Resource Curse

This paper explores the relation between countries’ pattern of trade specialization and long-term economic growth. It shows that countries specializing in the export of natural resource based products only fail to grow if they do not succeed in diversifying their economies and export structure. This conclusion follows from an empirical investigation that has three innovative features. First, it uses a

Conflict scholars have argued that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gemstones, may increase the chances for civil wars because rebels can sustain their organizations by looting resources and because certain types of resources, such as oil, create weaker state governments that are less capable of putting down insurgencies. Natural resources like oil also raise the value of capturing the state through war. However, empirical studies typically treat natural resources as exogenous variables, failing to consider the possibility that war alters the production levels of various natural resources. This endogenous relationship may help to explain the inconsistent empirical results linking natural resources and civil war onset. This article examines the two-way relationship between natural resources and civil war, focusing on oil, diamonds, and fisheries. The empirical findings suggest that most of the relationships run in the direction from war to resources, with no significant effects of resources on the onset of civil war. States with civil wars experience lower oil and diamond production, while marine fisheries production recovers in civil war–torn states.

This article shall focus on the political aspects of the resource curse theory, in particular the rentier state theory as a sub-theory of the resource curse. The rentier state is a political economy theory that seeks to account for state society relations in states that get most of their revenues, in the form of rents, from resource sector. Besides, the theory asserts that these rents have an effect on democracy, economic growth and security matters of the resource rich countries. Applying this theory to Azerbaijan shall contribute to Azerbaijan's political economy literature. In this paper, I argue that revenues generated from energy exports hinder democracy in Azerbaijan since they are used for fulfilling pockets of political elites and hampering emergence of any opposition to the dominant groups. In the very first part of the paper, the rentier state theory will be elaborated. More specifically, the concept of rentier state and how a rentier state behaves will be explained in detail so as to provide a framework for the case study of this paper. In the second part after giving a short brief about Azerbaijan's energy reserves and societal problems the rentier state theory will be applied to Azerbaijan in order to find out whether it suffers from the rentier state deficiencies. Indeed, the rentier effect and the repression effect of the theory will be analysed. In the final part, concluding remarks will be delivered with a laconic summary of the paper.

This study re-evaluates the impact of natural resources on growth using panel data and a factor-efficiency accounting framework. The resource-curse thesis is dismissed as capital efficiency is improved by geographically-concentrated natural resources, which hinder institutional ...

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.

Natural resources contribution to economic growth is still a major puzzle in economic development since some data analysis show a reverse relationship between growth and resource abundance.1 Some countries such as Norway, Australia and Botswana has gained their resources wealth successfully in positive development within their country. However, enormous resources can be a curse for some countries, for example, Nigeria and Venezuela. On the other hand, poor natural resource countries including Singapore and Hong Kong, show an exceptional economic growth compared to resource-rich countries. As an analogy, simple consumer’s theory tells that consumer will gain more utility by consuming more goods. Using the same principle, countries should be better off by using more resources. This essay argues that significant natural resource endowments, which are well-governed under the specific circumstances such as diversification in economic activity and institution strengthening, can contribute positively to development outcomes.

With the inception of an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) by the government in 1983, Ghana's minerals and mining sector has seen a major resurgence over the past one and a half decades. To study the contribution of the sector to the national economy, this paper analyses the results of a survey of the contribution of 12 of 16 large scale mines operating in Ghana by the end of 1998 and also reviews the contribution of the sector as a whole to certain key national economic indicators. In view of the significant contribution identified, the paper also attempts a review of the extent to which the "Resource Curse" phenomenon has characterised the re-emergence of the importance of Ghana's mining sector. The country is, however, not as dependent on its mining sector as some mineral-rich economies, since the contribution of other commodities to national export earnings and GDP is also considerable. The paper concludes that Ghana's mining sector could be sustainable if the policy initiatives, including diversification of the sector, strengthening of linkages other than fiscal, curbing the dependence on imports, curbing public expenditure, and improving productivity through training and appropriate technology transfer, which the government is now focusing on, were implemented.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 remains a deeply puzzling event. The action was uncharacteristic of Moscow's Third World policy and extremely self-destructive. Moreover, archival sources reveal that, just nine months earlier, the Politburo was strongly opposed to such an undertaking. Based on archival documents, this article examines what could have caused this sudden, reckless shift in policy, and attention is drawn to a hitherto overlooked factor. Guided by the “resource curse” literature, the possibility that the Soviet leadership may have been radically emboldened in their contemporary external outlook by the extraordinary surge in energy wealth that occurred during 1979 is analyzed.

