Toulmin

Analyse af teksten ”Clinical Imagination and Clinical Forethought: Anticipating and Preventing Potential Problems”, som er et kapitel i bogen Clinical Wisdom and Interventions in Acute and Critical Care : A thinking-in-action approach af Benner, Kyriakidis og Stannard.

 L'anno che segna una vera svolta in questo campo è il 1958, quando, in pieno neopositivismo, contemporaneamente e senza collegamento alcuno, escono due libri:  -Trattato dell'argomentazione, La nuova retorica di Chaim Perelman  -Gli usi dell'argomentazione, di Stephen Toulmin BREVE INTRODUZIONE STORICA  L'anno che segna una vera svolta in questo campo è il 1958, quando, in pieno neopositivismo, contemporaneamente e senza collegamento alcuno, escono due libri:  -Trattato dell'argomentazione, La nuova retorica di Chaim Perelman  -Gli usi dell'argomentazione, di Stephen Toulmin BREVE INTRODUZIONE STORICA  L'anno che segna una vera svolta in questo campo è il 1958, quando, in pieno neopositivismo, contemporaneamente e senza collegamento alcuno, escono due libri:  -Trattato dell'argomentazione, La nuova retorica di Chaim Perelman  -Gli usi dell'argomentazione, di Stephen Toulmin L'ARGOMENTAZIONE  L'argomentazione ha una finalità, un obiettivo (Toulmin, Perelman, 1958, Anscombre, Ducrot, 1983)  L'argomentazione ha una finalità, un obiettivo (Toulmin, Perelman, 1958, Anscombre, Ducrot, 1983)  L'argomentazione ha una finalità, un obiettivo (Toulmin, Perelman, 1958, Anscombre, Ducrot, 1983)  L'argomentazione ha una finalità, un obiettivo (Toulmin, Perelman, 1958, Anscombre, Ducrot, 1983) PIU PRECISAMENTE…  Toulmin associa ad ogni fase i corrispondenti termini modali  Alla prima fase sono associati termini modali quali: probabilmente, forse, può darsi, …  Alla seconda fase: deve, necessariamente, occorre che, …  Alla terza fase: presumibilmente, ragionevolmente, … PIU PRECISAMENTE…  Toulmin associa ad ogni fase i corrispondenti termini modali  Alla prima fase sono associati termini modali quali: probabilmente, forse, può darsi, …  Alla seconda fase: deve, necessariamente, occorre che, …  Alla terza fase: presumibilmente, ragionevolmente, … PIU PRECISAMENTE…  Toulmin associa ad ogni fase i corrispondenti termini modali  Alla prima fase sono associati termini modali quali: probabilmente, forse, può darsi, …  Alla seconda fase: deve, necessariamente, occorre che, …  Alla terza fase: presumibilmente, ragionevolmente, … PIU PRECISAMENTE…  Toulmin associa ad ogni fase i corrispondenti termini modali  Alla prima fase sono associati termini modali quali: probabilmente, forse, può darsi, …  Alla seconda fase: deve, necessariamente, occorre che, …  Alla terza fase: presumibilmente, ragionevolmente, …

I argue here that Sellars' "Myth of the Given" is usually misinterpreted as having less extensive scope than it usually does.  On a sufficiently generic construal of the Myth, I argue that there is a distinctively phenomenological version of the Myth, one that can be found in the early Husserl but that is absent from Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty's evasion of the phenomenological Myth bears directly on Robert Hanna's argument for Kantian Non-Conceptualism.

I argue that both Sellars and Merleau-Ponty should be read as radicalizing, in quite different ways, Kant's rejection of the sensory-cognitive continuum". In Sellars, this radicalization leads him to posit "sheer receptivity", as distinct from intuitive representations. In Merleau-Ponty, this radicalization leads him to describe "operative intentionality" or "motor intentionality" of the lived body. Hence we should distinguish between the kind of intentionality that does belong to the conceptual order (discursive intentionality) and the kind of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty examines (somatic intentionality). This distinction provides an alternative position to the debate between McDowell and contemporary Sellarsians (deVries, Rosenberg) if one rejects the assumption that intentionality belongs only to the conceptual order.

Robert Brandom‟s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously  as more than a mere „heuristic aid‟ to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles Peirce‟s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a „picture on a page‟.

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it  will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. Such a reading of recognition will be contrasted with contemporary constructivist interpretations such as those offered by Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard. As a consequence of our reconstruction of its emergence from nature, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

“Science and Religion Are Complementary.” 
World Religions: Belief, Culture, and Controversy. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013.

