Singular Thought

This is the introductory essay to the collection of essays: 'Acquaintance: New Essays' (eds. Knowles & Raleigh, forthcoming, OUP). In this essay I provide some historical background to the concept of acquaintance. I examine various Russellian theses about acquaintance that contemporary acquaintance theorists may wish to reject. I consider a number of questions that acquaintance theorists face. I provide a survey of current debates in philosophy where acquaintance has recently been invoked. And I also provide brief summaries of the other essays in this volume.

This paper is largely exegetical/interpretive. My goal is to demonstrate that some criticisms that have been leveled against the program Gareth Evans constructs in The Varieties of Reference (Evans 1980, henceforth VR) misfire because they are based on misunderstandings of Evans’ position. First I will be discussing three criticisms raised by Tyler Burge (Burge, 2010). The first has to do with Evans’ arguments to the effect that a causal connection between a belief and an object is insufficient for that belief to be about that object. A key part of Evans’ argument is to carefully distinguish considerations relevant to the semantics of language from considerations relevant to the semantics (so to speak) of thought or belief (to make the subsequent discussion easier, I will henceforth use ‘thought’ as a blanket term for the relevant mental states, including belief). I will argue that Burge’s criticisms depend on largely not taking account of Evans’ distinctions. Second, Burge criticizes Evans’ account of ‘informational content’ taking it to be inconsistent. I will show that the inconsistency Burge finds depends entirely on a misreading of the doctrine. Finally, Burge takes Evans to task for a perceived over-intellectualization in a key aspect of his doctrine. Burge incorrectly reads Evans as requiring that the subject holding a belief be engaged in certain overly intellectual endeavors, when in fact Evans is only attributing these endeavors to theorists of such a subject.
Next, I turn to two criticisms leveled by John Campbell (Campbell, 1999). I will argue that Campbell’s criticisms are based on misunderstandings – though they do hit at deeper elements of Evans’ doctrine. First, Campbell reads Evans’ account of demonstrative thought as requiring that the subject’s information link to an object allows her to directly locate that object in space. Campbell constructs a case in which one tomato (a) is, because of an angled mirror, incorrectly seen as being at a location that happens to be occupied by an identical tomato (b). Campbell claims that Evans’ doctrines require us to conclude that the subject cannot have a demonstrative thought about the seen tomato (a), though it seems intuitively that such a subject would be able to have a demonstrative thought about that tomato, despite its location is inaccurately seen. I show that Evans’ position in fact allows that the subject can have a demonstrative thought about the causal-source tomato in this case because his account does not require that the location of demonstratively identified objects be immediately accurately assessed. What is crucial is that the subject have the ability to accurately discover the location. Second, Campbell criticizes Evans’ notion of a fundamental level of thought. I show that this criticism hinges on view of the nature and role of the fundamental level of thought that mischaracterizes Evans’ treatment of the notion.

Keywords: communication, semantics/pragmatics, direct reference theory, singular thoughts, Russell's Principle, Generality Constraint, Husserl, Evans, Perry, twin examples, demonstratives, demonstrative identification, perception, perceptual content

Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativ-ity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.

How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling’s prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts?
It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: (i) on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon of singular imaginings of different nonexistents of the same (fictional) kind; (ii) while, at the same time, to attribute this position to Thomas Reid, thus correcting some misunderstandings of his view on imagination.

Wie denken und sprechen wir eigentlich über einzelne Objekte in Raum und Zeit? Diese Frage rührt gleichermaßen an Grundprobleme der neueren sprachanalytischen Philosophie und der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls. Unter dem Titel 'Konstitutionsproblem' begegnet sie uns dort in folgendem Gewand: Wie bringen wir es zuwege, ein raumzeitliches Objekt über eine Zeitspanne und über eine Reihe von kognitiven Perspektivenwechseln hinweg 'im Sinn' zu behalten? Der Autor unternimmt den Versuch, das Konstitutionsproblem in einer Art und Weise zu verfolgen, die methodisch sowohl für Sprachanalytiker als auch für Phänomenologen akzeptabel ist.

