Social Equality

Ogni antropologo è figlio del suo tempo. Il mondo che ci si presenta davanti è un mondo in rapido movimento (T. Ingold 2000) e le scienze sociali devono rapidamente analizzare e comprendere i cambiamenti. Un'antropologia, che in questo senso evidenzi, affronti e, se possibile, risolva i disagi sociali presenti nelle nuove società multiculturali, che hanno più visibilità nelle grandi metropoli europee e americane e si delineano sempre di più come "città globali"

Salé s’est développée sous forme de lotissements juxtaposés, et grâce aux flux migratoires importants qu’elle reçoit. Elle est devenue une ville dortoir qui dépend vivement de la capitale administrative Rabat qui concentre l’essentiel des équipements et des infrastructures.
Etant convaincue que Salé est une ville millénaire à fort potentiel de développement qui n’a pas joui de l’importance qu’elle mérite au sein de l’armature urbaine nationale et régionale. Nous traitons notre projet de fin d’études autour de cette problématique, celle de soigner l’image de Salé, forger son identité, booster son attractivité et la libérer du stéréotype de « ville dortoir » ou « ville résidentielle ».
Particulièrement attachée à l’idée de doter Salé d’une image de marque et de la rendre compétitive aux grandes villes marocaines en l’occurrence Rabat, Tanger et Casablanca ; nous avons pensé à créer un projet urbain médiateur et durable, à savoir l’éco-quartier universitaire et sanitaire de Hssaine.
Dès lors, notre projet vient articuler plusieurs enjeux (sécurité, confort, culture, loisir, connectivité, promotion, solidarité, bien-être, mixité sociale et fonctionnelle…) autour d’une unité fédératrice d’ensemble pour s’inscrire dans une vision intégratrice et durable.
Aussi, nous devons à l’objectivité de dire que les problématiques urbaines à Salé sont très complexes et compliquées pour qu’elles soient résolues par un seul projet urbain. La création d’un éco-quartier, étant une action d’aménagement urbain ponctuelle qui vise un seul arrondissement n’est certainement pas suffisante pour mettre à niveau toute une ville de la taille de Salé et la libérer de son côté obscur.

Abstract: in this paper I argue that upper-limit sufficientarianism suffers from a major problem stemming from its distinctive indifference to supra-threshold distributions. I argue that supra-threshold distributions must either be relevant justice or irrelevant to justice, but facing up to this distinction shows that upper-limit sufficientarian face a dilemma. Either supra-threshold distributions are relevant to justice, and the indifference to those distributions is incoherent or supra-threshold distributions are irrelevant to justice, and indifference to those distributions is trivial as it is not a matter of justice nor is it a contested claim.

Several democratic theorists have recently sought to vindicate the ideal of equal political power (“political equality”) by tying it to the non-derivative value of egalitarian relationships. This chapter critically discusses such arguments. It clarifies what it takes to vindicate the ideal of political equality, and distinguishes different versions of the relational egalitarian argument for it. Some such arguments appeal to the example of a society without social status inequality (such as caste or class structures); others to personal relationships among equals, like friendship. Each strategy faces problems. After discussing what social status consists in, the chapter argues that social status equality does not require an equal distribution of power, but only that unequal distributions are not justified on grounds incompatible with the citizens’ fundamental equal moral standing. By contrast, personal relationships among equals do require equal power; but establishing that their norms apply to our political community is challenging.

El vol. 2 del libro “Políticas públicas para la equidad social”, ofrece un espacio de diálogo internacional e interdisciplinario en torno a las políticas públicas a partir de tres ejes temáticos considerados imprescindibles para la construcción de sociedades más justas, a saber: Educación, Género y Estudios Urbanos. Bajo el convencimiento que la producción de conocimiento científico se erige como un insumo necesario para desarrollar políticas públicas más eficaces, equitativas y sostenibles capaces de abordar y corregir las diversas causas de las desigualdades.

