual method is to establish functionally oriented chat rooms
with specified access to bring together the appropriate personnel without overloading the
chat system capability. Several systems to facilitate chat are in use or under development.
The use of these tools must be managed carefully in order to comply with bandwidth and
architecture limitations of the force.
(2) Virtual collaboration allows all analysts to share data on a near real time (NRT)
basis and keep the TM intelligence picture current. One option currently available is the
use of Intelligence Link-S and the Joint Worldwide Communications System (JWICS).
JWICS is a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends

IV-2
a JIC to a JTF joint intelligence support element (JISE) or other tactical user. It uses
worldwide connectivity to share intelligence production in near real time. JWICS terminals
are normally located in the sensitive compartmented information facility rather than with
current operations intelligence activities. This makes real time data-sharing difficult.
Nevertheless, JWICS can provide a virtual link and offers several applications.
(a) One available technique is the establishment of a TM “homepage.” A TM
homepage may include the TM IPB database (OB data, templates, and imagery), the base
collection plan (PIR, essential elements of information, and collection strategy), the
approved attack strategy, target information folders and hyperlinks to other information
such as modernized intelligence database (MIDB), automated message handling system,
and integrated production agency. Having a TM homepage can also facilitate peacetime
information exchange between the theater staffs and stateside forces that are programmed
for deployment. Web sites are usually formatted in HTML for human use; to parse
(machine-to-machine) the data, consider formatting it on the Web site in a machine-
readable format. Ensure that the Web site is compatible with the IPB, collection
management, and targeting tools.
(b) While the homepage serves as a repository of current information, a daily
threat missile analysis meeting allows analysts and operators to resynchronize the TM
intelligence picture, coordinate TM collection priorities, and revalidate the overall attack
strategy.
b. Databases. The easy exchange of databases on target information or access to those
databases (wherever they reside) is the goal throughout IPB, collection management, and
target development (this requires the need for standardized databases and formats). Those
joint, interoperable, automated target database systems serve to facilitate data exchange
and target nomination. The Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) is the
current joint system in use for this purpose. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System and Air and Missile Defense Workstation are capable of exchanging information
with TBMCS; however, this requires manual manipulation of data (human interface). The
Automated Deep Operations Coordination System can also interface with TBMCS and
many commands are fielding it to support the fight. Better virtual tools are also under
development within the framework of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
and other technological initiatives. The most rudimentary form of collaboration is via
telephone, fax, and e-mail links. Verbal cross-talk among TM analysts, CMs, and
targeteers over existing communications is simple and effective and can diminish
misinterpretation of TM events. This form of communication, however, requires manual
transmission of data and cannot provide immediate exchange of electronically formatted
information or transfer of massive amounts of data.

4. JTMTD Integration Through Liaison

a. Liaison officers (LNOs). The most common means of coping with today’s integration
problems is through the use of LNOs. When communication links are limited or not fully
interoperable, LNOs are critical. With regard to the JTMTD process, LNOs provide direct
coordination that can alleviate problems of miscommunication and lend expertise in terms
of developing a joint attack strategy and a single TM intelligence picture. Component
LNOs provide Service-specific expertise, system knowledge, and, in some cases, additional
collection and staff support. Liaison provides connectivity between Service components
that facilitates a cross-flow of time sensitive information that can shorten response time.

IV-3
Both the sending and receiving organizations must properly plan for the use of LNOs, as
the manpower requirement can be significant.
(1) As information and battle management capabilities continue to modernize, a
“virtual liaison” capability is emerging from the multiple use of common databases, NRT
information sharing, interoperable tools, and C3 systems. This should reduce the number
of LNOs required within the TMD subject area. Such a virtual capability will enable
coordination and collaboration when LNO requirements exceed available manpower, when
time is not available to exchange LNOs, when the scope of duty doesn’t warrant a full-time
LNO, or when a requirement emerges after deployment and operations have already
commenced. Until forces fully field this capability, LNOs will continue to play a vital role
and may be the sole means of coordination between echelons capable of providing the
required degree of collaboration. See Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Joint Task Force Liaison Operations (FM 5-01.12/MCRP 5-1B/NTTP 5-02/AFTTP(I) 3-2.21),
for additional information on effective LNO procedures.

5. JTMTD Integration Through Consolidation

Consolidating all in-theater TM analysis efforts and equipping those efforts with
appropriate tools and access offers an efficient method (given current technology) for
producing target nominations within the attack windows of opportunity.
a. Theater Missile Element (TME). When established, a jointly staffed TME serves as
a single focal point for all TM efforts. A consolidated TM analysis element would be
responsible for fulfilling all JTF TM, and specifically JTMTD, requirements and
coordinating all individual component JTMTD requirements. A single analysis element is
beneficial because it--
(1) Improves and expedites communications between intelligence cells.
(2) Maximizes use of limited resources by reducing redundancy.
(3) Improves TM target production.
(4) Reduces manpower requirements.
(5) Makes reattack recommendations based on BDA results.
b. TME Tasking. The TME works with existing intelligence, collection management,
and targeting operations to produce TM target nominations. The location of the TME
depends on the situation and organization of available forces (see Appendix D).
Appropriate tasks for a TME include--
(1) Conducting and updating TM IPB.
(2) Recommending TM targeting strategy and target nominations.
(3) Providing TM situational updates to the JFC commander and components.
(4) Contributing to WMD situational updates to the JFC commander and
components.
(5) Maintaining liaison to SOF operations to coordinate cruise missile activities and
TM attack operations planning.
(6) Recommending a synchronized TM collection strategy.

IV-4
 (7) Coordinating dynamic re-tasking of sensors in support of TM TST target
nominations.
(8) Recommending dynamic re-tasking of sensors in support of TM TST target
nominations and counter-battery operations.
c. TME Organization. A notional TME organization along with associated
responsibilities for each functional cell follows.
(1) A TM analysis cell is responsible for--
(a) Developing and continuously updating the TM IPB.
(b) Providing NRT reporting of TBM launches and impact points.
(c) Maintaining interoperability of intelligence database systems.
(d) Identifying TM indications and warning.
(e) Submitting RFIs to the collection managment cell.
(f) Disseminating intelligence to components.
(g) Nominating TM targets to the targeting cell.
(h) Assisting with CA for the TM target system.
(2) A collection management cell is responsible for--
(a) Tracking and responding to RFIs submitted by the analysis cell.
(b) Maintaining sensor awareness.
(c) Developing a TM collection strategy in conjunction with the JTF CM.
(3) A targeting cell is responsible for--
(a) Developing a joint TM attack strategy and prioritizing targets that meet
established attack strategy criteria, in conjunction with the JFC joint intelligence officer
(J2) and joint operations officer (J3).
(b) Maintaining a joint TM targeting database and target folders.
(c) Submitting target nominations to the JTCB or appropriate TST agency
based on the approved attack strategy.
(4) A WMD cell is responsible for--
(a) Serving as a JTF nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) subject matter expert
(SME).
(b) Developing enemy NBC COAs in conjunction with NBC analysts.
(c) Monitoring enemy use of NBC.
(2) A special operations liaison element is responsible for:
(a) Coordination between the TME and SOF planning and execution elements.
d. TME Functions and Capabilities. To accomplish all required tasks, a TME requires,
as a minimum, the following functions/capabilities:

IV-5
 (1) Terrain limitation. The current processor available is the Digital Topographic
Support System.
(2) NRT imagery display for theater and national imagery. Current systems
available are the Joint Services Workstation, ISR Manager, and Distributed Common
Ground Station.
(3) Missile launch indications and electronic intelligence information. Current feeds
available are the Theater Information Broadcast System, Integrated Broadcast System, and
Joint Tactical Ground Station.
(4) Air situational awareness. Current system feeds are available through the Air
Defense System Integrator, GCCS common operational picture, and the TBMCS situational
awareness application.
(5) Connectivity to Theater Intelligence Systems. Some current processors are the
Tactical Exploitation System, All Source Analysis System, and TBMCS.
(6) Target nomination/deconfliction. Current systems available are the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System, JSTARS Common Ground Station, and TBMCS.
(7) Collection Management Tool(s). Current systems available are community
online intelligence system for end-users and managers software on JWICS; ISR Manager;
photo reconnaissance intelligence strike module, and the Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Management Tool.