Invited student-oriented argument essay, demonstrating the present writer’s “CLEAR Argument Paradigm,” a generative model (based on Stephen Toulmin’s analytical model) to assist students in writing their own arguments: Claim (Position), Limits (Qualifier), Evidence (Reasons, Grounds), Assumptions (Warrants & Backing), and Rebuttal (to objections).  

Eine etwas gekürzte Fassung dieses Aufsatzes ist erschienen in: Christian Denker (Hrsg.), Lebensform Wittgenstein. Bilder und Begriffe, Wien (Passagen Verlag) 2009 Information unter: http://www.passagen.at/cms/index.php?id=62&isbn=9783851658958&L=0 Wenn wir nicht gerade Neurowissenschaftler sind, glauben wir im Normalfall nur in einem metaphorischen Sinn, dass sich die Gedanken im Kopf befinden. Freilich kommt so eine Ausdrucksweise vor, aber damit wird zumeist auf eine vage Art auf den Zusammenhang von Denktätigkeit und Gehirntätigkeit Bezug genommen. Dass ein derartiger Zusammenhang besteht, wird von kaum jemand bezweifelt, aber wenn nach einer Konkretisierung gefragt wird, erhält man häufig nur sehr unklare Antworten oder die Befragten ziehen sich auf die Aussage zurück, dass sich das eben nicht so leicht sagen lasse. Abgesehen davon wird das Denken als eine äußerst private und individuelle Angelegenheit betrachtet. »Die Gedanken sind frei«, das ist ein Diktum, das in diesem Sinne verstanden wird. Niemand hat Zugriff auf meine Gedanken, es sei nicht möglich, die Gedanken anderer zu lesen etc. Das wird häufig vorgebracht, außer in jenen Shows, die geradezu den besten Gedankenleser küren wollen. Aber selbst dort wird von der Voraussetzung ausgegangen, dass das Prozedere des Denkens oder die Gedankenproduktion, wenn man so will, zunächst von isolierten Subjekten vollzogen wird. Es ist dann nur die Frage, wie es sich mit der Unzugänglichkeit bzw. angeblichen Zugänglichkeit verhält. Für unsere Zwecke geht es nun nicht darum, die Kontexte zu konstruieren, in welchen es sinnvoll und angebracht sein kann, sich der erwähnten Ausdrucksweisen zu bedienen. Und das ist zugleich auch ein erster wichtiger Punkt bei Wittgenstein. Er macht uns nämlich darauf aufmerksam, dass es Situationen geben kann, bei welchen es nicht erklärungsbedürftig ist, zu sagen, dass der Ort des Denkens in unserem Kopf sei. Es käme aber darauf an, die

Die Frage nach der Natur des menschlichen Geistes ist das zentrale Thema sowohl der Philosophie des Geistes, als auch der Neurowissenschaften. Die beiden Disziplinen stellen dabei allerdings verschiedene Aspekte in den Mittelpunkt: Während man in der Philosophie des Geistes Menschen als Personen versteht, die mit ihrer sozialen und physischen Umwelt interagieren und die Freiheit haben, gewisse Handlungen auszuführen und andere zu unterlassen, geht man in den Neurowissenschaften von der Tatsache aus, dass Menschen körperliche Wesen und als solche, wie alle materiellen Entitäten, den Gesetzen der Naturwissenschaften unterworfen sind. Mentale Phänomene werden in den Neurowissenschaften als Prozesse des Gehirns (ev. in Verbindung mit anderen Teilen des menschlichen Körpers) verstanden, das, wie alle körperlichen Organe, vollständig durch eine Auflistung der kausalen Prozesse, die sich in ihm abspielen beziehungsweise abspielen können, beschrieben werden kann.

Inicialmente se relaciona, en este artículo, el concepto de argumentación jurídica, así como su finalidad. A continuación, se refiere la teoría de Stephen Toulmin y un esquema fundamentado en sus planteamientos, aplicable al análisis de providencias judiciales. Acto seguido se sugieren los elementos que se deberían analizar para una correcta y completa reflexión respecto de la justificación del sentido de los fallos proferidos por la Corte Constitucional y la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia. Por último, se aplica el modelo simple ajustado a la extensión del trabajo tomando como unidad de análisis una sentencia proferida recientemente por parte de la Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. En este ejercicio queda evidenciada la utilidad de la estructura argumentativa, así como los límites que comporta. En el estudio de la sentencia se observó que la Sala fundamentaba el sentido del fallo de manera principal en tres aserciones, desde las cuales se configuraron sendas estructuras argumentativas: en su análisis se encontraron deficiencias en la racionalidad de la fundamentación de dos de ellas.