Este vol. 2, cuenta con 29 capítulos de destacados especialistas internacionales, que desde distintos enfoques nos invitan a la reflexión en torno a la complejidad e impacto de las políticas públicas en la sociedad. La publicación está separada en 3 bloques a partir los 3 ejes temáticos antes mencionados. Todos los capítulos fueron sometidos a una evaluación de pares de parte de al menos dos integrantes del comité científico del libro.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is simply a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

Critics of private charity often claim that the better off should instead assist the disadvantaged through political reform. The present article explores this idea with reference to effective altruism, a powerful new paradigm in the ethics of philanthropy. Effective altruism presses the relatively affluent not only to give generously, but also to subject their practical deliberations to rigorous evaluations of impartiality and cost-effectiveness. The article contends that the movement's sophisticated methodology is not sufficient to overcome the worries of institutionalist critics. At the same time, it shows that a transition from assistance to advocacy faces underappreciated and serious limitations. The measurement-based methodology that allows effective altruists to identify promising assistance programs does not carry over well to political reform. In addition, unleashing greater private wealth into politics may exacerbate unequal opportunities for political influence. The paper closes with preliminary suggestions for overcoming these concerns and connects them to broader developments in the politics of philanthropy.

Race has been a prominent discourse in the contemporary world and academic discipline since the last few decades as it determines a variety of moral problems. In response to this discussion, race tends to emphasise a couple of philosophical aspects in favour of concepts and categories. The concept of race forms a debate in reality whilst racial taxonomy gives a physical system of division such as black, white, Asian, Native American, and so forth. Correspondingly, there have been remarkable problematic issues with regards to biological realism, antirealism or eliminativism alongside social constructivism. In addition, the particular term, race, predominantly, embodies a pair of notions: it is a biological position, demarcated by observable physical characteristics in terms of certain ancestry and geographical territory - it is a historical moral perspective, which is construed by ancient societies. Therefore, by employing qualitative mode of enquiry, I attempt this research to defend the thesis that race is not real, and it could be an upshot of social constructivism. Then, I look forward to illuminating a few substantial findings: the central claims of antirealism or eliminativism, a critique of social constructivism along with a brief analysis of political and cultural constructionism. Notwithstanding these limited outcomes, this research suggests that further studies need to be carried out in order to explore the unreal nature of race.

Introductory courses dealing with sex, gender and sexuality are usually quite biased, going as far as to deny the reality of biology. Drawing on the Catholic tradition (Aquinas), this article presents an accessible argument aimed at restoring deliberative balance in the classroom.

This essay seeks to provide a justification for the ‘egalitarian authority claim’, according to which citizens of democratic states have a moral duty to obey (at least some) democratically made laws because they are the outcome of an egalitarian procedure.
It begins by considering two prominent arguments that link democratic authority to a concern for equality. Both are ultimately unsuccessful; but their failures are instructive, and help identify the conditions that a plausible defense of the egalitarian authority claim must meet. The first argument (discussed in Section II, after Section I clarifies what authority and democracy are taken to consist in) appeals to the simple idea that fairness disallows granting ourselves special privileges that we deny to others; and it suggests that fairness thus requires obeying democratic decisions rather than acting on our own judgment of the right policy. I show that this argument fails; and its failure indicates that we must invoke a less formal, more substantive understanding of equality to justify democratic authority. The second argument, recently suggested by Thomas Christiano, does just that. Democratic authority is, on this account, not justified by the formal demand for equal treatment but by the distinctive value of showing public equal respect to our fellow citizens. Such public equal respect requires treating as authoritative the democratic decisions in which citizens had an equal say. This argument does not, however, succeed in its goal either. While it plausibly establishes the value of democratic institutions, it does not provide grounds for a duty to obey democratic decisions (Section III). This essay thus develops an alternative argument, according to which egalitarian procedures have authority because, by obeying them, we can avoid acting on certain considerations that must be excluded from our intrinsically valuable egalitarian relationships. The authority of democratic decisions rests on the egalitarian fact that none of us has more of a say than any other, not on the further fact (crucial to the previous argument) that each of us has a positive say (Sections IV and V). The argument in turn helps us understand the limits of democratic authority: it is constrained not only by a demand for equality, and by considerations of justice, but also by a requirement of mutual concern without which our egalitarian relationships lack their distinctive value (Section VI).