6. JTMTD Integration Through Collocation

A final option to consider is to collocating TM intelligence activities. In peacetime, this
option could facilitate training, but offers increased risk for deployed forces. Collocation
presents a major security issue (providing an HPT for the enemy) and may require
components to detach these elements to remote sites during hostilities.

7. Conclusion
This chapter reinforces the need to integrate and embed JTMTD in JTF operations.
The need for integration is readily apparent, especially in light of past performance in
wartime and exercises. Given the limitations in force structures and available collection
systems, we must maximize the joint force’s collective capability. This chapter outlines
options. Regardless of which option the JFC chooses to utilize, the goal must remain to
develop a comprehensive target development strategy based on a sound TM IPB, supported
by a responsive collection system.

IV-6
 All-Source Correlation Cell at Fighter Command in WWII
The ability of the V-2 units to stop operations at one location, move to a completely new
operating area, and then resume launching within a few days was a crucial component of the Nazi
campaign, especially at the outset in September 1944. In order to direct attack operations against
the V-2 batteries, the Allies needed to quickly localize the new operating areas after the batteries
moved. This problem proved to be more difficult than anticipated. One example that highlights the
extent of the problem occurred on September 25, 1944 when a V-2 battery opened fire on Norwich
and Ipswich, England. Initial Allied estimates of the battery’s operating area ranged along an arc
100 miles in length. It took several days for the British to narrow the arc down and correctly
identify the vicinity of Staveren, Holland as the new operating area.
What was the problem? The British had established an analysis cell at Fighter Command
Headquarters to correlate data from various sources to localize the V-2 launch areas. This analysis
cell received data on missile tracks from air defense radars in the UK, flash-spotting and sound-
ranging reports from a survey regiment on the English coast; and aerial photographic
reconnaissance images of suspected launch areas. Once the actual campaign began, it was
discovered that these sources were not sufficient to cover an attack originating at long range from
the coast of Holland. Provisions were quickly made to enhance the information flowing into the “V-2
cell” at Fighter Command. The survey regiment brought balloons into use for their spotters in
England. Spotters were also moved to the European mainland, together with additional missile
tracking radar systems, to observe the V-2 launches at shorter ranges. A new unit was also set up
near Brussels to pass on reports from these mainland sources through a direct communications link
back to Fighter Command Headquarters. Missile contrail sightings by Allied bomber pilots flying
past the launch areas were also added to the mix. The best new source was information coming in
from the Dutch underground. New arrangements were made to get agent reports on missile force
operations passed over to Fighter Command with minimum delay.
Once the front line stabilized in October 1944, the V-2 battery at Staveren displaced to
southwest Holland to begin firing at London. Through this consolidated approach and with these
new sources in place, Fighter Command knew about this move even before the first missiles were
launched from the new operating area in The Hague.
Dr. Rob Allen, Sandia National Lab
Based on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

Intelligence Sources C orrelating Inform ation on V -2 O perations

H U M IN T
O ctober 1944
A gent reports
Contrail sightings
Flight crew debriefs
M A SIN T Fighter Com m and H Q 11th Survey Regt,
Radar tracking V -2 Cell Royal Artillery
Flash spotting Stanm ore, U K Canterbury, U K
Sound ranging
IM IN T
Photo-reconnaissance
SIG IN T 105th M obile Air 10th Survey Regt,
U LT R A reports Reporting U nit Royal Artillery
M alins, B elgium Eastern B elgium

IV-7
 Appendix A
SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

To be successful at determining potential enemy TM COAs, TM IPB requires interface

with, and support from national, theater, and tactical/organic sensors and surveillance
system networks. The discussion of sensors in this appendix is organized by intelligence
disciplines as described in JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,
and focuses on how each discipline contributes to the JTMTD process. These discussions
are, by design, general in nature and not specific to any particular area of responsibility or
sensor platform. They should be considered within the scope of the JTMTD process
described in Chapter III of this publication.

1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

HUMINT is intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human
sources. One key benefit of HUMINT is that it can provide an indication of enemy
intentions. The Defense HUMINT Service provides HUMINT intelligence as well as the
CIA. During wartime, obtain valuable HUMINT from activities undertaken by the combat
elements of the JTF (for example, via pilot debriefings following attack operations missions
and SOF). SOF as HUMINT is discussed in Appendix B.
a. Capabilities. Information gained from human sources can provide specific details of
weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, and other data important for conducting TMD
operations. HUMINT encompasses a broad range of potential data sources including
debriefings of enemy prisoners of war, information from government, military, and civilian
persons within the target country, and/or third country persons. Strategic debriefs of
persons entering the US and tracking international commerce (business, shipments, and
labor) are means of collecting potentially useful data. US persons and organizations
involved in activities abroad can also provide a wealth of current information. These
include inspection teams, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, etc.
b. Limitations. A significant limitation of HUMINT is timeliness of collection. The re-
tasking process is slow and possibly impractical or impossible to accomplish. Additionally,
HUMINT is subject to misinformation. Source credibility, reliability and the quality of
information gathered is personality dependent.

2. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography,
infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar,
wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic
display devices, or other media. Examples of IMINT collection platforms include National
Technical Means (NTM), U-2S, P3, and UAVs. In addition, JSTARS has an IMINT
capability with its synthetic aperture radar.
a. Capabilities. IMINT provides the ability to monitor HPTs including production
sites, installations, FOL/FOBs, transload sites, and other significant points of interest.

A-1
Imagery provides visual information and clues to activity that can be exploited and used for
targeting. A variety of electro-optical (EO), digital-based pictures; infrared; and radar
sensors are available, each of which has its own benefits and limitations.
(1) EO imagery is useful for a variety of tasks to include searching broad areas for
activity, terrain analysis, and LOC studies. High-resolution imagery can be used for
detailed analysis of installations and equipment and for production of target materials.
This can include commercially procured imagery.
(2) Infrared imagery is subject to the same atmospheric constraints as EO but can
detect heat from vehicles, buildings, etc. Infrared can penetrate certain types of camouflage
netting and can be combined with other types of imagery for better overall analysis.
Infrared is also effective at night.
(3) Radar imagery is effective in daylight, at night, and in adverse weather. Radar
imaging platforms are often the sole means of collecting during extended periods of poor
weather. Radar is good for detection of vehicles in the field or other mobile targets, and
depending on image quality, can aid in identification efforts.
b. Limitations.
(1) Collected imagery requires interpretation by analysts in some form. Depending
on the type of sensor, imagery analysis may be NRT or take hours to exploit.
(2) EO and infrared imagery cannot penetrate clouds and other atmospheric
disturbances can degrade their quality.
(3) Radar imaging is subject to radar shadow in areas of rugged terrain. Also
features easily seen on EO imagery may not be as apparent to radar imagery.
(4) Enemy CCD efforts may also make activities difficult or impossible for imagery
analysts to properly discern depending on imagery quality and the type of CCD applied.

3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

SIGINT comprises either individually or in combination all communications
intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation intelligence, however it is
transmitted. Examples of SIGINT collection platforms include the RC-135V/W (Rivet
Joint), C-130 (Senior Scout), U-2S, and Guard Rail/Common Sensor. In addition, AWACS,
a C2 battle management platform, has a SIGINT capability with its Passive Detection
System.
a. Capabilities. SIGINT provides the ability to identify C3 nodes, aircraft, integrated
air defense system components, and other communications or electronic platforms.
Collectively, SIGINT can identify unit locations and other key elements of enemy forces.
Use SIGINT information alone or to cross-cue other collection capabilities. SIGINT is
useful in determining activities planned or in progress by the adversary that are, by other
means, undetectable.
b. Limitations. SIGINT is reliant on emissions intercept of communications or
electronics. If an adversary is communicating via courier, landline communications, or
encrypted means, interception may be impossible or difficult to exploit. If a radar is not
operating, SIGINT sensors will not intercept. SIGINT is also subject to deliberate jamming
or deception efforts by the enemy and can be affected by line-of-sight restrictions in some
cases.

