Lobbying and Public Affairs in Europe: Some Comparative Remarks

3. Lobbying and Public Affairs in Europe: some comparative remarks Alberto Bitonti, Phil Harris and Claudia Mariotti The public affairs and lobbying industry represents an extremely relevant and fascinating field of observation to political analysts and to everyone engaged in the comprehension of complex political and economic environments such as the European one. To analyse how the influence of power works and what role interest groups and the various actors of a political system play in public decisionmaking processes is extremely useful to understand those processes and how the system operates. That is why, in collecting the data and all the points of view provided in the various chapters of this volume, we hope to have laid down the basis for a new and more complete perspective on what European democracy is today. The intellectual datum here is that understanding interest group systems remains crucial to understanding the functioning of advanced democracies, especially in an era when these democracies are becoming increasingly embedded in supranational policy networks. (Beyers, Eising and Maloney 2008, 1104) The main aim of this volume is to fertilize the ground for further research and for the development of new and stronger theories, able to explain what are the conditions and the factors affecting the development of public affairs in a country, the regulation of lobbying, the relationship between interest groups and traditional political actors, the weight of institutional frameworks, the influence of the European integration process on national developments, etc. The widest part of scientific literature on lobbying and interest groups seems to focus on the theoretical and historical analysis of interest groups and their role in democratic systems (Bentley 1908; Truman 1951; Latham 1952; Benn 1959-1960; Meynaud 1965; Olson 1965; Pasquino 1988; Morlino 1991; Graziano 1995; Rozell, Wilcox e Madland 2006; Andres 2009; Lowery 2013; Bitonti 2017), on the description of single political systems (for example Klüver 2013, Mihova 2014 or the recent Transparency International reports of 2014 and 2015 on various European countries), on particular lobbying campaigns (for instance, Sarlos and Szondi 2015 or Taghizade 2015) or on the topic of regulation (Brinig, Holcombe and Schwartzstein 1993; Greenwood and Thomas 1998; Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2010; Holman and Luneburg 2012; Lumi 2014; Veksler 2015). However, as highlighted by Thomas and Hrebenar (2009) or Kanol (2015), comparative research on lobbying looks particularly promising and needs to be expanded, as analogies and differences between different countries or areas of Europe (see for example Woll 2012, Fink-Hafner 2011 or Millar and Köppl 2014) may shed additional light on old theories or even bring to attention new categorizations and theories in the strongest cases. As Almond put it sixty years ago: "we turn to the comparative study of interest groups not with the hope that these rather than parties or governmental institutions will yield the principles of discrimination between types of political systems, but rather with the expectation that the systematic examination of interest groups in their complex interrelations with public opinion, political parties and formal governmental institutions will enable us to differentiate more accurately between political systems as wholes. In other words, the growing concern among scholars with interest groups and public opinion is the consequence of a search for a more complete and systematic conception of the political process as a whole, rather than a search for an approach which is an alternative to the present emphasis on formal governmental institutions" (1958, 271). Therefore, our aim in this concluding chapter is to begin to draft some preliminary comparative remarks which have emerged from the collection of cases presented in the volume, in the hope that they pave the way for further analysis and for new and additional readings and interpretations on lobbying and public affairs in Europe. Methodological problems Let us begin from some methodological observations. The first remark concerns the lack of a certain theoretical framing of lobbying and public affairs, according to a well-defined conceptualisation of boundaries. As is evident from the chapters of this book – academic literature does not seem to offer univocal solutions either – we are in front of a meaningful definitional problem, represented by the partial overlap between the domains of lobbying, public affairs, public relations and communication more generally (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Harris and Moss 2001). On the one hand, it is true that – practically speaking – these domains are actually intertwined, both for competences and organizational functions in agencies or companies; on the other hand though, for comparative research purposes, it is of the utmost importance to work out the problem of being able to compare information and data referring to the same object, even in different times and different places, in order not to sink into a sea of incommensurable figures, hardly meaningful when placed together. To make an actual example from our chapters: if for the UK and Italy (as well as for Austria, Spain, Germany, Poland and others) we were easily able to find the professional associations of lobbyists (with their relative number of members, rules