Føllesdal's much-discussed "Fregean" reading of Husserl's notion of noema has
recently been criticized on the grounds that, on this reading, Husserl would be
committed to either (1) a radical form of internalism about intentional content
and/or (2) descriptivism about the meaning of singular terms and/or (3) the
claim that there can be no direct reference, since intentional representation is
supposed to be mediated by noematic Sinn. I argue against these objections.

In der Philosophie des Geistes kann man unter »Externalismus« grob gesprochen die Idee verstehen, dass unsere propositionalen Akte und Einstellungenunsere Gedanken, wie ich weniger technisch sagen werde 1konstitutiv von den Aspekten der Welt abhängen, von denen sie handeln. Der Externalismus kann als eine der wichtigsten Entwicklungen der Philosophie der Sprache und des Geistes der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gelten, 2 und externalistische Auffassungen des Mentalen sind in der jüngeren Philosophie des Geistes in verschiedensten Varianten entwickelt worden. 3 Auf der einen Seite stehen dabei Auffassungen, denen zufolge unser Denken insgesamt in einer Weise von der Welt abhängt, dass wir im Großen und Ganzen nicht die Gedanken haben könnten, die wir haben, wenn die Welt nicht im Großen und Ganzen so beschaffen wäre, wie wir denken. Von einem solchen globalen Externalismus, wie man ihn vielleicht nennen könnte, unterscheiden sich lokale externalistische Auffassungen, denen zufolge (unmittelbar) nur bestimmte Arten von Gedanken aufgrund der spezifischen Weise, in der sie auf die Welt bezogen sind, konstitutiv von bestimmten Arten von Gegenständen abhängen. McDowells Externalismus ist ein solcher lokaler Externalismus. Die externalistische Idee, um die es ihm geht, kann man mit dem von ihm bevorzugten Ausdruck als die Idee der Gegenstandsabhängigkeit (object-dependence) von singulären Gedanken bezeichnen (vgl. STIS, passim). 4 Der erste Abschnitt dieses Kapitels beschäftigt sich mit McDowells Erläuterung dieser Idee.

reseñas ideas y valores · vol. lx · n. o 147 • diciembre de 2011 • issn 0120-0062 • bogotá, colombia [223] reseñas Santamaría, Freddy. Hacer mundos: el nombrar y la significatividad. Una investigación desde la filosofía analítica. Presentación por Mauricio Beuchot. Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, 2009. 232 pp. reseñas departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia [22 6]

This paper explores the peculiar phenomenology of photographic pictorial experience. I begin with an attempt to clarify what exactly we mean by saying that photographs have a special phenomenology: identifying what kind of phenomenology we are trying to account for is the first step to assess existing theories and develop a proper view; I do this in section 2. In sections 3, 4 and 5 I examine three different theories available in the philosophical literature that try to account for the special phenomenology of photography: Walton’s ‘transparency thesis’ (section 3), Currie and Pettersson’s ‘trace theory’ (section 4) and Hopkins’ theory of ‘factive pictorial experience’ (section 5). I claim that none of them is completely satisfactory. Then, in section 6, I begin sketching my own view by describing what I think is special about the sensory phenomenology of photography. I suggest that it is the property of particularity. In section 7, I explain in detail what it means for a thought and an experience to be particular rather than general. I compare the case of perceptual and memory experiences to the case of photographs, and I claim that, although photographs resemble perceptual experiences in various respects, they are actually more similar to episodic memories. I suggest that photographic experiences, like memory experiences preserve not only visual similarity but also, the particular character of the original scenes. In this sense, I claim, photographs are documental images. In section 8, I summarise my view and clarify some important issues. Once my proposal has been fully explained, in section 10 I put forward the advantages of my theory over alternative views. I claim that my account captures the virtues of these theories while avoiding their problems.