The objective here is to extend work that relates systems of belief to EXECUTIVE economic activity. This is done by assessing the response of a sample of SUMMARY individuals who have started their own businesses (called "entrepreneurs" in this study) with a contrast sample of non-entrepreneurs deliberately chosen to differ (called "career professionals" in this study) to a series of questions designed to operationalize underlying cultural values. The concept of culture as used in this study is based on early work by Kluckhohn and Strodbeck, which posits that human problems and their solutions are limited in number. Group cultures in this approach reflect the dominant responses to these problems and solutions. Geert Hofstede expanded upon this basic idea in a landmark 1980 study. Hofstede found statistical evidence for four underlying dimensions of culture, together with "consequences" that reflect a given society's culture in the institutions and behaviors it maintains. Hofstede's dimensions are: Power distance Management of inequality between people Individualism Relationship between individuals and collectives Uncertainty avoidance Stance toward the future I Masculinity Allocation of roles between the sexes Address correspondence to Rita

U ovom radu kratko je pojasnjen pojam pozitivne  diskriminacije prije svega na  trzistu rada ali i opcenito u drustvu.
Takodjer predoceni su znacaj i ciljevi mjera pozitivne  diskriminacije.
Ponudjene  su definicije pojmova  prdrasude, stereotipi i diskriminacija kao i pozitivna  diskriminacija. U zakljucnom djelu prikazan je kroz nekoliko primjera negativan utjecaj primjene  mjera pozitivne  diskriminacije po drustvenu stabilnost.

We focus this paper on the conditions to build reliable science, technology and higher education systems in Latin America, based on international comparative studies, fieldwork and interviews conducted over the last three years. The analysis shows that science can have a major role in furthering the democratization of society through public policies that foster opportunities to access knowledge and the advanced training of human resources. Broadening the social basis for higher education promotes the qualification of the labour force and contributes decisively to social and economic development.
The need to guarantee higher education diversity, strengthening scientific institutions and investing in a strong science base, is deemed as critical, but goes far beyond policies centred on innovation and industry-science relationships. It requires adequate training and attraction of skilled people, as well as promoting scientific and technological culture among society.

In this paper I analyze interpersonal and institutional recognition and discuss the relation of different types of recognition to various principles of social justice (egalitarianism, meritarianism, legitimate favouritism, principles of need and free exchange). Further, I try to characterize contours of good autonomous life, and ask what kind of preconditions it has. I will distinguish between five kinds of preconditions: psychological, material, cultural, intersubjective and institutional. After examining what the role of recognition is among such preconditions, and how they figure in the work of Honneth, Fraser and Taylor, I suggest a somewhat complex and hopefully rich picture of interpersonal and institutional recognition as a precondition of autonomous good life.

What are the implications of a commitment to social equality for our economic institutions? How can a “relational” conception of egalitarianism help us to think critically and normatively about the structure and design of our major economic institutions? In my attempt to offer responses to these questions, I will outline the contours of a relational account of economic interactions. In order to do so, I will try to draw attention to an institution neglected by egalitarians, namely business corporations. My main claim is that a commitment to social equality requires a more democratic functioning of economic organizations.

Esta publicación ha sido posible gracias, en primer lugar, a la colaboración del museo romano oiasso, de san telmo museoa, de la universitat de Barcelona, de la université toulouse III, de la université lyon 2, del laboratoire d'histoire et de patrimoine de montréal, de Icom-España y del Ecomuseu de les Valls d'Àneu. y, en segundo lugar, a los apoyos económicos de las siguientes instituciones: el Vicerrectorado del campus de gipuzkoa de la upV/EHu; la fundación canadá; el Departamento de Educación del gobierno Vasco; y el Departamento de cultura, turismo, Juventud y Deportes de la Diputación foral de gipuzkoa. por último, este libro se ha llevado a cabo en el marco del grupo investigación El patrimonio cultural y natural en tiempos de crisis. Retos, adaptaciones y estrategias en contextos locales (cso2015-68611-r) financiado por el ministerio de Economía y competitividad, y del grupo de Investigación en patrimonio construido (It890-16) del sistema universitario Vasco.

