Principles for Deposit Insurance

Стабилен финансиски сектор, со тоа и банкарски сектор како негов важен дел, создава предуслови за развој на финансиско посредување и ефикасна алокација на ресурси кои имаат големо значење за развој и просперитет на една национална економија. Во рамките на финансискиот сектор, на стабилноста на банкарскиот сектор се дава приоритетно значење. Приоритетот во стабилноста на банкарскиот сектор и мотив за негово одржување е мотивирано од неколку фактори :
> Стабилен банкарски систем го забрзува економскиот раст;
Како резултат на зголемена доверба на населението во банкарскиот систем, се зголемуваат заштедите во банките и се создаваат поволни предуслови за интезивирање на инвестиционите активности на домашните економски субјекти. Отсуство на било какви „потреси“ во банкарското работење на една национална економија стимулира и прилив на странски капитал.
> Стабилен банкарски систем овозможува предуслови за заштита на малите штедачи;
Кога во работењето на банките имаме висока степен на стабилност, се намалува опасноста од почести и ненајдени банкротства, со што се заштитуваат и депозитите на малите штедачи. Сето тоа допринесува за зголемена доверба во финанскиот систем во една држава.
> Стабилен банкарски систем овозможува заштита од потенцијален распад на системите за плаќање во рамките на национална економија.
Банкарскиот систем ја има централната улога во системот на плаќања во една неционална економија. Поради тоа било каква дестабилизација или „потрес“ во системот може да предизвика проблеми при секојдневното реализирање на налозите од страна на домашните економски субјекти.

This paper compares account based Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) with deposit insurance (DI) in a moral hazard setting. The relevant agents’ utilities are the same in the two systems when either the deposit insurance fee is paid ex post or the deposit insurance fund (DIF) bears the risk-free interest rate. If the DIF’s return is lower than the risk-free rate, then CBDC yields higher welfare than DI. As in reality the DIF mainly invests in claims on the government, CBDC and DI can be regarded equivalent in practice. However, in old times of metallic standard the DIF could have invested primarily in non-interest bearing metal, which is in line with the fact that early central banks issued demand deposits to the non-bank private sector.

Motorcycle insurance is required for operating a motorcycle. Each state defines what type of vehicle falls under the category of a motorcycle, and what the minimum requirements are for insurance coverage. Check with your state's Department of Motor Vehicles to determine what the minimum requirements are. Each state requires proof of insurance, and that operator's keep insurance up to date. Fees are often charged if motor bike insurance lapses.

