Science and values

This paper discusses the epistemology of the Internet of Things [IoT] by focusing on the topic of trust. It presents various frameworks of trust, and argues that the ethical framework of trust is what constitutes our responsibility to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. The first section briefly presents the IoT and scrutinizes the scarce philosophical work that has been done on this subject so far. The second section suggests that the field of epistemology is not sufficiently capable of dealing with technologies, and presents a possible solution to this problem. It is argued that knowledge is not only social phenomena, but also a technological one, and that in order to address epistemological issues in technology, we need to carefully depart from traditional epistemic analysis and form a new approach that is technological (termed here Techno-Epistemology). The third and fourth sections engage in an epistemic analysis of trust by dividing it in to various frameworks. The last section argues that these various frameworks of trust can be understood to form a trustworthy large-scale socio-technological system, emphasizing the place of ethical trust as constituting our commitment to give proper accounts for all of the other frameworks.

Os ecossistemas campestres; A diversidade vegetal; As estratégias de manejo; O papel dos manejadores; A destruição dos campos; A pecuária familiar e a conservação dos campos; Novos contextos; A crise ambiental como face da crise civilizatória; A conservação dos recursos naturais como oportunidade; O caso do campo nativo e a pecuária sustentável; O campo nativo como promotor do desenvolvimento; Proposta metodológica; Nova abordagem na produção do conhecimento; A participação como pressuposto; As unidades experimentais participativas; Passos metodológicos; A rede de pesquisa participativa; A rede de inovação; A rede de produção certificada.bitstream/item/55763/1/DT99.pd

The study of intellectual humility (IH), which is gaining increasing interest among cognitive scientists, has been dominated by a focus on individuals. We propose that IH operates at the collective level as the tendency of a collective’s members to attend to each other’s intellectual limitations and the limitations of their collective cognitive efforts. Given people’s propensity to better recognize others’ limitations than their own, IH may be more readily achievable in collectives than individuals. We describe the socio-cognitive dynamics that can interfere with collective IH and offer the solution of building intellectually humbling environments that create a culture of IH that can outlast the given membership of a collective. We conclude with promising research directions.

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large class of chemicals, whose carbonfluorine bonds allow a wide range of industrial applications but also make them highly persistent. Since there is evidence about only a few of them and their properties may vary, one of the pressing issues regarding PFAS is how to group them for different purposes. In this paper, I aim to show how a recent panel of experts about grouping PFAS was co-opted in a way that favor the fluorine industry. The panel consisted of eleven experts, including authors renowned for views in conflict with fluorine industry regulatory approaches, answering questions through an online application. Its main results along with the experts’ answers were published in 2022 in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Through a detailed analysis of all the material published and in dialogue with the literature about industry-funded research, I will present how choices in the design of the panel (e.g., which kind of consensus the exercise could capture, the ways questions were framed or even changed), in textual analysis (e.g., criteria for assembling opinions) and in the communication of the findings (e.g., what gets included or excluded) were made in an industry friendly way affecting two specific grouping approaches. I conclude with some lessons about this kind of influence of industry funding.

Accepted for publication at Principia: an international journal of Epistemology (EISSN 1808-1711) https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia Estimated publication in 2025. Bravo, P. (in press). Grouping approaches to PFAS and industry funding: a case study on the findings of a recent panel of experts. Principia.

The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between the democratic experience and the legitimacy of an institutional context. In this exploration, John Dewey's concept of the aesthetic experience plays a key role. The main thesis is the possibility to conceive of citizens' recognition of democratic legitimacy as Dewey envisages the feeling of consummation completing the aesthetic experience. This approach gains plausibility when we link Dewey's concept of the aesthetic experience to his concept of experimental democracy, that is, democracy as a cooperative problem-solving practice in which actors try out provisional solutions by means of social communication

Given that values influence the scientific process, including when doing economics, we should be asking under what conditions this influence is justifiable. In this paper, I argue that citizen engagement could be the best way to scrutinize and justify value influences in economics. To do so, I analyze a number of citizen engagement initiatives in economics and discuss how they contribute to value scrutiny. Next, I look at the rationales that have been formulated for such a citizen economics, like, e.g., increasing economic literacy, democratization, and, strengthening the legitimacy of economics, and I evaluate their benefits for the scrutiny of values. Overall, the paper concludes that citizen engagement is a promising way to address value judgments in economics and to make economics epistemically more robust even though there are still some challenges to be addressed for it to become part of a broadened economic methodology.

Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the socalled Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different arguments, and ought to be disentangled. I will also show that the arguments against value-freedom and supporting a value-laden conception of science, are different from the arguments against autonomy, which support democratized science. Moreover, while some of the arguments against autonomy and for democratized science may actually be consistent with value-freedom, they conflict with some philosophical views about the internal diversity of well-designed epistemic communities. This article distinguishes the Value-Free Ideal and the autonomy thesis, as well as their antitheses, and investigates their relations to some of the socio-epistemological models of the social organization of scientific research. Its aim is to make explicit some incompatibilities between different normative frameworks developed in philosophy of science.

This presentation explores the foundational concepts of positive psychology, focusing on its definition, historical development, and key principles. It begins by defining positive psychology as the scientific study of human strengths, virtues, and factors contributing to a flourishing life. Originating as a response to the pathology-centric approach of traditional psychology, positive psychology emphasizes optimal functioning, subjective well-being, and resilience.

The discussion delves into the methodologies of positive psychology, contrasting the bottom-up approach, which emphasizes strengths and proactive strategies, with the top-down approach of holism, which integrates systemic perspectives. Key concepts such as self-actualization, based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, are examined to illustrate how positive psychology fosters personal growth and fulfillment.

The presentation also explores Carl Rogers' concept of actualizing tendency, highlighting its alignment with positive psychology's focus on strengths, personal growth, and resilience. Additionally, it examines the integration of humanistic psychology principles within positive psychology, emphasizing their shared focus on personal growth, self-actualization, and therapeutic applications.

Practical applications of positive psychology interventions are showcased, supported by case studies demonstrating their effectiveness in enhancing well-being and resilience. Ethical considerations and limitations associated with these interventions are also addressed, underscoring the importance of cultural sensitivity and holistic approaches to promoting human flourishing.

In conclusion, the presentation summarizes key insights, stresses the significance of integrating positive psychology principles in enhancing overall well-being, and outlines future directions for research and practice in the field.

In contrast to the history of science and to science and technology studies, the value discourse in the philosophy of science has not provided a thorough analysis of the material culture of science. Instruments in science have a special characteristic, namely that they explicitly and clearly emerge from and remain embedded in social contexts, and are thus imbued with values. We argue that the materials (in most cases they are artifacts) used in science are necessarily influenced by both epistemic and non- epistemic considerations. A consequence of this is that a descriptive term cannot give sufficient information whether an artifact is performing in an acceptable way. Instead of the prevailing descriptive approach, we therefore advocate a normative notion of values in the material culture of science. To this end, we connect the material culture of science to the so-called “new demarcation problem”, in order to lay the foundations for a value-sensitive approach to the analysis of instruments. By assessing the five approaches of demarcation concerning value-influences, it will be shown that they break down at various points if the material aspects of science are taken seriously.

Scientists have the epistemic responsibility of producing knowledge. They also have the social responsibility of aligning their research with the needs and values of various societal stakeholders. Individual scientists may be left with no guidance on how to prioritise and carry these different responsibilities. As I will argue, however, the responsibilities of science can be harmonised at the collective level. Drawing from debates in moral philosophy, I will propose a theory of the collective responsibilities of science that accounts for the internal diversity of research groups and for their different responsibilities.