Danmark bryster sig af, at være blandt de første nationer, der gik op i miljøet. Men ser man på de, til tider lumre, energisparekampagner, staten iværksatte fra oliekrisen i 1973 og frem, var miljøet fraværende de første mange år. Derimod var budskabet økonomi og patriotisme.

Buck, Christopher. “Religions Share Enduring Values.” World Religions: Belief, Culture, and Controversy. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011.

Argument essay, introducing the present writer’s “CLEAR Argument Paradigm,” a generative model (based on Stephen Toulmin’s analytical model) to assist students in writing their own arguments: Claim (Position), Limits (Qualifier), Evidence (Reasons, Grounds), Assumptions (Warrants & Backing), and Rebuttal (to objections).  

I argue here that Huw Price's anti-representationalism should take more seriously the partial rehabilitation of representationalism undertaken by Sellars' distinction between signifying and picturing. Although signifying is not a word-world relation, and as such, semantic notions such as "means," "refers to" cannot ground substantial metaphysical doctrines, Sellars' account of picturing is best interpreted as a version of transcendental naturalism, and as such, "overcomes" the Carnapian "overcoming" of metaphysics.

In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. I concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I make reference to some conceptual tools derived from John Searle's social ontology and Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. My strategy consists in showing that recognitive phenomena cannot be isolated at the level of human interaction, and are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, it is argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom.

I argue that both Sellars and Merleau-Ponty should be read as radicalizing, in quite different ways, Kant's rejection of the sensory-cognitive continuum". In Sellars, this radicalization leads him to posit "sheer receptivity", as distinct from intuitive representations. In Merleau-Ponty, this radicalization leads him to describe "operative intentionality" or "motor intentionality" of the lived body. Hence we should distinguish between the kind of intentionality that does belong to the conceptual order (discursive intentionality) and the kind of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty examines (somatic intentionality). This distinction provides an alternative position to the debate between McDowell and contemporary Sellarsians (deVries, Rosenberg) if one rejects the assumption that intentionality belongs only to the conceptual order.

Cosmopolis Stephena Toulmin a -,rtrzecia droga,, w sporze modernizmu z postmodernizmem TOMASZ ZAREBSKI Uniwersytet Wroclawski' odkad haslo ,,postmodernizm" pojawilo siq we wsp6lczesnej humanistyce, niemal natychmiast staio siq przedmiotem licznych spor6w i kontrowersji, kt6re trwaj4 do dzisiaj. wsrod jego przeciwnikow opory budziprzed,e wszystkim po stulat zerw ania z doty chczas owym, ra cj onal nym dzie dzictw em modernizmui latomiast j ego zwolennicy, przeciwnie, zdecydow anie odle-gnuj4 siE od calej racjonalistycznej tradycji.

This paper deals with a sensitive and controversial topic – objectivity in ethnographic research. More specifically, I would like to look at how reflexive procedures can increase the objectivity of the knowledge produced by ethnographies. The essay is organized in five parts. I will start by giving a preliminary, summary definition of the two key concepts which are at the centre of my analysis – objectivity and reflexivity. I will then give a brief description of the epistemological framework in which my conceptions of objectivity and reflexivity are located. Thirdly, I move on to consider the epistemic status of ethnographic research, and will emphasize that ethnographies are not just “theory–laden”, as many writers have stated, but also “praxis” or “procedure laden”. In other words, I will stress that it is not only theories which are inevitably incorporated in research, influencing what observations can be made; much the same can also be said of the concrete research practices which are supposed to embody the theoretical perspective. Fourthly, I will discuss why it is so useful to employ reflexive practices, and then immediately afterwards will illustrate the ways in which reflexive descriptions can contribute to greater objectivity of ethnographic accounts. In conclusion, I will discuss a number of objections which have been raised against reflexivity.