Are democratic egalitarians bound to endorse statism? It seems so, given their insistence on relations of democratic reciprocity, and the lack of such relations in the global realm. If so, it would apparently be inconsistent to endorse both cosmopolitanism and democratic egalitarianism. Democratic egalitarians actually face an apparent dilemma: either they must accept statism, or they must provide further explanation regarding why they do not. Luck egalitarianism, by contrast, seemingly offers a more straightforward ground to the claim that the scope of justice is global. My thesis is twofold: first, I show that (a) democratic egalitarians can escape the dilemma, to the effect that, as such, they need be committed neither to statism nor to cosmopolitanism, and (b) that luck egalitarians are not, so to speak, as shielded from the dilemma as it might first appear. Second, I defend the plausibility of global social egalitarianism against both statist variants of democratic egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism, and suggest a form of division of labor between domestic and global justice.

In recent years, a number of theorists have argued that Rawls's vision of a property-owning democracy seems like a promising way to institutionalise an ideal of social equality. In this paper, I distinguish two economic aims that appear central to these accounts of social equality: widespread security and control. I then argue that, inso-far as Rawls's property-owning democracy retains many large-scale corporations, it is poorly placed to realise these two economic aims unless it is supplemented with an adequate regime of corporate governance. I go on to assess three possible regimes of corporate governance for a property-owning democracy: (1) investment fund activism; (2) worker-managed firms; and (3) labour-capital partnerships. I argue that all three regimes offer different trade-offs between widespread economic security and control; however, there are social egalitarian reasons – albeit of a provisional nature – to see regime (3) as a superior option to regimes (1) and (2).

The idea of equality features in a number of competing accounts of the demands of justice, and does so in a variety of different ways. In what follows here I first examine the background role of a formal idea of equality in all plausible accounts of justice, before then moving on to describe the place of a more substantive idea of equality in the best known and most influential account of justice, that of John Rawls. I then consider a number of post-Rawlsian accounts of the place of equality as an ideal of justice, including an examination of the " equality of resources " view of Ronald Dworkin, and the " luck egalitarianism " of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, before discussing the contrast between 'distributive' and 'social' (or 'relational') approaches to equality.

This chapter analyzes the impacts of fair trade's efforts to narrow the global North-South divide, focusing particularly on the case of Africa. Africa is currently experiencing the largest growth in fair trade certified producer groups and products. Since Africa represents one of the most disadvantaged regions in the world, the need for fair trade to enhance environmental sustainability and social equality for farmers and agricultural workers is acute. As we demonstrate, fair trade in Africa is closely linked to organic initiatives in seeking to halt environmental degradation in agro-export sectors. Fair trade's support for producer and organizational empowerment is linked explicitly to issues of gender equity, bolstering the initiative's social mandate. Although it is by no means a panacea, we conclude that fair trade provides an important avenue for addressing critical environmental and social problems in Africa today.

The welfare state in its infancy even in the period of greatest expansion after World War II could not draw their legitimacy from the philosophical justification. This policy was the result of sharing of positive economic growth and efforts of political elites to prevent a leftist working-class movement. The welfare state urgently needed argument, which this approach offers a higher moral or philosophical principles and to release him from the status of preventive policies towards the extreme left respectively. to social unrest. Change is coming in 1971 with the arrival of the work A Theory of Justice by one of the greatest political and moral philosophers of 20th century J. Rawls which as a liberal legitimizes some leftist ideas. This work is a selection of the author's arguments which legitimize redistribution in politics of welfare state.