This article develops the concept of wrongful depathologization, in which a psychiatric disorder is simultaneously stigmatized (because of sanist attitudes towards mental illness) and trivialized (as it is not considered a "proper" illness). We use OCD as a case study to argue that cumulatively these two effects generate a profound epistemic injustice to OCD sufferers, and possibly to those with other mental disorders. We show that even seemingly positive stereotypes attached to mental disorders give rise to both testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance. We thus expose an insidious form of epistemic harm that has been overlooked in the literature.

The axiology of science, and the general axiology, is articulated in three areas of values, shaped according to the opposition between liberating values (desiderata) and eliminating values (demands or duties). The former are linked to symbolic, technical and social actions; the latter to their normative, ecological and institutional frameworks. Without the former, the latter do not exist (there are no languages without linguistic acts, there are no ecological systems without actions of transformation of the environment, there are no institutions without actions of some subjects on others), but without the latter, actions have no meaning (there is no meaning of symbolizations without normative frameworks of interpretation, transforming actions have no positive or negative effects outside the system of balances between conservation and destruction or extinction, the actions of some subjects on others lack legitimacy outside the institutional frameworks presupposed in their exercise). The articulation of the three spheres opposes actions as conditions of existence of structures to structures as conditions of meaning (significance, objectivity and legitimacy) of actions.
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Social life coalesces into communities through cooperation and conflict. As a case in point, Shwed and Bearman (2010) studied consensus and contention in scientific communities. They used a sophisticated modularity method to detect communities on the basis of scientific citations, which they then interpreted as directed positive network ties. They assumed that a lack of citations implies disagreement. Some scientific citations, however, are contentious and should therefore be represented by negative ties, like conflicting relations in general. After expanding the modularity method to incorporate negative ties, we show that a small proportion of negative ties, commonly present in science, is sufficient to significantly alter the community structure. In addition, our research suggests that without distinguishing negative ties, scientific communities actually represent specialized subfields, not contentious groups. Finally, we cast doubt on the assumption that lack of cites would signal disagreement. To show the general importance of discerning negative ties for understanding conflict and its impact on communities, we also analyze a public debate.

Defensores do princípio da precaução propõem com frequência mudanças nas práticas científicas, para que elas facilitem o mesmo objetivo do princípio: evitar ameaças incertas ao ambiente ou à saúde humana. A ciência deveria ser uma ciência precautória. Apesar da importância prática da ciência precautória e da sua proximidade com os debates sobre ciência e valores, ela ainda não foi sistematicamente examinada. Neste artigo, pretende-se contribuir para a literatura sobre a ciência precautória de dois modos: sistematizando sua literatura prévia e propondo uma definição de um de seus elementos principais, a precaução epistêmica, como uma orientação específica para a gestão de riscos indutivos. Conclui-se com algumas objeções que tal definição levanta, bem como caminhos de pesquisas futuras para abordá-las.

There is a growing concern for the proper role of science within democratic societies, which has led to the development of new science policies for the implementation of social responsibility in research. Although the very expression 'social responsibility of science' may be interpreted in different ways, many of these emerging policy frameworks define it, at least in part, as a form of anticipative reflection about the potential impacts of research in society. What remains a rather under-discussed issue is the definition of the bearer of the social responsibility of science. In other words, it is not clear who is supposed to engage in such an anticipative reflection, whether individual researchers or research groups. In the past few years, philosophers of science have begun to use qualitative research methods to fill the gaps between normative models of the organisation of ideal scientific communities and the reality of actual scientific practices. In this article, I follow this approach to discuss the issue of the collective dimension of the social responsibility of science. I rely on a qualitative study conducted on an interdisciplinary research group and I describe how group dynamics position individuals and distribute duties and roles, including social responsibility. Qualitative descriptions of the distribution of duties within actual research groups should inform the formulation of general prescriptive theories on the collective responsibility of science.

With twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy of science's unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of 'valuing evidence' as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology's universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science-values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being 'at war with science'. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos's search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.