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4. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)
MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative
analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma,
and hydro magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying
any distinctive feature associated with a target. The detected feature may be either
reflected or emitted. Examples of MASINT collection platforms include the RC-135S (Cobra
Ball), DSP satellites, and developmental UGS such as the Advanced Remote Unattended
Sensor.
a. Capabilities. For many applications, MASINT means measuring some physical or
chemical features associated with a target, analyzing the features to develop a
characteristic target signature, and then comparing that signature to the entries in a pre-
existing signature library to characterize or identify the target. This process can require
specialized signal processing and computationally intensive data analysis techniques, but
modern MASINT systems are generally designed to accommodate this need. Different
types of MASINT sensors are applicable across the full spectrum of TM activity. For
example, NBC sensors can be used to help with the detection of production and storage
facilities and to characterize missile warheads. Seismic and acoustic UGS are excellent for
the remote detection/identification of moving TM elements. Radar and radio frequency
sensors can be effectively used to cross-cue other sensors and to detect, characterize, and
track vehicles. Non-imaging infrared sensors can be used for TM performance
characterization, launch detection, missile tracking, impact point prediction, and for
contributions to the overall combat assessment process.
b. Limitations. MASINT characterization and identification of a particular target may
depend on the prior acquisition of a unique signature for that target type. Some MASINT
phenomena are detectable only at very short ranges, or through the use of specialized
detection equipment; this may necessitate hand-emplacement of certain kinds of sensors.
Limited availability of some types of MASINT assets places particular importance on
thorough and constantly updated IPB in order to ensure the best sensor placement possible.
Also, the timeliness of the information gathered can vary depending on the capabilities of
the MASINT sensors and their means of communication.

5. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

OSINT is information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general
public. Sources of intelligence include defense publications, the Internet, and Foreign
Broadcast Information Service reports.
a. Capabilities. Open source data is widely available through publications, electronic
media, and broadcasts and is easy to access and analyze. Depending on the situation,
reporting on events may occur instantaneously. If a voluminous amount of data is available
for a specific area of interest, searching through it can be manpower intensive.
b. Limitations. Incomplete information, outdated information, and
misinformation/deception efforts are significant drawbacks.

6. Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

TECHINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of foreign material produced for
strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when

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an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper
steps to report it. The item is then exploited at increasingly higher levels until a
countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary’s technological advantage. There
are various components of the DIA responsible for analysis and production of TECHINT.
Service agencies also participate in these programs, e.g., the National Ground Intelligence
Center and the NAIC.
a. Capabilities. While TECHINT is not a source that can be directly used to locate
elements of an opposing missile force, exploitation of equipment and systems gives valuable
insight regarding the operational capabilities and limitations of the items in question.
Therefore, TECHINT may materially aid the IPB process in a variety of ways; a specific
example is providing assistance with modeling the adversary’s capability.
b. Limitations. TECHINT is limited by the requirement to possess the equipment that
will be exploited and by time required to achieve an effective countermeasure. TECHINT is
not a source for locating elements in wartime.

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 Appendix B
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Command of Special Operations Forces

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its components
organize for war and contingency operations by providing Army, Navy, and Air Force
Special Operations Command units to a JFC under the command and control of a Joint
Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Service components of the JTF may receive any
one of the following liaison elements to conduct tactical operations or facilitate planning:
Special Operations Command and Control Element; Special Operations Coordination
Element; Special Forces Liaison Element; and Special Operations Liaison Element. For
more information, see JP 3-05, Doctrine for Special Operations, 17 April 1998.

2. SOF Roles and Missions

a. There are no pre-packaged SOF solutions specifically designed to support TMD
activities. SOF can serve in a variety of roles and accomplish diverse missions, but are
limited in number and cannot be mass-produced. As a result, application of SOF in a TMD
role must reflect operational necessity and a careful evaluation of the threat environment.
b. Although SOF have proven useful in a TMD role, their application to this particular
mission area is not and should not be automatic. When employing SOF in any role or
mission, SOF commanders always evaluate the potential situation in terms of the “SOF
Operational Mission Criteria:”
(1) Is this an appropriate mission for SOF?
(2) Does this mission support the theater campaign plan?
(3) Is this mission operationally feasible?
(4) Are the required resources available to support the mission?
(5) Does the expected outcome justify the risk?
c. Whenever it makes more sense to employ conventional forces against a particular
target, the conventional option should always come first. The application of SOF in TMD
must result in a clear value-added to the operation and the situation must lend itself to a
favorable risk-reward evaluation.

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 SOF specifically demonstrated the ability to contribute to TMD during Operation
DESERT STORM. The first JSOTF cross-border SCUD-hunting mission, consisting of 16
SOF personnel and two vehicles, occurred on 7 February 1991. It set the pattern for
subsequent cross-border operations. Armed Blackhawk helicopters, called defensive armed
penetrators, accompanied the insertions. Once on the ground, the teams hid during the day
and conducted reconnaissance at night. These SOF operations proved to be so successful—
especially the Blackhawk attacks on SCUDs and SCUD-related targets—that on 14
February, General Schwarzkopf approved augmenting the JSOTF with a reinforced Ranger
company and more 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment helicopters.
By the time the ground war started, the JSOTF was conducting a wide range of
operations. As many as four SOF teams at a time were inside Iraq, conducting operations
against the SCUD complexes. These teams called in F-15E, F-16, and A-10 sorties to strike
the targets they found. On 26 February, SOF attacked a radio relay site. First, AH-6
attack helicopters peppered the radio relay compound with mini-gun and rocket fire.
Rangers then secured the compound and set charges to destroy the 100-meter tall tower.
The Blackhawks also conducted “thunder runs,” direct missions on SCUDs, their lines of
communications, and other command and control facilities. The JSOTF also used “Gator”
minefields to limit SCUD mobile launcher movement. Because of JSOTF operations, the
number of SCUD launches fell dramatically and their accuracy was greatly impaired.

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 Appendix C
QUESTIONS FOR TM IPB DEVELOPMENT

1. Background
This appendix contains a list of considerations for developing TM IPB. These
considerations are presented to help orient analysts and operators by providing relevant
questions, which may need to be answered. This list is not meant to be all encompassing or
exhaustive. For additional information regarding TM IPB, refer to Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (FM 3-01.16/MCWP 2-12.1A/NTTP 2-01.2/AFTTP (I) 3-2.36), March 2002.

2. Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment

a. Focused TM IPB. The goal of defining the battlespace environment is to determine
intelligence gaps and define parameters. Defining the battlespace environment helps to
focus the TM IPB effort by--
(1) Identifying significant characteristics of the environment.
(2) Defining the TM area of operations.
(3) Defining the TM area of interest.
(4) Exploring the enemy’s options for using TMs across the spectrum of conflict.
(5) Defining the boundaries of the expected TM launch areas.
(6) Identifying TM rates of fire for each TM threat.
b. Representative questions for identifying significant characteristics include:
(1) How many launchers and missiles are available?
(2) What are the minimum, maximum, and effective ranges of the missiles?
(3) What are the expected missile trajectories?
(4) Where are likely targets for enemy missiles? Are they effective against this kind
of target?
(5) Does the country produce its own launchers/missiles or are they imported?
(6) What type of reinforcement capability does the enemy have (does the country
have the ability to rebuild equipment or purchase equipment from neighboring/friendly
countries)?
(7) What have been the threat country’s attempts to acquire new missile systems
and from where?
(8) Do TM forces have any special support requirements that will indicate the
specific areas of operation?