Das Versagen internationaler Finanzmärkte in den Jahren 2007-2009 ging mit einer Infragestellung eines auf freien und selbstregulierten Märkten basierenden Kapitalismus einher, dessen Vorherrschen im Mittelpunkt vieler Erklärungsversuche für die Weltfinanzkrise steht. Vorliegende Dissertation untersucht, inwiefern diese Einschätzung gerechtfertigt ist, und kommt zum Ergebnis, dass die Finanzkrise nicht das Resultat freier Märkte war, sondern dem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen denselben einerseits und weitreichender staatlicher Regulierung sowie staatlichen Interventionen andererseits zuzuschreiben ist. Im Zentrum der Forschung dieser Arbeit steht die Einführung staatlicher Einlagensicherung in den USA als Antwort auf die Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1929-1933. Die Folge der Versicherung von Bankverbindlichkeiten durch den Staat war eine gesteigerte Risikoneigung von Banken („Moral Hazard“), die insbesondere infolge der Erosion der gleichzeitig mit der Einlagensicherung 1933 eingeführten Restriktionen seit den 1980er Jahren zunahm. Diese ab 1933 eingeführten staatlichen Restriktionen waren nämlich durch die Versicherung von Bankverbindlichkeiten erforderlich gemacht worden und sollten der exzessiven Aufnahme von Risiko entgegenwirken. Die zunehmende Anzahl an Finanz- und Bankenkrisen infolge des erhöhten Risikoprofils des Bankensektors machte vermehrt staatliche Intervention notwendig, um die negativen Folgen eines sonst möglichen Kollapses des sukzessiv dominanter werdenden Finanzsektors zu verhindern. Mit jedem staatlichen Eingriff, der Finanzinstitutionen nicht den vollen Umfang ihrer Verluste tragen ließ, wurde diesen ein weiterer Anreiz dafür geliefert, zukünftig exzessives Risiko einzugehen, welches nicht sie – die Finanzinstitute – selbst, sondern der Staat zu tragen hatte. So ist der Zeitraum seit 1980 von einem auf Moral Hazard zurückzuführenden fragilen Bankensektor geprägt. In Zusammenhang mit den staatlichen Versuchen, den zunehmend fragilen Finanzsektor zu stabilisieren, ist vor allem die Entwicklung des Phänomens „Too-Big-to-Fail“ zu nennen. Dieses beschreibt den Unwillen politischer Entscheidungsträger und Regulatoren, große und systemisch bedeutsame Finanzinstitute bei drohendem Bankrott normalen Marktgesetzen zu unterwerfen; stattdessen werden diese Institute aufgefangen („Bailout“). Darüber hinaus kommen der Ausweitung der historisch eng definierten Rolle der Federal Reserve als „Lender-of-Last-Resort“ einerseits und „Regulatory Forbearance“ sowie dem „Greenspan Put“ andererseits eine zentrale Bedeutung zu.
In vorliegender Arbeit wird die Entwicklung oben genannter Phänomene historisch nachgezeichnet und deren Bedeutung in Hinblick auf die Finanzkrise 2007-2009 erläutert. Somit ergibt sich für die Arbeit eine Bedeutung für das Verständnis einerseits der Finanzkrise 2007-2009 selbst und andererseits für die historische Entwicklung der Finanzmärkte generell, welche seit dem frühen 19. Jahrhundert sporadisch und seit den 1970/80er Jahren eingehend analysiert wird. Besondere Beachtung erfährt hier die etwa 1980 einsetzende Phase, die häufig als eine der „Deregulierung“ aufgefasst wird. Die Dissertation soll dazu beitragen, die Charakterisierung des Zeitraums seit 1980 als „Laissez-Faire“ einer Neubewertung zu unterwerfen. Zentrale Aussage der Dissertation ist, dass dieser Zeitraum weniger durch eine Liberalisierung als vielmehr durch eine „selektive Liberalisierung“ gekennzeichnet ist. Basierend auf einem Komplex an Entwicklungen seit etwa der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts, die zu einem oft als Laissez-Faire-Markt wahrgenommenen Regulierungszustand führten, wurden Banken zunehmend befähigt, aufgrund eines mangelhaften Verständnisses für Liberalisierung für eine Lockerung der historischen Restriktionen zu lobbyieren. Parallel hierzu wurde aber der staatliche Einlagenschutz aufrechterhalten und das staatliche Sicherheitsnetz generell ausgeweitet. Dies hatte eine Destabilisierung der Finanzmärkte zur Folge, indem die Aufnahme extremen Risikos insbesondere durch große Banken staatlich gefördert wurde. Dementsprechend sollten große Finanzinstitute eine maßgebliche Rolle sowohl hinsichtlich der Bildung der Immobilienblase, die zur Weltfinanzkrise 2007-2009 führte, als auch während der Krise selbst spielen und einen kausalen Faktor für deren Ausbruch darstellen.

Mineral deposits are essential for the economic, technological and social development. However, to enable them to play an appropriate role in the process of sustainable development, they need to be safeguarded in a comprehensive and systemic manner in the same measure as other elements of the environment. The practice of securing access to areas where the mineral deposits can be found is based on the statement that they can be extracted only in places where they occur. This fact defines the type and scope of instruments for safeguarding prospective deposit areas of minerals and their documented deposits. These issues gained in significance in the EU level in recent years however views on this subject across the Member States still vary. The paper subjects instruments of mineral deposit safeguarding used in Poland, Slovakia and Czechia to the analysis and multi-criteria comparative assessment. It recommends their division into the conceptual, legal, spatial planning and economic ones. As a result of studies, similarities and differences in the approach to mineral deposit safeguarding in individual countries are shown, indicating good practices and suggesting possible changes. The analysis revealed many analogies in actions aimed at mineral deposit safeguarding in individual countries, however the assessment of their effectiveness and implementation points at the necessity of taking further steps to increase deposit safeguarding.