This article investigates the causes of North Korea's failure to pursue export-oriented industrialization, and examines whether Sino-North Korean economic cooperation might facilitate such a transformation or not. It concludes that Sino-North Korean economic interactions are more likely to reinforce North Korea's traditional resource dependency than to stimulate export-oriented industrialization.

Countless studies document the correlation between abundant mineral resources and a series of negative economic and political outcomes, including poor economic performance, unbalanced growth, weakly institutionalized states, and authoritarian regimes across the developing world. The disappointing experience of mineral-rich countries has generated a large body of scholarship aimed at explaining this empirical correlation and a list of prescriptions for combating the resource curse. The most popular solutions emphasize macroeconomic policies, economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, and direct distribution to the general population. The success of these solutions has been limited because they either presuppose strong state institutions, which are widely absent in the developing world, or assume state ownership over mineral wealth and thus the need for external actors to constrain the state. At the same time, domestic private ownership is rarely proposed and often maligned. Yet, in some countries, it would serve as a more viable way to avoid the resource curse by fostering institutions that more effectively constrain state leaders, encouraging them to invest in institution building, and enabling them to respond more successfully to commodity booms and busts.

Oil politics is a major force in global and domestic politics, especially in developing countries. Oil income makes oil-producing “petrostates” vulnerable to the resource curse, the symptoms of which include pervasive corruption, wasted public spending, volatile economic growth, and more frequent civil wars and domestic conflict. Yet while common tendencies are observable among the group of petrostates, there are also important and systematic differences among them. States that are petro-revolutionary – having both oil income and a revolutionary leader – tend to instigate conflicts at a rate three and a half times that of a comparable “typical” state (one without oil or a revolutionary leader). Indeed, the tendency of petrostates to get into international conflicts cannot be explained without disaggregating the group. This research thus emphasizes the point that oil does not have a single, monolithic effect, but rather it interacts with domestic politics in a complex way.

Is resource abundance a blessing or a curse? Typically, in resource rich countries, domestic fuel prices are lower, and energy intensity of GDP is higher. But they have higher investment in R&D and fixed capital stock, larger foreign exchange reserves and more inflows of FDI. They also have lower budget deficits and lower inflation. These are conducive for long term growth. We also find that in resource rich countries, real exchange rate is generally higher, accumulation of human capital is slower and institutions are worse, especially if they were not strong initially, which are detrimental for growth. JEL Classification: O25, O43, Q32, Q43, Q48

This essay will be a comparison of Kiren Aziz Chaudhry’s "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labour Remittance and Oil Economies” and Steffen Hertog’s “Shaping the Saudi State: Human Agency's Shifting Role in Rentier-State Formation”. I have selected these two texts because they both examine the causal relationship between oil rents and state-building/bureaucratic development, with specific reference to the cause of Saudi Arabia. Both tackle assumptions about generic rentier-state theory, and their independent and dependent variable are the broadly the same. However, they crucially differ on the importance of intervening variables, most broadly the role of agency versus structure, but also on more specific, nuanced issues. The argument I will put forward is that Hertog’s account of state-building in Saudi Arabia is ultimately more convincing, as it cogently combines the relevance of elite agency in the early 1950s and 1960s with structural factors as a result of path dependency and subsequent entrenchment in later years. That being said however, Chaudhry’s cross-country comparative analysis and explicit focus on structures (whether they be economic or social) reveals crucial insights and conclusions which are overlooked or side-lined by Hertog.

This paper analyses the main obstacles and policy recommendations in order to avoid the Dutch Disease in the Norwegian context. Originally affecting the economy of the Netherlands by decreasing their competitiveness after the discovery of Europe’s largest natural gas field in 1959 near Groningen, the Economist introduced the term in 1977. While the Netherlands recovered fast from their disease with persistent growth since the 1960’s, the Dutch Disease infected plenty of countries all around the globe. But how is it possible, that Norway as the third-largest crude oil exporter after Saudi Arabia and Russia worldwide remains one of the top countries regarding competitiveness and entrepreneurship?

The article aims to present the problems faced by countries whose income depends on exporting natural resources. Even though the general expectation is that these countries are considered to be rich, dependency on the export of natural resources can cause many problems to national economies. There are several concepts used to describe the problems faced by these countries, such as „resource curse”, Dutch disease and banana republic. The goal of this article is to describe these situations and to analyze how they can be prevented in order to prevent serious damages to national economies. The strategies are analyzed depending on the level of development of the countries and the problems they are facing.