C-1
 (9) What areas provide the necessary prerequisites in terms of infrastructure,
camouflage, cover, and concealment to support TM operations? Which areas can be
eliminated for lack of the same?
c. Representative question for defining the TM area of operations includes:
(1) From what areas can the adversary conduct launch operations?
d. Representative question for defining the TM area of interest includes:
(1) From what areas can the adversary expect support for the conduct of launch
operations?
e. Representative questions for exploring the enemy’s options for using TMs include:
(1) National objectives
(a) What are the primary goals for fielding a mobile missile force (political,
military, economic, or a combination)?
(b) What, if any, are the apparent political goals--
• To influence peacetime regional and global politics?
• To deter potential hostile nations from attacking?
• To influence other nations during crisis or wartime (actual participation,
political or economic support for belligerents)?
• To negotiate favorable cease-fire terms in the face of military defeat
(threaten use)?
(c) What, if any, are the apparent military goals--
• To destroy enemy forces?
• To impact enemy tempo of operations?
• To affect resupply or other rear-area support operations?
• To conduct psychological operations?
• To employ long-range terrestrial and/or sea-strike capability?
• To establish/maintain zones of control (cruise missile)?
(d) What, if any, are the apparent economic goals--
• To replace/supplant high numbers of conventional weapons with relatively
inexpensive TM forces?
• To export missiles and/or associated equipment?
• To force neighbors to make economic concessions?
(2) Potential targets for enemy TMs
(a) What are the adversary’s likely targets for TMs?
• Cities and population centers?
• Military forces in the field?
• Naval vessels?

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 • Important installations for resupply and large fixed targets (ports, airfields,
trans-shipment nodes, and storage sites)?

3. Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects

a. The goal of describing the battlespace effects is to understand how aspects of the
battlespace affect enemy TM COAs and friendly COAs. It examines influences of the
battlespace by--
(1) Conducting terrain analysis.
(2) Conducting weather analysis.
(3) Analyzing other characteristics of the battlespace.
b. Representative questions for terrain analysis include:
(1) What are the likely areas of TM activity considering:
(a) Ground slope.
(b) Elevation.
(c) Road accessibility.
(d) Vegetation and ground cover.
(e) Soil trafficability.
(2) How do terrain factors affect enemy TM force operations?
(3) What areas support FOB activity?
(a) What types of road networks are required to support FOB activity?
(b) What are the terrain and mobility limitations for the deployment of a FOB?
(4) What are the terrain and other mobility limitations for both launcher and
support vehicles? What types of road networks are required to support resupply and
transload activities?
c. Representative questions for weather analysis include:
(1) What are the typical regional climatological factors affecting operations?
(a) Rain or snow.
(b) Fog or wind.
(c) Heat or cold.
(d) Cloud cover and other atmospheric factors.
(2) How do seasonal variations in weather patterns change potential operating
areas?
(3) How do climatological factors affect how TM operations are conducted in the
field?
(4) How do typical weather patterns affect friendly force operations?
d. Representative questions for other characteristics of the battlespace include:

C-3
 (1) What is the current status of expressway and rail construction projects?
(2) What future expressway/rail projects are planned?
(3) How will improved/deteriorated transportation infrastructure help or hinder TM
operations?
(4) Where are unit garrison locations and where do units routinely train?
(5) Where are missiles stored?
(6) Where are the special weapons storage areas? Is there a signature that can be
exploited?
(7) Where are the missile fuel storage depots? Is there a signature that can be
exploited?
(8) Are warheads produced in country? Where? Is there a signature that can be
exploited?
(9) Are NBC agents produced in country? Where? Is there a signature that can be
exploited?
(10) What are the key components of these chemical agents? Where are they
produced? Is there a signature that can be exploited?
(11) Are missiles or their components produced in country? Where? Is there a
signature that can be exploited? If not produced in country, where are they assembled?

4. Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary

a. Evaluating the adversary models enemy capabilities, based upon known
intelligence, by--
(1) Conducting OB analysis to include technical capabilities and limitations.
(2) Conducting mobility requirements (spatial) analysis.
(3) Incorporating temporal (timing) analysis.
(4) Examining TM doctrine and tactics to include target selection procedures,
missile allocation, C3 techniques, navigation capabilities and limitations, and force
protection assets.
b. Representative questions for conducting OB analysis include:
(1) What is the organizational structure of missile units? How many TELs comprise
each battalion?
(2) How many and what types of missiles are available?
(3) What is the command structure of TM units?
(4) What is the equipment status? Is it serviceable or poorly maintained?
(5) What level of experience do operators have with their equipment? Do they have
operational “in-the-field” experience?
(6) What is the minimum, maximum, and effective range of each type of missile?

C-4
 (7) What types of warheads are available (high explosive, NBC)? How many of each
type are there? Does the type of warhead affect storage requirements? Is there a
particular signature to these warheads that can be used in collection efforts?
(8) What is the TM accuracy? What is the circular error probable of each missile
type? What is the circular error probable of each warhead type?
(9) What special handling characteristics do the missiles have?
(10) Are missiles built in country or imported? If imported, are they pre-assembled
or assembled in country?
(11) What fuels do the missiles use (liquid or solid)? Are these fuels produced in
country? What kind, where, and how? Do they produce a signature that can be exploited?
(12) What types of special, non-launcher vehicles/equipment items do missile units
require? Do they produce a special signature that can be exploited?
(13) What types of vehicles are used to transport missiles and TELs? Civilian or
military vehicles? Do they produce a special signature that can be exploited?
c. Representative questions for incorporating temporal (timing) analysis include:
(1) How do equipment-related requirements such as maintenance affect the tempo
and sustainability of launch operations?
(2) What is the doctrinal rate of fire? What is the rate of fire for different warheads?
(3) What is the average transload time for a single TEL?
d. Representative questions regarding TM doctrine and tactics include:
(1) Doctrine
(a) Does the threat TM force follow another country’s doctrine or do they have
their own?
(b) Are there any doctrinal considerations that affect the determination of
firing positions, rates of fire, and distances between fire units?
(c) What doctrine modifications has the threat made based upon weapon
quantity/quality, weather factors, and terrain constraints?
(d) What are the doctrinal targets for TMs? Are launch units routinely given
alternate targets?
(e) What historical use of TMs influences the threat’s doctrine? What is the
doctrine for NBC use? Does this doctrine change, and if so, how and when?
(f) Are TM launch operations conducted in cooperation with air strikes or other
missile/rocket launches?
(g) What is the re-supply rate in terms of missile availability per launcher?
What is the organic quantity of ready rounds available per launcher? Where are the ready
rounds kept?
(h) Do TM units have organic engineering equipment for construction of hide
sites, repair of LOCs, and mine removal?

C-5
 (i) Do TM units plan to remain under an air defense umbrella during field
operations? If so, what type of air defense systems will provide this coverage? Do
particular TM elements normally operate in conjunction with a particular type of ground or
air defense unit? Does this provide a clue for collection?
(j) When more than one launch is planned for the same time, is the preferred
method to launch together from one location or to separate the TELs individually?
(k) What do launch point operations consist of? Does this produce an
identifiable signature that can be collected against?
(l) What are the launch countdown timelines?
(m) What are the missile checkout procedures?
(n) Will the enemy employ from pre-surveyed or non-surveyed launch sites?
(2) C3I
(a) Where are the communications infrastructures that support TM operations?
(b) What is the primary method of communications between TELs in hide sites
and next higher command element? What is the secondary method?
(c) How do higher command elements provide launch orders to TM field
commanders?
(d) What type of communications will be used in emergency situations between
launch, transload, and forward support personnel; and between commanders and the next
higher command element? What types of field radios are used by TM units, and do all,
some, or none of them have encryption capability?
(e) Do TM units in the field attempt to stay close to any communications
infrastructure?
(f) When TM launch elements are deployed, do they already have a launch
plan in hand or do they receive them at the deployed site? What is the lowest
organizational level at which discretionary launch authority is given? Does this vary based
on type of warhead (high explosive vs. NBC)?
(g) Is there a standard plan for disrupted launch operations? At what level is
the plan developed (battalion, brigade, or higher)?
(3) CCD
(a) What does the threat country know about US intelligence collection,
targeting, and attack operations capabilities?
(b) What CCD does the threat employ with its TM force?
(c) What types of decoys are available and what are their levels of fidelity?
(d) Does the adversary prefer day or night launch operations? Have TM forces
trained for night operations? Does operational employment change during poor weather?
(e) What force protection measures do TM forces employ before, during, and
after launch?
(f) Are hide sites pre-planned or ad hoc?

