Lobbying in the EU

In recent decades, civil society organisations (CSOs) have grown both in number and in their impact on policy-making, at European and also non-Member state level. Public institutions, motivated by the need to increase their legitimacy, have increasingly delegated functions to CSOs. Concomitantly, CSOs have expanded their access to public funding. In part because of increased access to public funding, and in part because of a stronger relationship with public powers, CSOs are under pressure to demonstrate that they use the resources they are given in an efficient, accountable and transparent manner, e.g. by adopting policies on fiscal transparency, and by maintaining financial solvency. The EU's interest in regulating CSOs is relatively recent. At present, the legal framework addressing CSOs' financial accountability includes two 'categories' of norms: those that regulate the award of public contracts and the concession of grants, and those norms that address transparency and openness. The first category includes the rules on public contracts and the rules on (co-)financing of CSO projects; whereas the second category includes the Financial Transparency Initiative (FTJ) and the Joint Transparency Register
(JTR). The FTJ gathers all information on EU funding in a single database. The JTR gathers information produced by the various organisations (including CSOs) that are interested in lobbying the EU, and who register voluntarily. Defining the boundaries of CSO fiscal accountability and effectively tackling cases of fraud or financial mismanagement remains a difficult endeavor. On the one hand, the EU still lacks a single overarching understanding (and, consequently, legal definition) of CSOs. This translates into the absence of clear legal definitions, and more generally into
the opacity of the information available on CSOs through EU databases. Moreover, as CSOs are 'private entities', they are not submitted to the same integrity mechanisms and norms that apply to public institutions, including internal and external oversight. Finally, a significant administrative burden imposed on CSOs may, in the end, counter EU efforts to tackle financial mismanagement by CSOs. In many respects, the issue of CSO financial accountability has come to resemble a dialogue of the deaf: EU institution-proposed reforms have been postponed, or have not produced the outcomes expected, or have been fiercely opposed by CSOs. At the same time, the self-regulatory tools (including policies on selecting donors, self monitoring and codes of conduct and standards) developed by CSOs to enhance their
financial accountability have not obtained official recognition from EU institutions.

In the aftermath of Eurozone crisis many politicians, scholars and EU leaders openly called for enhanced institutional reform and further EU integration in order to solve outstanding problems of the union. In that light the EU created the Europe 2020 Strategy with an aim to deliver smart and sustainable growths. The EU’s Digital Agenda for Europe is a flagship initiative of Europe 2020 strategy and it defines 7 priority areas as obstacles which will be tackled by the action plan in order to create unified digital Europe. One of the 7 priority areas is Digital Single Market (DSM) which aims to update the European Single Market for the digital era.
This thesis aims to examine how does the EU’s Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) advance EU integration.  Connectedly, it examines the effect of DAE on European integration based on the neofunctionalist theoretical framework. Accordingly, major focus of this thesis is devoted to investigation, conceptualization and operationalization, of multiple spill-over effects, namely: functional, institutional and political spill-over as core integrative mechanism behind the EU integration. In order to achieve the purpose of the thesis and examine the integrative mechanism behind the DAE this thesis utilizes theory testing process-tracing as main methodological approach. 
The significance of this thesis resides in highlighting the contemporary enhancement of EU integration within a specific sector in the modern, digital environment. Consequently, it emphasizes the functional EU integration in sectoral and vertical dimensions hence also reinvigorating the neofunctionalist theoretical framework of EU integration. Additionally, this thesis presents the defined goals and priorities of DAE which by implementing planned actions aims to significantly change the socio-economic environment of Europe and greatly impact ordinary citizen lives.

Th is book explores the activism promoted by organised networks of civil society actors in opening up possibilities for more democratic supranational governance. It examines the positive and negative impact that such networks of civil society actors – named “interlocutory coalitions” – may have on the convergence of principles of administrative governance across the European legal system and other supranational legal systems.
Th e book takes two main controversial aspects into account: the first relates to the convergence between administrative rules pertaining to different supranational regulatory systems. Traditionally, the spread of methods of administrative governance
has been depicted primarily against the background of the interactions between the domestic and the supranational arena, both from a top-down and bottom-up perspective. However, the exploration of interactions occurring at the supranational
level between legal regimes is still not grounded on adequate empirical evidence.
The second controversial aspect considered in this book consists of the role of civil society actors operating at the supranational level. In its discussion of the first aspect, the book focuses on the relations between the European administrative law and the
administrative principles of law pertaining to other supranational regulatory regimes and regulators, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Asian Development Bank, and the Council of
Europe. The examination of the second aspect involves the exploration of the still little examined, but crucial, role of civil society organised networks in shaping global administrative law. These “interlocutory coalitions” include NGOs, think tanks,
foundations, universities, and occasionally activists with no formal connections to civil society organisations. Th e book describes such interlocutory coalitions as drivers of harmonized principles of participatory democracy at the European and global levels.
However, interlocutory coalitions show a number of tensions (e.g. the governability of coalitions, the competition among them) that may hamper the impact they have on the reconfi guration of individuals’ rights, entitlements and responsibilities in the global arena.