This paper analyzes economic policies in resource rich countries and various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources. Arguments are provided in favor of "conditional resource curse" hypothesis: resource abundance hampers growth if institutions of a country are weak. We study the impact of the resource abundance on budget deficit and inflation, foreign exchange reserves and real exchange rate, as well as policies of maintaining low domestic fuel and energy prices. We show that lower domestic fuel prices, that are typical for resource rich countries, have a positive effect on investment in R&D and fixed capital stock, and on long term growth, even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy intensity. However, in resource rich countries real exchange rate is generally higher than in other countries. Besides, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions, especially if these institutions were not strong in the beginning of the period. While there is no solid evidence that, on average, resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, there is evidence that they use resources less efficiently, if their institutions are weak.

Studies of the resource curse as it affects African states abound, yet few deal specifically with the experiences of South Africa. The inability of countries to convert natural resource wealth into income and improved development measures remains highly pertinent, and is especially apparent in Africa’s largest economy. This paper takes a unique approach to studying the resource curse by comparing South Africa’s political economy with the existing resource curse literature. Using data from international organisations, studies of poverty and qualitative evidence this paper examines South Africa’s experience with mineral extraction. It is found that South Africa has experienced many of the symptoms outlined in the resource curse literature including relatively slow GDP growth, gross inequalities, entrenched poverty and the creation of a rentier state. Overall, it is concluded that South Africa has failed to benefit from natural resource wealth and can be classified as a resource cursed state. Not only has mineral wealth failed to benefit much of South Africa’s population, sections of society have actually been harmed through the process of mineral extraction. This paper is the first to examine South Africa in light of the current resource curse literature, and to conclude that the state far more closely resembles its sub-Saharan African neighbours than its upper-middle income peers.

This paper aims to understand why some natural resource rich developing countries have been able to diversify their economies while others have failed in this. Unlike much of the extant research in this area, this study develops and tests several hypotheses on political and institutional, rather than purely economic and geographic, factors enabling or hindering export diversification in the resource-rich developing world between 1962 and 2010. Among other things, it suggests that international institutions designed to help these countries overcome their “resource curse” through diversification can be effective only when they are alert to the different political and
institutional terrains.

The first part of this article provides an overview of the development of entrenched armed conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa which continue or have resurfaced in 2016. The author (JVdB) aims to expose the underlying causes and nature of the violent contestation by drawing on the works of C. T. Call in order to break open the black box of ‘failed states’ and analyze their legitimacy, capacity and security gaps separately. In addition the author will provide short scenarios of how these conflicts are likely to evolve in the short and medium-term and which (structural) factors will dominate these trends. The second part of this article (by JR) mainly aims at presenting the basic preconditions for the activities of the major terrorist organizations in Africa. With emphasis on the importance of the north-east and north-west regions of this continent in context of terrorist threats. Hence the initial focus was put on Somalia, which as a permanent fragile state remains under the increased influence of the Jihadist organization Al Shabaab, which is an organization with a high potential for increased capacity in the coming years. Next, was sketched out the situation in Egypt, considering, in essence, the activity of the so-called Islamic State in Sinai Peninsula. In this Analysis it also pointed to the intricate internal situation in modern Libya after so-called Arab Spring and international military intervention, where, despite earlier appearances, the terrorist threat was too much positioned, mostly by comprised to the internal conflict between the different Libyan political parties. Finally, efforts were made to illustrate the current terrorist activity in the Mali area, highlighting the importance of Al Qaeda branch AQIM and the situation in Nigeria where Boko Haram group operates.

El presente trabajo forma parte de los cursos que imparto a mis alumnos de la carrera de Ingeniería Civil de la Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC) y de la carrera de Edificaciones del SENCICO y es fruto de muchos años de experiencia en el desarrollo de sistemas aplicativos para la construcción, llevados a cabo en mis años de Jefe de Informática en una constructora del medio y luego en la aventura como contratista de obras y consultor independiente. Este trabajo tiene por finalidad mostrar procedimientos que simplifican el trabajo diario aumentando la productividad.