In "Understanding Demonstratives", Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that "Today is a fine day". In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans's cognitive dynamics-the skill of keeping track of one's spatio-temporal location in addition to memory-it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief.

It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then 'acquaintance'-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.

This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected.
The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.

Es un hecho que podemos tener pensamientos acerca de objetos materiales; podemos formar pensamientos demostrativos como el expresado por la oración “Eso es fastidioso” (refiriéndonos a un objeto que estamos percibiendo). Y también es un hecho que podemos formar este pensamiento porque tenemos experiencia perceptual de cierto objeto. Esto es, podemos asumir como un hecho que tener experiencia perceptual de un objeto es condición necesaria para la formación del pensamiento demostrativo en cuestión. La pregunta que me interesa abordar es: ¿cómo un sujeto forma esta clase de pensamientos? Es decir, ¿en virtud de qué hecho la experiencia perceptual pone al sujeto en la posición adecuada para tener o formar un pensamiento de esta clase? Mi objetivo en este texto es presentar una posible respuesta a estas preguntas.

My aim in this paper is to examine how Kent Bach's theory of singular thought about material objects meets the requirements of transmitting de re thought. I identify a certain possible paradox haunting Bach"s move of extending acquaintance in order to widen the scope of singular thought and I attempt to answer this possible paradox. First, I briefly present the manner in which Bach motivates extended acquaintance and which constraints he puts on it. I then address the problem of sorites paradox which might lead not only to Bach"s communication-based de re thoughts, but perception-based de re thoughts in general, thus defined. Finally, I offer my tentative solution to the problem of extended acquaintance which consists in introducing two constraints on singular thought, namely (i) the (external) acquaintance constraint and (ii) the (internal) cognitive significance constraint, and two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representations and indexical-discursive representations which are together crucial for having a singular thought.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, John Perry's direct reference theory of indexical thought, as presented in the late 1970s, generated a lot of debate. Unfortunately, the fact that Perry substantially revised this theory in the late 1980s, in response to worries raised by Howard Wettstein, failed to spawn similar attention. This article focuses on Perry's revised theory. I argue that Perry's revised theory collapses into a version of descriptivism about indexical reference. While able to handle both the cognitive values and perhaps surprisingly the rigid designation of indexical thoughts accurately, this theory should thus be unacceptable for anybody with a commitment to direct reference.

I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific individual things, whether those things are concrete or abstract. Everything that can be referred to by using a singular term has a haecceity. I distinguish between singular terms and general terms, on the one hand, and subject terms and predicate terms, on the other. I distinguish three types of sentence: singular predications; general predications; and singular quantifications. I show how singular predications can be eliminated without loss of content, provided we have singular quantifications as well as general predications. This should not be confused with Quine's "elimination of singular terms." I say a few words about propositions.

Resumen: Estoy interesado en indagar ¿cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos dependientes directamente de la experiencia son acerca de ciertos objetos materiales? ¿Cuál es, y cómo es la relación entre un estado mental y cierto objeto material cuando el primero es acerca del segundo? Esto es, ¿en qué consiste que el pensamiento demostrativo refiera a un objeto material? ¿Cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos acerca del mundo material se refieren a objetos del mundo material? Creo que existen dos maneras muy generales de responder a esta pregunta, y cada una de estas maneras depende de la versión de la teoría de la mente que se tenga. Por un lado, existe una versión Fregeana de la mente, según la cual existen modos de presentación que delinean la forma de la mente y que determinan cuáles son los objetos acerca de los cuales la mente tiene pensamientos. Existe otra versión más científica de la mente la cual llamo No-Fregeana, según la cual no existen modos de presentación que determinen acerca de cuáles cosas la mente tiene pensamientos, sino más bien son las relaciones causales (quizá desarrolladas evolutivamente) que existen entre clases de cosas y clases de estados mentales las que determinan acerca de cuáles objetos la mente tiene pensamientos. Lo que deseo hacer es mostrar por qué creo que el tratamiento no-Fregeano de la pregunta no da una explicación satisfactoria de cómo es posible que una mente pueda tener pensamientos demostrativos verdaderos acerca de objetos materiales. Mis reparos tienen que ver con la manera como conciben la conexión entre la mente y el mundo para que el pensamiento sea posible. Palabras Clave: Burge, Campbell, Evans, pensamientos demostrativos, semántica, experiencia perceptual.