Germany likely employs Europe’s largest national lobby labor force. This article presents a comprehensive study of German lobbyists’ workplaces and employer expectations of competencies. It provides insights into emerging requirements for a qualified workforce in a diversified job market.
Drawing on multiple sources of statistics, surveys and cases, a first section examines staffing and entry routes for the main employer types – associations, corporations and consultancies. The job market offers a broad range of career options. This includes an emerging set of junior training programs. German employers have devised fully-paid apprenticeship models as structured practical learning schemes where rotating workplace assignments alternate with seminar learning. Some employers partner in training alliances. Traineeships are tailor-made and unregulated, but their existence points to a growing employer interest in formally developing a talent base and professionalism.
A second section offers a job market snapshot based on 189 advertisements from 2012 to 2014. Job ads can be assumed to be an objective measure of employers’ articulated intentions and expectations for a quality pool of applicants. The survey tabulates preferences for experience, academic degrees, knowledge areas, personal, social and method competencies, and specific political expert skills. Results demonstrate a complex interplay of qualifications and requirements. Ads also show great variety and ambiguity, suggesting that lobbying lacks standardized job classifications and a stable common vocabulary.
Findings show that organizational settings influence task and competency combinations expressed in job ads. While all employers appear to follow similar recruiting patterns in regard to some qualifications, they also differ. For example, associations and businesses place more emphasis on policy concepts, organizational participation, coordination, administration, and direct representation than do consultancies, while the latter stress advisory roles and strategizing. Corporations get less involved in campaign advocacy. Associations focus on members. Consulting firms tend to recruit younger, less experienced staff, and to less often request domain knowledge. Highlighting commonalities and differences, this paper may help stimulate discussion on explicating employers’ competency-based human capital management and recruiting practices.
The results may help develop guidelines for apprenticeship schemes, continuing education, organized efforts of professional bodies and university curricula.

Reprinted in: S. Hummelbrunner/L. Kirchmair/B. Pirker/A.-C. Prickartz/I. Staudinger (eds), Shaping the Future of Europe, Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag 2022, 15-51

Citizens’ perception that lawmaking is dominated by special interests undermines their trust in democratic institutions and lawmaking processes. This also applies to the EU, where lobby regulation remains weak despite past lobbying scandals. While the European Commission and the European Parliament established a Joint Transparency Register in 2011, registration remains voluntary for lobbyists. Only in 2019 did the Parliament make a further step towards transparency by encouraging or even requiring political representatives to disclose their meetings with lobbyists. Given that domestic lobbies have increasingly been oriented towards the European supranational realm, adopting effective lobby regulation at EU level has become more essential than ever to protect the democratic legitimacy of EU lawmaking. This especially applies to the European Parliament, which has important decision-making powers in the context of the ordinary legislative procedure, and which represents the citizens of the EU, thereby constituting a key lobbying target. My goal, in this paper, is to show why and how lobbying should be further regulated in the European Parliament. I first examine the specificities of lobbying in the EU and in its Parliament, before looking at the EU’s constitutional framework, as well as EU parliamentary law and the Joint Transparency Register. I then evaluate the Parliament’s current regulation of lobbying from the perspective of EU primary law. I argue that its narrow focus on transparency is misguided and neglects other fundamental democratic values, such as equality. Moreover, the existing framework does not sufficiently focus on MEPs’ duties of integrity.

Rooted in the ideals of the global Islamist movements of the twentieth century, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a supporter of liberal democracy or western values. Its ultimate goal is the acquisition of power to build an Islamic State based on sharia. European policy makers need to become much better informed as to some of those they are engaging with.

Wie sieht die Zukunft der politischen Kommunikation in Deutschland aus? Wird es den gläsernen Abgeordneten geben, gewinnt die Europäische Union mehr Macht, können sich die traditionellen Leitmedien behaupten? Welche Chancen haben neue Parteien? Wird der Schlüssel zu politischen Karrieren das Internet? Wer schreibt und beeinflusst unsere Gesetze im Jahr 2030? Die Delphi-Studie geht diesen und weiteren Fragen mit einem innovativen Forschungsdesign nach. Über 100 Politiker unter 45 Jahren aus Parlamenten, Ministerien und Parteizentralen haben Schlüsselthesen zur Zukunft der politischen Kommunikation und Gesetzgebung bewertet. Die Ergebnisse der Befragung haben die Politiker erneut als Experten bewertet und kommentiert. Dieser Band stellt die Ergebnisse systematisch dar und diskutiert die Szenarien einer Politikergeneration, die in den nächsten Jahrzehnten die politische Verantwortung übernimmt.