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 (g) Do TELs hide alone or in groups? If in groups, how many and how close to
each other?
(4) Logistics and support
(a) How are propellant and oxidizer transported and stored for units in the
field? Are there designated regional storage facilities established for this purpose and
stocked for sustained operations?
(b) What preparations and activities are conducted prior to field operations?
(c) How are TM operations sustained in the field? What does the field support
infrastructure include? Are support installations ad hoc or permanent? What is the
distance between support nodes and what is the dispersal within a single node?
(d) How are transload operations conducted? Do the TELs transload at a
FOL/FOB or do GSE deploy forward to transload TELs at tactical resupply points?
(e) Where are NBC warheads stored? What special handling and security
measures are taken with NBC warheads? Are chemical warfare agents in bulk storage or
in filled warheads? Do they produce a signature that can be exploited?
(f) Are TM support operations conducted primarily during the day or at night?
(g) If FOL/FOBs are used, what are the facilities requirements? Are facilities
military or civilian? Do they differ in peacetime and wartime?
(h) Is there a brigade/battalion/platoon structure and are there forward support
bases at each of these levels? If so, are these further subdivided into separate support
areas? How do the units move to the field? How does this take place—all at once, or
piecemeal? How can this displacement be best observed?
(i) How are other non-transload resupply and support operations conducted in
the field? Do these operations produce an identifiable signature?
(j) What unique vehicles do TM forces use that are not found with conventional
ground forces?
(k) What vehicles are used for warhead transport? Are they unique?
(l) Are TM elements or supplies moved by rail for deployments over long
distances?

5. Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action

a. The goal of this step is to identify HPTs and to determine intelligence collection
requirements. It integrates the three previous steps by--
(1) Identifying the full set of COAs available to the enemy.
(2) Evaluating and prioritizing each COA.
(3) Developing situational and event templates based on previous analysis efforts.
(4) Determining NAIs and TAIs.
(5) Identifying intelligence collection requirements.

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 b. Representative questions for determining adversary COA options are based on
previous analysis (to include terrain, weather, capabilities, doctrine, tactics, infrastructure,
etc.), and include:
(1) What is the adversary’s objective in using missiles?
(2) What “wild card” options might the enemy choose even if less than optimal?
(3) What are the potential TM operating areas that will permit the adversary to
meet these objectives? Note: these operating areas become NAIs.
(4) What is the most likely enemy COA? What is the most dangerous?
(5) What are the TM vulnerabilities and decisive points? Of the high value targets
(HVTs), which ones are HPTs?
(6) Using doctrinal templates, terrain data, and known tactics, where will various
elements of the TM system likely be located (FOB, FOL, transload site, hide site, etc.)?
Note: these locations become TAIs.
c. Representative questions for determining employment of ground collection assets
include:
(1) Within each likely operating area, what are the best locations for placement of
SOF teams (e.g., high points with good concealment and line of sight to multiple avenues)?
Note: SOF personnel will normally perform this analysis.
(2) What are the best locations for emplacement or aerial delivery of UGS? Is there
sufficient ground cover to provide concealment? Is this position likely to be disturbed
(consider road shoulders, bypass areas, drainage conduits, and flood zones)?
d. Representative questions for determining countermobility targets include:
(1) From examination of the TM mobility network, are there any choke points?
(2) Can any of these choke points be interdicted with little possibility of immediate
bypass? How can they be interdicted? Will interdicting these points disrupt the launch
operation or simply delay future launches? How quickly can the adversary overcome
obstacles?
(3) How will the enemy TM force react to the disruption of the mobility network?
What new TAIs and collection coverage is required to observe these changes?

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 Appendix D
THEATER TARGET DEVELOPMENT MODELS

TMD is a theater-specific task. The manner in which each theater organizes forces to
conduct these operations will differ by the forces available and the nature of the threat.
This appendix discusses a variety of models in use in particular theaters and component
operations.

1. Consolidated Model: US Pacific Command (USPACOM) (7th Air Force

Executive Agent)
a. The US Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command, Korea (USFK/CFC) possesses an
integrated TM analysis element (TMAE). Within the element there are six cells: targeting,
command and control warfare (C2W), WMD, threat missile analysis, collection
management, and SOF. All these cells are collocated in a central area to facilitate the
JTMTD process and are responsible for the following:
(1) The targeting cell develops a TM attack strategy and integrates targets that
meet the attack strategy objectives into the analysis process.
(2) The C2W cell develops targets against the enemy’s C2 architecture.
(3) The WMD cell serves as the NBC SME cell, develops the NBC threat COA
(incorporating weather effects on the enemy’s use of NBC), and monitors the NBC
situation.
(4) The TM analysis cell develops the TM IPB and serves as the SME cell on
different types of threat TM systems and operations.
(5) The collection management cell submits collection requirements, prepares RFIs,
monitors collection activities, and coordinates with the SOF LNOs to request special
reconnaissance.
(6) The SOF cell includes two SOF LNOs (one Army and one Navy). The SOF LNOs
coordinate with the rest of the SOF community regarding team locations, daily mission
types, and priorities.
(7) USFK/CFC assets and capabilities include time critical targeting aid, ground
station module, JSTARS workstation, All Source Analysis System, generic area limitation
environment (GALE), tactical digital information link (TADIL) A and B, GCCS, and Expert
Missile Tracker, as well as numerous capabilities provided by the Korean Combined
Operations and Intelligence Center (KCOIC). The TMAE uses Automated Deep Operations
Coordination System to coordinate TM TST prosecution and BDA analysis with other
elements of the JAOC.
(8) The 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) deploys liaison
officers to the JAOC to facilitate cross-component integration. In Korea, upon request of
the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), the 32d AAMDC commander
serves as the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) for TMD (DAADC-TMD).

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The DAADC-TMD supervises all TMD activities on behalf of the CFACC /7th Air Force
Commander.

2. Collaborative Model: US Central Command (USCENTCOM)

a. USCENTCOM follows the organizational structure of a J2/J3. The TMD cell
operates under the supervision of the J3 and serves as a principle adviser to the JFC and
JTF staff on TMD issues, primarily those related to active defense. This group is concerned
with air defense operations, which includes the monitoring of Patriot unit movements,
Patriot air defense coverage, the air defense plan and defended asset list, and Patriot
missile logistics. The Theater Missile Team operates as the cell within the J2 for
coordination of IPB, collection management, and TM target nomination to the JTCB. The
TMD cell and Theater Missile Team are not collocated; they reside in the joint operations
center (JOC) and JIC respectively.
b. Development of intelligence centers for attack operations rests in great part within
the respective component’s intelligence centers (Navy SUBPLOT, Air Force ISR team,
Army Analysis and Control Element, and AAMDC). Collaboration is accomplished through
verbal communications. USCENTCOM assets and capabilities include TRAP, 5D server,
JSTARS MTI monitoring, GCCS, and GALE. USCENTCOM provides the IPB on the
strategic TMD infrastructure such as FOBs, LOCs, SSM manufacturing plants, chemical
munitions plants, SSM training locations, and pre-conflict significant events to a
subordinate JTF or component commanders.