In Clough's reply paper to me (2013a), she laments how feminist calls for diversity within scientific communities are inadvertently sidelined by our shared feminist empiricist prescriptions. She offers a novel justification for diversity within epistemic communities and challenges me to accept this addendum to my prior prescriptions for biomedical research communities (Goldenberg 2013) on the grounds that they are consistent with the epistemic commitments that I already endorse. In this response, I evaluate and accept her challenge.

What is happening with the Anthropocene? The question remains unanswered. It is acknowledged that evidence extracted from Lake Crawford, as assessed by the AWG, aligns with the usual criteria for formalising an epoch. However, amidst the numerous criticisms, the significant social consequences of both its acceptance and rejection are evident. Embracing the Anthropocene, whether as an epoch, event, or another classification, endorses a concept informally employed across various spheres to address humanity’s global environmental challenges. Some members of the AWG advocate that geology should shoulder societal responsibility in this regard 14. Others argue that this represents an improper blending of geology with environmental concerns, as asserted by the President of the Official College of Geologists in Spain 15. Therefore, its acceptance also bears internal social implications within the geological community. Factors such as which research group attains greater visibility—and consequent funding—within society, as well as the prominence attributed to specific geological themes—such as deep time versus recent geological phenomena—are contingencies that would surprise many in terms of their impact on knowledge throughout the history of science.

In recent months there has been increasing recourse to the courts in various countries by people and organizations who wish in various ways to influence or prevent the application of agricultural biotechnology in those lands. As part of the editorial policy of GM Crops and Food to consider from time to time all aspects of relevant activity, we have introduced another feature which will appear often but not in every issue of the journal: GM crops in the courts. We are very fortunate that Professor Drew Kershen, Earl Sneed Centennial Professor of Law (Emeritus) at the University of Oklahoma, College of Law, has agreed to contribute the benefits of his thinking and experience. He has very wide experience of regulatory and legal issues pertaining to GM-technology, focusing his attention on agricultural biotechnology law and policy since 1997. This is the first of his contributions.

It has been a largely unquestioned assumption in the philosophy of science, even among those who are interested in the essential role of values and standpoints in science, that knowledge is the epistemic attitude that scientists primarily strive to attain. In contrast, I argue that scientific practices aim at managing, producing, communicating, and transmitting a diverse range of epistemic attitudes, including not only knowledge, but also ignorance, curiosity, suspicion, provisional acceptance, uncertainty, doubt, concern, attention, and more. Scientific practice often aims at unsettling our epistemic security rather than settling or enhancing it, or at redirecting our attention rather than offering a secure piece of knowledge. My claim is not just that scientists often have and articulate these various epistemic attitudes along the way in their march towards knowledge, but that having and transmitting such attitudes is often the goal of scientific practice. Scientists do not just pursue knowledge; they do things like try to undercut one another’s certainty; build openings for future research programs; debunk methodologies; recruit more researchers to their programs; and so on. Scientists are ineliminably embedded in social contexts and power relations and situated within epistemic perspectives, and these concrete situations shape not just what they can know, as standpoint theorists have emphasized, but what epistemic attitudes and goals it makes sense for them to value and pursue. It is artificial, I will try to show, to see all this activity as ultimately organized by a pure quest for knowledge.

It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paperdeveloped through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-settingseeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.

Straightening the current 'value-laden turn' (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimisednot excluded-in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scientific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed by proponents of the VLT, it proposes four prerequisites which any model for values in the acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry should respect, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: (1) the truth of scientific knowledge must be ensured; (2) the uncertainties associated with scientific claims must be stated clearly; (3) claims accepted into the scientific corpus must be distinguished from claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of (4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from international institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Betz's conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) and Hansson's corpus model (ensuring the truth of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) is proposed. Additional prerequisites are finally suggested for future research, stemming from the requirement for philosophy of science to self-reflect on its own values: (5) any model for values in science must be descriptively and normatively relevant; and (6) its consequences must be thoroughly assessed.