During the last 10 years children's rights in the EU are being manipulated by adoption proponents and others with vested (financial) interests in the business with children. These actors succeeded in getting their grievances onto the agenda of the EU institutions. This led to a biased interpretation of key international instruments on (intercountry) adoption and child rights. The results are devastating for families.

Reveals the diplomatic history behind a controversial international definition of antisemitism, adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016. Shows that this definition has been consequentially misrepresented by pro-Israel advocacy groups as well as senior IHRA officials.

Media coverage:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/23/ihra-misrepresents-own-definition-of-anti-semitism-says-report

Errata:
https://jamiesternweiner.wordpress.com/2021/10/04/ihra-the-politics-of-a-definition-errata/

В статье проанализировано лоббирование корпорациями и некоммерческими организациями общественных и частных интересов в Европейском Союзе. НКО (некоммерческие организации) в сфере частных интересов чаще всего лоббируют потребительские интересы, интересы защиты окружающей среды и многообразных сообществ (например женщин). Корпорации чаще всего лоббируют частные интересы: отраслевые, профессиональные, а также интересы частных компаний. Часто они конкурируют при продвижении своих интересов, что приводит к лоббистским баталиям, например к борьбе вокруг введения новой европейской химической политики (реформа REACH). Европейский Союз финансирует НКО, что делает их независимыми. Независимость приобретается в рамках создания системы сдержек и противовесов при обсуждении и принятии решений. Депутаты Европейского Парламента, а также представители Европейской комиссии, предпочитают иметь дело с НКО, тогда как члены Совета ЕС – с корпорациями. Еще в 2005 г. эффективность НКО и корпораций оценивалась как равноценная, но к 2009 г. ситуация изменилось: корпорации обогнали НКО в эффективности лоббирования по многим направлениям, за исключением сфер потребительских товаров, продуктов питания и напитков, где позиции НКО традиционно сильны. В ряде отраслей, таких как энергетика, медицина и фармацевтика НКО более не способны составлять конкуренцию корпорациям.

The article examines corporations and non-governmental organizations’ lobbying for public and private interests in the European Union. NGOs often lobby for public interests – consumer interests, environmental protection sphere interests, community interests (e.g. women's interests). Corporations prefer to lobby for private interests – industry interests, professional interests, private company interests. It often happens that they compete in lobbying for their interests, which leads to lobbying battles such as confrontation over reform of chemical industry (REACH reform). The European Union funds NGOs, and it helps them to be independent. As a part of ‘checks and balances’ system in the European decision-making process, it creates a competitive environment for lobbying. As a result, deputies of the European Parliament and representatives of the European Commission prefer to deal with NGOs; on the other hand, members of the Council of the European Union prefer to deal with corporations. In 2005, lobbying effectiveness of NGOs and corporations was assessed as equivalent. By 2009, the situation has changed: corporations raised the effectiveness of lobbying, and now they are ahead of NGOs in many areas, with the exclusion of consumer products, food and beverages. Thus, NGOs are no longer able to compete with corporations in several industries such as energy, medicine and pharmaceutical industry.

The article outlines the international standards for the regulation of lobbying. These standards were introduced at four international organizations and supranational associations: 1) the European Union; 2) the Council of Europe; 3) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 4) the Commonwealth of Independent States. The article states that the key reason for the introduction of standards for the regulation of lobbying at the international level was consider­able corruption in the adoption of legal acts. It is concluded that latent and unregu­lated lobbying can seriously undermine public confidence in the institution of government, especially in the countries of the so ­called "new democracy ". International regulation of lobbying takes the form of resolutions, procedural rules, guidelines, recommendations and model legislation. Notably, the first steps towards international regulation of lobbying were taken by the institutions of the European Union. Today EU standards for the regulation of lobbying is based on a series of articles set out in the EU-founding treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. EU standards for the regulation of lobbying influence not only the EU Member States, but it also extends to EU Partner Countries. Significant steps in the implementation of international standards for the regulation of lobbying are being constantly carried out by the Council of Europe. The establishment of CE standards for the regulation of lobbying is reflected in the activity of statutory bodies of the Council of Europe and its semi-autonomous bodies. In recent years a lot of work on the strengthening of international standards for lobbying regulation has been done by the Organisation for Economic Co­operation and Development. To help address the concerns with transparency and integrity in lobbying, the OECD Member Countries adopted in 2010 a Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying/

Nesterovych V.F. Constitutional and Legal Bases of the Institute of Lobbying: Foreign Experience and Perspectives for Ukraine: Monograph
Нестерович В.Ф. Конституционно-правовые основы института лоббирования: зарубежный опыт и перспективы для Украины: монография

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa: lobbying, corruzione, interesse pubblico.-2. Le dinamiche della partecipazione degli interessi.-3. La regolazione del lobbying nello scenario comparato.-3.1. Il modello statunitense e la sua evoluzione e circolazione.-3.2. Il modello europeo: il lobbying e l'inclusione degli interessi.-3.3. La regolazione indiretta e «avvolgente».-4. Le nuove regole del lobbying nelle politiche anticorruzione in Europa.-5. Il caso Italiano: un sistema in trasformazione.-5.1. Nuovi approcci nella disciplina anticorruzione italiana.-5.2. La regolazione diretta del lobbying nel sistema della prevenzione della corruzione.-6. Considerazioni conclusive.