This PowerPoint briefing was given as part of a book tour for "The Most Traveled Man on Earth."  It covers the following topics: an overview of the life of Judge Harry Toulmin (1766-1823), including his career as a Unitarian minister driven out of England, his presidency of Transylvania College, his service as Secretary of State of Kentucky, and his appointment as the first Federal judge to serve in what is now Alabama; his activities in early Alabama as a founding father of the state; his son General Theophilus Toulmin; Toulmin's arrest warrant for and detainment of Aaron Burr; the disappearance of the town of Washington Court House in SW Alabama and Judge Toulmin's last residence and his burial place; and the successful search for the missing town, led by Lew Toulmin and archaeologists from the University of South Alabama.

Christopher Buck, “Public Schools May ‘Teach About Religion’—Not ’Teach Religion’.” World Religions: Belief, Culture, and Controversy. (Academic Edition.) Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012.

Argument essay, introducing the present writer’s “CLEAR Argument Paradigm,” a generative model (based on Stephen Toulmin’s analytical model) to assist students in writing their own arguments: Claim (Position), Limits (Qualifier), Evidence (Reasons, Grounds), Assumptions (Warrants & Backing), and Rebuttal (to objections).

Introduces Buck’s “DREAMS Paradigm.” “DREAMS” is a mnemonic acronym for the Doctrinal, Ritual, Ethical, Artistic, Mystical, and Social dimensions of religion. Developed as a classroom tool (for university students) in formally comparing world religions.

 

Este documento contiene instrucciones y rúbrica de evaluación para una política pública compuesta por argumentos sobre una tesis de hecho (género judicial), una tesis valorativa (género epidíptico o demostrativo) y una tesis de política (policy, género deliberativo).
En su revisión, el lector podrá identificar con gran nivel de detalle, los elementos del modelo argumentativo de Stephen Toulmin.

In this paper I draw on the history of moral philosophy in the twentieth century in order to make the case that Rawls's conception of reflective equilibrium and Wellman's conception of conductive argument share the same fundamental sources. I show that both have their roots in an often (but unjustly) neglected position on the nature of moral reasoning championed by the likes of Henry Aiken, W. T. Stace, and H. L. A. Hart.  In light of this common ancestry, I suggest that both reflective equilibrium and conductive argument ought to be viewed and evaluated in a similar light--as being theories of defensible judgment making rather than theories of argument.

[ES]Propongo un analisis logico-informal del argumento del Tercer Hombre del Parmenides como parte de un todo argumentativo, combinando el modelo de Toulmin con el uso de esquemas argumentativos. El analisis pone de manifiesto la estructura de la argumentacion, asi como los compromisos de los interlocutores. Ademas, la discusion en el dialogo de la aceptabilidad de premisas, garantias y argumentos apunta a un cierto caracter metaargumentativo, que apoya la tesis de que el ‘ascenso argumentativo’ es tipico de algunas discusiones filosoficas clasicas. [EN]I offer an informal analysis of Plato´s Parmenides argument of the Third Man, using a theory of argument schemes rooted in  the Toulmin model. This analysis focuses on argument structure and arguers’ commitments. In addition, the discussion about the acceptability of premises, warrants and arguments in the dialogue points to a certain meta-argumentative character. This character is representative of the ‘argumentative ascent’ found in some classical philosophical discussions.

- Explores the role of modal expressions as argumentative indicators by using the Italian modal system as a case study.

- Uses predictions/forecasts in the business-financial daily press to investigate the relation between modality and the context of argumentation.

- A specialist research monograph that could simultaneously provide background information and be used as an inspiration or methodology guide for PhD students.

This book addresses two related questions that have first arisen in Toulmin’s seminal book on the uses of argument. The first question is the one of the relationship between the semantic analysis of modality and the structure of arguments. The second question is the one of the distinctive place, or role, of modality in the fundamental structure of arguments. These two questions concern how modality, as a semantic category, relates to the fundamental structure of arguments. The book addresses modality and argumentation also according to another perspective by looking at how different linguistic modal expressions may be taken as argumentative indicators. It explores the role of modal expressions as argumentative indicators by using the Italian modal system as a case study. At the same time, it uses predictions/forecasts in the business-financial daily press to investigate the relation between modality and the context of argumentation.

ABSTRACT. Around the Stephen Toulmin’s
book, Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity, I would like to present three topics: (i) The Cosmopolitanism (mainly the
Eighteen Century Cosmopolitanism) is the
basis for the way our democracies has been
implemented. (ii) This Cosmopolitanism was
a situated answer for a historically contextualized problem; now this answer is very old
and alien to our present. (iii) Taking the concepts of our global justice in a contingent and
continually negotiated position, it is the best
way in order to defend our democracies in a
world were they are weak.