Nigeria is a West African country that is referred to as "the giant of Africa". The reason is because it is Africa"s most populous country with more than 150 million people, and the world"s eighth largest oil producer. Oil was discovered in commercial quantity in the 1950s and generated so much wealth for the country in the 1970s. Since then, Nigeria has been dependent on oil revenue which accounts for over 90 percent of its export earnings. Despite these huge earnings, the country and its producing region (Niger Delta) suffers from poverty, unemployment, insecurity, corruption, environmental degradation, and conflict over oil resource as a result of bad leadership, poor economic management. The oil resource rather than being a blessing has become a curse to the nation because; the excessive reliance on oil revenue has resulted in economic stagnation and political instability.

In this study, we propose a new approach for the visual inspection of interactions between human development and economic growth and a set of variables that reflect the dependence of mineral resources. We focus on the ten African countries with the highest share of mineral exports compared to total exports in the period from 2007 to 2016. First, we provide a descriptive analysis and we rank the countries according to their average annual growth in relation to a set of proxies of resource dependence and economic indicators during the sample period. Second, we cluster the different states by means of a dimensionality-reduction technique that enabled synthesising the information in the rankings into two factors: (a) economic growth and human development, and (b) growth in mineral resource dependence. Finally, we project all countries into a perceptual map and observe four clusters that roughly correspond to the main African regions, and whose distribution shows a slightly negative slope (indicative of a weak inverse relationship between mineral dependence and development). Regarding the interactions among variables, we observe a tenuous negative association between average growth in human development and the relative weight of mineral rents. These results, coupled with the fact that the average growth in resource rents does not materialise in higher economic growth, indicate that corruption may be impeding economic development, especially if it is understood under a more inclusive perspective that incorporates health and education. This finding underscores the need to promote institutional quality and to develop a mining strategy to help revert the effects of the resource curse in mineral-dependent African countries. Accordingly, we propose a series of policy measures based on four main objectives: competitiveness, transparency, sustainability and inclusiveness.

Fueled by a massive offshore deep-water oil boom, Angola has since the end of war in 2002 undertaken a huge, complex, and contradictory national reconstruction program whose character and dynamics have yet to be carefully studied and analyzed. What explains the patterns of such projects, who is benefitting from them, and how? The dissertation is grounded in the specific dynamics of cassava production, processing and marketing in two villages in Western Malanje Province in north central Angola. The ways in which Western Malanje’s cassava farmers’ livelihoods are shaped by transport, marketing, and an overall agrarian configuration illustrate how contemporary reconstruction – in the context of an offshore oil boom – has occurred through the specific conjunctures of multiple geo-historical processes associated with settler colonialism, protracted war, and leveraged liberalization. Such an explanation contrasts with previous more narrow emphases on elite enrichment and domination through control of external trade. Infrastructure projects are occurring as part of an agrarian configuration in which patterns of land, roads, and markets have emerged through recursive relations, and which is characterized by concentration, hierarchy and fragmentation.

Since Ghana discovered oil in large commercial quantities in 2007, many have questioned whether the country can avoid the resource curse. Defined as the inability of resource rich developing nations to benefit from such resource compared to non-resource rich nations, this thesis has proven mostly true in many developing nations. In this paper, I examine the importance of institutional quality in relation to avoiding the resource curse. I do this by methodically analyzing in historical context various indicators (Rule of Law, Effective Governance and Openness and Accountability), and argue that, resources (in this case, oil) are not in themselves a curse, rather the nature of institutions, whether curse resistant or curse receptive determines such outcome. Through a comparative case study of Nigeria (1960-2000) and Ghana (1972-2012), I demonstrate how weaknesses in the former’s institutional environment (very weak rule of law, ineffective governance and the lack of openness and accountability), contributed to the country’s demise as a resource cursed nation. I also examine Ghana in the same way, demonstrating that the country’s institutions are relatively susceptible to the resource curse due to the mediocre state of its institutional environment and fairly weak rule of law.

Constructing a developmental democratic state in Ghana depends on an intricate mix of external factors and internal competencies and political will. Of great importance is the prevailing economic and political circumstances that Ghana finds itself juxtaposed against the prevailing regional and global conditions. The regional and global dimensions are critical to this discussion because countries do not exist in a vacuum and neither do they develop in one. Beyond a nation's socio-cultural existence, regional and global considerations must necessarily come into play.

