Fuchs - The Brain A Mediating Organ

Thomas Fuchs
The Brain
A Mediating Organ
Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience has been driven by the idea that by
reductionist analysis of mechanisms within a solitary brain one can
best understand how the human mind is constituted and what its
nature is. The brain thus came to appear as the creator of the mind
and the experienced world. In contrast, the paper argues for an eco-
logical view of mind and brain as both being embedded in the relation
of the living organism and its environment. This approach is crucially
dependent on a developmental perspective: the brain is conceived as
a plastic systemof open loops that are formed in the process of life and
closed to full functional cycles in every interaction with the environ-
ment. Each time a new disposition of coherent neural activity is
formed through repeated experience, structures of the mind are
imprinted onto the brain. The brain becomes a mediating organ or a
window to the mind, for it is structured by the mind itself.
Key Words: brain, mind, embodiment, consciousness, hard problem
Introduction
Until now, cognitive neuroscience has mainly been driven by the idea
that by reductionist analysis of mechanisms within an individual brain
one can best understand the origin and nature of the human mind.
Conscious experience came to be regarded as a by-product of the
brains activity as a symbol-manipulating machine. However, this
view separates the brain not only from the living body, but also from
its interactions with the environment. As a consequence, mind and
world are treated separate from each other, with the outside world
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18, No. 78, 2011, pp. 196221
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being mirrored by the mind as a representational system inside the
head. As Thompson (2007, p. 36) remarked, this has yielded abstract
and reified models of the mind as a disembodied and cultureless phys-
ical symbol system in the brain of a solitary individual.
Similarly, current theories of intersubjectivity are also based on a
representationalist view. Concepts such as Theory of Mind, mental-
ization or simulation all have in common that they conceive of social
understanding as implying some kind of inner representations of oth-
ers presumed mental states that we then have to project onto them.
Research into the social brain has favoured a third-person paradigm
of social cognition as a passive observation of others behaviour,
based upon an inner modelling process in the individual brain. One
could even say that according to these concepts the person who per-
ceives another does not actually interact with him or her, but deals
with internal models or simulations of her actions.
This kind of neurobiological reductionism and solipsism is by no
means an inevitable result of brain research. As I will argue, it is based
on an overestimation of the brain as a god-like creator of mental life.
The brain is certainly a central organ of the living being, but it is only
an organ of the mind, not its seat. For the mind is not located in any
one place at all; rather, it is an activity of the living being which inte-
grates at any moment the ongoing relations between brain, body and
environment. Assuming such an embodied, extended and dynamic
view of the mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Thompson and
Stapleton, 2009), the brain loses its mythological powers and turns
into a still fascinating, yet far more modest mediator of human experi-
ence, action and interaction.
This mediating role of the brain becomes all the more obvious if we
look at it not only cross-sectionally, but include the developmental
aspect. The structures of lived experience are inherently mental, i.e.
they include spatial, temporal, logical, symbolical, and other patterns
which in the course of organism-environment interactions are
extracted and ingrained in microstructures of the brain. This results in
the formation of neural networks that serve as dispositions for mean-
ingful reactions to similar situations in the future. Thus, in fact the
brain is formed by mental life; from early childhood on, mental struc-
tures come to be imprinted in the brains structure, and the individual
increasingly shapes his own brain through his actions and interac-
tions. The brain may also be regarded as a matrix that transforms all
experience into lasting dispositions of behaviour and experience. It
constitutes a system of open loops that have been formed in the course
of earlier interactions, and that are functionally closed each time the
THE BRAIN A MEDIATING ORGAN 197
organism is interacting with a certain object or situation that it has
dealt with before (Fuchs, 2008).
From this point of view, the brain is not a creator, but a relational
organ: it is embedded in the meaningful interactions of a living being
with its environment. It mediates and enables these interactive pro-
cesses, but it is in turn also continuously formed and restructured by
them. The mind may be regarded as a continuous process of relating to
the environment which is constantly transformed into the more stable
structures of neural networks and dispositions. This reciprocal rela-
tionship of process and structure, with each of the two poles
enabling and modifying the other, is the foundation of the joint devel-
opment of mind and brain. It also strongly contradicts any reductionist
notions of the brain as the creator of the mind.
In what follows, I will first outline a concept of the life process as
the unifying basis of organic and mental processes. To overcome
dualistic predicaments, life is regarded as a unity of the living body
(Krper) and the lived body (Leib). The one denotes the body as an
autopoietic living system, the other the body as a centre of subjective
experience. This means that processes of living and processes of liv-
ing through (Leben and Erleben) are both aspects of the life process
seen from two complementary points of view. On this basis, I will
describe three essential cycles of the life process; namely (1) cycles of
organismic homoestasis, (2) cycles of organism-environment interac-
tion, and (3) cycles of social interaction. Finally, I will consider the
developmental side of these cycles: the relation of lived and living
body may also be regarded as an ongoing interaction of process and
structure, or of lived experience and sedimented dispositions. Thus,
the organisms interaction with the environment constitutes the basis
for the development of mind and brain.
A Dual Aspect Theory of Life
Cognitive neuroscience is still based on the principal divide between
the mental and the physical, or between the subjective mind and
the objective body, the one only accessible from within, or from the
so-called first-person perspective, the other only accessible from
without, or from a third-person perspective. As a result, social cogni-
tive neuroscience also assumes a disembodied sender-receiver rela-
tion between two Cartesian minds, with their bodies only serving as
signal transmission devices. What is lost in the principal divide is the
human person which essentially means a living being, an embodied
subject. The person is neither pure subjectivity experienced from
198 T. FUCHS
within, nor a complex physiological system observed from without; it
is a living being interacting with others from a second-person or
you-perspective, and thus, as a unity of interiority and exteriority.
When talking with another person, listening to his words, seeing him
laughing, shaking hands with him, etc. we perceive himboth as a con-
scious, experiencing being and as a physical, bodily being at the same
time.
