Mediation and Qatari foreign policy

By getting involved in the “Arab Spring”, Qatar was determined to continue waging its foreign policy aimed at strengthening the positions of the country combined with the intention to create corresponding markets outside the country for Qatari gas. The
Russia-Iran-US agreement on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, along with the newly-emerging Iran-US approchement, urged Qatar to re-think its Syrian agenda, especially in light of the diplomatic blockade by the Gulf states. It is concluded in the article that after the Syrian crisis, Qatar will continue seeking gas markets in order to ensure its national
interests.

Article: The Middle East remains of a major geostrategic importance. Global powers found in the recent developments an opportunity to chart their way into the region; sending troops and reinforcements, rebuilding alliances and restoring old relations. Amidst this chaotic environment, a number of regional forces opted to adopt a different approach: soft power. It is obvious that such forces have found in soft power an efficient tool that can achieve what tanks and jets failed to do. In this article, four soft power models in the Middle East are assessed and analysed: Turkey, Iran, Qatar and Oman.

Mediation from soft diplomacy to foreign policy In this chapter we will explore how Qatar gained its current title as a "trusted partner" through mediation. Running in the 2nd decade of its enriched journey, where it was started from north of Yemen mountains passing by Lebanon, Sudan, Djibouti, Palestine until the most recent mediation between Taliban and Afghani government. There are many examples for Qatar mediation roles, it happened where Qatar mediated between countries and other actors, in partnership with other allies and global, continental, regional, and sub regional organizations. As it's a principle in Qatar foreign policy to comply diplomatic efforts with UN principles and international law. On the other hand, tools and potentials that made Qatar recognition as a successful mediator are a complexity of various things such, widely strong political connections, huge financial resources, reliability and impartiality. Involving in mediation for Qatar wasn't easy task, as its always stuffed with unpredicted challenges coming from several geopolitical factors along with other variations. We will demonstrate some of these challenges and how it affects the whole processes and initiatives. Also, Impartiality principle sometimes leads to dilemmas where it requires tremendous efforts and resources to solve issues and bring parties back to negotiations, this includes but not limited to, shuttling diplomacy, huge financial resources, multilateral diplomacy and sometimes coaching and trainings for some parties to narrow the differences and pave the way for middle ground. Mediation in Qatar case made fruit of soft diplomacy and created a high profile for the small gulf country, however this has created some negative competition from some neighbors who is ready to destroy any achievement no matter what is the lost just to undermine the efforts been made. And this been the case; honesty, transparency and dignity always played a key role to contain tensions. Spoilers repeatedly showing up regardless their goals, mostly its conflict of interests is the driver behind those, but sometimes it's just change resistance and fear of future specially with elites lived long time in conflict. The theoretical model of Qatar mediation strategy, is yet to be identified by scholars and all what has been written "personally" is descriptive reports with some analysis built on relative articles and publications. n conclusion although that many has described Qatar mediation as

The crisis symbolised by the withdrawal from Doha of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain in March, 2014, was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore set a precedent in terms of dispute resolution between the six member states. The disagreement that sparked the ambassadors’ withdrawal was among the most serious in recent years, and threatened to seriously undermine relations between the GCC states. The crisis certainly affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.
This chapter discusses causes of the crisis, and a review of its development and eventual resolution with the signing of the Riyadh Supplementary Agreement on 16 November 2014. This chapter suggests that the crisis will continue to affect the GCC in future. While the immediate crisis has passed, the loss of trust between the GCC states is likely to take some time to resolve. Nevertheless, the resolutions that emerged from the 35th GCC summit held in Doha on 9 December 2014 indicate a kind of convergence in understanding among the GCC countries on a number of regional issues. This convergence was arrived at in the context of various regional pressures on the member states and the Gulf region as a whole, stemming particularly from concerns around the emergence of the Islamic State and Iran’s nuclear programme. Finally, the chapter argues that resolution of the crisis is indicative of the maturity of the GCC states, and reflects their ability to focus on prioritising their own local interests. In the longer term, it seems likely that this maturity will enhance integration and strengthen the GCC.