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background information
1.2 Scope of the problem
1.3 Research framework
Chapter 2 Energy Profiles of Central Asian Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects
2.1 Kazakhstan
2.2 Kyrgyz Republic
2.3 Tajikistan
2.4 Turkmenistan
2.5 Uzbekistan
2.6 Measuring the Security of External Energy Supply and Energy Export Demand in Central Asia
2.6.1 Methodology
2.6.2 Data
2.6.3 Results and Policy Implications
2.7 Summary
Chapter 3 Economy, Energy and the Environment in Kazakhstan
3.1 Economy of Kazakhstan
3.2 Energy System
3.2.1 Fossil Fuel
3.2.2 Coal
3.2.3 Crude Oil and Natural Gas
3.3 Environmental Problems in Kazakhstan
3.4 Modeling CO2 Emissions, Energy Use, and Economic Growth
3.4.1 Methodology
3.4.2 Data
3.4.3 Empirical Findings
3.5 The Dutch Disease in Kazakhstan
3.5.1 Methodology
3.5.2 Data
3.5.3 Empirical Findings
3.6 Summary
Chapter 4 Decomposition Analysis of Industry Sector CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion in Kazakhstan
4.1 Methodology
4.2 Data
4.3 Empirical Findings
4.4 Summary
Chapter 5 Power Industry
5.1 Electricity Generation
5.2 Commercial Heat Generation
5.3 Life Cycle Assessment of Commercial Heat and Electricity Production
5.3.1 Goal and Scope
5.3.2 Data
5.3.3 Methodology
5.3.4 Pre-Combustion
5.3.5 Combustion
5.3.6 Results and Discussion
5.3.7 External Costs of Power Production
5.4 Health Effects of Coal: A Long-Run Relationship Assessment of Coal Production and Respiratory Health in Kazakhstan
5.4.1 Methodology
5.4.2 Data
5.4.3 Empirical Findings
5.5 Potential of Renewable Energy in Kazakhstan
5.5.1 Solar Energy
5.5.2 Biomass and Geothermal Energy
5.5.3 Hydropower
5.6 Summary
Chapter 6 Wind Power in Kazakhstan
6.1 Wind Climates and Local Winds
6.2 Potential Assessment
6.2.1 Data
6.2.2 Methodology
6.2.3 Results and Discussion
6.3 Environmental Improving Effect of Wind Energy
6.4 Cost of Wind Energy
6.5 Multi-Criteria Analysis of Wind Power
6.5.1 Criteria Selection
6.5.2 Technical Criteria
6.5.3 Environmental Criteria
6.5.4 Socioeconomic Criteria
6.5.5 Methodology
6.5.6 Results and Discussion
6.6 Summary
Chapter 7 Green Growth Strategy of Kazakhstan
7.1 Effect of Kazakh Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on Industrial Energy Intensities
7.1.1 Methodology
7.1.2 Data
7.1.3 Results and Discussions
7.2 Summary
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications
8.1 Policy Recommendations

Norway serves as a unique example of a developed country whose economy is dominated by export of natural resources. Thanks to its large petroleum reserves Norway has become one of the richest countries in the world. This thesis examines how the country has coped with its transformation and if it has avoided the so-called resource curse. It deals with the effects of the oil industry on the other sectors of the economy as well as on Norwegians’ wellbeing. As the revenue from the petroleum production has grown, the state has implemented number of economic policies with the aim to utilize it in favour of the weakened industries and the society as a whole. So far, the oil industry has brought Norway prosperity thanks to sound governance and fitting policies. The question is whether the measures are sufficient to tackle both the decreasing production and prices of oil while maintaining the advantage the country has gained.

Since 2010, many African governments have challenged twenty years of extractive sector liberalization that has played a key role in unlocking mineral riches and attracting foreign direct investment. The potential for extractives to drive economic structural transformation is intuitively attractive, the Africa Mining Vision (2009) document providing a primary template. Geological inheritance alone, however, is not a
panacea for economic development, industrialization or poverty alleviation. While much attention to the ‘resource curse’ has identified the problem of excessive rent-seeking and the consequent impact on elite consolidation, democracy, governance and macroeconomic distortions, a more fundamental problem, the ‘other resource curse’, may be an overlooked driver: a lingering assumption that mineral resources should straightforwardly provide significant revenue streams for public goods, inputs for industrial transformation, and extensive employment. Geology alone is neither conducive nor antithetical to economic development. Stakeholders require a more comprehensive understanding of the possibilities and limits of extractives in contemporary Africa.

This thesis studies Azerbaijan's perspective on the European Union. The author draws upon a wide-variety of (local) sources to exemplify and explain Azerbaijan's particular attitude. Over the years, Azerbaijan became increasingly reluctant to implement EU's policies: the EU was no longer perceived solely as an example, but was rather seen as an equal partner or a dependent client. The thesis looks into the domestic factors that caused this change, as well as effect of the behaviour of the EU and its Members States. The author argues that the EU has too little too late in order to gain Azerbaijan's support and credibility. EU's absence in important matters such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has led to deep grievances, which cannot easily resolved. The thesis therefore argues that it will require effort and understanding from both sides for any improved relations to develop.