However, present philosophy of mind is mainly based on the
assumption of a profound difference between consciousness and bio-
logical life the one conceived as internal and purely mental, the
other as an external, functional property of certain physical systems.
Thus, the basis of the mind shrinks to the brain, and the body with its
sensors and actors becomes a mere input-output device in the brains
service. Hence there is no way to close the gap between mind and life
(Thompson, 2007, p. 222). Since mental processes and neuronal pro-
cesses are conceived as detached from the living organism, they may
only be directly related to each other, leading to a short-circuit of mind
and brain and the manifold vain attempts to overcome the Cartesian
divide interactionism, parallelism, functionalism, epiphenomen-
alism, eliminative materialism, identity theory, emergence or super-
venience. Whatever theory we choose, the so-called hard problem of
consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) cannot be solved as long as mind and
life are conceptualized in such a way that they intrinsically exclude
one another.
A possible way out of this impasse is offered by the concept of
embodiment, referring to both the embedding of mental processes in
the living organism and to the origin of these processes in an organ-
isms sensorimotor experience. The brain is primarily an organ of the
living being, and only by this becomes an organ of the mind. For both
life and mind are essentially related to what is beyond them, depend-
ent on the continuous exchange with their environment. Just as respi-
ration cannot be restricted to the lungs but only functions in a systemic
unity with the environment, so the individual mind cannot be
restricted to the brain. Consciousness is not a localizable object or
state at all, but a process of relating-to-something: a perceiving-of,
remembering-of, aiming-at, grasping-for, etc. In short, it is something
that we live and enact.
1
This dynamic and intentional character of con-
sciousness is not covered by the concept of single mental events
that could be translated into corresponding brain states. Therefore the
neurocognitive system cannot be grasped separately either; it exists
[1] See No, 2009, pp. 47ff., for a similar view on the dynamics of consciousness.
only enmeshed in the world in which we move and live with others
through our bodily existence.
On that condition, a rational option seems to take a mixed or
dual-aspect approach to mind and brain which does not create an
explanatory gap in an absolute sense (Figure 1). For this approach, the
living organism is the common denominator, which may be regarded
under two aspects: on the one hand, as a lived body or subject-body, on
the other hand as a living or object-body (Leib and Krper; cf. Thomp-
son, 2007; Fuchs, 2008). The first aspect corresponds to the first- and
second-person perspective, the other to the third-person perspective.
The one denotes the body as a centre of subjective and intersubjective
experience, the other the body as an autopoietic living system, includ-
ing the brain as a central mediating organ. Instead of a gap between
two radically different ontologies (the mental and the physical), we
are now faced with a duality of aspects within embodiment, a Leib-
Krper problem, so-to-speak, but with a common reference to the liv-
ing being or the person. The question now is about the relation
between ones body as subjectively lived and ones body as an organ-
ismin the world. And the answer must be in principle that processes of
living and processes of living through (Leben and Erleben) are both
aspects of the life process seen from two complementary points of
view.
The second-person perspective reminds us that only the living being
as a whole may be regarded as the proper subject of feeling, thinking,
speaking, laughing, acting, etc. Only while interacting with others in
200 T. FUCHS
Subjective
experience
Living
body
Living
being
Physio-
logical
processes
1
st
/ 2
nd
person perspective 3
rd
person perspective
Lived
body
Figure 1: Dual aspect of life
an empathic mode, within the common life world, are we getting
access to the embodied mind. There is a fine observation made by the
eighteenth-century German philosopher Lichtenberg when con-
fronted with contemporary attempts to localize the soul in the brain:
If in beholding the setting sun I take a step forward, I come nearer to it,
how minimal this may be. However, it is quite different with the organ
of the soul. It might well be possible that by an all too near approxima-
tion, as with the microscope, one removes oneself from what can be
approached. (Lichtenberg, 1796/1973, p. 852)
Neuronal excitations or circumscribed brain structures are not the
adequate scale to look for the basis of the mind. Consciousness, mind
and life are not micro-, but macro-phenomena that only show them-
selves to others in co-existence, from the second-person perspective.
Below a certain distance they just disappear.
Later on, we will see how the brain mediates between the micro-
scopic world of physical processes and the macroscopic world of the
living organism. For the moment, it is important to point out that the
second-person perspective and its scale are essential for the develop-
ment of mind and brain as well. Mothers interacting with their babies
intuitively keep just the right distance that allows the babies to see
them sharp (Papouek and Papouek, 1995). Imitation, affect attune-
ment, joint attention and empathy all processes of central impor-
tance for the early development of the brain as a social organ
depend on the right distance and the second-person perspective. It is
only in the course of these embodied and meaningful interactions that
the neural systems responsible for social cognition and other higher
cognitive functions can mature. The resulting specialized neural net-
works should best be regarded as components of overarching interac-
tion cycles: once formed in the course of these interactions, they serve
as open loops for future situations presenting similar requirements to
the individual. The brain then acts as a connecting and mediating
organ, enabling the re-actualization of acquired dispositions through
the functional closure of sensorimotor cycles comprising the whole
system of organism and environment. Only this large-scale system of
ongoing interactions may be regarded as the sufficient supervenience
basis for conscious life.
But the second-person perspective is not only prior genetically, but
also methodologically for all research into consciousness, mind and
brain. As Thompson (2001) has pointed out, the mind as a scientific
object is an abstraction of our empathic cognition of each other in the
life-world. Therefore the question How do we go from mind-
independent nature to subjectivity and consciousness? is misleading
from the start. The hard problem of consciousness or the explana-
tory gap between consciousness and nature depends for its very for-
mulation on the premise that the mind exists out there as a natural
entity. But this naturalistic account equivalent to metaphysical
realism wrongly assumes that we could attain a viewpoint inde-
pendent from our own cognition and lived experience in the second-
person perspective. It fails to take into account that the mind as a sci-
entific object can only be constituted as such from a personalistic
perspective. Thus, empathy and social understanding are the precon-
dition for any science of mind and brain.