While the Great Recession and ensuing “Arab Spring” have taken a heavy toll on many nations in North Africa and the Middle East, yielding unprecedented volatility in country risk metrics, GCC member-states, with the exception of Bahrain, seemed relatively immune to economic decline. But the 2014 Saudi-Qatari Rift, which can be interpreted as a fight between the world’s leading oil and natural gas producers, could have deeper and longer lasting consequences than previous crises....

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

Gli affari d’oro della nostra industria bellica in Qatar. Fincantieri connection - Le armi che Leonardo Italia ha venduto alle forze armate del Qatar - Sfilata della politica italiana in Qatar pro industria bellica. L’affaire Beretta - Doha invia materiale sanitario, Roma arma e addestra i militari del Qatar - Nasr 19, giochi di guerra dei bersaglieri spediti in Qatar - Italia e Qatar, le due intelligence a tavola in una villa romana - Training militari Italia-Qatar e commesse per 5 miliardi per navi e missili - Dal 2016 i Carabinieri addestrano l’intelligence e la polizia segreta del Qatar - Gli 007 italiani a difesa degli immensi giacimenti di gas del Qatar.

This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. First, through a rigorous survey of the literature, it probes the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations from late 1970s until 2000s with a view to pinpointing prominent dynamics. In light of these general dynamics, the study then zeroes in on the regional and domestic motivations that facilitated a political alignment between Ankara and Doha. Second, through expert interviews, the current study substantiates the findings from the meager literature on the Turkish-Qatari relations.
Findings of this study indicate that the historical evolution of the Turkish-Gulf Arab relations is marked by political orientations of actors, security concerns and economic interests. Findings on the regional dynamics of the more specific Turkish-Qatari relations indicates that close relations between Ankara and Doha cannot be viewed separately from the overall trajectory of relations with the other Gulf Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. However, the underlying forces that the Arab Spring surfaced seems to have challenged this conclusion, as Ankara and Doha currently enjoy exceptional relations with one another while they are in increasingly worse terms with their neighbors.
The study further reveals that the present Turkish-Qatari political alignment is not attributable to one specific factor. These relations have been shaped by a confluence of numerous dynamics. First example is the convergences of foreign policy approaches and tools both actors have used, which facilitated taking similar positions on important regional issues. Another finding is that the regional developments prior to and throughout the specified period created a conducive environment for both actors to cooperate in numerous areas. In this regard, Arab Spring stands out as the most prominent arena whereby Ankara and Doha elevated their relations to the level of political alignment. The study also suggest that the domestic dynamics, as materialized in the role of leadership, as well as both actors’ interests, have been important determinants of cordial relationships. Finally, identity politics, as materialized in both actors’ vision regarding the regional political structure and who the players of this structure should be, stands out as a central force that shaped relations.

‘Country risk’ is essentially about assessing the economic prospects of a nation holistically, within the broader legal and geopolitical soil without which institutional investors cannot grow their assets. The government of Qatar is now paying an incommensurate price for having thought it could defy forever the laws of geo-economic gravity.

The Qatar-GCC diplomatic crisis began when three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017. The ‘Qatar-Gulf Crisis’ is now 10 months old, and has spread to Horn of Africa making it a hotspot for rivalry. Initially, two traditional pro-Saudi countries in the region, Sudan and Somalia, have preferred to stay neutral in the diplomatic spat and urged dialogue. This report argues that Qatar’s diplomatic presence in the region, especially in Sudan and Somalia, contributed to their neutral stance. It also contends that Turkey’s engagements in both these countries and its position in the Qatar-Gulf spat influenced their position.

The Gulf crisis, which has escalated into a full-blown diplomatic and economic blockade on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt and their allies, is first and foremost the product of smoldering tensions between the parties, which have arisen from pronounced differences in Qatari and Saudi Arabian economic and foreign policy at a time of social, economic, and political upheaval that is shaping the future of the Middle East.