or codes of conduct), in other cases (such as Sweden, Slovakia, Greece or Latvia) we only found associations of public relations or communication professionals/agencies. In some other countries (for example in Slovenia, Italy or Lithuania) associations of both types are present, with important overlaps translating in shared memberships or competences. It is worth remembering that, for instance, two of the three organizations at the base of UKPAC (the lobbyists’ organization of UK) refer to the world of public relations, while the third focuses on political consultants. Can we actually compare these different types of associations? And should we distinguish the industry of lobbying from those akin – but different – of public relations, communication, political consulting and in general of public affairs? We think such a distinction is not fully possible; that is why, in this volume, the authors of each chapter – as experts of the field (either scholars or practitioners) – were asked to focus on the lobbying industry, considering the professional associations which best can be said to represent lobbyists, even if in many cases these could only be associations of public relations or communication, maybe with sub-sections dedicated to public affairs and lobbying. However, in each case an explanation is provided concerning the actual situation of the country. Probably, as suggested by McGrath (2005), in order to record a complete recognition of the professional status of lobbyists in a country, the presence of a distinct professional organization and the self-recognition of the industry’s own specificities are among the key elements to consider, but any assessment is necessarily needed on a case by case basis. Directly connected to the previous consideration, there is a second remark concerning the reliability of data and collected information, such as those concerning the number of professionals working in the industry. In this regard, the registers of lobbyists can be one obvious source; but it is quite problematic to compare systems with mandatory registers (such as Slovenia, Lithuania or UK), systems with voluntary registers (such as Germany, Romania or EU institutions) and systems with no registers or regulations at all (such as Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal or Belgium). Furthermore, an additional issue concerns the possible difference between lobbyists “for hire” and in-house lobbyists, where some regulatory frameworks (such as the UK law) totally exclude the latter. In the countries where there is not any register, we may refer to the number of members of professional associations: though, aside from the overlaps and uncertainties mentioned above, it is quite intuitive that if they are voluntary associations (and not professional orders with a mandatory registration to a bar, such as for lawyers in France or Italy), they cannot expect to bring the totality of the professionals inside, so that a (more or less significant) part of the phenomenon would escape the net of the researcher. Furthermore, a substantial problem remains, regarding the self-perception of lobbying professionals as lobbyists. Accepting Thomas and Hrebenar’s definition of what a lobbyist is: “A person designated by an interest group to facilitate influencing public policy in that group's favor by performing one or more of the following for the group: (1) directly contacting public officials; (2) monitoring political and governmental activity; (3) advising on political strategies and tactics; and (4) developing and orchestrating the group's lobbying effort” (2009, 135) we can easily consider a number of professionals as lobbyists (for example those working in NGOs, trade unions, sectional associations etc.), who in many European countries would hardly define themselves as such1. As a consequence, neither the legal criterion involving registers nor the membership of professional associations can be sufficient sources of information, leaving much space to estimates to be done again on a case by case basis (in this regard, better theorization and deeper attempts of operationalization would certainly help). This is the reason why we relied on the assessment and the point of view of our contributors, as recognised experts on the professional environment of their country. Growth, professionalization, regulation Moving to the merit and to the analysis of trends, a growth of the industry seems to be evident in most countries, at least in terms of people employed and turnover. Especially in the bigger European countries (Germany, UK, Italy, France, Spain, etc.), the number of lobbying firms or in-house public affairs departments seems to be on the rise, proving a general expansion of the industry. In around half of the cases, the presence of university courses and Master’s degrees in lobbying or public affairs seems to corroborate the hypothesis of the expansion of the industry and also of a growing professionalization of the job. However, in order to assess the degree of professionalization of lobbying in each country, the number of firms and of specific educational programs are not sufficient. We agree with McGrath when he says that multiple factors are necessary in order to recognize a full professional status to lobbyists, such as an intellectual tradition and an established body of knowledge, membership in strong professional organizations, the adherence to professional norms, codes of conduct, etc. (McGrath 1 It is worth considering how this is probably one of the main cultural differences between most European countries and the American context, where instead the word ‘lobbyist’ is much more accepted and commonly used by lobbyists themselves (Thomas and Hrebenar 2009). In Europe various studies noted “the plethora of terms used by lobbyists to describe their work—parliamentary relations, government relations, public affairs, political PR, parliamentary counselling, political opinion forming, issue management, among others—before noting that the one word which tends not to appear in any agency’s brochure is ‘lobbying’” (McGrath 2005, 127). 