Cycles of Embodiment
Having outlined some basic features of the embodied approach to
mind and life, I will now take a closer look at the interactive cycles
mediated by the brain. Following Thompson and Varela (2001), we
can distinguish three intertwined modes of embodiment which form
the basis of the human mind:
(1) cycles of organismic self-regulation, engendering a basic
bodily sense of self;
(2) cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organism and
environment, implying an ecological self;
(3) cycles of intersubjective interaction, resulting in what may
be called a social self.
(1) Organismic Self-Regulation
As is well known, the integrity and self-preservation of the organism
depend on regulatory cycles involving brain and body at multiple lev-
els. However, organismic regulation also has an affective and con-
scious dimension. Affective neuroscience, represented by authors like
Damasio (2000) and Panksepp (1998a,b), has emphasized the
dependence of a background consciousness on the homeodynamic
regulation of the whole body: various centres in the brain stem, hypo-
thalamus, and insular and medial parietal cortex process the neuronal
and humoural signals from the body and integrate them into a body
landscape that is constantly changing. This landscape includes the
present state of the inner milieu (hormone concentration, glucose,
oxygen, carbon dioxide, pH-value of the blood, etc.), interoceptive
signals from the viscera, and proprioceptive signals from the whole
musculoskeletal system including the heart, vessels, skin and vestibu-
lar system. Brain and body are therefore most intimately connected
202 T. FUCHS
and influence each other in constant circular feedback. This interac-
tion results in a background feeling of being alive, a basic self-affec-
tion which lends a sense of mineness to all our experiences. Processes
of life and processes of mind are thus inseparably linked: every con-
scious state is ultimately rooted in the homeodynamic regulation
between brain and body, and, in a sense, integrates the present state of
the organism as a whole.
Similarly, all affects as the core of our subjective experience are
bound to the constant interaction of brain and body. Moods and emo-
tions are states of the organism as a whole, involving nearly all sub-
systems: brain, autonomous nervous system, endocrine and immune
system, heart, circulation, respiration, and expressive muscular sys-
tem. Each feeling is inseparably linked to the physiological alterations
in the body. Only when these alterations are signalled to somato-
sensory areas of the brain, feelings in the full sense may arise.
2
This already makes it clear that the unity of brain and organism on
the vital level also encompasses the higher brain functions. All con-
scious activities such as perceiving, thinking and acting are not based
only on neural activities in the neocortex, but also on the continuous
vital and affective regulatory processes involving the whole organ-
ism. Thus, the brain centredness of cognitive neuroscience is ulti-
mately based on a Cartesian separation of mind and body that is
inadequate to a systemic view of the organism. Neither consciousness
nor the brain may be separated from the living body as a whole.
(2) Cycles of Sensorimotor Coupling Between Organism and
Environment: Embodied Cognition and Action
Now apart from inner regulation, the main task of the nervous system
is to mediate the sensorimotor cycles that connect organism and envi-
ronment. Here embodiment implies the inherent connection of per-
ception and bodily action, as already developed in the concepts of
Uexklls (1920/1973) Funktionskreis and Weizsckers (1940/1986)
Gestaltkreis. What the organism senses is a function of how it moves,
and how it moves is a function of what it senses. Living beings do not
[2] Cf. Damasio (2000, pp. 279ff.) granted, Damasio presents his concept in traditional
representationalist terms, characterizing the relevant brain regions as body maps and
even distinguishing first-order from second-order maps (ibid., pp. 133ff.). However,
according to his own account, there is (a) a moment-to-moment, and (b) a circular interac-
tion between brain and body, that means a constant repercussion of neural activities in
somatosensory and emotional brain areas on the state of the body (ibid., pp. 154, 283f.).
Therefore the concept of representation seems too static and detached fromthe interaction
to adequately describe these processes. For a more detailed critique of representation-
alism, see below p. ??
just passively receive information from their environment; rather,
they actively participate in the generation of perception and cognition.
This even applies for basic categories such as space. In a classical
experiment, Held and Hein (1963) investigated two groups of new-
born kittens which are blind at first. One group was carried around in
their environment in a basket, thus only passively receiving visual
stimuli, while the other group could move around freely. When
released after six weeks, the first group was incapable of any spatial
perception, only stumbling around helplessly, while the other kittens
had learnt to perceive and move in space perfectly. This shows that
perceptual space is not a pre-given external container, but rather a
medium or working-space, moulded by our sensing and moving bod-
ies from undifferentiated visual stimuli. In other words: interacting
with the environment induces the brain to develop the structures nec-
essary for its adequate perception. The enactive approach to cogni-
tion first put forward by Varela et al. (1991) takes this generally: a
cognitive beings world is not a pre-given external realm, represented
internally by the brain, but a relational domain created by that beings
agency and coupling with the environment. In other words: living sys-
tems enact their world as inseparable from their own structure and
actions.
To illustrate this, let us look at perception froma representationalist
approach: there is an object out there, say a knife, whose features are
transmitted to the retina, then further processed by the brain using an
internal representation of the object; once this is activated, a cons-
cious representation of the object is created. Instead of this linear
model, the dynamic sensorimotor approach put forward by ORegan
and No (2001) regards the object as being constituted through
sensorimotor cycles: perceptual experience is not an inner state of the
brain but an ongoing skillful activity constituted by the perceivers
implicit, practical knowledge of the object and of the way sensory
stimulation varies with movement. In vision, for example, when the
eyes rotate, the sensory stimulation on the retina shifts and distorts in
precise ways, similarly when the body moves forward or backward,
etc. In touch, the sensorimotor interdependence is evident as well.
Moreover, objects are always perceived as affording possible actions,
or in Heideggers terms, as objects ready-to-hand, as is obvious in
the case of the knife. The object can indeed only be perceived by an
embodied agent capable of somehow interacting with it, e.g. by
having suitable limbs to walk towards the knife, grasp it, etc.