This paper examine the discourse and practices of the two most active GCC countries in the Mediterranean, and will conduct its analysis through a discussion of such highlighted issues as economy, migration and political ideas. Adopting content discourse analysis, this paper studies documents from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to help better understand these countries’ changing role and influence, as well as their policies and role perceptions in the Mediterranean area. Investigating their alternative discourses, the paper will highlight the conflicting, competing and also converging policies and visions of these actors regarding EU policies.

Largely unacknowledged in the international media, the blockade against Qatar, led by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt has been in place since June 2017, the standoff persisting until today. The quartet’s justification for continuing the blockade is Qatar’s foreign policy. According to them, Qatar finances and supports terrorism in the region. Basing their allegations on the 2014 agreement that Qatar signed with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they claim that Qatar has violated this agreement. Qatar, on the other hand, denies these allegations and has garnered regional and international support for its position.

The ramifications of this action have stirred up a crisis which continues to affect the social and political relationships between the Gulf States, most importantly the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In imposing the blockade, the leaders have undergone a tremendous shift in their foreign policy towards their fellow GCC member. The crisis has given rise to numerous questions, predictions and concerns, including whether it signifies the first domino in the gradual collapse of the GCC.

Nonetheless, upon analysing the historical relationships between the Arabian Gulf states, it is found that the Qatar crisis is not a new phenomenon in the Gulf but part of the political struggles that have spanned the life of these states. However, the political struggles of the present day differ from the conflicts of the past because of the new political context and, most importantly, the political ideologies that the leaders of the Gulf states have come to adopt. Hence, the characteristics of the Khaliji (Gulf) leaders, especially those imposing the blockade, are best understood within the framework of their political ideology and political discourse. This can be analysed through what I call the role of “tribal ideology in Khalijism”1, which has existed in the context of Khaliji politics both before and after the formation of the Arabian Gulf states.

My paper will focus on understanding the reasoning of the leaders of the blockade by studying their foreign policy discourse ― their foreign policy decisions, the role of tribal ideology and their use of the tribe in their foreign policy making towards Qatar. My paper will employ the method of discourse theory and discourse analysis.

A new memoir puts the spotlight on a period when Eritreans faced a double annexation—when the powerful nations tried to partition the former Italian colony between Sudan and Ethiopia which would have wiped the territory off the map as a nation. The book chronicles in great detail the multi-pronged and well-coordinated conspiracy that put the Red Sea territory on a global diplomatic chopping block

This paper investigates to what extent mediation has been a relevant foreign policy tool during the Arab Spring by looking into the mediation attempts of Turkey, Qatar and Iran. To answer this question, the paper examines why and how these actors mediated, to what extent they were able to apply mediation as a tool of foreign policy, whether their mediation attempts could deliver any results and whether there was a receptive audience with respect to their mediation. Despite certain setbacks, mediation has been a relevant foreign policy tool during the Arab Spring. The uses of mediation by these actors run parallel to their foreign policy priorities. In addition, during the Arab Spring, mediation has proved more effective in small-scale conflicts, such as hostage crises, rather than large-scale ones, such as those between regimes and oppositions. Despite considerable potential for regional powers to take on mediator roles, the effectiveness of their mediation attempts depends on their commitment and reliability as mediators.

The aim of this article is to examine how the process of foreign policy decision-making affects the conduct of states in the international system and how states respond to external threats according to internal factors, notably elite threat perceptions and the capacity of institutions to mobilize power. Despite its small size and population, Qatar has achieved enormous regional projection in the last decades. Our hypothesis is that the Arab Spring forced Qatar and the rest of the monarchies in the Gulf to restructure their foreign policies. The mediator-integrator role that Doha had played till then gave way to a more active, independent role in which the tools of hard power gradually replaced those of previous soft power. These changes aggravated tensions with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which, in 2017, decided to impose a blockade on Qatar.

The aim of this article is to examine how the process of foreign policy decision-making affects the conduct of states in the international system and how states respond to external threats according to internal factors, notably elite threat perceptions and the capacity of institutions to mobilize power. Despite its small size and population, Qatar has achieved enormous regional projection in the last decades. Our hypothesis is that the Arab Spring forced Qatar and the rest of the monarchies in the Gulf to restructure their foreign policies. The mediator-integrator role that Doha had played till then gave way to a more active, independent role in which the tools of hard power gradually replaced those of previous soft power. These changes aggravated tensions with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which, in 2017, decided to impose a blockade on Qatar.