This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations.

Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine.

The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides.

While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

Il secondo quaderno della Research Unit on Law & Economics (RULES) dell’Università Bocconi è dedicato al lobbying. Perché approfondire il tema della pressione degli interessi privati sulle istituzioni? È attuale? Che tipologia di problemi di natura giuridica, economica e sociale genera? È a queste domande che il quaderno tenta di rispondere. Per comprendere e fare ordine ci sono cinque aspetti che, più di altri, meritano un approfondimento. A ciascuno di questi il quaderno dedica un capitolo. Lo fa unendo due metodi: empirico, per quanto riguarda la raccolta e l’esposizione dei dati; logico-deduttivo, per isolare i problemi e ipotizzare, quando possibile, soluzioni operative.

Il presente volume è stato preliminarmente sottoposto ad una revisione da parte di una Commissione di Lettura interna nominata dal Consiglio del Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza. Detta Commissione ha formulato un giudizio positivo sull'opportunità di pubblicare l'opera. © 2017 Ledizioni LediPublishing Via Alamanni, 11 -20141 Milano -Italy www.ledizioni.it [email protected] Riccardo de Caria, "Le mani sulla legge": il lobbying tra free speech e democrazia Prima edizione: aprile 2017 ISBN 9788867056118 Progetto grafico: ufficio grafico Ledizioni Informazioni sul catalogo e sulle ristampe dell'editore: www.ledizioni.it Le riproduzioni a uso differente da quello personale potranno avvenire, per un numero di pagine non superiore al 15% del presente volume, solo a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da Ledizioni. Bibliografia 335 Ringraziamenti 355 «Ai Signori Membri della Camera dei Deputati Signori, [...] Noi subiamo l'intollerabile concorrenza di un rivale straniero che, a quanto pare, si trova in condizioni talmente superiori alle nostre, per la produzione della luce, da inondare il nostro mercato nazionale a un prezzo favolosamente ridotto; giacché, nel momento stesso in cui si fa vedere, le nostre vendite cessano, tutti i consumatori si rivolgono a lui, e una parte dell'industria francese, che ha innumerevoli ramificazioni, è tutt'a un tratto colpita dalla stagnazione più completa. Questo rivale, che altri non è che il sole, ci fa una guerra così feroce, che sospettiamo che sia aizzato contro di noi dalla perfida Albione (davvero una buona diplomazia al giorno d'oggi!), tanto più che per questa isola orgogliosa esso ha un rispetto che non ha verso di noi. Noi vi chiediamo di voler approvare una legge che ordini la chiusura di tutte le finestre, abbaini, paralumi, paraventi, imposte, tende, lucernari, occhi di bue, tapparelle, in una parola di tutte le aperture, i buchi, le feritoie e le fessure attraverso i quali la luce del sole è solita penetrare nelle case, a danno delle belle industrie di cui noi ci vantiamo di aver dotato il Paese, che non potrebbe oggi, senza essere ingrato, abbandonarci ad una lotta così impari [...]». Frédéric Bastiat, Sofismi economici, I, Petizione dei fabbricanti di candele, ceri, lampade, candelieri, lampioni, smoccolatoi, spegnitoi, e dei produttori di sego, olio, resina, alcol, e in generale tutto ciò che concerne l'illuminazione (1845)

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.

We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy‐makers in systems without lobbying legislation.

Lo Stato, in misura e con velocità diversa da luogo a luogo, è oggetto di detronizzazione.
La sua sovranità politica si trova a fare i conti con un’altra sovranità che si va affermando, a prima vista irresistibilmente, perché su scala mondiale: è la sovranità dell’economia “finanziarizzata”.
Essa ha i suoi sudditi-cittadini, le sue istituzioni e la sua forza: una forza non politica, ma non per questo meno efficace nel condizionare la vita dei popoli.