Thus, the world is constituted by us in the course of a living interac-
tion, in which our ongoing perceptual and motor experiences are
204 T. FUCHS
always already linked to each other. In these interactions, the brain
works as a mediating organ, not as the sole producer of perception.
Instead of inner maps or models it is equipped with neuronal networks
shaped by earlier sensorimotor experiences that underlie the comple-
mentary skills of perceptually interacting with situations and objects.
These networks serve as open loops that are closed to full functional
cycles through the bodys dealing with suitable counterparts of the
environment. This is supported by the discovery of so-called canoni-
cal neurons in the premotor cortex that are activated both when han-
dling tools and when only looking at them (Grafton et al., 1997;
Gallese and Umilt, 2002). The knife is perceived as ready-to-hand
in an embodied sense, because the motor system is actually involved
in its perception (see also Tucker and Ellis, 2001). Therefore neural
states should be described not as mere correlates of mental states, but
rather in terms of how they participate in dynamic sensorimotor pat-
terns involving the whole organism. Perception evokes these pat-
terns, or in other words: to recognize a thing is to know how to deal
with it.
This embodied account applies for motor action as well. My actions
are not somehow triggered by an inner mind, but they are enacted by
me as an embodied subject. When I am writing a letter, for example,
there is no point in the unity of action where my self ends and the
world begins, no border that separates inner and outer world.
Neural networks, muscular movements of my hand, pencil and paper
synergically work together to put my thoughts down, and the whole
body-environment system creates my experience of agency. Being
able to write a letter is obviously a capacity not of the brain, but of an
embodied subject connected to an environment which provides pen-
cils, paper, words and script. I am not a pure consciousness outside of
my own writing, but an ecological self whose borders do not stop at
my skin (Neisser, 1988). In the skillful handling of tools, in playing
piano or driving a car, I incorporate these instruments. Thus, I feel the
paper scratching at the top of the pencil, and being an experienced
driver, I feel the roughness of the street below the wheels of my car,
just as the blind man feels the ground at the top of its stick, not in his
hand. As living bodies, we are extended into the world always up to
the locus where the actual interaction with the world is going on.
(3) Cycles of Intersubjective Interaction:
Embodied Intersubjectivity
If cognition is the activity of an embodied subject, this applies in par-
ticular to the domain of social cognition or the perception of the other.
According to the enactive approach, social cognition is based on a
special form of action, namely social interaction.
Currently, social cognitive neuroscience is still largely based on
representational concepts. Social cognition is regarded as something
the brain does by means of certain social modules. Similarly, present
concepts of so-called mind-reading, mentalization or simulation take
social cognition to be a matter of how we infer or model unobservable
mental states from outward behaviour. We are hidden to each other in
principle, therefore understanding others must be based on internally
mapping or modelling their actions and thus explaining or predicting
their behaviour. Moreover, current research paradigms in cognitive
neuroscience focus on one-way, detached social situations and are
biased towards localizing social cognition in one participant, or in his
brain only. However, our primary and everyday encounters with oth-
ers are not solitary observations, but interactions within the second-
person perspective. In these, we normally dont use any imaginative,
introspective simulation or inference; instead, we immediately per-
ceive the others intentions and emotions in his expressive behaviour
as related to a meaningful context (Scheler, 1923/1954; Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, pp. 215ff.; Gallagher, 2001; 2008).
To illustrate this, let us imagine a football play in which one player
sees his teammate raise his arms in joy over a goal. According to
representationalism, he will internally represent the others body, but
now combined with a theory of mind or simulation mechanism which
tells him: he is happy. Instead of this linear concept, the enactive
approach looks at the circular dynamics within the dyad of embodied
agents. Both partners are linked to form a common system through
mutual perceptions and reactions. Grasping, pointing, handing-over,
moving-towards, smiling, crying, etc. all these are not just external
behaviours that we have to furnish with meaning by way of inference,
but they are inherently meaningful and goal-directed actions. Thus,
the footballer will immediately perceive the other as cheering, and,
empathically sharing his pleasure, he will also perceive himas someone
ready-to-hug, as it were. His understanding is interactive from the
start, and might easily result in spontaneously embracing his teammate.
No simulation or introspection is necessary to share the pleasure the
206 T. FUCHS
embrace is just the manifestation of both players interaffectivity and, to
use Merleau-Pontys term, intercorporality (Merleau-Ponty, 1985).
Accordingly, phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity are
grounded on the idea that we recognize each other first and foremost
as interacting embodied subjects, not as inner spectators of anothers
impenetrable body surface. I immediately see the triumph in my team-
mates face and in his raised arms; I see the shame in anothers blush-
ing, the grief in his tears, the anger in his glowering gaze or in his
bodily tension. This is based on a circular sensorimotor process in
which each partner constantly influences the other by his actions
(Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009). The others angry face will elicit an
expressive response in my own face and body which in turn finds res-
onance in his body, etc. Thus, we feel the others affect by the reso-
nance it elicits in our own body. Understanding is jointly created in the
moment-to-moment process of interaction, with both partners being
engaged in what has been called participatory sense-making (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). This includes processes of synchroniza-
tion and resonance, rhythmic co-variation of gestures, facial or vocal
expression, complementary or antagonistic behaviour, etc. In other
words: we perceive the others embodied mental states through our
embodied interaction. To understand others means primarily to know
how to deal and to interact with them. It is only in situations of
detached observation or ambiguity that we resort to more sophisti-
cated cognitive procedures like imaginary transposition, deliberation
or inference in order to make sense of their behaviour.
A Developmental Perspective
This intercorporal concept is confirmed when we take a look at the
development of social cognition in early childhood. Infant research
has shown that even newborn babies are able to imitate the facial
expressions of others (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; 1989). By the
mimetic capacity of their body, they transpose the seen gestures and
expressions of others into their own proprioception and movement.