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader
Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

Este trabalho desenvolve uma análise sobre o fracasso do embargo comercial, diplomático, e político de 2017 em controlar o comportamento do Qatar, como expresso na Lista de 13 Demandas. Tendo como foco as ações do Qatar desde então, a base teórica será dada pelo Realismo Ofensivo de John Mearsheimer, com conceitos como acumulação de poder e a Balança de Ameaça, e também com conceitos tirados do Neoliberalismo de Keohane e Nye. O objetivo é buscar entender como o Qatar resistiu às pesadas sanções econômicas e diplomáticas, e manteve sua soberania intacta. Minha hipótese é de que 2 fatores foram fundamentais : Primeiro, as demais economias árabes não tinham suficiente influência na qatari, pois as trocas comerciais realizadas eram irrelevantes. Aqui uso o conceito de interdependência dado por Keohane e Nye. Segundo, o Qatar expandiu o alinhamento com outros dois países, o Irã e a Turquia, para redirecionar seu comercio internancional e obter aliados em um Balanceamento. Para justificar minha análise, usarei dados estatísticos macroeconômicos que mostram primeiro a independência macroeconômica qatari, e segundo relatórios internacionais e fontes jornalísticas que demosntram o novo alinhamento diplomático com Irã e Turquia.

Global sea trade expanded from 1.6 billion tonnes in 1965 to 10.3 billion tonnes in 2015/2016 and the disputes connected with it have grown up. International arbitration has been the most widely used mean of out-of-court dispute resolution, because of its flexibility, confidentiality, neutrality and international enforceability. But mediation is more flexible and more confidential, cheaper and faster (the average total costs of a commercial mediation represent less than 5% of the average cost of an arbitration and is usually concluded within two-three months) and the settlement agreements will be internationally enforceable from 2019 onwards. Will mediation overcome arbitration? There are three main methods of dispute resolution: litigation, arbitration, mediation; choose the most adequate one according to the type of dispute. The choice requires a high level of training

Il Qatar, piccolo emirato che occupa una delle penisole situate nel Golfo Persico, confina esclusivamente con l'Arabia Saudita. Avendo alle spalle una tradizione nomade e scarse risorse idriche, la zona che oggi corrisponde all'emirato è stata attraversata da numerose tribù originarie della Penisola Arabica prima e, successivamente, dalla Persia. Nella seconda metà dell'Ottocento la famiglia Al Thani riuscì a imporre la sua autorità, non senza numerosi conflitti al suo interno. Dopo l'indipendenza dagli inglesi (1971) e il rifiuto di entrare a fare parte sia dell'Arabia Saudita che degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, il Qatar conquistò la sua indipendenza. In seguito alla scoperta dei primi

Qatar is a country of spectacular contrasts: from pearl fishing, its main industry until the 1930s, to gas and oil, which generate immense wealth today; it has famously been at the centre of both triumph and controversy in recent years for hosting the 2022 fifa World Cup. Almost a lifetime since he grew up in Qatar, Michael Quentin Morton writes about the country’s colourful past and its astonishing present. The book is filled with stories about the people of this land: the tribes and the travellers, the seafarers and slaves – as much a part of Qatar’s history as its rulers and their wealth.

The opaque Arabian world guards its secrets well, but Masters of the Pearl penetrates the veil to shed light on a country that until now has defied explanation.

Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood is commonly portrayed as realpolitik, simply part of Gulf power politics. However, the personal history of Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, and his influence on Qatari society, is just one example of how the connection between the country and the social movement has a long history.

Bahrain appears to be the only country in the Arab world whose
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is loyal to the government, and has not been conceived of as a threat to regime stability. This stands in stark contrast to the Saudi and Emirati approach, whose aggressive campaign against the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere stems from fears that the Brotherhood’s grassroots Islamism could pose a substantive threat to monarchical legitimacy back home. What explains Bahrain’s contradictory position, and can Manama maintain it as the Qatar crisis
enters its third month?