3. Deployable TMD Operations Centers: USEUCOM, JAOC, and AAMDC

a. USEUCOM. HQ USEUCOM has developed a deployable, centralized operations and
intelligence cell to coordinate and execute TMD. The TMD cell is equipped and basic cadre
is provided by the Operations Directorate, Command and Control Division (ECJ36). When
activated and deployed, this cell augments the combined/joint task force to facilitate TMD
operations. The cell’s mission is to facilitate defense of critical assets from theater missile
threats and neutralize enemy weapon systems and support infrastructure. Positioning of
the TMD cell is dependent on the conflict environment, available communications
infrastructure, available space, and mission focus. There is no intent to habitually
associate the TMD cell with any particular component; rather, training and exercises focus
on augmenting any component, with linkages to the other components’ key systems and
functions. Datalinks into the cell provide intelligence and targeting data, missile launch
detection (for passive defense warning), and integrated battlespace picture, and
terrain/cartographic data. Current manning for the TMD cell is primarily composed of
component systems operators assembled around a core of USEUCOM staff representatives.
As necessary, component operations and intelligence representatives assist in cell
functions.
(1) The TMD cell interfaces with the area air defense commander (AADC) through
collocation or by voice/datalink (depending on cell location), providing required information
to facilitate C2. In the USEUCOM AOR, TMD attack operations are referred to as
“counterforce” operations. Using the available intelligence and operations information, the
cell performs analysis, prediction, detection, and target production functions. The TMD cell
focuses on short dwell targets (TM TSTs) because of the associated difficulties in
prosecuting those targets. However, established procedures and linkages are equally
effective for targeting long dwell, infrastructure, or preemptive targets.

D-2
 b. JAOC. When the commander Air Force forces is designated the joint forces air
component commander (JFACC), he will form a JAOC to plan, direct, and provide C2 for
joint air operations in support of the JFC’s campaign plan. In this capacity, the JAOC will
maintain visibility on the theater/JOA-wide attack operations effort against TMs.
Dependent on the contingency and the theater, and whether the mission involves war or
military operations other than war, the composition, organization, and functions of the
JAOC will be tailored to meet the mission. However, the basic framework of an air
operations center still applies. For more information on JAOC organization and functions,
refer to Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Army Air and
Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination (FM 3-01.20/MCRP 3-25.4A/NTTP 3-
0.1.6/AFTTP(I) 3-2.30), January 2001.
c. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC).
(1) The AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile
defense. The AAMDC is a fully integrated air and missile defense organization that is
entirely mobile, maintaining its own organic C4I systems and shelters within the Air and
Missile Defense Planning and Control System, which forms the foundation of the AAMDC
tactical operations center. However, it requires external connectivity support as part of an
integrated C4 joint system. Normally, the AAMDC conducts split-based operations in
support of the AADC and the Army Forces (ARFOR) (support to the ARFOR is normally
transferred to the JFLCC if one is designated). The AAMDC collocates the AAMDC Main
(operations/intelligence sections) with the JAOC and the AAMDC TAC
(administration/logistics sections with operations/intelligence situational awareness) with
the ARFOR headquarters. However, based on METT-TC the AAMDC has the flexibility
and agility to organize itself in a variety of ways to successfully support and execute the
higher headquarters air and missile defense guidance, intent, and concept of operations.
(2) Roles of the AAMDC Commander.
(a) The commanding general of the AAMDC has two roles common to every air
defense artillery commander. The general is both the commander of the air defense artillery
forces assigned to him, and the air and missile defense coordinator for the Army
commander. In addition, the general may be appointed as a DAADC. These three roles
reflect the total theater involvement of the AAMDC. METT-TC determines the
commander’s location and role.
(b) After considering factors of METT-TC, the JFC and AADC will determine
whether or not to designate a DAADC. This designation formalizes the relationship
between the land-based air and missile defense assets dedicated to theater level missions
and the AADC, and helps to ensure fully integrated and synchronized counterair
operations. The DAADC performs integration and planning to ensure efficient coordination
and rapid response to counterair requirements. The DAADC ensures the Army land forces’
contribution to the counterair fight is properly planned, synchronized, and executed. The
AAMDC as the senior Army air defense element in support of the AADC/DAADC
requirements is the primary interface at the JAOC for all land-based active air defense
operations.
(c) Although the AAMDC commander may serve as a “deputy” AADC, the
DAADC would not assume the role of the AADC if the AADC were incapacitated. Not a true
deputy commander, the DAADC’s primary responsibilities are to assist the AADC in
planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing land-based air and missile defense

D-3
operations. Neither the AAMDC commander nor his staff has the tactical, technical, or
procedural expertise and capability to perform all of the functions of an AADC in a joint
environment. The AAMDC Commander, as the DAADC, supports the AADC/DAADC
relationship by providing the following support to the AADC:

• Integrate land-based air and missile defense into theater DCA

operations.

• Advise the AADC regarding ROE (weapon control status, weapons

control procedures, states of readiness/emission/alert, fire control orders, etc.), airspace
control measures, weapon control measures, and air defense warnings.

• Assist the AADC with air defense plan development.

• Advise the AADC regarding land-based air and missile defense

operations and capabilities.

D-4
 REFERENCES

Joint Publications
Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 01 (Amended 5
Jun 03)
Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 9 Mar 00
Joint Pub 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 24 May 00
Joint Pub 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 Oct 99
Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, May10 Apr 97
Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 Apr 98
Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 Jan 02

Army
FM 6-20-10 (FM 3-60), The Targeting Process, 8 May 1996
FM 34-130, Army Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 Jul 94
FM 100-12, Army Theater Missile Defense Operations 31 Mar 00
FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, Aug 99
US Army Field Artillery School Special Text 6-60-30, The Army Tactical Missile System
(Army TACMS) Family of Munitions (AFOM) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTP), 28 Feb 2001

Marine/Navy
MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, 26 Feb 98
MCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare
MCWP 3-25.4, Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook

Air Force
Air Force Instruction 13-1AOC, Volume 3, Operational Procedures--Aerospace Operations
Center, 1 Jul 2002
Combat Air Forces Concept of Operations for Command and Control Against Time Critical
Targets, 8 Jul 1997
Cruise Missile Supplement to CAF TCT CONOPS, Mar 1998.

OTHER
Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London,
1957
Commanders Handbook for Joint Time Sensitive Targeting, United States Joint Forces
Command Joint Warfighting Center, 22 Mar 02

Reference-1
Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997
(Reprint)
David Irving, The Mare’s Nest, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1965
Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993
(DIA) NAIC –061-0789-97 Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace Methodology (SECRET)
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Military Analysis Division, “V-Weapons
(CROSSBOW) Campaign”, (2nd Edition), Jan 1947
USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, 25 Jan 96
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Missile Defense Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace, FM 3-01.16, MCWP 2-12.1A, NTTP 2-01.2, AFTTP 3-
2.36, Mar 02
Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Army Air and Missile
Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination, FM 3-01.20, MCRP 3-25.4A, NTP 3-01.6,
AFTTP(I) 3-2.30, Jan 2001

Reference-2
 GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC area air defense commander

AAMDC Army Air Missile Defense Command
ALCM air launched cruise missile
ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
ARFOR Army forces
ASM air-to-surface missile
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

C2W command and control warfare
C3 command, control, and communications
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
CA combat assessment
CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile
CCD camouflage, concealment, and deception
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CM collection manager
CMA collection management authority
CMO collection management operations
COA course of action
COM collection operations management
CONOPS concept of operations

Glossary-1
CRM collection requirements management

DA direct action
DAADC deputy area air defense commander
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DSP Defense Support Program

EO electro-optical

FM field manual
FOB forward operating base
FOL forward operating location
FSU former Soviet Union