Perception, proprioception and action are integrated within a common
sensorimotor space. The infant does not need to carry out any process
of inner simulation or inference. Its body schema is characterized by a
transmodal openness that immediately allows it to imitate others. So
what primary intersubjectivity starts with is not mind-reading, but
embodied interaction or intercorporality.
Since bodily mimesis evokes corresponding feelings as well, a
mutual affective resonance gradually develops within the dyad. 6- to
8-week-olds already engage in proto-conversation with their mothers
by smiling and vocalizing (Trevarthen, 1979; 1993). They both
exhibit a finely tuned coordination of movements, rhythmic syn-
chrony and mirroring of expressions, that has been compared to a cou-
ple dance. Stern has emphasized the temporal flow patterns and
vitality affects that are shared by both partners (Stern, 1985/1998).
Infants perceive affects as the intermodal extract of rhythmic,
melodic, vocal, facial and gestural characteristics. These intermodal
characters and contours are one of the main bridges of intercorporeal
resonance, and with it, of primary understanding. Affect attunement
and mutual resonance create dyadic affective states (Tronick, 1998),
often an intense pleasure or joy: the emerging affect during a joyful
playing situation between mother and infant may not be divided and
distributed among them. It arises from the between, or from the
overarching common situation in which both are immersed. The
origin of emotional life lies in interaffectivity.
Let us take a look at the brain side of this development. Research
into the mirror neuron system has supported the linkage between per-
ception and action also in social cognition, namely a close functional
coupling between actions produced by the self and actions perceived
in others (Gallese, 2002; Gallese et al., 2004). The movement of the
other is already understood as a goal-directed action because of its
match to a self-performed action. This seems to apply for the emo-
tional coupling or empathy as well: the perceived expression of pain,
disgust or fear activates corresponding brain areas linked to ones own
emotional experience (Wicker et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004). Thus,
proprioceptive, kinaesthetic and emotional self-awareness is tacitly
implied in perceiving the face and expression of another person. The
neural systems involved in mutual understanding and empathy appear
to be of a practical nature, rather than inferential, for they involve the
dynamic pairing of the bodies of self and other.
However, brain mechanisms such as the mirror neuron system can
hardly be taken as a sufficient basis for mutual understanding. First,
mirrors certainly do not exist in physical nature. Amirror on the wall
does not mirror anything except for a subject who is able to take its
reflections as a mirror image. Thus, the infant first has to learn that
others are like me in the course of mutual exchange and interaction.
Moreover, assuming an embodied and developmental view of mirror
neurons, infants are not expected to understand others action goals by
means of the mirror system before they can perform the action them-
selves. There is increasing evidence that the neuronal mirror system
has to be trained through sensorimotor experience in order to
208 T. FUCHS
adequately react to social situations.
3
Hence, a merely cross-sectional
view misses the embedded and biographical character of social brain
systems. They, too, serve as open loops which only develop and
function within in a common space of embodied and meaningful
interactions.
Owing to the singular plasticity of the human brain, the history of
the interactions continuously influences the infants dispositions and
skills. The patterns of interaction are sedimented in their implicit
memories, resulting in what Lyons-Ruth et al. (1998) have called
implicit relational knowing. This means a pre-reflective knowledge or
skill of how to deal with others how to share pleasure, elicit atten-
tion, avoid rejection, re-establish contact, etc. The infant acquires spe-
cific interactive schemes (schemes of being-with, Stern, 1985/1998)
and body micropractices that are needed for the respective interaction.
Implicit relational knowing is a temporally organized, musical mem-
ory for the rhythm, dynamics and affects that are present in the inter-
action with others. It may also be regarded as an intercorporal
memory which shapes the actual relationship as a procedural field that
encompasses both partners (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
To illustrate this, let us take the example of the football players once
more: the interaction cycle is based on neural networks that work as
open loops which are functionally closed by the actual situation.
These loops are the result of similar interactions mainly experienced
in early childhood: embracing the partner still re-actualizes, though
unconsciously, the first embraces between mother and child. Both
partners implicit or body memories are re-enacted in their encounter,
mediating the specific feel of the interaction, its timing and affective
loading. However, this shared affective state does not arise in their
individual brains, but from the intercorporal system constituted by
both players. Understanding is achieved through the interaction itself,
and no independent inner states are transmitted to the other through
certain cues that he would first have to figure out and interpret in order
to go on.
What does this mean on the neural level? Explanations of social
cognition by means of special brain modules only single out certain
pieces or fragments of the whole cycle of organism-environment
[3] Cf. Catmur et al. (2007); Grossmann and Johnson (2007). Accordingly, studies of antici-
patory eye movement during observation of a goal-directed action showed that it is pres-
ent in 12-month-olds but not in 6-month-olds (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006). Moreover, there is
evidence from ERP studies that situations of joint attention have an effect on the infants
brain structures, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, associated with the allocation of
attentional processing resources (Striano et al., 2006).
interaction. Without these cycles, the specialized brain areas neces-
sary for social understanding would not even have developed. After
all, the brain is not inserted into the world as a prefabricated appara-
tus, but it is structured epigenetically by the continuous interaction of
organism and environment. As we have already seen in the case of the
newborn kittens, interactive functions create their corresponding
brain structures, which in turn modify future interactions. In other
words, the environment induces the development of the organic con-
ditions necessary for interacting with it.
4
This applies in particular to
the social environment which becomes the crucial ontogenetic niche
for the brains development. In its course, customs, habits and cultural
techniques are acquired by imitation and cooperative learning. The
embodied mind is intersubjectively constituted at the most fundamen-
tal level. Correspondingly, the human brain is essentially adapted to
develop within a social context.