A critical analysis on Qatar’s role in the crises on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, with a critical review of the evolution of Doha’s degrees of interference between 1995 and 2017. A focus has been placed on the Libyan crisis and the involvement of two blocks of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Qatar on one side, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on the other).

NB: The paper is co-authored. the first part, written by Odetta Pizzingrilli, focuses on the Jordanian case (pp. 318-324).
The second part is written by Luigi Giorgi and focuses on the Qatari case (324-335).

Les crises qui se sont produites récemment au Moyen-Orient, ont rapproché la Turquie et le Qatar dont les relations étaient déjà au beau fixe. Le président de la République Recep Tayyip Erdogan avait récemment réalisé une visite d’Etat au Qatar. Nous allons cette semaine analyser la visite d’Erdogan au Qatar et les développements dans la région.

La République de Turquie et le Qatar ont décidé de faire avancer leurs bonnes relations dans le domaine militaire. Dans ce contexte, la Turquie établira une base militaire au Qatar. La décision de l’implantation d’une base militaire turque, sous forme de brigade, a été validée et entérinée suite à sa publication dans le Journal officiel.

Nearly four decades have passed since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. In a deeply divided and dysfunctional region, for some it is still an anti-Arab forum that keeps Arab divisions alive, for many others it is a beacon of hope for Arab integration efforts and for wider prosperity.
The contributors to this volume explore the policies and priorities of GCC states, the tensions within and across the organisation, and behavioural traits of its key actors. Several also pay close attention to the GCC’s interactions with the wider region and in particular such countries as Iran and Turkey.

Initially published on 26th April 2008 in American Chronicle, AfroArticles, Buzzle and OpEd News:
https://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_muhammad_080501_open_letter_to_hrh_2c_.htm

Republished subsequently in the official site of the Oromo Liberation Front:
http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/News/2008/Open%20Letter%20to%20HRH.html

Excerpt:
To better understand the situation, one has to examine combined data as regards the various nations and the religious groups of Abyssinia. The ruling Abyssinian tribes are mainly the Amhara and the Tigray, who amount to ca. 30% of the entire population. The rest (70% of the country´s entire population) are either Cushitic (Oromos, Ogadenis, Sidamas, Afars, Kaffas, Kambatas, Hadiya, Agaw, and Shekachos) or Nilo-Saharan (Anuak).

It would however be erroneous to consider the aforementioned figures without further analysis; the oppressed Cushitic and Nilo-Saharan nations follow different religions, either traditional African religions or Islam and Christianity (the latter preached mainly through Western, Catholic and Protestant missionaries). The Abyssinian Amharas and Tigrays are either Monophysitic (heretic Christians) or Muslims. Muslims make ca. 40% of the Abyssinians. Viewed by the Monophysitic Abyssinian elite and people as historical enemies and as renegades, they have been terribly oppressed, perhaps more than the Cushitic nations.

We can thus draw the conclusion that the Monophysitic Abyssinians represent approximately 18% of the country´s total population, and rule invariably discriminating and tyrannizing the Abyssinian Muslims and all the subjugated Cushitic and Nilo-Saharan nations. If we compare this figure to those given for other cases of despotic regimes, notably Milosevic´s Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein´s Iraq, we realize that nothing was more unrepresentative and more totalitarian, more discriminatory and more tyrannical than the colonial state of ´Ethiopia´.

1971’de bağımsızlığını kazanan ve yaklaşık 1.5 milyon nüfusu bulunan Körfez’in küçük
fakat etkili ülkesi Katar’ın iç ve dış politikasını şekillendiren temel dinamik, rejimin yani
Katar Emirliği’nin güvenliğini sağlamak olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, Hamad Bin Halife El-Tani
gibi Katar’ın yeni Emiri Şeyh Tamim bin Hamad bin Halife El-Tani de, devlet-merkezli yürütülen
ve ‘çelişkili’ görünmesine rağmen birbirini tamamlayan dış ve iç politika stratejileri
izlemiştir.