This book aims to uncover and assess changes in the EU's foreign policy towards Ukraine in the times of wide-scale social protests in Kyiv. To accomplish this task, this book enlists and analyses documents, agreements, and treaties which establish the frameworks for EU-Ukraine cooperation. It also identifies the interests of lobbying groups in Brussels. Finally, it describes the impact of the regional balance of powers on EU-Ukraine relations.
This book attempts to specify the nature and structures of drivers behind the EU policy towards Ukraine, as well as uncover the place of human rights in these structures. Based on cases from the Orange Revolution, Tax Maidan, and Euromaidan, the book tests a hypothesis that the wide-scale violations of the right for assembly are enough to downplay the preeminence of the EU's economic objectives. If such violations happen, decision-makers in Brussels switch into the "crisis" management mode on the expense of exploring business opportunities.

Dieser Beitrag vermittelt Grundwissen, um für einen Verband Lobbying-Konzepte zu erstellen. Er regt zunächst dazu an, über Lobbyarbeit als Politikberatung und das dafür nötige Selbstverständnis nachzudenken. Er stellt Lobbychancen im institutionellen Kontext vor, gibt einen Überblick der Kommunikationsinstrumente und schließt mit einem Blick auf die rechtliche Regulierung. Nicht erörtert werden hier Lobby-begleitende Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Kampagnen und weitere Verbandskommunikation (dazu weitere Kapitel im selben Buch) oder Schnittstellen zu Mitgliedermanagement, Themen- und Rechtsstrategien, Kooperationen und Auftragsvergaben an Dienstleister. –
Lobbying, hier als projektbezogene Einflussnahme auf konkrete Ziele bei einer staatlichen Entscheidung vorgestellt, ist für viele Verbände Routine – und andere Neuland. Längst nicht alle Verbände verstehen sich als Profitruppe politischer Interessenorganisation, an der niemand vorbeiregieren soll und die täglich im politischen Zentrum stehen. Ihnen stehen Verbände gegenüber, die „an der Peripherie politischer Tauschprozesse angesiedelt“ sind. Aber alle Verbände haben die Chance auf Teilhabe an der Verbändedemokratie, wenn sie den kleinen Lobby-Werkzeugkasten öffnen wollen. Die Voraussetzung für politische Wirksamkeit ist für alle gleich: innerverbandliche Willensbildung. Die Mitglieder müssen ein vitales Interesse daran haben, einen politischen Willen zu bilden und ihm allgemeinverbindlich Geltung zu verschaffen. Regierende hören Verbänden nicht nur zu, weil sie Fachwissen bündeln und filtern. Das ist wichtig – aber ersetzbar. Das Einbinden von Verbänden ist für sie vorteilhaft, weil Verbände politische Kräfte, Interessen und Meinungen ihrer Mitglieder bündeln und filtern.
Diese Einflusschancen muss ein Verband aktiv bewirtschaften. Dazu gehört, robusten Wettbewerb und Risiken zu ertragen. Denn selbst ausgezeichnetes Lobbying garantiert keinen Durchsetzungserfolg. Ist ein Verband politisch ambitioniert und dauerhaft engagiert, muss er Wissen, Kontaktnetze, Fähigkeiten und Führungsqualität Schritt für Schritt aufbauen. Der ideale Lobbyist ist ein „Politikversteher“, der die Eigenarten des politischen Betriebs lesen kann und serviceorientierte Politikberatung auf den Marktplatz bringt. Nicht jeder im Hauptamt und Ehrenamt ist fähig, fachliche Expertise mit politischer Intelligenz und Dialogfähigkeit zu koppeln. Auch die Selbststeuerung der Facharbeitskreise, in denen sich Mitglieder engagieren, ist mit taktischen Ansprüchen der Lobbyarbeit meist überfordert. Planen und lenken muss das Verbandsmanagement. Trotzdem ist Lobbying kein Einzelsport, sondern Teamaufgabe. Auch strikte Zentralisierung in der Geschäftsstelle ist nicht ratsam. Vielmehr gilt es, Lobbyaufgaben klug im Haupt- und Ehrenamt zu verteilen, gezielt Mitglieder in Hauptstadt- oder Wahlkreis-Projekte einzubeziehen und die kollektive Leistung als Lobby intern laufend zu vermitteln. Schließlich zahlen Mitglieder dafür Beiträge. Hier liegt auch eine Aufgabe für das Verbandsmarketing, Wahrnehmungsdefizite zu schließen und politisch wirksame Lobbykraft zum Teil der Verbandsmarke zu machen.