These learning processes are illustrated once more by the above
schema (Figure 2): each subjective experience and behaviour induces
changes in the plastic neural memory structures, which in turn results
in altered experience or action. In other words, there is a continuous
interaction between experiential process and brain structure. Over
time, experiences are sedimented in the form of organic habits, dispo-
sitions and interactive schemes that eventually constitute the
210 T. FUCHS
experience
behaviour
(neuro-)
plasticity
modifies induces
habits, ski lls
interactive
schemes
sedimen-
tation
Figure 2: Learning as a transformation of experience and behaviour into
organically sedimented habits, skills or schemata
[4] In a morerecent experiment, Mringanka Sur and his group were able to induce a major cor-
tical reorganization in newborn ferrets (Melchner et al., 2000; see also No, 2009, p. 54f.).
They cut through one of their optical nerves whose stump then grewtogether with the part
of the diencephalon which otherwise forwards impulses of the acoustic nerve to the cor-
tex. Nowvisual stimuli reached a brain region which normally processes acoustic signals.
Surprisingly, the brain adapted to the new sensory stimuli, and the acoustic centre turned
into a visual centre. Even neurons characteristic of visual areas developed anew, so that
the ferrets were able to see with the eye concerned (even though not as good as normally).
What tasks a cortex region finally takes on is thus dependent on the sensory input and its
specific, motion-related patterns. Similar cortical reorganizations can be observed after
brain lesions or injuries.
individuals personality. We may speak of an embodied socializa-
tion, because the specific human faculties can only develop in the
course of mutual interaction and cooperation, through which they are
imprinted on the organic growth processes of the brain.
The Brain as an Organ of Transformation and Resonance
To summarize, I have briefly described three cycles of embodiment:
cycles of organismic self-regulation, including a basic bodily
sense of self;
cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organismand environ-
ment, resulting in an ecological self;
cycles of intersubjective interaction, underlying the social
self.
The human brain is crucial for all three modes of embodiment. Yet it
does not create, but mediates and regulates the cycles, and it is in turn
shaped and structured by them throughout the lifespan. Now if the
human mind emerges from these circular modes of interaction, and if
it is accordingly embodied in the living organism as a whole, then the
myth of the brain as a creator of the mind should be abandoned. On the
contrary, it is the mind understood as the process through which a
human being relates to, and interacts with, the world in a meaningful
way that shapes and uses the brain. From birth on, the spatial,
temporal, logical and symbolical structures of the interaction pro-
cesses are extracted and transformed into neural microstructures that
facilitate corresponding future interactions. This interchange of pro-
cess and structure enables the individual to use his acquired disposi-
tions and skills (perceptual, motor, affective, cognitive, etc.) for
interacting with the world on increasingly complex levels. The brain
serves as a matrix and mediator of interaction at the same time.
This also corresponds to the original evolutionary role of the brain.
Already primitive organisms without a central nervous system inter-
act with the environment by sensing stimuli or nutrient gradients
(afferences) and accordingly adapting their movements and reactions
(efferences). In the course of evolution, the central nervous system
was inserted into the already existing cycles of afferent and efferent
processes as a transforming and diversifying organ. By linking differ-
ent afferences to suitable efferences, it amplified the organisms scope
of options. With growing development of the brain, its coordinating
functions increased, in particular by the establishment of complex
feedback and feedforward loops. However, this did not change its
principal character as an organ that primarily mediates the organism-
environment interactions.
Now, the decisive progress brought about by the evolution of the
mind was not just an improved reaction to stimuli, but gestalt forma-
tion, i.e. the grasping of complex units, perceptual objects and situa-
tions as a whole. A situation is the situatedness of a living being
towards its environment, and to grasp a situation means to grasp one-
self in relation to it. This is mainly brought about (1) by ones embod-
ied being-in-the-world, implying proprioceptive, kinaesthetic and
sensorimotor experiences; (2) by an integrated evaluation of the
meaning and the options of a given situation, which is experienced as
emotion; (3) in later and particularly human stages, by symbolic repre-
sentations of the world, i.e. by language and concepts. The mind is
directed towards wholes or units, such as cats or trees, lived
body, feeling, self, or concepts. This allows the organismto expe-
rience the environment as well as itself in relation to it, and thus to act
and react on it in a meaningful way.
If we now try to describe the role of the brain for the mind on this
basis, we may conceive it as an organ of transformation which inte-
grates the configurations of single elements (stimuli) of a given situ-
ation into wholes: the patterns of synchronized neuronal excitations
correspond to the holistic structures or gestalt units emerging in sub-
jective experience. However, these neuronal patterns are not inner
representations of the outer world; rather, they should be conceived as
resonating with the structures of the given environment, thus closing
the corresponding interactive loops. We may illustrate this by a pic-
ture puzzle where the process of gestalt formation is a bit delayed
(Figure 3):
212 T. FUCHS
Figure 3: Gestalt formation
While we are scanning the picture with quick eye movements, its
black-and-white structures interact with pre-existing patterns of neu-
ral excitations (= attractors) in the primary and associative areas of the
visual cortex. Similar patterns are activated in quick succession in
search for disambiguation or congruence. This tuning-in of neural
system and environment is achieved by repeated cycles of top-down
and bottom-up processing. Once a suitable pattern of neural excitation
has emerged that means, a pattern or attractor that sufficiently reso-
nates with the structures of the picture we suddenly recognize the
Dalmatian dog. In this way, the configuration of single spots or ele-
ments is transformed into a coherent whole, corresponding to our per-
ception of the dog. According to our present state of knowledge, the
pattern is stabilized by synchronized oscillations (2030 Hz) of the
participating neural assemblies which are thus resonating with each
other as well as with the configuration of environmental stimuli
(Singer et al., 1995; 1997). Of course, these processes have still to be
explored in further detail.
Why couldnt these patterns of neural excitation be called a repre-
sentation of the dog? Well, firstly the representatial relation some-
thing stands for some other thing requires someone who
establishes this relation and for whom it exists. Tracks in the snow as
such do not represent the animal that has left them; they are just
mouldings in the surface unless someone recognizes them as tracks.
