Papers by Pierre Cloarec
Are democratic egalitarians bound to endorse statism? It seems so, given their insistence on rela... more Are democratic egalitarians bound to endorse statism? It seems so, given their insistence on relations of democratic reciprocity, and the lack of such relations in the global realm. If so, it would apparently be inconsistent to endorse both cosmopolitanism and democratic egalitarianism. Democratic egalitarians actually face an apparent dilemma: either they must accept statism, or they must provide further explanation regarding why they do not. Luck egalitarianism, by contrast, seemingly offers a more straightforward ground to the claim that the scope of justice is global. My thesis is twofold: first, I show that (a) democratic egalitarians can escape the dilemma, to the effect that, as such, they need be committed neither to statism nor to cosmopolitanism, and (b) that luck egalitarians are not, so to speak, as shielded from the dilemma as it might first appear. Second, I defend the plausibility of global social egalitarianism against both statist variants of democratic egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism, and suggest a form of division of labor between domestic and global justice.
Drafts by Pierre Cloarec
The paper examines some objections that have been advanced against egalitarianism, or more specif... more The paper examines some objections that have been advanced against egalitarianism, or more specifically liberal egalitarianism. It does so through identifying what makes a theory distinctively egalitarian, before turning to antiegalitarian claims and objections. This first step is necessary, because, in order to be anti-egalitarian, a claim needs to be directed against a particular demand of equality, rather than against an abstract and empty notion of "egalitarianism". Then some claims are presented, and it is suggested that they may be relevant for an egalitarian through the examination of their strengths and weaknesses. Arguments are identified according to the standpoint from which they are formulated: the good, market behavior, and so on. None is them is plainly rejected, but some paths are suggested as possible responses. It is argued, as a conclusion, that antiegalitarians claims range from threats to challenges, and must be addressed by egalitarians so that they fit into a reflective equilibrium.
In his "Against Equality and Priority", Michael Huemer attacks both egalitarianism and the priori... more In his "Against Equality and Priority", Michael Huemer attacks both egalitarianism and the priority view, on the ground of what he calls his "Pareto argument". The outline of the argument is that (1) equality is rejected by the "weak Pareto principle", and (2) priority is rejected by the "urepugnant premise". Yet, the argument is internally flawed for four distinct reasons: (1) the "weak Pareto principle" goes beyond what the Pareto criterion actually demands; (2) the "urepugnant premise" has dubious implications; (3) while Huemer claims to be comparing three possible "worlds", his argument actually rests on four such worlds; and (4) the "better than" relation Huemer builds is not adequately defined, and cannot be said to be either transitive or intransitive, so that the whole argument fails to make its point. In conclusion, I argue that Huemer's argument is externally flawed as well, for it ignores the actual egalitarian literature and focuses on too narrow a conception of egalitarianism.
Conference/workshop presentations by Pierre Cloarec
Colloque du Cevipof «Pluralisme libéral»
This paper was presented at the Cevipof on september 21, 2012. Its main aim is to critically exam... more This paper was presented at the Cevipof on september 21, 2012. Its main aim is to critically examine most common conceptions of neutrality, as they are related to political decision making. It is shown that none of these is an adequate way to cope with pluralism, and suggested that what matters is the citizens’ ability to preserve pluralism over time, even though current decisions are not satisfying according to the particular conceptions they hold.
Responsibility is an important issue in discussions of justice, and luck egalitarianism owes much... more Responsibility is an important issue in discussions of justice, and luck egalitarianism owes much of its appeal to its making clear how it could be incorporated in an egalitarian conception of justice. Yet it is also a notoriously puzzling issue, that calls for a greater clarity if we are to clarify how it can rightly be used as grounding justice-based claims. It is appropriate, then, to begin by some conceptual clarifications on the many meanings of “responsibility.” This serves to understand how differing conceptions thereof could fit into a broader conception of justice. Here I propose to start from the question: “What is it that makes a distribution of responsibilities a fair one?,” rather than to assume, as luck egalitarians do, that the adequate distribution of responsibilities and associated burdens and benefits is one that tracks attributive responsibility as finely as possible. I attempt to show that, for political purposes, responsibility is best understood in relation to agency and authority over oneself, rather than as moral responsibility commonly understood. The bulk of my argument is that, if we understand equality in a relational sense, we should accept the idea that persons are to be viewed as agents possessing a presumptive authority over themselves, and hence that the way responsibilities are ascribed to them should reflect this view. Moreover, if equality and agency matter, the sense of one’s own worth ought to be socially secured. If my argument is right, strict luck egalitarianism is unable to do so, although a revised version thereof might be advanced that meets the requirements advanced here.
Many natural events, such as earthquakes, floods or wildfires, are prone to cause terrible damage... more Many natural events, such as earthquakes, floods or wildfires, are prone to cause terrible damage to human populations as well as to their built and natural environment, that is, to turn into catastrophes. Yet there are reasons to affirm that a catastrophe of that kind need not always be an injustice. Here I address a powerful, yet ultimately flawed argument to the effect that there is no duty of justice to provide disaster relief to the victims of a disaster; namely that (1) a disaster is not itself an injustice, and (2) that, even if it were an injustice, there would be no agent to whom a valid claim of justice could be addressed. I examine two plausible objections to that argument, and show that, even though both fail, and thus even though both parts of the argument rest on acceptable premises, the argument does not adequately support its conclusion.
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Papers by Pierre Cloarec
Drafts by Pierre Cloarec
Conference/workshop presentations by Pierre Cloarec