individuals who have started their own businesses (called "entrepreneurs" in this study) with a contrast sample of non-entrepreneurs deliberately chosen to differ (called "career professionals" in this study) to a series of questions designed to operationalize underlying cultural values. The concept of culture as used in this study is based on early work by Kluckhohn and Strodbeck, which posits that human problems and their solutions are limited in number. Group cultures in this approach reflect the dominant responses to these problems and solutions. Geert Hofstede expanded upon this basic idea in a landmark 1980 study. Hofstede found statistical evidence for four underlying dimensions of culture, together with "consequences" that reflect a given society's culture in the institutions and behaviors it maintains. Hofstede's dimensions are: Power distance Management of inequality between people Individualism Relationship between individuals and collectives Uncertainty avoidance Stance toward the future I Masculinity Allocation of roles between the sexes

In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens? Traditionally, liberals have provided two different answers to this question. Some have adopted a conception of neutrality of justification, while others a conception of neutrality of effects. Recently, Alan Patten has defended an alternative, novel and sophisticated, conception of neutrality – neutrality of treatment. In this article I assess whether neutrality of treatment is, in fact, a superior conception of neutrality. I try to show that neutrality of treatment suffers from the very same weaknesses that Patten attributes to its alternatives and that, overall, neutrality of justification, properly construed, provides a more promising account of both the sense in which a state ought to be neutral and of the object of neutrality. Finally, I argue for a broader account of the normative bases of liberal neutrality than the one proposed by Patten. This account includes, beyond considerations of fairness, a relational principle of equal standing.

The writing conceived here undermines the inscriptions of the Master.  It emerges as an articulation of alternative views as a basis for the multiple readings and re-articulations for decision, action and transformation in everyday life.  The very possibility of an alternative view sets into process an unstable oscillation, casting a seed of doubt into any transcendental claim a given view might make.  How then to write the alternative?  Or at least lay the grounds, open the spaces, emancipate action for alternatives.....?

So what does writing to undo Power involve?  ...  "writing is structured like an unconscious that plays with and plays at being the conscious tool of Power. Its surface may ‘say’ one thing while at the same time underwriting the forbidden discourse(s) audible and visible only in puns, slips of the tongue, the graffiti, the ghostly faces in the shadows at the margins of the eye where
the denied, unmet and unvoiced ‘goods’, ‘desires’, ‘needs’ and unutterable injuries, complaints, and disappointments have their subaltern existence. Writing is a complex, even dangerous, affair."  The chapter explores the processes and what is at stake when writing.  Writing is a research methodology...... it is a political and an educational process and practice.

Este artículo está dedicado a eliminar numerosas confusiones posibles acerca del pensamiento igualitarista. Comienzo por mostrar que las formas más plau-sibles de igualitarismo no se adecuan bien en ninguno de los lados de la distin-ción entre igualitarismo télico e igualitarismo deóntico. Prosigo argumentando que la pregunta referida al alcance de los principios distributivos igualitaristas no puede ser respondida en abstracto, sino que, en cambio, supone proveer pre-viamente una explicación acerca de las distintas maneras en que la desigualdad en la distribución puede ser algo malo. Luego, discuto algunas comprensiones  erradas de la “objeción de nivelar hacia abajo” y de la relación entre igualitarismo y prioritarismo. Al hacer esto, mi propósito es ofrecer una explicación más plausible acerca de lo que los igualitaristas deberían creer.

As the Evangelical Theological Society celebrates 65 years of a blessed existence, we are looking back from where we came and looking forward to where we are going. But unless we can move forward with all evangelicals, our work will not survive.

The ETS is patently under-populated by women. Currently only 7% of the members are female. But even this percent is high compared to the (in)visible role of women within the society and in the journal. The object of this paper, therefore, will be to explore the dissonance between the purposes of the ETS, the mission of the journal, and the constitutional by-laws with actual member participation, journal involvement, and conference activity of women.

If the ETS wants to move vibrantly into the future, we must evaluate our current trajectory. Underutilizing the expertise of trained evangelical women scholastics entails the quality of academic work is lopsided, and the theological mind dwarfed. While simply saying that female participation should represent gender percentage in the world would be not only unreasonable but also legalistic, fostering a learned environment that supports women’s academic advances and advancement must be more fully addressed. Our future depends on it.