Speaking of neural representations therefore runs into homunculous
problems: who in the brain should recognize the excitation patterns as
patterns of a dog? One might argue that neural patterns are not only
causally connected to earlier input (as the tracks are) but also func-
tionally connected to adequate behaviour (e.g. recognizing and call-
ing ones dog). They could then be called representations because
they fulfil a function for the living system. However, the perception of
the dog is only accomplished through the ongoing interactions of neu-
ral activations, eye movements and environment forming a closed
loop. There is no component within this cycle that represents another
one, in the sense that it stands for it while it is absent. The term repre-
sentation suggests that the brain activities could, at least in principle,
be separated fromthe cycle, as if they were reconstructing inside what
is outside. But in the perception-action cycle as described above there
is no inside and outside any more. Instead, perception is enacted by
the brain-body-environment system as a whole.
The inseparability of brain-body-environment interactions is cru-
cial for the concept of the extended and enactive mind. If separable
representations could serve as a sufficient supervenience basis for the
mind, there would also be circumscribed neural correlates of con-
sciousness, and body and world would merely play a causal, not a con-
stitutive role for the emergence of consciousness. However, such
delimited neural correlates of experience have never been demon-
strated, and thought experiments of brains-in-a-vat producing con-
sciousness without being connected to a living organism have been
convincingly refuted (Thompson, 2007, pp. 239ff.; Cosmelli and
Thompson, 2011). As shown above, already the background feeling
of being alive is bound to the ongoing and reciprocal interaction of
brain and body which is maintained even in states of dreaming or in
locked-in syndromes (Kyselo, in press). Thus, the living body plays a
constitutive role for awareness at the most basic level, and this is not
compatible with traditional representationalism.
5
What about the memory of the dog then? Shouldnt the neural pat-
terns corresponding to this memory be called representations that
stand for the dog and are activated once we recall, imagine or see it?
But here the question arises: representations of what exactly? No
memory is reactivated in the same way again, for there are no replicas
or snapshots (or traces of snapshots) in the brain any recollection is
actually a reconstruction within a new context. We have never seen
exactly this token of a Dalmatian dog before. There could be represen-
tational types, of course. But then the notion of representation loses all
the circumscribed and distinct properties that made it so attractive to
neuroscientists. For there would have to be not only inclusive hierar-
chies of representations (for animals, dogs, Dalmatian dogs, etc.), but
also adaptations, distortions and mixtures of representations (imagin-
ing for example a Dalmatian lion), and so on, all recruiting partly dif-
ferent, partly overlapping neural assemblies in varying interactions. If
we take the dynamic and creative character of imagination and recol-
lection into account, wouldnt it seem more adequate to dispense with
the notion of representation for these phenomena altogether?
6
Of course, the transformation or gestalt formation described above
is based on prior experience. Whenever the brain is repeatedly
exposed to similar objects (such as Dalmatian dogs) or situations, it is
induced to extract regularly correlated features or prototypes of these
experiences. This is accomplished, according to Hebbs rule, through
increased couplings and synaptic weightings of the neurons involved
214 T. FUCHS
[5] For a limited use of the concept of representation in the sense of dynamical, context-sensi-
tive and action-oriented representations to be used for online problem solving, see
Wheeler (2010).
[6] For an extensive critique of the representationalist concept of memory, see Bennett and
Hacker (2003, pp. 15471); Edelman and Tononi (2000, pp. 93ff.).
(Edelman and Tononi, 2000, pp. 113ff.). But there is no need to resort
to the static notion of representations to denote these neuronal dispo-
sitions. A concept based on attractors and resonance seems much
better suited to account for the dynamic and flexible interconnection
of brain, body and environment systems. To take another example: as
children we learnt to read words letter by letter (e.g. a-p-p-l-e),
which induced our brains to form corresponding neural patterns,
attractors or open loops. Once established, they now enable us to
immediately grasp the meaning of the word apple, without being
aware of the single letters. The loop is closed by the resonance of the
specialized neural networks with the configuration of black lines,
even when these are given in different fonts, enlarged, distorted, etc.
The neural system is not made for mirroring or reconstructing the
environment in the head, but for attuning to, and reaching as much
coherence with, the environment as possible. The same applies for
motor action: if I want to write the word apple in a letter, the underly-
ing patterns of neural activity are transformed into corresponding
motor patterns, resulting in the action of my hand, with continuous
proprioceptive and sensory feedback from my writing. Again, a
closed sensorimotor loop has formed, including the brain and nervous
system, the hand, the pencil and the letter.
In sum, the brain serves to transform configurations of single sen-
sory or motor elements into higher level units or patterns of neural
activation which correspond to the perception-action cycles on the
subjective level. Through this, the brain becomes an organ of media-
tion between the microscopic world of physical processes on the one
hand, and the macroscopic world of the living organismand its experi-
ences on the other hand. By integrating elementary processes into
higher-order patterns, it enables the living being to relate to the world
through perceiving and acting. However, this is not a one-way (bot-
tom-up) relationship: the formation of patterns of neural activity may
only be explained top-down, namely through the macroscopic struc-
tures or gestalt units which characterize the interaction of the living
being with its environment. We may describe this as a circular rela-
tionship or circular causality which combines both top-down and bot-
tom-up influences between higher and lower levels.
7
Following this line, we cannot regard subjective experience as a
mere epiphenomenon of underlying neuronal (real) processes. On
the contrary, it plays an essential role in the interaction of organism
and environment. For it is only through conscious experience that the
[7] See Fuchs (in press) for a more detailed description of circular causality.
organism is able to enter into a relation with the environment on the
higher level of meaning, of integrated perceptive and cognitive units
or gestalten; and these meaningful units in turn influence the plastic-
ity, the structuring and functioning of the brain. Abiographical biol-
ogy, as we may call it, implies the continuous formation and
reshaping of the brain through subjective experience. There is an
ordering or structuring influence that the mind exerts on the properties
of the brain: it consists in forming, maintaining and interconnecting
meaningful units of experience which stabilize corresponding neur-
onal activity patterns and thus are also able to trigger actions and
reactions of the organism as a whole.
