Books by Chiara Cordelli
Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2015, in the United States alone, some $373 billion was recorded i... more Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2015, in the United States alone, some $373 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies.
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Philanthropy in Democratic Societies: History, Institutions, Values
Edited by Rob Reich, Lucy Ber... more Philanthropy in Democratic Societies: History, Institutions, Values
Edited by Rob Reich, Lucy Bernholz, and Chiara Cordelli
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo23530413.html
Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies.
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Contributors: Eric Beerbhom (Harvard), Lucy Bernholz (Stanford), Paul Brest (Stanford) Chiara Cordelli (Chicago), Aaron Horvath (Stanford) Jonathan Levy (Chicago), Ray Madoff (Boston College), Ryan Pevnick (NYU), Walter Powell (Stanford), Rob Reich (Stanford), Olivier Zunz (Virginia)
Papers by Chiara Cordelli
In what sense, and to what extent, should a liberal state be secular? Many interpret liberal-egal... more In what sense, and to what extent, should a liberal state be secular? Many interpret liberal-egalitarian political theory as dictating a radical separation between church and state. Against this view, Cécile Laborde has powerfully argued that, in fact, liberal-egalitarianism is not committed to strict separation as such. Laborde understands the liberal-egalitarian commitment to separation as ultimately grounded on a principle of neutrality. However, she argues that the conception of neutrality to which liberal egalitarians are committed is much more ‘restricted’ than it is often thought. If a commitment to separation is derivative from a commitment to neutrality, then, if neutrality is restricted, secularism is minimal. This means that not all forms of religious establishment should be regarded as impermissible from a liberal-egalitarian perspective. Contra Laborde, I argue that restricted neutrality should not be understood as the only ground of separation. Separation has plural grounds. Forms of religious recognition that do not violate any of the requirements of restricted neutrality, may still be regarded as impermissible from a liberal-egalitarian perspective, if they (1) violate a basic commitment to fairness; (2) treat citizens in a patronizing way, and/or (3) violate, in their justification, a requirement of sincerity, as grounded on reciprocity.
Where organized religion begins, democratic rights end. Or so it is often assumed. Traditionally,... more Where organized religion begins, democratic rights end. Or so it is often assumed. Traditionally, most political philosophers have agreed that democratic norms should
not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical organizations. And while a growing number of scholars have recently argued in favor of democratizing some
nonpolitical organizations, most notably business firms, religious associations continue to be regarded as paradigmatic cases of democracy-free zones. Contrary to this view, I defend a pro tanto right to democracy within large and hierarchical churches. I then explain that, once appropriately qualified, this right is not overruled by claims to freedom of religious association and church autonomy. Testing the extension of democratic rights to churches provides an opportunity to tackle, at once, a series of
broader normative issues, including the scope of democracy "below" the state, the limits of freedom of association, and the putatively special status of religion.
In response to growing economic and political interdependence at the international level, contemp... more In response to growing economic and political interdependence at the international level, contemporary theories of justice have debated whether the demands of distributive justice extend beyond the nation-state. This article addresses the reverse question: whether and how the demands of justice arise below the state, at the level of civil society associations. This question becomes especially pressing in light of the increasing fragmentation of national governance, and the growing institutional interdependence between political institutions and private associations. The article argues that the extent to which civil society associations are directly bound by egalitarian principles, ultimately depends on a complex set of factors, including their structure and size, their role in the social provision of important goods, as well as the kind of relationship they entertain with political institutions.
Many normative arguments against privatization develop from a concern with the self-interested an... more Many normative arguments against privatization develop from a concern with the self-interested and profit-maximizing rationality of market actors. These arguments leave unaddressed an important question: what is wrong with privatization, if anything, when those empowered by it are socially-minded, even altruistic actors, as opposed to profit-maximizing ones? This question matters, since many instances of privatization involve so-called ‘nonprofit’ organizations, instead of profit-seeking entities. In this contribution, I develop three arguments against the privatization of some public functions, the validity of which does not depend on contentious assumptions about the rationality or motivations of market actors. I first appeal to three distinctive values that a liberal-egalitarian society should honor: equal freedom, value pluralism, and symbolic reciprocity. I then defend three correlative functions that political institutions must perform for those values to be fulfilled: the omnilaterality function, the externalizing function, and the expressive function. Finally, I argue that contemporary forms of privatization deprive political institutions of the ability to simultaneously fulfill these functions and do so regardless of the specific nature of the private agents through which privatization operates. I will suggest that, in certain respects, privatization to nonprofits can be even worse, morally speaking, than privatization to for-profit entities.
Although intergenerational family transfers of private wealth should be limited on grounds of int... more Although intergenerational family transfers of private wealth should be limited on grounds of intergenerational justice, these same grounds can provide states with pro tanto reasons to support intergenerational charitable transfers of private wealth. This is because, given their distinctive governance structure and ability to exist over long time horizons, philanthropic institutions, unlike the nuclear family, can and should play three distinctive roles in helping a society fulfill its intergenerational obligations. First, they can be harnessed to counteract the short-termism and presentism of the democratic process, in a way that promotes the long-term interests of future generations. Second, they can supplement political institutions in fulfilling the ultimate purpose of the just savings principle, in circumstances where a regression from the steady-stage state to the accumulation stage is possible but highly unlikely. Third, they can complement political institutions in securing the reproduction of a particular form of capital—social capital—over time.