Noise pollution has negative health impact on people. Studies showed that the measurement method present in different past Directives (70/157/EEC, 97/24/EC, 2001/43/EC, 2002/49/EC) does not reflect real world driving behaviour anymore; for this reason, lobbies decided to collaborate with the European Union institutions in defining technical requirements for the type-approval of motor vehicles and their silencing system, but also to harmonise permissible sound levels that differ from Member State to another.
Furthermore, providing high level of environmental protection and public safety, a better quality of life and health, and taking account of road vehicles as a significant source of noise in the transport sector, has become one of the main objectives.
This master thesis wants to highlight the importance of the lobbies in finding a common solution in order to boost the production’s volume in line with challenging remarks arising from global experiences. Through a careful research and analysis of the internal sound level of motor vehicles and of replacement silencing systems of the proposal dynamics between actors, I would like to demonstrate that the final Regulation 540/2014 on the sound of motor vehicles was a win-win solution for the interest representatives, as well as for the civil society.
I will try to bring to light the fact that lobbies’ interest convergence concerning the interinstitutional negotiation was the key factor in supporting the success of the Commission's proposal, a stance that, in my regard, has redefined the role of lobbies in the ordinary legislative procedure.

En décembre 2020, les Suisses votaient sur l’initiative populaire « pour des
multinationales responsables ». Cet épisode récent a rappelé que la régulation de l’activité des sociétés multinationales fait l’objet de luttes politiques, auxquelles participent les dirigeants d’entreprises et les associations patronales qui les représentent. Il était pertinent d’offrir un éclairage historique sur ces dynamiques en analysant la manière dont plusieurs grandes multinationales suisses et leur association d’intérêt, « Industrie-Holding », se sont engagées dans des activités politiques depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L’ouvrage met en lumière les processus par lesquels les représentants de ces entreprises ont contribué à l’élaboration d’institutions et de règlements qui favorisent leurs affaires : accords de double imposition, garantie contre les risques à l’investissement, accords de protection des investissements, etc. Il étudie également la perception qu’ont eue d’autres groupes d’intérêt, notamment les syndicats et d’autres fractions du patronat, du phénomène d’internationalisation selon différents contextes économiques. Enfin, Sabine Pitteloud dévoile les stratégies des multinationales suisses lorsque le processus d’internationalisation est remis en cause dans les
années 1970 et discute la résilience du capitalisme helvétique.

Many  special  interests  are  engaged  in  lobbying  the  European  Union,  raising questions  over  levels  of  transparency  among  leading  EU  figures  and  within  EU
institutions and whether the EU has done enough to ensure greater transparency in  the  lobbying  process.  This  report  examines  the  action  taken  by  the  EU  to address  this  issue  and  assesses  some  of  the  options  to  make  the  EU  more
transparent.  The  contribution  of  this  report  is  twofold  by  first  looking  closely  at Scandinavia,  a  highly  regarded  region  in  terms  of  transparency,  for  ideas  to improve  the  EU‘s  reputation.  Secondly,  the  report  scrutinises  some  of  the recommendations that have been advocated by reformers to achieve this aim.

The purpose of this analysis is to present and test an information processing theory of interest group influence in the EU. While it has long been acknowledged that information is the currency of lobbying in the EU, a systematic examination of how interest groups gather, generate, synthesise, and transmit information to decision-makers is still missing. I posit that interest group influence is a function of a group's ability to efficiently process information. Conceptualising influence in this way not only brings the study of influence in-line with key insights from the larger interest group literature, but it also helps avoid some serious methodological issues related to measuring influence. Using data from a large-scale online survey and elite interviews I compare how information processing varies across six different types of interest groups. The results suggest that most types of interest groups in the EU have similar information processing capabilities and thus, that influence in the EU appears to be, on balance, fair and impartial.

Šis darbas unikalus tuo, kad kol kas nei Lietuvos, nei užsienio mokslinėje literatūroje nebuvo pateikta konceptualios lobistinės veiklos teisinio reguliavimo analizės.  Šio darbo tema neabejotinai yra įdomi ir aktuali., kadangi lobizmo teisinis reguliavimas Lietuvoje yra tirtas fragmentiškai, o Lobistinės veiklos įstatymas ir jo pakeitimai – nėra analizuojamas akademinėse publikacijose Šis darbas - pirmas Lietuvoje tokio masto tyrimas, kuriame bandoma kompleksiškai ir išsamiai išnagrinėti lobizmo tesinio reguliavimo ypatumus Lietuvoje ir ES, atliekant sisteminį Lietuvos lobistinių procesų, juos reglamentuojančių teisės aktų  ir jų įgyvendinimo tyrimas. Atlikta analizė gali tapti nuoroda individualioms lobizmo reglamentavimo studijoms, kadangi aptaria esminius lobizmo veiklos reikalavimus, atsakomybes ir priežiūros organus. Darbe suformuluotos išvados ir išsamios rekomendacijos Lietuvos lobizmo reglamentavimui tobulinti.