2005). In most European countries these factors are still absent or only very recently beginning to emerge. Thus we can observe very different situations in each specific country, even if a general trend towards professionalization is visible, with the creation of lobbyists’ associations, codes of conduct and signs of more professional awareness in many countries, in big as in medium-size EU memberstates, in older as in younger democracies. We think that, in this regard, a key role can be attributed to the common EU framework, considering a decision-making process in Brussels which traditionally enhances the participation of stakeholders and lobbyists, thus providing an easy example to look at from the member-states (Greenwood 2011; Klüver 2013). Another very important set of indicators to look at in each country comes from the presence – and the type – of lobbying regulation. It has been made evident in the literature (Thomas 1998; Chari, Murphy and Hogan 2007; Transparency International 2015; Veksler 2015) and in most cases presented in this volume (see for example the chapters on Lithuania, Italy or Slovakia) that by ‘lobbying regulation’ we cannot strictly refer only to laws on lobbying registers, but we should also consider an additional number of legislative and regulatory measures, concerning revolving doors, conflicts of interests, political financing, anti-corruption, the physical access to governmental buildings, and in general the transparency and the openness of public decision making processes (participatory democracy and what may be broadly defined open government, see Lathrop and Ruma 2010). As mentioned above, we have cases with a stronger regulatory framework (such as Austria, Ireland or Lithuania), cases with a weaker regulation (such as Germany) and countries where lobbying is not considered at all, at least not by any dedicated regulation (such as Luxembourg, Malta or Belgium). Besides the issue of what relationship can be found between growth of the industry and regulation, or of which conditions favour the adoption of regulation (recalled for instance in Lumi 2014), we can highlight an increasing attention all over Europe on the issue of lobbying regulation, probably once again as a consequence of a major influence from Brussels (both as an example of a policy-making arena open to interest groups and as the location of important NGOs promoting transparency, such as Transparency International) or of a strong mobilization of lobbyists associations in various domestic environments (for instance in Romania, Italy or Spain). As noticed in the same chapters concerning countries where lobbying regulation has been adopted (for example UK or Austria), though, major flaws and loopholes persist in all cases, for example in the unjustified recalled distinction between lobbyists “for hire” and in-house, or in the scarce implementation of the provided measures. A sign that the debate on lobbying regulation has still a long way ahead. A ubiquitous negative public perception What seems a constant in all the presented cases (with the meaningful exception of Luxembourg and partially the EU institutions) is the negative public perception of lobbying and lobbyists. When looking at public opinion or media reports, the term ‘lobbying’ is overlapped with corruption in the worst cases or with opacity of decision-making in the best. Overall, this is an interesting indicator, which crosses different historical traditions and legal systems, bringing most European lobbyists to choose other labels to describe their job. Thus we go back to the definitional problem, where a greater collaboration between scholars and professional associations of lobbyists would certainly help (McGrath 2005, 133), but where a strong cultural problem is evidently present (see also chapter 1.2). In fact, it is worth noting how this negative perception is absolutely transversal and ubiquitous, both in common law and civil law countries, both in neo-corporatist and pluralist systems, in the West as well in the East, in the North as well in the South. The only exception among the member-states seems to be Luxembourg, where a diffused pro-business culture may be the compensating factor against a prejudice which usually connotes lobbying as undue political influence of wealthy companies or organizations. As evidenced in chapter 1.2, part of the problem may concern the conception of the Public Interest and the common philosophical tradition at the base of most European legal systems, especially as concerns continental Europe. Very interestingly, much of the problem may also be simply lexical, having to do with the perception of lobbying as something exotic, mainly American, which would be something different from the influence of policy-makers put in place by civil society organizations or professional associations, even if lobbying – just looking at the technical