Books by Jeroen Van Bouwel
Contents:
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences a... more Contents:
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel
PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE
Social Sciences and the Democratic Ideal: From Technocracy to Dialogue; P.Baert, H.Mateus Jerónimo& A.Shipman
Stakeholders or Experts? On the Ambiguous Implications of Public Participation in Science; S.Solomon
Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory; K.Rolin
PART II: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
Improving Democratic Practice: Practical Social Science and Normative Ideals; J.Bohman
Fact and Value in Democratic Theory; H.Kincaid
PART III: DEMOCRATIC THEORY ELUCIDATING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Problem With(Out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism; J.Van Bouwel
Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science - Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies; A.Bouvier
PART IV: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Public Sociology and Democratic Theory; S.P.Turner
Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy; E.Weber
Some Economists Rush to Rescue Science From Politics, Only to Discover in Their Haste, They Went to the Wrong Address; P.Mirowski
PART V: (FUTURE) OBSTACLES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRACY
Fuller and Mirowski on the Commercialization of Scientific Knowledge; F.Remedios
Humanity: The Always Already – or Never to be – Object of the Social Sciences?; S.Fuller
Index
PhD Thesis, Ghent University.
Papers by Jeroen Van Bouwel
Oeconomia, 2023
Given that values influence the scientific process, including when doing economics, we should be ... more Given that values influence the scientific process, including when doing economics, we should be asking under what conditions this influence is justifiable. In this paper, I argue that citizen engagement could be the best way to scrutinize and justify value influences in economics. To do so, I analyze a number of citizen engagement initiatives in economics and discuss how they contribute to value scrutiny. Next, I look at the rationales that have been formulated for such a citizen economics, like, e.g., increasing economic literacy, democratization, and, strengthening the legitimacy of economics, and I evaluate their benefits for the scrutiny of values. Overall, the paper concludes that citizen engagement is a promising way to address value judgments in economics and to make economics epistemically more robust even though there are still some challenges to be addressed for it to become part of a broadened economic methodology.
Economics and Philosophy, 2002
In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accou... more In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And, deliberation is necessarily enculturated or situated “. . . we take human agents to reason their way to action, using the concepts that are available to them in the currency of their culture” (p. 220). When deciding how to act, “. . . people find their way to action in response to properties that they register in the options before them, properties that are valued in common with others and that can be invoked to provide at least some justification of their choices” (p. 272). That people seek to make justified decisions implies that, at times, their own goals or objectives will be modified in deliberation. Something that rational choice theory cannot allow.
Philosophica (Gent), 2003
Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2003. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontologi... more Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2003. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy.” Philosophica (gent) 71: 81–98. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2003). When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. PHILOSOPHICA (GENT), 71, 81–98. ... Van Bouwel J. When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. PHILOSOPHICA (GENT). 2003;71:81–98. ... Van Bouwel, Jeroen. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy.” PHILOSOPHICA ...
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2017
We are grateful to Alan Irwin for his constructive response Agreeing to Differ? to our paper and,... more We are grateful to Alan Irwin for his constructive response Agreeing to Differ? to our paper and, notwithstanding differences between his view and ours, we agree with many of his comments. In this short rejoinder, we zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises. We also use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of our ideas.
Perspectives on Science 23(2), 2015
"Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research appro... more "Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways.
Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined."
The Social Sciences and Democracy, Jan 1, 2009
Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2009. “The Problem With(out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberativ... more Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2009. “The Problem With(out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism.” In The Social Sciences and Democracy, ed. Jeroen Van Bouwel, 121–142. Palgrave Macmillan. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2009). The problem with(out) consensus: The scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism. In J. Van Bouwel (Ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy (pp. 121–142). Palgrave Macmillan. ... Van Bouwel J. The problem with(out) consensus: The scientific consensus, deliberative ...
Carlo Martini and Marcel Boumans (eds.). Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer.
In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and ack... more In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty & Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.
Social Epistemology, 2017
In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratical... more In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.
In: Collin Finn and Julie Zahle (eds.) Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate. Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science. Berlin: Springer. (forthcoming)
Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of social scientists... more Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of social scientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism -a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with this framework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence, reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recent contributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, away from dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winner-takes-all approach. Then, the challenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach or defending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; how can they co-exist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making the best out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists and individualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as the next leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper ends with a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralism defended in the literature.
Philosophy of the social sciences, Jan 1, 2004
Commenting on recent articles by Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle, the author questions the way in wh... more Commenting on recent articles by Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle, the author questions the way in which the debate between methodological individualists and holists has been presented and contends that too much weight has been given to metaphysical and ontological debates at the expense of giving attention to methodological debates and analysis of good explanatory practice. Giving more attention to successful explanatory practice in the social sciences and the different underlying epistemic interests and motivations for providing explanations or reducing theories (which ask for different kinds of explanatory information to be found on the social or on the individual level) might lead to real progress in the debate on methodological individualism, and away from the unending battles of (metaphysical) intuitions.
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2010
Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind... more Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
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Books by Jeroen Van Bouwel
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel
PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE
Social Sciences and the Democratic Ideal: From Technocracy to Dialogue; P.Baert, H.Mateus Jerónimo& A.Shipman
Stakeholders or Experts? On the Ambiguous Implications of Public Participation in Science; S.Solomon
Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory; K.Rolin
PART II: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
Improving Democratic Practice: Practical Social Science and Normative Ideals; J.Bohman
Fact and Value in Democratic Theory; H.Kincaid
PART III: DEMOCRATIC THEORY ELUCIDATING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Problem With(Out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism; J.Van Bouwel
Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science - Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies; A.Bouvier
PART IV: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Public Sociology and Democratic Theory; S.P.Turner
Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy; E.Weber
Some Economists Rush to Rescue Science From Politics, Only to Discover in Their Haste, They Went to the Wrong Address; P.Mirowski
PART V: (FUTURE) OBSTACLES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRACY
Fuller and Mirowski on the Commercialization of Scientific Knowledge; F.Remedios
Humanity: The Always Already – or Never to be – Object of the Social Sciences?; S.Fuller
Index
Papers by Jeroen Van Bouwel
Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined."
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel
PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE
Social Sciences and the Democratic Ideal: From Technocracy to Dialogue; P.Baert, H.Mateus Jerónimo& A.Shipman
Stakeholders or Experts? On the Ambiguous Implications of Public Participation in Science; S.Solomon
Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory; K.Rolin
PART II: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
Improving Democratic Practice: Practical Social Science and Normative Ideals; J.Bohman
Fact and Value in Democratic Theory; H.Kincaid
PART III: DEMOCRATIC THEORY ELUCIDATING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Problem With(Out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism; J.Van Bouwel
Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science - Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies; A.Bouvier
PART IV: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Public Sociology and Democratic Theory; S.P.Turner
Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy; E.Weber
Some Economists Rush to Rescue Science From Politics, Only to Discover in Their Haste, They Went to the Wrong Address; P.Mirowski
PART V: (FUTURE) OBSTACLES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRACY
Fuller and Mirowski on the Commercialization of Scientific Knowledge; F.Remedios
Humanity: The Always Already – or Never to be – Object of the Social Sciences?; S.Fuller
Index
Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined."
In this chapter, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.