Bu araştırmayı desteklemek için dış fon kullanılmamıştır. Grant Support: The author(s) acknowledge that they received no external funding in support of this research. Etik Beyan: Bu çalışmanın hazırlanma sürecinde bilimsel ve etik ilkelere uyulduğu ve yararlanılan tüm çalışmaların kaynakçada belirtildiği beyan olunur. Ethical Statement: It is declared that scientific and ethical principles have been followed while carrying out and writing this study and that all the sources used have been properly cited. Telif Hakkı & Lisans: Yazarlar dergide yayınlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları CC BYNC 4.0 lisansı altında yayımlanmaktadır.

Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. A question that naturally arises is: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values-the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with. I conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.

Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement about precisely how to do so, economists should standardly adjust QALYs and DALYs to reflect egalitarian values.

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this paper I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does better. When scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values: the values of the public or its representatives.

The  IHME  Covid-19  prediction  model  has  been  one  of  the  most  influential  Covid  models  in  the United States. Early on, it received heavy criticism for understating the extent of the epidemic. I argue that this criticism was based on a misunderstanding of the model. The model was best interpreted not as attempting to forecast the actual course of the epidemic. Rather, it was attempting to make a conditional  projection:  telling  us  how  the  epidemic  would  unfold,  given  certain  assumptions.  This misunderstanding of the IHME’s model prevented the public from seeing how dire the model’s projections actually were.

Philosophers of science now broadly agree that doing good science involves making non-epistemic value judgments. I call attention to two very different normative standards which can be used to evaluate such judgments: standards grounded in ethics and standards grounded in political philosophy. Though this distinction has not previously been highlighted, I show that the values in science literature contain arguments of each type. I conclude by explaining why this distinction is important. Seeking to determine whether some value-laden determination meets substantive ethical standards is a very different endeavor from seeking to determine if it is politically legitimate.

Scientists have the ability to influence policy in important ways through how they present their results. Surprisingly, existing codes of scientific ethics have little to say about such choices. I propose that we can arrive at a set of ethical guidelines to govern scientists' presentation of information to policymakers by looking to bioethics: roughly, just as a clinician should aim to promote informed decision-making by patients, a scientist should aim to promote informed decisionmaking by policymakers. Though this may sound like a natural proposal, I show it offers guidance that conflicts with standard scientific practices. I conclude by considering one cost of the proposal: that it would prevent scientists from acting as advocates in a way that is currently common in certain fields. I accept that the proposal would restrict scientists' political advocacy rights, but argue that the benefits of adopting it-promoting democratic governance-justify the restriction.

Scientists are frequently called upon to "democratize" science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the non-epistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations, but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit the scientist to accepting the public's objectionable values, or may she veto them? I argue that there are a limited set of cases where scientists can, consistently with a commitment to democratized science, set aside the public's judgments.

I compare two different arguments for the importance of bringing new voices into science: arguments for increasing the representation of women, and arguments for the inclusion of the public, or for "citizen science". I suggest that in each case, diversifying science can improve the quality of scientific results in three distinct ways: epistemically, ethically, and politically. In the first two respects, the mechanisms are essentially the same. In the third respect, the mechanisms are importantly different. Though this might appear to suggest a broad similarity between the cases, I show that the analysis reveals an important respect in which efforts to include the public are more complex. With citizen science programs, unlike with efforts to bring more women into science, the three types of improvement are often in conflict with one another: improvements along one dimension may come at a cost on another dimension, suggesting difficult trade-offs may need to be made.