In this essay, I argue that in typical cases of singular thought, a thinker stands in an evidential relation to the object of thought suitable for providing knowledge of the object’s existence. Furthermore, a thinker may generate representations that purport to refer to particular objects in response to appropriate, though defeasible, evidence of the existence of such an object. I motivate these constraints by considering a number of examples introduced by Robin Jeshion in support of a view she calls ‘cognitivism’. Although I agree with Jeshion that acquaintance is not required for all cases of singular thought, I argue that her account doesn’t go far enough in rejecting semantic instrumentalism, the view that we can generate singular thoughts arbitrarily, by manipulating the mechanisms of direct reference.

My aim in this paper is to examine how Kent Bach's theory of singular thought about material objects meets the requirements of transmitting de re thought. I identify a certain possible paradox haunting Bach's move of extending acquaintance in order to widen the scope of singular thought and I attempt to answer this possible paradox. First, I briefly present the manner in which Bach motivates extended acquaintance and which constraints he puts on it. I then address the problem of the sorites paradox which might lead not only to Bach's communication-based de re thoughts, but perception-based de re thoughts in general, thus defined. Finally, I offer my tentative solution to the problem of extended acquaintance which consists in introducing two constraints on singular thought, namely (i) the (external) acquaintance constraint and (ii) the (internal) cognitive significance constraint, and two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representations and indexical-discursive representations which are together crucial for having a singular thought.

How do we inferentially unify separately acquired empirical information into a single comprehensive picture of the lives of persistent particulars? This paper argues that hidden in such inferences is a Fregean puzzle that can only be solved by individuating our demonstratives thoughts in terms of object-dependent Fregean Senses. I begin by characterizing some constraints on a non-skeptical account of our inferential unification of empirical information. I then go on to show that traditional Fregean views of Sense cannot explain the rationality of such inferences; the consequence of which would be widespread skepticism concerning fundamental aspects of our empirical worldview. I show how the theory of object-dependent Senses can account for the rationality of the puzzling inferences. Lastly, I consider the alternative that we abandon a Fregean explanation of the rationality of inferences. While not fully dismissing that option, I briefly raise, what I take to be, a daunting challenge that uniquely faces non-Fregean views of rational inference.

What capacities for discrimination must a subject possess in order to entertain singular thoughts? Evans has suggested that a subject must be able to discriminate his referent from all other entities in order to be able to do so; what he calls Russell's Principle. Evans' view has few followers, and he has been repeatedly accused of presenting no argument in its favour. In this paper, I present what I take to be Evans' argument. I suggest that he has been misinterpreted as introducing Russell's Principle for the purpose of fixing reference. Rather, he introduces it in order to ensure that our conceptual capacities have the functional complexity to allow for objective thought. I suggest that the logical types of our thought are constituted by their inferential potential and argue that, even though singular thought may be possible without the satisfaction of Russell's Principle, singular thought that forms part of an objective world view is not.

In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.

We argue that the most ambitious version of the me ntal files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide -ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsup ported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory fr om a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerni ng the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track basic individuals , nd our higher level capacities for singular thought. 1. Introducing singular thought: the philosophical explanandum Many thoughts are general : they are about properties or categories. For exam ple, the generic thought that wombats are cute is paradigmatically g eneral. 1 So are quantificational thoughts, like the thoughts that all (or some) wombats are cu te. However, we also have singular thoughts, thoughts about particular individuals. Fo r example, if one sees an unfamiliar creature...