For all incarnations of the resource curse hypothesis, Botswana presents an outlier. With both history and geography seeming to conspire against developmental success, Botswana is a remarkable case for any development scholar. However, my focus on the country is motivated by its counterfactual role in the compelling hypothesis that institutional quality is decisive for avoiding the resource curse. At the critical juncture of resource extraction, Botswanan institutional quality was not sufficient to avoid the resource curse. This leaves us with a puzzling question: what enabled Botswana to develop in spite of its institutional quality and resource dependence? In addressing this, I trace the evolution of the country’s institutions and political economy, emphasising the decisive role that agency played at critical moments. I argue that Botswana’s resource blessing is not reducible to institutional explanations but is rather due to a confluence of structural and agential factors. In doing so, I enrich existing theory by bringing history and agency back into the fold; challenging the ahistoricity and determinism common to many institutional explanations of the resource curse.

It has been nearly 20 years since a working definition for “sustainable development” was put forward by the World Commission on Environment and Development. The concept endures in the mission statements and frameworks of action of various societal actors, including those of neighborhood associations, metropolitan development authorities, environmental ministries, and United Nations (UN) specialized organizations, to name a few. Yet many observers doubt that sustainable development is occurring in poor countries. This failure, the critics contend, stems from miserly transfers of foreign aid. The extent to which inadequate aid is to blame for poor environmental/developmental outcomes is an open question. But vocal demands for increasing aid to meet sustainable development goals come from many parts of society and are persistent. Exhortations for more aid to help poor countries are noble, perhaps even justifiable, but there are understandable doubts about the wisdom of transferring large capital and technical resources to countries that are slow to adopt needed institutional reforms. Aid without institutional reform is a recipe for wasted resources and donor fatigue. Worse, it may enhance inequities of wealth and power in recipient countries. There are few illustrations to draw on demonstrating how institutionally impoverished societies are affected when they are compelled to absorb massive aid inputs over a short period––a remedy suggested by some prominent aid experts. As a proxy, it is valuable to examine instances where swift macroeconomic changes, spurred by external investment and export-led growth, has occurred without significant institutional development. The case of Equatorial Guinea and its sudden oil riches is examined to discern whether, in the absence of meaningful institutional reform, rapid and profound increases in foreign direct investment and export income enable poverty alleviation and sustainable development.

Investigating the contribution of international oil companies (IOCs) toward local content development (LCD) in Yemen oil and gas (O&G) industry with a focus on supply chain (SC) perspectives. Background: Two competing schools of thoughts one arguing for another one arguing against have fronted their points regarding the place of local content policies (LCPs) in the modern era, especially in the mining industry. There is need to ascertain the convincing alternative and where Yemen stands regarding these competing opinions. Methods: This was a qualitative study that employed face-to-face interview in gathering the primary data. The study setting was Yemen while the data obtained was analysed thematically in agreement with scholarly support for the analysis method for qualitative data. Results: The study involved 15 participants sampled from local suppliers, government officials, supply chain management (SCM), and IOCs staffs. Findings indicated there is majority agreement for benefits and importance of having LCPs in Yemen, although such policies have not been established. Conclusion: The government of Yemen (GoY) holds the key to the success and the degree of IOCs contribution to LCD. Without these policies in place, the IOCs contribution cannot be challenged legally leaving it to be more of part of the corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions has generally been approached through demand-side initia- tives, yet there are increasing calls for supply-side interventions to curtail fossil fuel production. Pursuing energy transition through supply-side constraints would have major geopolitical and economic consequences. Depending on the criteria and instruments applied, supply cuts for fossil fuels could drastically reduce and reorient major financial flows and reshape the spatiality of energy production and consumption. Building on debates about just transitions and supply con- straints, we provide a survey of emerging interventions targeting the supply of, rather than the demand for, fossil fuels. We articulate four theories of justice and criteria to prioritize cuts among fossil fuel producers, including with regard to carbon intensity, production costs, affordability, developmental efficiency and support for climate change action. We then examine seven major supply constraint instruments, their effectiveness and possible pathways to supply cuts in the coal, oil and gas sectors. We suggest that supply cuts both reflect and offer purposeful political spaces of interventions towards a ‘just’ transition away from fossil fuel production.