definition provided above – is exactly what everybody does, both in neo-corporatist and in pluralist systems (Schmitter 1974). The crisis of traditional political representation and the challenge of European democracy in the 21st century Certainly, the growth of the lobbying industry can also be explained by a significant crisis of representative democracy and of its traditional actors, especially in older democracies. In the 20th century, political parties, and additionally trade unions and business associations, were the main characters of the political scene and the main reference for anyone wishing to influence a public decision; at least from the last two decades of the century, and ever more in the following years, a paramount evolution took place, involving historical, technological, social, economic and political changes, shaping the world of today and of the next decades. The end of the Cold War, a closer European integration, the spreading of Internet and of digital technologies, a large process of liberalization of many economic sectors and of privatization of previously State-owned companies, the crisis of old parties and of classical representative democracy (proved by decreasing party memberships and electoral turnouts), the rise of NGOs and other private actors in the public arena, the increased importance of political marketing and communication, the personalization of politics and a growing concentration of power in the executives in comparison to legislative assemblies, the development of a more complex, multi-level and multi-dimensional political environment overall are all factors which play a fundamental role in changing the European panorama, creating more favourable conditions for the development of a public affairs industry, particularly where the roots of a lively civil society are more vigorous. In fact, political parties and the traditional labour and employers’ organisations, despite keeping to play a predominant role in many countries (especially those with a neo-corporatist tradition), do not fulfil the need of political representation as completely as before, allowing new subjects (single corporations, SMEs, NGOs, professional associations, etc.) to emerge in the public scene on their own, trying to influence the governmental process even without and outside political parties. Different declinations of this picture can of course be found in the various national contexts and in the cases presented in this volume, for example with some common characteristics shared by the younger democracies of Eastern Europe – where the weight of the old authoritarian culture still plays a role (McGrath 2008; Duvanova 2009; Fink-Hafner 2011) – by the Nordic countries – where the consensual type and the traditional openness and transparency of the decision-making system are still crucial factors (Lijphart 1984 and 1999) – or by the micro-states such as Malta or Cyprus – where the dimension of the State is evidently a determining factor in shaping the type of decision-making process (Kanol 2014). It is important then to take into account the influence of the specific political culture, the development of particular political structures and channels of access to the “black box” of decision-making, in order to assess the conditions of development of a public affairs industry in each country. Nonetheless, some general trends can be highlighted, all having to do with the change of representative democracy and its conditions in the 21st century. The wave of populism and “anti-political” parties rising in many EU countries in the recent years is probably a further symptom of the crisis of representative democracy as we knew it. In this regard, the development of a healthy and vibrant public affairs scene may even aspire to be an answer to this crisis, allowing a wider circle of subjects to earn a voice in the public arena of the future, flanking the old traditional actors and inserting new flows of legitimacy into the system. Of course, in such a scenario, it is of the utmost importance to facilitate the best conditions for the development of a decision-making process fulfilling the requirements of accountability, transparency, openness and fairness, through effective regulations and smart policies favouring the actual functioning of representative democracy in the new scenario. In order to do so, scholarly research and deep understanding of the actual dynamics involving decision-making systems and the role that interest groups play in it are fundamental. In the end, without an integrated vision of the interest group system of EU countries, with their different institutional structures, systems of political representation, political cultures, philosophical and legal traditions, social and economic frameworks, one can risk to focus a comparative overview of the European lobbying industries on the most apparent and easily detectable aspects of the phenomenon, ignoring, though, the most important part of the iceberg, represented by the system of influence and by the real decision-making processes of each country. We hope that the analysis, data and the insights presented in this volume from over forty contributors from across Europe will help pave the way for researchers to strengthen our understanding of the area in future years, allowing a deeper comprehension not only of EU lobbying and public affairs industries, but of European democracy itself. BIBLIOGRAPHY ALMOND, Gabriel A. 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