Тази монография, превод на "The Problem of Mankind Sovereignty: How the Law of Human Will Should Regulate Artificial Intelligence,", се впуска в новаторско изследване на правните и етични картини, преоформени от напредъка на изкуствения интелект. В основата си работата се задълбочава в концепциите за "суверенитета на човечеството" и "правото на човешката воля", като ги предефинира в ерата на изкуствения интелект.
Суверенитетът на човечеството, традиционно закотвен в понятията за автономия, самоопределение и човешки права, е изправен пред безпрецедентни предизвикателства в ерата на изкуствения интелект. Монографията изследва как всеобхватното влияние на ИИ и възможностите за вземане на решения потенциално нарушават този суверенитет, особено по отношение на човешката автономия и обществените норми.
Историческата перспектива за суверенитета разкрива неговата еволюция и контекстуално значение в днешната ера на възникващ ИИ. Дискурсът се простира до философските и етични основи, които са в основата на суверенитета на човечеството, подчертавайки човешката воля и правата на човека. Тъй като системите с изкуствен интелект все повече навлизат в области, изискващи морална и етична преценка, напрежението между детерминистичната природа на ИИ и съзнателната, морална човешка воля става очевидно.
Монографията постулира, че правото играе ключова роля в защитата на суверенитета на човечеството срещу потенциалното преобладаване на ИИ. Предлага се разработването на системи с изкуствен интелект, придържащи се към правото на човешката воля и принципите, ориентирани към човека. Правото на човешката воля се очертава като централна тема, концептуализираща сложната връзка между човешката воля и технологичния детерминизъм на ИИ. Тази концепция подчертава необходимостта от системи с изкуствен интелект, които се привеждат в съответствие с човешките намерения и етични стандарти, като в крайна сметка се застъпват за правни рамки, които балансират иновациите на ИИ с опазването на човешката воля.
Разделите разглеждат какво може и трябва да бъде регулирано от правото и съответно какво не може да бъде ефективно регулирано. Тези раздели се занимават с прозрачност, отговорност, защита на данните, стандарти за безопасност и сигурност на ИИ и предизвикателствата при регулирането на непредсказуемостта и проблемите с интелектуалната собственост спрямо ИИ.
Монографията завършва с прогнози и сценарии за бъдещото взаимодействие между развитието на ИИ и човешкия суверенитет. Бъдещето на изкуствения интелект и човешкия суверенитет вероятно ще бъде сложна картина от тези сценарии. Наложително е като общество да се подготвим за тези потенциални бъдещи сценарии, като насърчаваме адаптивни, устойчиви и етични подходи към съществуването на ИИ. Тази далновидност ще ни позволи да се възползваме от предимствата на ИИ, като същевременно запазим основните ценности на човешкия суверенитет и самоопределение.

Ключови думи: суверенитет на човечеството, правото на човешката воля, изкуствен интелект, етичен ИИ, ориентиран към човека ИИ дизайн, правни рамки, регулиране на ИИ, човешка автономност, етични стандарти, управление на ИИ, ориентирани към бъдещето ИИ стратегии.

Sama wiedza to nie wszystko… O wartościach i odpowiedzialności uniwersytetu* Tytuł tego tekstu mógłby się wydawać, na pierwszy rzut oka, części naszego środowiska, jeśli nie dziwny, to zapewne nieco zaskakujący, gdy pisze go pracownik takiej kolebki nauki i wiedzy, jaką jest uniwersytet. Zaraz jednak przedstawię powody, dla których ten temat właśnie wybrałem. Chciałbym poruszyć w tym tekście kwestię naszych wartości, naszej odpowiedzialności i naszych działań. Naszych, to znaczy uniwersytetu w ogóle 1 , duża część tych wartości, odpowiedzialności i działań jest także częścią obrazu każdego z nas, nas samych, każdego z osobna i ludzkości w całości. A w kontekście wielu globalnych zagrożeń dla ludzkości i naszej planety, np. takiego, jakie niesie kryzys klimatyczny, kwestia wiedzy, wartości, odpowiedzialności i działań jest kwestią priorytetową i palącą.