Various mechanisms of prudential oversight over the financial system can help to make an economy more resistant to contagious financial shocks. Better and more realistic
supervision of institutions is needed both in capital-importing and capital-exporting countries. This paper examines  international rules for capital ratios, how far implicit and explicit guarantees undermine financial agents’ and institutions’ sense of responsibility for their own decisions, what can be done to strengthen the operation of
market discipline for banks, and the need to develop deeper
financial markets so that the concentration of the risks in the banking system can be diluted. Given differences in country circumstances, the focus of international cooperation
should be to ensure that generally agreed principles needed to
ensure strong banking systems are applied worldwide.

This article provides a comparative analysis of the Great Depression (1929-1933) and the Great Financial Crisis (2007-2009) by contrasting the crises' main drivers and how they relate to each other with respect to the United States. To this end, causes, consequences and measures undertaken during the crises are evaluated and dissected. The analysis reveals striking parallels between the Great Depression and the Great Financial Crisis. Causal factors in both crisis were a flawed design of the banking system (unit banking, too-big-to-fail), a real estate boom and high debt burdens of both households and financial institutions as well as pronounced economic inequality. Measures taken during the crises differed markedly, however. Whereas politicians' approach to the Great Depression was long characterised by inaction, responses during the recent crisis proved to be swift and aggressive. The response to the recent crisis prevented a repeat of the Great Depression by attenuating the immediate adverse effects on the economy. However, there exists strong evidence that the response may only have deferred the adjustment process initiated by the crisis of 2007-2009. The paper presents empirical observations supporting the view that the structural problems which led to 2007-2009 are still existent today and continue to threaten financial stability.

The global financial crisis of the last decade has exposed the vulnerability of banking systems around the world as we witnessed various bank-runs and bail-out efforts from governments. At the backdrop of this historical event, governments around the world were realizing the need for more efficient macro-prudential tools to mitigate the systemic risks inherent in our financial systems. International regulatory bodies like the Basel Committee on banking supervision revised their regulatory frameworks and issued revisions of Basel II as Basel III for the ―regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector‖ in the years that followed the financial crisis. Accordingly, countries around the world have been increasingly adopting the regulatory frameworks based on the phase-wise implementation of the Basel III accord.
Besides Basel III, Deposit Insurance Schemes have stood out as essential tool for minimizing systemic risks as well as for the overall safety of the financial systems. There has been a broad consensus on relying on the ex-ante deposit insurance fund with risk-based pricing of premiums for such a safety net. China is the latest country to join the herd of countries introducing such a deposit insurance scheme consisting of a mandatory flat rate and a risk-based component. By the time of writing this dissertation, Chinese regulatory bodies have already launched their version of the deposit insurance in May 2015.
Apparently it is important to study an appropriate valuation of the deposit insurance premiums for Chinese banks while China is making this historical endeavor. Therefore, this paper uses an alternative methodology of option pricing model introduced by Walter and Schaller (2011) to calculate the risk-based premiums as well as the corresponding fund size for Chinese banks. This model is based on the open Black Scholes formula modified by Merton (1977). It is a single indicator model as applied in Walter (2011) that uses Tier1 ratio specified in the Basel framework as a proxy for measuring specific risk of an individual bank. The put values for each year for each bank are determined by simulating the Tier 1 ratios using Monte-Carlo simulation process based on Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-Vasicek model, which incorporates mean-reversion. Subsequently the premiums and total insurance fund for the sample period are determined using the specific risk factor and the total customer deposits as the size factor.
The minimum capital ratio of 12%, which was used by Walter & Schaller (2011) and Walter (2011) as state-of-the-art trigger of default, results in a very large amount of deposit insurance fund for China, which we believe is not appropriate. Thus we followed CBRC‘s regulatory framework based on Basel III and use 10.5% as the minimum capital ratio which will be used as a trigger. We found that using 12% as trigger the total accumulated deposit insurance fund for six years to be 55.26 trillion RMB whereas while using 10.5% as expected a lower amount of 20.028 trillion RMB. The average specific risk factor is found to be 7.63% while the average percentage share of premiums in terms of total deposits is 7.33%. Therefore, we conclude that if only flat-rate premiums are to be levied to the Chinese banks, it should be around 7.33% of their total customer deposits. This rate is as expected higher than world standards and significantly higher than the flat-rate suggested by Chinese regulatory bodies. We also conclude that the average rate after adding the flat rate and risk-based components should be around 7.33% for the Chinese banking industry.