GALE generic area limitation environment

GCCS Global Command and Control System
GLCM ground launched cruise missile
GMTI ground movement target indicator
GSE ground support equipment

HE high explosives
HPT high-payoff target
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target

IFF identification, friend or foe

IMINT imagery intelligence
IP initial point

Glossary-2
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR intelligence requirement
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IWS Information Work Space

J2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J3 operations directorate of a joint staff
JAOC joint air operations center
JDISS joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JIC joint intelligence center
JIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JISE joint intelligence support element
JOA joint operations area
JOC joint operations center
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTMTD joint theater missile target development
JTF joint task force
JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

km kilometer
KCOIC Korean Combined Operations Intelligence Center

LNO liaison officer

LO low observable
LOC line of communications

Glossary-3
M

MAD mutually assured destruction (Historical)

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MAZ 543 FSU truck used by various TELs and cargo vehicle types
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time, and civilian
MIDB modernized integrated data base
MIST Multiple Input Sensor Terminal
MSIC Missile and Space Intelligence Center
MTI moving target indicator
MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

NAI named area of interest

NAIC National Air Intelligence Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NRT near real time
NSA National Security Agency
NTM national technical means
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command

OB order of battle
OCA offensive counterair
OPTEMPO operating tempo
OPS operations

PIR priority intelligence requirements

R&D research and development

RCS radar cross section

Glossary-4
RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation
RFI request for information
RJ Rivet Joint

SA situational awareness
SAM surface-to-air missile
SATCOM satellite communications
SCIF sensitive compartmented information facility
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIR specific information requirement (Army)
SLCM sea launched cruise missile
SOF special operations forces
SOR specific orders and requests
SR special reconnaissance
SS surface-to-surface
SSM surface-to-surface missile
SUPPLOT supplementary plot (Navy SI analysis space)

TAADCOORD theater Army air defense coordinator

TADIL A&B tactical digital information link – A & B
TAI target area of interest
TBM theater ballistic missile
TBMCS theater battle management core system
TDDS Tactical Data Dissemination System
TECHINT technical intelligence
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
TGO terminal guidance operations
TGT target
TLAM TOMAHAWK land-attack missile
TM theater missile
TM IPB theater missile intelligence preparation of the battlespace
TMAE theater missile analysis element
TMAM theater missile analysis meeting
TMD theater missile defense
TME theater missile element
TO&E table of organization and equipment

Glossary-5
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TPL time phased lines (Army)
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRAP tactical related applications
TST time sensitive target
TTP tactics, techniques and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UGS unattended ground sensor
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

V1 World War II flying bomb

V2 World War II ballistic missile
VTC video teleconference

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WWII World War II

Glossary-6
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air-to-surface missile (ASM) – an air-launched guided missile for use against surface
targets. (JP 1-02)
Area of Interest (AI) – that area of concern to the commander, including the area of
influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy
territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This
area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could
jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)
Area of Operations (AO) – an operational area defined by the joint force commander
for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically
encompass the entire operational area of the joint force
commander, but should be large enough for component
commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.
(JP 1-02)
Ballistic Missile - a missile that does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce
lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is
terminated. (JP 1-02)
Collection Management – in intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence
requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities,
tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or
agencies, monitoring results, and re-tasking, as required. (JP 1-02)
Cruise Missile – guided missile, the major portion of whose flight path to its target is
conducted at approximately constant velocity and depends on the
dynamic reaction of air for lift and upon propulsion forces to
balance drag.
Dwell Time – the period of time a target will remain stationary or an activity will
continue until completed.
Forward Operating Base (FOB) - the TM force’s main unit supply and storage
activity containing warhead, missile and propellant storage sites;
transporters and cranes; checkout vehicles; fuel trucks (vehicle and
missile fuel); and resupply vehicles and other support vehicles. An
FOB is normally dispersed and can operate from the field or urban
environment, or can be hidden in large buildings or underground
facilities. An FOB requires robust lines of communications
(primarily roads and rails) to support continuous TM operations.
Note: This definition describes FOB in support of TM operation, which is not
defined in Joint Publication 1.02, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms.

Ground Support Equipment (GSE) – vehicles, cranes and equipment used to support
TEL replenishment between launch operations. The largest
amount of GSE is typically found at the FOL and FOB.

Glossary-7
high-payoff target (HPT) - A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly
contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-
payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired
and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly
commander’s mission. (JP 1-02)
high-value target (HVT) – A target the enemy commander requires for the successful
completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be
expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions
throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. (JP 1-02)
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) – an analytical methodology
employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,
environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence
preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for
each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate.
The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of
the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it
in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a
continuing process. (JP 1-02)
Named Area of Interest (NAI) – the geographical area where information that will
satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. NAIs
are usually selected to capture indications of adversary COAs but
also may be related to conditions of the battlespace. (JP 1-02)
SCUD missile The Scud is a mobile, Russian-made, short-range, tactical ballistic
surface-to-surface missile system. The SCUD-series guided
missiles are single-stage, short-range ballistic missiles using
storable liquid propellants.
Target Area of Interest (TAI) – the geographical area where high-value targets can
be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of
interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only target
areas of interest associated with high priority targets are of
interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning
and wargaming. Target areas of interest differ from engagement
areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all
available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by a
single weapon. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-8
 INDEX

A
AADC, D-2, D-3, D-4
AAMDC, v, D-1, D-2, D-3
Air Land Sea Application Center. See ALSA
air launched cruise missile. See ALCM
air-to-surface missile. See ASM
ALCM, II-12, II-13, II-14
ALSA, ii, iii
AO, III-15
AOR, II-6, D-2
area air defense commander. See AADC
area of operations. See AO
area of responsibility. See AOR
ARFOR, D-3
Army Air Missile Defense Command. See AAMDC
Army forces. See ARFOR
Army Tactical Missile System. See ATACMS
ASM, iv, II-13, II-14
ATACMS, III-19

B
battle damage assessment. See BDA
BDA, III-5, III-17, III-18, IV-4, D-1

C
C2, I-2, II-1, III-3, III-20, IV-2, A-2, D-1, D-2
C2W, D-1
C3, II-3, IV-4, A-2, C-4
C3I, C-6
C4I, II-14, IV-2, D-3
C4ISR, III-5
CA, ix, III-17, III-18, IV-5
CALCM, II-12, III-19
camouflage, concealment, and deception. See CCD
CCD, II-14, III-4, III-18, A-2, C-6
Central Intelligence Agency. See CIA
CIA, I-5, I-6, III-8, A-1
CM, III-8, IV-5
CMA, I-6
COA, III-2, III-3, III-5, III-7, III-15, C-7, C-8, D-1
Collection Management, v, vi, ix, I-6, III-7, III-8, III-9, III-11, III-12, III-13, III-14, III-15, IV-6
collection management authority. See CMA
collection manager. See CM
collection requirements management. See CRM
COM, I-6, III-8
combat assessment. See CA
combat operations management. See COM
command and control. See C2
command and control warfare. See C2W
command, control, and communications. See C3
command, control, communications, and intelligence. See C3I
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. See C4I
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
See C4ISR
concept of operations. See CONOPS
CONOPS, III-1, III-2
conventional air-launched cruise missile. See CALCM
course of action. See COA
CRM, I-6, III-8
Cruise Missile, iv, II-12, II-13

D
DAADC, D-1, D-3
Defense Intelligence Agency. See DIA
Defense Support Program. See DSP
deputy area air defense commander. See DAADC
DIA, I-5, I-6, III-5, III-8, A-4
DSP, III-11, A-3

E
electro-optical. See EO
EO, A-2

F
field manual. See FM
FM, 1, iv, III-5, III-7, III-19, IV-4, C-1, D-3, 1
FOB, II-2, II-4, II-6, III-11, III-16, III-19, C-3, C-7, C-8
FOL, II-4, II-6, III-11, III-16, A-1, C-7, C-8
forward operating base. See FOB
forward operating location. See FOL