Immer mehr gewinnt die Europäische Union mit ihren inzwischen 27 Mitgliedstaaten unter einem Dach an Bedeutung. Innerhalb der Grenzen der Europäischen Union leben rund 500 Millionen Menschen. Die jährliche Wirtschaftsleistung erbringt mehr als 11 Billionen Euro. Mit der Einführung des europäischen Binnenmarktes ist im Jahr 1993 mit seinem freien Personen-, Waren-, Dienstleistungen- und Kapitalverkehr einer der dynamischsten Wirtschaftsräume der Welt entstanden.
Zahllose Unternehmen, Wirtschaftsverbände, Staaten und Politikberater bzw. Lobbyisten verfolgen auf europäischer Ebene die politischen Entscheidungen und nehmen aktiv an der Gestaltung der politischen Rahmenbedingungen in Straßburg und Brüssel teil, um im Dialog mit Politik und Verwaltung zur Aktualisierung und Modernisierung des rechtlichen Rahmens beitragen zu können. Es soll noch hinzugefügt werden, dass diese Organisationen und Staaten von politischen Interessen über fundiertes Fachwissen von politischen Entscheidungen gerne sich beeinflussen ließen.
Diskussionen in den Europäischen Ländern besonders in den Medien wie Zeitungen, Fernsehen etc. gibt es genügend. Obwohl europäische Politikerinnen nach der Wahl dem Türkei- EU-Beitritt zustimmen möchten, schaut die Gesellschaft skeptisch zu und verhindert dies. Die Gesellschaft der Union sollte die Türkische Gesellschaft und Kultur besser kennenlernen, da es viel zu viele Vorurteile gibt, die die Gesellschaft hindern, den Türkei-Beitritt zu genehmigen. Dazu ist es nötig, dass hier Lobbying betrieben wird, um die Gesellschaft über die Türkei zu informieren. Trotzdem läuft es bergab, wobei bergab zu laufen angenehmer ist und positiv gemeint ist. Seit Oktober führt die EU offizielle Verhandlungen mit der Türkei über einen Beitritt.
Ziel der Arbeit ist eine Analyse der Interessen, die Türkei in der Europäischen Union haben zu wollen.

Tureckie organizacje biznesu jako agenci procesów europeizacyjnych. Casus TÜSİAD siątych XX wieku. Znaczenie TÜSİAD w obszarze współkreowania polityki zagranicznej Turcji bywa porównywane z wpływami Rady Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, organu konstytucyjnego i na stałe wpisanego w turecki system polityczny i fi lozofi ę funkcjonowania tureckiego państwa 3 . Utworzenie tej organizacji było wynikiem inicjatywy dwunastu właścicieli największych tureckich holdingów. Stowarzyszenie powstało po ingerencji tureckich wojskowych w życie polityczne kraju w 1971 roku, gdy wielki biznes poszukiwał sposobów skuteczniejszego wpływania na tureckich decydentów. Utworzenie TÜSİAD było punktem zwrotnym w relacjach państwo-biznes, organizacja ta była bowiem pierwszym stowarzyszeniem biznesowym skupiającym członków na zasadzie dobrowolności.

Der Schlussbeitrag untersucht die Schwierigkeiten, die unterschiedliche Interessenorganisationen mit der Einführung der Digital Public Affairs haben, wieso es zu Widerständen und Abwehrreaktionen kommt und welche Potenziale derzeit noch nicht genutzt werden. Dazu dient auch der Blick in die USA. Die internen Funktionen interaktiver, IT-gestützter PA-Arbeit werden zunächst herausgestellt. Bei der externen Kommunikation werden Ansätze und Möglichkeiten für Informationsleistungen, Adhoc-Kampagnen und dauerhafte Organisationsformen für Grassroots Lobbying betrachtet. Zuletzt werden das Mantra der Transparenz kritisch beleuchtet und Forderungen für eine Weiterentwicklung des Transparenzbegriffs aufgestellt.

The European Commission relies on external advice to fulfil its legislative and policy-making tasks, convening so-called expert groups which bring together government representatives and industry, plus some academics and representatives from trade unions and NGOs. The high level of industry involvement shows how the Commission is prioritising corporate interests, giving corporations a formal role in EU decision making to an extent reserved for no other sector.

Abstract
Why are some interest groups successfully using social networks for their lobbying campaign whereas others don’t? This article suggests that some actors are aware that social networks can be used in a positive direction to lobby their target. It also shows that some others are not aware of the dimension of those networks. In order to test the effect of social networks, this article draws on an unprecedented dataset of interest groups in the European union. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis of more than 44,000 tweets through dedicated software, this article studies the success and the failure of several interest groups. The findings indicate that Intermarché, a French supermarket chain, failed to communicate with the general public, leaving scope to the NGO Bloom helped by a successful comic posted on the web. By doing so, Intermarché has won on the field of lobbying to decision makers in Brussels, but lost on the public opinion field. This is a clear case of an absence of social media strategy in a lobbying campaign.

Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto es una revista universitaria especializada en el estudio de la Unión Europea desde un enfoque interdisciplinar. Su objetivo fundamental es difundir conocimientos sobre el proceso de construcción europea en sus diferentes dimensiones (histórica, política, jurídica, económica, social, cultural...), así como suscitar la reflexión y la valoración crítica de los diferentes factores que van determinando su evolución y transformación.