This paper defends Lewis’ (1979a) influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism (Cappelen and Dever, 2013; Holton, 2015) to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.

Aristotle assumes in many contexts that we are able to have singular thoughts such as “Cleon is white.” However, one might be puzzled about whether this is really compatible with his theory of thought, which is commonly taken to explain thought about intelligible kinds rather than individuals. The purpose of this paper is to show that Aristotle had conceptual resources to give an adequate account of singular thought in non-descriptivist (i.e. non-predicative) terms. The proposal put forward is that Aristotle’s account, which is given in analogy with his account of sense perception, is a version of causal theory. This is to be contrasted with another non-descriptivist theory, the Thomistic view, which characterizes singular thought as a kind of general thought, “indirect” or “reflexive,” and explains the reference to a singular item in terms of phantasm. In opposition to this view, the paper argues that Aristotle explains the singular reference in terms of non-predicative, simple thought, which concerns not only intelligible kinds, but also singular items.

When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this view to be committed to postulation of illusions of object-dependent thought in cases like that mentioned. The core ingredient in my illusion-free version of the view is a special form of disjunctivism. Alleged cases of illusion are not considered parasitic on “the good case” where the object thought about is perceived.

Among Singularists, it has been widely accepted that one can have singular thought by acquaintance, and that acquaintance encompasses the perceptual acquiring, memorizing and communicating of singular thoughts. I defend the possibility of having a singular thought via extending acquaintance to intermediaries other than just through written and spoken words. On my account, singular thought includes two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representation and indexical-discursive representation. Also, it is determined by two constraints: (i) the acquaintance constraint: singular thought includes a causal-historical relation to the object; and (ii) the cognitive significance constraint: we have a cognitive capacity to deliberately encode an indexical-iconic representation into an indexical-discursive representation, which enables us to have a singular thought.

My aim in this paper is to examine how Kent Bach's theory of singular thought about material objects meets the requirements of transmitting de re thought. I identify a certain possible paradox haunting Bach's move of extending acquaintance in order to widen the scope of singular thought and I attempt to answer this possible paradox. First, I briefly present the manner in which Bach motivates extended acquaintance and which constraints he puts on it. I then address the problem of the sorites paradox which might lead not only to Bach's communication-based de re thoughts, but perception-based de re thoughts in general, thus defined. Finally, I offer my tentative solution to the problem of extended acquaintance which consists in introducing two constraints on singular thought, namely (i) the (external) acquaintance constraint and (ii) the (internal) cognitive significance constraint, and two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representations and indexical-discursive representations which are together crucial for having a singular thought.

Aristotle assumes in many contexts that we are able to have singular thoughts such as “Cleon is white.” However, one might be puzzled about whether this is really compatible with his theory of thought, which is commonly taken to explain thought about intelligible kinds rather than individuals. The purpose of this paper is to show that Aristotle had conceptual resources to give an adequate account of singular thought in non-descriptivist (i.e. non-predicative) terms. The proposal put forward is that Aristotle’s account, which is given in analogy with his account of sense perception, is a version of causal theory. This is to be contrasted with another non-descriptivist theory, the Thomistic view, which characterizes singular thought as a kind of general thought, “indirect” or “reflective,” and explains the reference to a singular item in terms of phantasm. In opposition to this view, the paper argues that Aristotle explains the singular reference in terms of non-predicative, simple thought, which concerns not only intelligible kinds, but also singular items.

Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they are. I propose, therefore, a methodological contribution, a new source of data about singular thought. We can tell whether a thought is singular if we ask what we can coherently deny at the same time at which we agree with the thought. When we agree with a thought that is general, we cannot coherently deny about the thought’s subject a certain description, the one that occurs in the thought’s subject position. To show how to use this new data source, I develop a linguistic method for testing whether a speaker expresses a singular or a general thought.

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or 'naïve' view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, nonphilosophical populace -which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly 'indirect' theories.