The article describes a string of new court decisions breaking the corporate veil. Those decisions appear to be a consequence of bank bankruptcies becoming ever more expensive to the state because of deposit insurance having to reimburse losses. The article attempts to predict how the theory applied in the case at hand (namely that capital adequacy legislation had not been complied with and lending transactions were entered into without a substantive review of the chances for return) can be developed to be applied to other cases of bankruptcies. The article also briefly compares the approach taken with the basis for liability under German law. The further development is explained in https://www.academia.edu/24712770/Piercing_the_Corporate_Veil_as_a_Factual_Matter.

Mineral deposits are essential for the economic, technological and social development. However, to enable them to play an appropriate role in the process of sustainable development, they need to be safeguarded in a comprehensive and systemic manner in the same measure as other elements of the environment. The practice of securing access to areas where the mineral deposits can be found is based on the statement that they can be extracted only in places where they occur. This fact defines the type and scope of instruments for safeguarding prospective deposit areas of minerals and their documented deposits. These issues gained in significance in the EU level in recent years however views on this subject across the Member States still vary. The paper subjects instruments of mineral deposit safeguarding used in Poland, Slovakia and Czechia to the analysis and multi-criteria comparative assessment. It recommends their division into the conceptual, legal, spatial planning and economic ones...

The present research article shall outline how blockchain technology could be combined with insurance solutions against political risks. Through the definitions and the characterization of the key concepts of traditional insurance law and blockchain technology using case examples of specific political risks, it will be shown, how the insurance coverage of political risks could be achieved through smart insurance contracts in the future.

The global financial crisis highlighted clearly the need for better regulation and supervision of the financial sector. As far as deposits, citizens suddenly realized that different levels and forms of depositor protection co-existed in the EU. Because of the possible spreading of bank runs all over the world, deposit insurance schemes (DGSs) became more common, and also countries where they did not exist, they began to set up them, like Australia and New Zealand. On the other side, in countries where the schemes were already adopted, an overhaul of the main characteristics of these schemes started. In this research, differently from previous papers, we want to answer two main research questions. The first one considers the fact that the new European Directive requires that DGSs' funding arrangements are risk based pricing systems able to minimize the moral hazard risk. This is something new which tend to make banks evaluated/supervised by the DGSs similarly to the firms evaluated by the banks when the latter lend money to the former. More importantly, the second research question aims to analyze the main characteristics of a prospective harmonized European DGS, by comparinga how the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) works in the U.S.

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the compliance of the Macedonian deposit insurance system with the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. The results of the evaluation show that the system fully complies with 11 principles, partially complains with 2 and is non-compliant with 4 principles, while it is not possible to determine compliance with one of the 18 core principles. The deposit insurance system is not compliant with principle 1 – Public policy objectives, principle 7 – Cross border issues, principle 13 – Legal protection and principle 14 – Dealing with parties at fault in a bank failure. The principle 2 – Mitigating moral hazard and the principle 12 – Public awareness have been partially compliant and the principle 10 – Transitioning from a blanket guarantee to a limited coverage deposit insurance system is the one which compliance is not possible to determine. After the evaluation analyses this paper presents recommendation in order to improve the compliance and the efficiency of the deposit insurance system of Republic of Macedonia.