Thus, we arrive at a duality of aspects not only in description, but
also in explanation. Let us take an example: what is the cause of blush-
ing? From a physiological point of view, that means, regarding the
object body, one would name the increased blood flow caused by a
dilation of the skin vessels, which for its part is triggered by a specific
activation of the limbic system, corresponding to a transitory imbal-
ance of trophotropic and ergotropic processes in the diencephalon,
etc. However, with all this we remain strictly within the causal concat-
enation of physiological processes, thus within a layer where we find
neither feelings nor motives, no meaningful relations that could give
rise, for example, to shame or anger. There are only sequences and
patterns of activity in the brain and the nerves. To be sure, neuronal
processes enable the experience of feelings. But enabling does not
mean causation, for conversely it is also true that only meaningful bio-
graphical experiences have made the neuronal processes possible in
their specific form.
Now from the subjective point of view, regarding the lived body,
we would not hesitate to say that blushing is the expression of the
shame that the person experiences in an embarrassing situation. In
blushing the embodiment of the subject becomes manifest; for shame
is not an inner state but inseparable fromits bodily expression, as well
as from the situation to which it is intentionally directed. Shame is a
meaningful reaction of the embodied subject or the person to his or her
environment. The development of this emotional reaction within
interpersonal situations of early childhood has also shaped the
neuronal patterns underlying the present feeling. Thus, shame
encompasses the totality of physiological, motivational, subjective
and intersubjective phenomena which, however, correspond to very
different aspects or perspectives. Therefore we have to describe and
explain shame in a dual way, i.e. from two complementary perspec-
tives that are not transferable into each other: on the one hand as a
216 T. FUCHS
complex concatenation of physiological mechanisms, on the other
hand as a biographically understandable reaction to an interpersonal
situation. However, there is no causation involved between the men-
tal and the physical, as if they were separated entities; rather, the
person as a living being embodies and encompasses both aspects
the lived and the living body.
Conclusion
I have outlined what may be called an ecological view of mind and
brain as both being embedded in the relation of organismand environ-
ment. In this view, there is no locus of the mind; rather, the mind is a
distributed phenomenon. Conscious experience corresponds to the
highest level of integration of brain processes, but it may not be
restricted to them; it only arises in the overarching systemof organism
and environment, on the basis of an interplay of multiple components.
These are the brain and the whole organism with its senses and actors
as well as the corresponding and suitable counterparts in the environ-
ment. Thus, the brain as such does not contain any more of conscious-
ness than e.g. the hands or the feet. It is only the living being or the
person as a whole that is conscious, perceives and acts. This also cor-
responds to our own experience: we are not pure subjects who observe
events from the margin of the world, but we are embodied, living
beings who experience events in the world. There is nothing inside us
which perceives, feels, or thinks neither a Cartesian mind nor a
bodiless brain. Consciousness is not an inner state, but an activity of a
living being in its world.
The brain is certainly necessary for the emergence of conscious-
ness, because all circular processes that I have outlined are converg-
ing in it. It could thus be compared to the main station of a railway
system: if the station or major parts of it are destroyed, then the traffic
will break down. But, to carry the comparison forward, the railway
traffic is neither produced nor localized in the main station. On the
contrary, it is the traffic that employs the rail system with its manifold
branchings and of course its central coordination in the main station in
order that the transport processes run as fluently as possible. Simi-
larly, conscious activity is not localized within the brain; rather, it is
the integral of the actual relations between brain, organism and
environment.
We tend to overestimate the importance of the brain to the extent
that we even ascribe our own thoughts, feelings or actions to it. But
the brain is only one of our organs; it does not produce, but only
mediates and modulates the cycles of embodied interaction. It func-
tions as a system of open loops or attractors that are constantly com-
plemented by the environment; but it cannot construct the world by
itself. Indeed, there is no such thing as a brain by itself, unless it has
been separated from the living organism through an autopsy.
This becomes fully obvious once we look at the co-development of
mind and brain. The brain develops and continuously changes with
the experiences we accumulate during our lives. As these experiences
are always organized by spatial, temporal, logical and other cognitive
structures, they shape the brain in such a way that it becomes a
mediumfor the mind to function in the world. Every time a newdispo-
sition of coherent neural activity is formed through repeated experi-
ence or exercise, meaningful structures of that experience are
imprinted onto the brain which nowallows for smooth and unimpeded
functioning. Process turns into structure, and vice versa. Thus the
brain enables us to intentionally direct ourselves to the objects or
goals we choose for example, reading or writing a letter without
getting stuck in single details or interfering distractions. The brain is
like a window to the mind: it is transparent for its functions because it
is structured by the mind itself. Conversely, any dysfunction of the
brain results in some kind of opacity a certain window to the world
is blurred or closed.
Of course this is not to say that mind is something external to life;
rather, it is a manifestation of the life process itself. Correspondingly,
it is through the process of life that the brain becomes an organ of the
mind; for this process is inherently meaningful and mindful fromthe
beginning. How the intertwining of (neuro-)physiological and mental
processes in the living organism is to be understood in more detail
remains an open question for further research. However, instead of
trying to localize mental functions in brain structures or searching for
static neural representations of external objects, future research
should rather investigate how each neural activity is inserted in the
functional cycles of perception and action, and by this, in the relation
of organism and environment. For only this relation provides the
meaningful context into which neural processes have to be embedded
in order to subserve mental life. Therefore only an embodied and eco-
logical view of the brain may adequately capture its role as a
mediating organ.
218 T. FUCHS
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers whose valuable com-
ments have helped me to improve the article. It was supported by a
grant of the Volkswagen Foundation entitled The brain a relational
organ.
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