In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its c... more In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens? Traditionally, liberals have provided two different answers to this question. Some have adopted a conception of neutrality of justification, while others a conception of neutrality of effects. Recently, Alan Patten has defended an alternative, novel and sophisticated, conception of neutrality – neutrality of treatment. In this article I assess whether neutrality of treatment is, in fact, a superior conception of neutrality. I try to show that neutrality of treatment suffers from the very same weaknesses that Patten attributes to its alternatives and that, overall, neutrality of justification, properly construed, provides a more promising account of both the sense in which a state ought to be neutral and of the object of neutrality. Finally, I argue for a broader account of the normative bases of liberal neutrality than the one proposed by Patten. This account includes, beyond considerations of fairness, a relational principle of equal standing.
This article examines the way in which Albert Weale's procedural account of democratic justice un... more This article examines the way in which Albert Weale's procedural account of democratic justice understands: (1) the boundaries of the democratic social contract, in terms of who is included or excluded from the contract; and (2) the boundaries of justice (i.e. the scope of entitlements and obligations of justice) that result from the contract. Either Weale's empirical method justifies the problematic exclusion of certain groups of agents from the democratic contract and thus potentially from the scope of justice, or his method is not as empirical as Weale wants it to be, because in order to evaluate those exclusions as unjust and to prevent them, the theory needs to postulate thick moral standards that are independent from, and external to, democratic procedures. Furthermore, the boundaries of justice resulting from Weale's empirical-contractarian theory are likely to lead to the absence of justice where it would be most needed, especially at the international level. These concerns notwithstanding, Weale's book remains a highly significant contribution to both democratic theory and theories of justice, as well as to our understanding of the relationship between them.
Across countries, governments are urging civil society, in particular charitable and non-profit a... more Across countries, governments are urging civil society, in particular charitable and non-profit associations, to take up a part of the social burden, and to produce and provide critical human services and social goods, either independently or on governments' behalf. This type of privatization, or public–private partnership, is encouraged by many on grounds of pluralism and liberty, as empowering individuals and their associations. In this paper, I aim to provide a liberty-based normative argument against privatization. A common view, supported by both conservatives and classical liberals, is that the more social responsibility is left or delegated to civil society, the more civil society will flourish. I contend, by contrast, that when political societies rely on civil society to provide critical goods and services, individuals' freedom of association is threatened. The consequence of privatization is a multiple loss, in terms of individual freedom, value pluralism and the expressive character of civil society.
Talks by Chiara Cordelli
Reports by Chiara Cordelli
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Books by Chiara Cordelli
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Edited by Rob Reich, Lucy Bernholz, and Chiara Cordelli
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo23530413.html
Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies.
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Contributors: Eric Beerbhom (Harvard), Lucy Bernholz (Stanford), Paul Brest (Stanford) Chiara Cordelli (Chicago), Aaron Horvath (Stanford) Jonathan Levy (Chicago), Ray Madoff (Boston College), Ryan Pevnick (NYU), Walter Powell (Stanford), Rob Reich (Stanford), Olivier Zunz (Virginia)
Papers by Chiara Cordelli
not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical organizations. And while a growing number of scholars have recently argued in favor of democratizing some
nonpolitical organizations, most notably business firms, religious associations continue to be regarded as paradigmatic cases of democracy-free zones. Contrary to this view, I defend a pro tanto right to democracy within large and hierarchical churches. I then explain that, once appropriately qualified, this right is not overruled by claims to freedom of religious association and church autonomy. Testing the extension of democratic rights to churches provides an opportunity to tackle, at once, a series of
broader normative issues, including the scope of democracy "below" the state, the limits of freedom of association, and the putatively special status of religion.
Talks by Chiara Cordelli
Reports by Chiara Cordelli
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Edited by Rob Reich, Lucy Bernholz, and Chiara Cordelli
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo23530413.html
Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies.
The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.
Contributors: Eric Beerbhom (Harvard), Lucy Bernholz (Stanford), Paul Brest (Stanford) Chiara Cordelli (Chicago), Aaron Horvath (Stanford) Jonathan Levy (Chicago), Ray Madoff (Boston College), Ryan Pevnick (NYU), Walter Powell (Stanford), Rob Reich (Stanford), Olivier Zunz (Virginia)
not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical organizations. And while a growing number of scholars have recently argued in favor of democratizing some
nonpolitical organizations, most notably business firms, religious associations continue to be regarded as paradigmatic cases of democracy-free zones. Contrary to this view, I defend a pro tanto right to democracy within large and hierarchical churches. I then explain that, once appropriately qualified, this right is not overruled by claims to freedom of religious association and church autonomy. Testing the extension of democratic rights to churches provides an opportunity to tackle, at once, a series of
broader normative issues, including the scope of democracy "below" the state, the limits of freedom of association, and the putatively special status of religion.