Vannevar Bush was at the forefront of American research policy during World War II, but he suffered a steep fall after the war, and by 1948 had left government service altogether. What motivated such a significant loss of influence? Drawing on previously unexamined sources, this article traces the causes of Bush's decline in authority to his loss of powerful allies, particularly with the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the retirement of Henry Stimson; to his long-standing feuds with military leaders; and to several political missteps on Bush's part that alienated figures in Congress and elsewhere. Continued examples of personal conflict in the postwar period not only impacted Bush's career, but also shaped the structure of the resulting institutions that emerged to fund Cold War-era science. Rather than an abrupt change occurring immediately after the war, the postwar transition to public institutions was both gradual and influenced by the personal networks that preceded it. Bush's quiet departure from government was tied to the emergence of military dominance in American research, largely at the expense of civilian scientific leaders. Such a shift in control of research policy had

Vannevar Bush was at the forefront of American research policy during World War II, but he suffered a steep fall after the war, and by 1948 had left government service altogether. What motivated such a significant loss of influence? Drawing on previously unexamined sources, this article traces the causes of Bush’s decline in authority to his loss of powerful allies, particularly with the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the retirement of Henry Stimson; to his long-standing feuds with military leaders; and to several political missteps on Bush’s part that alienated figures in Congress and elsewhere. Continued examples of personal conflict in the postwar period not only impacted Bush’s career, but also shaped the structure of the resulting institutions that emerged to fund Cold War–era science. Rather than an abrupt change occurring immediately after the war, the postwar transition to public institutions was both gradual and influenced by the personal networks that preceded it. Bush’s ...

Course Description: Taking our cue from the entanglements that historically have pervaded the relation between biology and information technology since the early 20th century, this course interrogates the sociocultural and technological conjuncture that has brought computer science, biology, and engineering together into peculiar, ingenious, and often controversial alliances. What do AI, synthetic biology, and biotechnology have in common? How have they come to be associated? What are the debates and ethics emerging from such associations? Our main topics will be: biotechnology and the CRISPR revolution, the use of AI systems and machine learning to optimize synthetic biology, and the ethical conundrums surrounding optimization of human minds and bodies.

Course Description:Taking our cue from the entanglements that historically have pervaded the relation between biology and information technology since the early 20th century, this course interrogates the sociocultural and technological conjuncture that has brought computer science, biology, and engineering together into peculiar, ingenious, and often controversial alliances. What do AI, synthetic biology, and biotechnology have in common? How have they come to be associated? What are the debates and ethics emerging from such associations? The main topics we will cover include: biotechnology and the CRISPR revolution; the use of AI systems and machine learning to optimize synthetic biology; and the ethical conundrums surrounding optimization of human minds and bodies.

According to Alasdair MacIntyre, virtues can be defined in terms of social practices. A virtue is an excellence of character required for obtaining the internal goods of a social practice. Social practices are: … any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and music. 1 On this view, a social practice is open-ended and self-reflective in the sense that it is part of the practice to seek to improve the practice. What it means to improve the practice on Macintyre's account is to be understood normatively. It involves getting better at the practice, but it also implies extending and at times reconceiving

While the science and values literature has seen recurrent concerns about wishful thinking, there have been few efforts to characterize this phenomenon. Based on a review of varieties of wishful thinking involved in climate skepticism, we argue that instances of wishful thinking can be fruitfully characterized in terms of the mechanisms that generate them and the problems associated with them. We highlight the array of mechanisms associated with wishful thinking, as well as the fact that it can be evaluated both from epistemic and ethical perspectives. We argue that it is doubtful that a single unified definition of wishful thinking can be developed. Moreover, the concept of wishful thinking can problematically focus excessive attention on individual and epistemic problems in science, to the exclusion of social and ethical problems.

This essay examines the important roles for values in science, from deciding which research projects are worth pursuing, to shaping good methodological approaches (including ethical concerns), to assessing the sufficiency of evidence for scientific claims. I highlight the necessity of social and ethical value judgments in science, particularly for producing properly responsible research. I then examine the implications of the need for values to inform scientific practice for public trust in science. I argue that values serve as a key basis for public trust in scientists, along with the presence of expertise and engagement in a well-functioning expert community, and that scientists should thus be more open about the values informing their work. This result holds whether the science at issue is a matter of consensus or still contested within the scientific community.