G
GALE, D-1, D-2
GCCS, IV-3, IV-6, D-1, D-2
generic area limitation environment. See GALE
GLCM, II-14
Global Command and Control System. See GCCS
ground launched cruise missile. See GLCM
ground support equipment. See GSE
GSE, I-2, II-6, III-16, C-7

H
high-payoff target. See HPT
HPT, III-15, IV-6
human intelligence. See HUMINT
HUMINT, v, III-15, A-1

Glossary-2
 I
imagery intelligence. See IMINT
IMINT, v, A-1
intelligence directorate of a joint staff. See J2
intelligence preparation of the battlespace. See IPB
intelligence requirement. See IR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. See ISR
IPB, i, v, vii, viii, I-3, I-5, I-6, II-13, II-14, III-1, III-2, III-4, III-5, III-6, III-7, III-8, III-11, III-12,
III-14, III-15, III-16, III-17, III-18, III-20, IV-1, IV-3, IV-4, IV-5, IV-6, A-1, A-3, A-4, C-1, D-1,
D-2
IR, II-12, III-8, III-10
ISR, vi, ix, I-6, I-7, II-13, II-14, III-5, III-7, III-8, III-11, III-12, III-13, III-15, III-16, IV-1, IV-6, D-
2

J
J2, III-8, IV-5, D-2
J3, IV-5, D-2
JAOC, v, D-1, D-2, D-3
JFACC, I-5, D-2
JFC, i, iv, viii, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, III-1, III-3, III-4, III-5, III-8, III-11, III-13, III-20, IV-1, IV-4,
IV-5, IV-6, B-1, D-2, D-3
JFLCC, D-3
JIC, I-4, IV-3, D-2
JIPB, vi, III-5, III-6, III-7
JISE, IV-3
JOA, I-5, III-5, D-3
JOC, D-2
joint air operations center. See JAOC
joint force air component commander. See JFACC
joint force commander. See JFC
joint force land component commander. See JFLCC
joint intelligence center. See JIC
joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. See JIPB
joint intelligence support element. See JISE
joint operations area. See JOA
joint operations center. See JOC
joint special operations task force. See JSOTF
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System. See JSTARS
Joint Targeting Coordination Board. See JTCB
joint theater missile target development. See JTMTD
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. See JWICS
JSOTF, B-1, B-2
JSTARS, II-13, IV-6, A-1, D-1, D-2
JTCB, I-4, III-14, III-15, IV-5, D-2
JTF, I-5, I-6, III-1, III-5, III-8, IV-1, IV-3, IV-4, IV-5, IV-6, A-1, B-1, D-2
JTMTD, i, iv, v, vii, viii, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, III-3, III-4, III-8, III-14, III-15, III-16, III-17, III-20, IV-
1, IV-2, IV-3, IV-4, IV-6, A-1, D-1
JWICS, IV-2, IV-6

K
KCOIC, D-1
Korean Combined Operations Intelligence Center. See KCOIC
 L
liaison officer. See LNO
line of communications. See LOC
LNO, IV-4
LO, II-12, II-13
LOC, I-6, III-2, A-2
low observable. See LO

M
MASINT, v, A-3
measurement and signature intelligence. See MASINT
METT-TC, D-3
MIDB, IV-3
Missile and Space Intelligence Center. See MSIC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time, and civilian. See METT-TC
modernized integrated data base. See MIDB
moving target indicator. See MTI
MSIC, I-5, I-6
MTI, D-2
MTTP, i, I-2
multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures. See MTTP

N
NAI, III-10
NAIC, III-5, A-4
named area of interest. See NAI
National Air Intelligence Center. See NAIC
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. See NIMA
National Security Agency. See NSA
national technical means. See NTM
NATO, II-15
Naval Warfare Development Command. See NWDC
NBC, IV-5, A-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-7, D-1
NIMA, I-5
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO
NRT, IV-2, IV-4, IV-5, IV-6, A-2
NSA, I-5, I-6, III-8
NTM, A-1
nuclear, biological, and chemical. See NBC
NWDC, ii

O
OB, II-14, III-2, III-17, III-18, IV-3, C-4
OCA, II-14
offensive counterair. See OCA
operating tempo. See OPTEMPO
operations directorate of a joint staff. See J3
OPTEMPO, III-4, III-16
order of battle. See OB

Glossary-4
 P
PIR, vi, I-6, III-10, IV-3
priority intelligence requirements. See PIR

R
R&D, II-2
RCS, II-12, II-13, II-15
RDT&E, III-12
request for information. See RFI
research, development, test and evaluation. See RDT&E
RFI, III-8
Rivet Joint. See RJ
RJ, II-13

S
SA, III-5, III-11
SAM, II-4
sea launched cruise missile. See SLCM
SIGINT, v, III-19, A-2
signals intelligence. See SIGINT
situational awareness. See SA
SLCM, II-14
SOF, v, I-6, II-13, III-15, III-19, IV-4, IV-5, A-1, B-1, B-2, C-8, D-1
special operations forces. See SOF
special reconnaissance. See SR
SR, III-19
SSM, II-4, D-2
surface-to-air missile. See SAM
surface-to-surface. See SS
surface-to-surface missile. See SSM

T
table of organization and equipment. See TO&E
Tactical Data Dissemination System. See TDDS
tactical related applications. See TRAP
TAI, III-10
target. See TGT
target area of interest. See TAI
TBM, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-7, II-14, IV-5
TBMCS, IV-3, IV-6
TDDS, II-14
TECHINT, v, A-3, A-4
technical intelligence. See TECHINT
TEL, I-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-13, II-14, III-11, III-16, C-5
terminal guidance operations. See TGO
theater ballistic missile. See TBM
theater battle management core system. See TBMCS
theater missile. See TM
theater missile analysis element. See TMAE
theater missile analysis meeting. See TMAM
theater missile defense. See TMD
theater missile element. See TME
theater missile intelligence preparation of the battlespace. See TM IPB
time sensitive target. See TST
time-phased force and deployment data. See TPFDD
TLAM, ix, II-12, III-19
TM, i, v, vi, vii, viii, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-10, II-
15, III-1, III-2, III-3, III-4, III-5, III-6, III-7, III-8, III-10, III-11, III-12, III-13, III-14, III-15, III-
16, III-17, III-18, III-19, III-20, IV-1, IV-2, IV-3, IV-4, IV-5, IV-6, A-1, A-3, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4,
C-5, C-6, C-7, C-8, D-1, D-2
TM IPB, I-5, I-6, III-7, III-14, III-16, C-1
TMAE, D-1
TMD, v, III-15, III-20, IV-2, IV-4, A-1, B-1, B-2, D-1, D-2
TME, IV-4, IV-5
TOMAHAWK land-attack missile. See TLAM
TPFDD, I-6
TRADOC, i, ii
transporter-erector-launcher. See TEL
TRAP, II-14, D-2
TST, III-19, IV-5, D-1
TTP, I-5

U
UAV, II-12, II-13, II-14
UGS, III-19, A-3, C-8
unattended ground sensor. See UGS
United States Central Command. See USCENTCOM
United States European Command. See USEUCOM
United States Special Operations Command. See USSOCOM
unmanned aerial vehicle. See UAV
USCENTCOM, v, ix, D-2
USEUCOM, v, D-2
USSOCOM, ix, B-1

W
weapons of mass destruction. See WMD
WMD, I-1, I-2, I-6, II-2, II-3, II-12, II-14, III-2, IV-4, IV-5, D-1
World War II. See WWII
WWII, I-8, IV-7

Glossary-6
 FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43)
NTTP 3-01.13
AFTTP(I) 3-2.24
11 NOVEMBER 2003

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0400705

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed.
Electronic means only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force:

DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR.

Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Air Force Distribution: X if restricted publication

PIN: 081205-000