Question: How does the change of equilibrium between the allocation of Risk, Hardship and the Impossibility doctrines affect the parties to an international sale of goods contract, under the provisions of the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles, the ICC and the English and French Laws? Abstract Most international sale of goods contracting parties elect national and or international instruments, to regulate their commercial or business transactions. During the lifetime of such transactions, unforeseen change of circumstances could occur and disrupt the equilibrium of their contract. Unpleasant situations of this sort have most often affected the contracting parties, by plunging them into a dispute. Conflicts of this type usually lead to either the modification, renegotiation, suspension or termination of the contract, depending on the rules of the competent national legal system (forum). It could also provoke a difficult financial situation that could cause insolvency or bankruptcy. This article will comparatively analyse and investigate such instruments like the CISG of 1980, (Contract of the International Sale of Goods), and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts of 1994 (UPICC) will follow. The discussion will continue by analysing and investigating the ICC 2010 Incoterms risk provision, the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979, and the recently reformed French Code Civil of the year 2016. It will be comparatively important to analyse and investigate these provisions, relatively to the doctrines in focus. This will include the Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus doctrines. A conclusion will be made on what should be done in order to address the conflict of laws issues related to the change of equilibrium that affects contracting parties, under the doctrines and provisions in focus. A guideline reform proposal will be presented, with the advice for national Governments to appoint an ad hoc Committee that will draft the reform proposal. Such will be put at the legal and political disposals of national Governments, to debate, adopt, ratify and apply.

La plupart de bourses sont passées aujourd’hui au trading électronique et ont supprimé complètement ou presque la négociation à la criée et au langage des signes. Depuis au moins une décennie, les bourses se cotent elles-mêmes en espérant lever les fonds permettant d’investir dans les innovations technologiques en mesure d’accélérer encore la vitesse des transactions.

La législation européenne (MiFID), mise en oeuvre en 2007, a supprimé le monopole des marchés nationaux là où il existait (surtout en France et au sud de l’Europe) et s’est attaquée aux monopoles de fait. Cette création d’un marché européen des produits et services financiers a également accéléré l’utilisation de systèmes algorithmiques de haute fréquence. Aujourd’hui, quelques années après le déclenchement de la crise, l’Union européenne revient sur la législation encadrant ce système, mais elle n’a aucune volonté de remettre en question ses fondements conceptuels qui sont pourtant à l’origine de la crise actuelle.

Regulatory initiatives are frequently shaped by the ability of the financial industry to build alliances across the wider business community. Yet comparative and international political economy scholarship remains divided over how to explain the resulting networks of financial lobbying. Using quantitative text analysis of more than 8000 responses to EU financial regulatory consultations between 2010 and 2018, we map patterns of lobbying coordination based on co-signing and text re-use in consultation responses for the first time. This unique dataset is used to analyse hitherto hidden patterns of domestic and cross-border coordination by financial organizations within and between European countries. We find that while distinctive national lobbying networks persist at the country level, the internationalization of financial actors is statistically associated with the formation of coordination ties with foreign financial actors. This suggests that European financial integration has facilitated the emergence of new cross-border alliances which complement-rather than substitute for-existing domestic financial interest coalitions. We argue that the text-as-data approach employed here makes an important new contribution to scholarship on business power and the political economy of Europe. Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments.

This paper offers a comparative analyses between lobbying regulation in the EU and in the US. It looks at the tools used by political scientists to measure the strength of lobbying regulation and how effective these tools are. It compares the evolution of lobbying regulation in the US and the EU, in order to establish an understanding of the political climate that underpins politician’s, lobbyist’s and citizen’s views of this issue.

"S-a decis de la Bruxelles" sau "Vine de la Bruxelles" spun des politicienii şi autorităţile româneşti pentru a explica decizii dificil de înţeles şi de aplicat, sau politici care bulversează sectoare întregi. Pe bună dreptate, pentru că legislaţia aplicabilă în România poate fi până la 70% elaborată de instituţiile europene. Însă instituţiile româneşti şi actorii din mediul privat sau non-profit sunt sau pot fi implicaţi în elaborarea deciziilor şi legislaţiei europene. Sunt oare folosite toate pârghiile instituţionale şi private în aşa fel încât România să se bucure de o imagine pozitivă şi să îşi promoveze eficient interesele la Bruxelles? “Vine de la Bruxelles”, “suntem subreprezentați la Bruxelles”, “avem o imagine proastă la Bruxelles”, “vocea românilor nu contează în Uniunea Europeană”, “nu ne cunoaștem interesele în UE”, “nu există o poziție de țară bine definită” sunt miturile la care incearca sa raspunda acest studiu.