This paper discusses the removal of voting rights from those convicted of criminal offences. I focus on two defences of disenfranchisement: firstly, I question one justification of the view that voting rights are conditional on the fulfilment of certain responsibilities associated with citizenship that offenders fail to meet. Secondly, I criticise a recent expressivist justification of disenfranchisement based on the idea that this measure is uniquely suited to express dissociation from serious and unmitigated wrongdoing. While embracing the expressivist perspective of the latter line of argument, I argue that disenfranchisement also expresses attitudes and judgments which are incompatible with social equality. Disenfranchisement conveys the judgments that offenders are not equal members of the community and they are not fit to participate in the democratic process. In doing so, it violates the duty of the state to treat its citizens with equal respect and undermines offenders' equal status. Moreover, this policy fosters objectionable inequalities of esteem: other members of the community are very likely to internalise the judgment that offenders are second-class citizens and to regard them as inferior, which in turn would undermine their status in society.

Baseada no referencial teórico de Rousseau, a referida investigação assinala que, se a sociedade injusta (iníqua, “que é”), caracterizada pelo Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens [1754], traz como fundamento a propriedade privada, a divisão do trabalho e a alienação, instaurando uma desigualdade incompatível com o pressuposto da condição humana, a saber, a liberdade, à sociedade justa (legítima, que “deve ser”) se impõe a questão que, segundo o exposto em Do Contrato Social [1762], envolve a construção de “uma forma de associação” que seja capaz de defender e proteger “a pessoa e os bens de cada associado”, implicando também que o vínculo estabelecido entre o indivíduo e todos os demais possibilite a conservação da liberdade, embora exigindo de cada membro a obediência, o que demanda uma sujeição que não se circunscreva senão a si mesmo, conforme assegura a Vontade Geral. Dessa forma, baseada no caráter necessário que Rousseau atribui ao pacto social, que constitui-se no ato pelo qual o povo se faz povo e torna-se um corpo coletivo e moral que emerge como a única fonte legítima do poder e seu único detentor, a investigação, que traz como princípio metodológico o materialismo histórico e dialético, assinala a Vontade Geral como condição para o exercício da soberania popular em uma construção que requer uma formação econômico-social que possibilite sua manifestação como tal, na medida em que encerra o interesse comum e um processo que envolve as decisões coletivas e, antes, a sua elaboração, e demanda a criação de condições concretas para a sua objetivação, o que implica a inter-relação que, abrangendo liberdade e igualdade, consiste no “direito de ser homem” e perfaz a verdadeira democracia.

In our study we investigated the effect of Selflessness and Social Conformity motivations on attitudes towards social equality and ideological preferences, and compared it between Eastern and Western Europe. According to our results both Cultural-Group-based and Economic-Income Egalitarianism enforced leftist ideological preferences in both regions, although these relationships were far stronger in the Western European sample. Selflessness motivation enhanced egalitarian attitudes and leftist preferences by this in both regions. Social Conformity motivation showed a negative relationship with Cultural-Group-based Egalitarianism and a positive one with rightist ideological preferences partly mediated by the former in both groups, whilst in the Eastern European sample the same motivation simultaneously enhanced leftist ideological preferences mediated by Economic Egalitarianism. We also identified a negative relationship between Cultural-Group-based and Economic-Income Egalitarianism in Eastern Europe, which indicates that economic solidarity might be selective in this region.

What kind of equality should we value and why? Current debate centres around whether distributive equality is valuable. However, it is not the only (potentially) morally significant form of equality. David Miller and T. M. Scanlon have emphasised the importance of social equality—a strongly egalitarian notion distinct from distributive equality, and which cannot be reduced to a concern for overall welfare or the welfare of the worst-off. However, as debate tends to focus on distribution, social equality has been neglected and we do not have a clear understanding of what it is and why it might be valuable. This paper aims to address this gap.